Opinion

Rochelle Wyatt v. United States Postal Service

Court
Merit Systems Protection Board
Filed
Feb 2, 2023
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ROCHELLE M. WYATT, DOCKET NUMBER

Appellant, AT-0353-16-0492-C-1

v.

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, DATE: February 2, 2023

Agency.

THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

David Champion, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant.

Luis O. Rodriguez, Esquire, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman

Raymond A. Limon, Member

Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the September 25, 2017

compliance initial decision, which found the agency in partial noncompliance

with the Board’s final decision in the underlying appeal. Wyatt v. U.S. Postal

1

A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add

significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,

but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not

required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a

precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board

as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).

2

Service, MSPB Docket No. AT-0353-16-0492-C-1, Compliance Petition for

Review (CPFR) File, Tab 1; Wyatt v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB Docket No.

AT-0353-16-0492-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 10, Compliance Initial

Decision (CID). For the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s com pliance

petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown.

5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

BACKGROUND

¶2 On September 25, 2017, the administrative judge issued a compliance

initial decision finding the agency in noncompliance with the Board’s final

decision in the underlying appeal to the extent it had failed to pay the appellant

any back pay. CID at 1-3. Accordingly, the administrative judge granted the

appellant’s petition for enforcement and ordered the agency to pay her the

ordered back pay. CID at 3. Regarding the disputed issue of entitlement to

overtime pay as part of the back pay award, the administrative judge agreed with

the agency’s position that the appellant was not entitled to it because she did not

have a history of working overtime during the time of year included in the back

pay period. CID at 3 n.2.

¶3 The administrative judge informed the agency that, if it decided to take the

actions required by the compliance initial decision, it must submit to the Clerk of

the Board a narrative statement and evidence of compliance and that, if it decided

not to take the required actions, it must file a petition for review. CID at 4-5;

5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(6)(i)-(ii). The administrative judge also informed the

appellant that she could request Board review of the compliance initial dec ision

by filing a petition for review within 35 days, i.e., no later than October 30, 2017,

or within 30 days after she actually received the decision if she proved that she

received it more than 5 days after issuance. CID at 5. The administrative judge

provided the appellant specific instructions regarding how to file a petition for

review. CID at 5-8.

3

¶4 On October 30, 2017, the agency filed a statement of compliance pursuant

to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(a)(6)(i), and the matter was referred to the Board for a

final decision on the agency’s compliance. 2 Wyatt v. U.S. Postal Service, MSPB

Docket No. AT-0353-16-0492-X-1, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tabs 1-2;

see 5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c). In a November 15, 2017 response, the appellant,

through her representative, challenged the agency’s compliance, arguing that it

had not paid her the appropriate amount of back pay and impro perly denied her

overtime back pay. CRF, Tab 3.

¶5 In a May 22, 2018 Order, the Board informed the appellant that her

response to the agency’s compliance submission appeared to challenge the

administrative judge’s finding that she was not entitled to overt ime pay as part of

her back pay award but that such challenge must be raised with the Board through

a petition for review of the compliance initial decision. 3 CRF, Tab 4.

Accordingly, the Board ordered the appellant to state whether she intended her

November 15, 2017 compliance response to also serve as a petition for review of

the compliance initial decision. Id. at 1-2. The appellant responded in the

affirmative, and the Board docketed her November 15, 2017 submission as a

petition for review of the September 25, 2017 compliance initial decision. CRF,

Tab 5 at 2; CPFR File, Tabs 1-2.

¶6 In a June 14, 2018 letter acknowledging the appellant’s compliance petition

for review, the Board informed her that her petition appeared to be untimely filed

because it was not filed on or before October 30, 2017, the 35 th day following the

issuance of the compliance initial decision, or within 30 days after receipt of the

2

The agency’s compliance with the actions identified in the compliance initial decision

will be addressed in a separate order in MSPB Docket No. AT -0353-16-0492-X-1.

3

Pursuant to the Board’s regulations, an appellant’s challenges to an initial decision

may be raised with the Board through a petition for review of that decision, not through

a response to the noncomplying party’s statement of compliance. See 5 C.F.R.

§§ 1201.114(a)(1), 1201.183(a)(1).

4

decision if it was received more than 5 days after issuance. CPFR File, Tab 2 at

1-2. The letter explained to the appellant that the Board’s regulations require a

petition for review that appears untimely filed to be accompanied by a motion to

accept the filing as timely and/or to waive the time limit for good cause. Id. at 2.

¶7 On June 25, 2018, the appellant filed a motion to waive the deadline for

filing her petition for review on the ground that she did not understand that the

compliance initial decision denied her claim for overtime back pay. 4 CPFR File,

Tab 3

ANALYSIS

¶8 A petition for review generally must be filed within 35 days after the date

of the issuance of the initial decision or, if the appellant shows that the initial

decision was received more than 5 days after the initial decision was issued,

within 30 days after the date the appellant received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R.

§ 1201.114(e). Here, the appellant has not alleged that she received the

compliance initial decision more than 5 days after its issuance. Therefore, her

petition for review of the September 25, 2017 compliance initial decision must

have been filed no later than October 30, 2017, i.e., the 35 th day after issuance of

the compliance initial decision. CID at 5. As the appellant did not file her

petition for review until November 15, 2017, it is untimely filed by 16 days.

CPFR File, Tab 1 at 1.

¶9 The Board will waive the deadline for filing a petition for review upon a

showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). To

establish good cause for the untimely filing of a petition, a party must show that

4

On July 10, 2018, the agency responded to the appellant’s motion to waive the time

limit, 1 day after the agency’s deadline to file such a response. CPFR File, Tab 5; see

5 C.F.R. § 1201.55(b). The agency subsequently filed a motion to waive its own

untimeliness. CPFR File, Tab 7. Because we find herein that the appellant did not

demonstrate good cause to waive the untimeliness of her petition for review, we also

hereby deny as moot the agency’s motion to waive its untimeliness.

5

she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular

circumstances of the case. Rivera v. Social Security Administration,

111 M.S.P.R. 581, ¶ 4 (2009); Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R.

180, 184 (1980). To determine whether an appellant has shown good cause, the

Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of her excuse and

her showing of due diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether she

has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control th at

affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or

misfortune that similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to timely file

her petition. Rivera, 111 M.S.P.R. 581, ¶ 4; Moorman v. Department of the

Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table).

¶10 The appellant argues that good cause exists to excuse her 16 -day filing

delay because she did not understand that the compliance initial decision denied

her claim for overtime back pay as it “did not clearly state the appellant would

not receive overtime.” CPFR File, Tab 3 at 1-2. Ordinarily, the belated

discovery of a basis for filing a petition for review does not establish good cause

for waiving the filing deadline. Carroll v. Office of Personnel Management,

114 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 10 (2010). Nonetheless, the Board has found good cause to

excuse an untimely filed petition for review when the outcome of the appeal itself

was unclear because of ambiguities in the initial decision. Id.

¶11 Here, the compliance initial decision did not leave the outcome of the

appeal itself unclear but rather included a sufficiently clear statement that the

administrative judge agreed with the agency’s argument that the appellant was not

entitled to overtime pay as part of her back pay award. CID at 3 n.2.

Specifically, the administrative judge stated that, “[b]ased upon the evidence

submitted in this matter, it appears that the agency’s position that the appellant is

not entitled to overtime is valid because she does not have a history of working

overtime except around Christmas, and the back pay period in the instant matter

does not include the Christmas period.” Id. She also noted that “[t]he Board’s

6

back pay award does not seek to put the appellant in a better position than she

would have been otherwise.” Id. The appellant’s claim that she failed to

comprehend the effect of these statements, particularly given that she was

represented at all times during the compliance proceedings, is not reasonable and

thus does not demonstrate good cause for her untimeliness.

¶12 The appellant has not alleged any other basis for finding that good ca use

existed to excuse her filing delay and thus has not shown that she exercised due

diligence or ordinary prudence in filing her petition. In addition, we note that she

was represented and that her filing delay of 16 days was not minimal. See, e.g.,

Crozier v. Department of Transportation, 93 M.S.P.R. 438, ¶ 7 (2003) (finding

13-day delay in filing petition for review was not minimal); Beck v. General

Services Administration, 86 M.S.P.R. 489, ¶ 7 (2000) (15-day delay not minimal).

Accordingly, the appellant has not established good cause to excuse her filing

delay.

¶13 In light of the foregoing, we dismiss the appellant’s petition for review as

untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 This Order does not constitute a final

order and therefore is not subject to judicial review under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1).

Upon the Board’s final resolution of the remaining issues in this petition for

5

Even if the appellant had timely filed her petition for review, she has not shown any

error in the administrative judge’s determination that she was not entitled to overtime

pay as part of her back pay award. Overtime may be calculated either on the basis of an

employee’s prior overtime assignments or upon the experience of similarly situated

employees during the relevant period. Ball v. U.S. Postal Service, 91 M.S.P.R. 364,

¶ 8, aff’d, 53 F. App’x 910 (Fed. Cir. 2002). However, a status quo ante remedy does

not require that the appellant be placed in a better position than she was in at the time

of the agency’s action. Hagan v. Department of the Army, 99 M.S.P.R. 313, ¶ 8 (2005).

Here, the back pay period at issue was March 16 through July 26, 2016. The agenc y

provided evidence showing that, during the same 4 -month period in 2015 and 2017, the

appellant did not work any overtime hours. CF, Tab 6 at 6 -44. The appellant’s

submitted evidence does nothing to dispel the agency’s claim, as it only shows that she

worked overtime around the Christmas holiday in 2015, which does not overlap with the

relevant back pay period. CF, Tab 8 at 3-4. Thus, as the administrative judge properly

found, the appellant is not entitled to overtime pay as part of her back pay award .

7

enforcement, a final order shall be issued, which shall be subject to judicial

review.

FOR THE BOARD: /s/ for

Jennifer Everling

Acting Clerk of the Board

Washington, D.C.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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