Frederick v. LeBlanc

Case: 21-30660 Document: 00516630641 Page: 1 Date Filed: 02/01/2023

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 1, 2023

No. 21-30660 Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

Austin Frederick,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

James M. LeBlanc, Secretary, Department of Public

Safety and Corrections; Angela Griffin; State of

Louisiana, Through the Department of Public Safety

and Corrections; Teresa Cooley; M. Lewis; D'Anna

Lawton,

Defendants—Appellants,

______________________________

Austin Frederick,

Plaintiff—Appellee,

versus

State of Louisiana, Through the Department of Public

Safety and Corrections; James M. LeBlanc, Secretary,

Department of Public Safety and Corrections; Angela

Griffin,

Defendants—Appellants.

Case: 21-30660 Document: 00516630641 Page: 2 Date Filed: 02/01/2023

No. 21-30660

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Louisiana

USDC Nos. 3:18-CV-682, 3:18-CV-780

Before Graves, Ho, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Austin Frederick sued various officials of the Louisiana Department

of Public Safety and Corrections under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Louisiana state

law, claiming that he was overdetained. After some litigation, the district

court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Defendants

appealed.

Upon our review, it appears the district court misapplied the summary

judgment standard in qualified immunity cases. Because the district court

relied on the absence of evidence to find genuine disputes of material fact, we

now conclude that we cannot adequately review the district court’s ruling.

Accordingly, we vacate and remand to permit the district court an

opportunity to identify which facts in the summary judgment record

Frederick may be able to prove at trial.

I.

Frederick was sentenced on September 16, 2016, to one year in prison

in the custody of the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections

(the “Department”) following his conviction for possession of cocaine. On

December 3, 2016, Frederick was released on good time parole supervision.

On December 26, 2016, Frederick was arrested and he was sentenced to 90

days in jail for a parole violation. On March 21, 2017, the Department

*

This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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amended Frederick’s full term date to July 16, 2017. Frederick was released

to good time parole supervision on March 22, 2017.

Four days later, he was arrested on new drug charges and booked into

the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center. On June 20, 2017, while still there,

Frederick self-revoked his parole in the September 2016 drug case. On

September 15, 2017, Frederick pleaded guilty to the new drug charges and

was sentenced to time served for those offenses. That same day, he was

transferred to the Winn Correctional Center (“Winn”) to serve the

remainder of his 2016 one-year sentence. His full-term release date was

amended by the Department to October 26, 2017.

On September 25, 2017, Frederick filed a request for administrative

remedy at Winn, complaining his release date had been miscalculated and he

was entitled to immediate release. Winn advised Frederick that his

administrative remedy grievance was forwarded to the Department, but the

Department was unable to locate Frederick’s grievance. Frederick was

released from Winn on October 26, 2017.

On July 11, 2018, Frederick filed a § 1983 complaint against Secretary

of the Department James LeBlanc; Administrative Program Director for

Adult Services Angela Griffin, who was responsible for the computation of

felony sentences and for the timely release of prisoners; and unknown

Department employees he alleged were responsible for the calculation of

prisoners’ release dates. 1 Frederick alleged that he was legally entitled to be

released from custody on July 16, 2017, but Defendants kept him in custody

until October 26, 2017. He alleged, inter alia, that Defendants failed to

1

Frederick also filed a civil rights complaint in the 19th Judicial District on the

same date, which was subsequently removed to federal court and consolidated with the

instant § 1983 case.

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establish policies to prevent the overdetention of prisoners and that

Defendants’ conduct violated his due process rights under the federal and

state constitutions. He subsequently filed an amended complaint, naming as

additional defendants the Department and Department employees Teresa

Cooley, Mario Lewis, and D’Anna Lawton. He alleged that Lewis and

Lawton miscalculated his release dates on several occasions and that Griffin,

LeBlanc, and Cooley were responsible for ensuring that the calculations were

accurate.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that Frederick’s claims

were barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and should be

dismissed with prejudice until the Heck requirements were met. The

individual Defendants also asserted that they were entitled to qualified

immunity because Frederick failed to allege that a clearly established

constitutional right was violated. The district court denied the motion.

Defendants later filed a motion for summary judgment. They again

argued that Frederick’s claims were barred by Heck and that Defendants

were entitled to qualified immunity.

Frederick responded that his claims weren’t Heck-barred because they

didn’t implicate the validity of his conviction or sentence and that

Defendants weren’t entitled to qualified immunity because he had a clearly

established constitutional right to timely release, and the conduct of

Defendants was objectively unreasonable.

The district court agreed that the Department wasn’t a person capable

of being sued under § 1983 and that there was no evidence supporting the

individual capacity claims against LeBlanc, Griffin, and Cooley, but

otherwise denied summary judgment. The district court rejected

Defendants’ argument that Frederick’s claims were barred by Heck because

Frederick wasn’t seeking to invalidate his sentence. The district court also

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determined that Defendants weren’t entitled to qualified immunity because

Frederick had a clearly established right to timely release from prison, and

Frederick demonstrated a violation of that right.

Defendants appealed, arguing both that Frederick’s claims are Heck-

barred and that they are entitled to qualified immunity.

II.

This appeal presents three issues: (1) whether we have jurisdiction to

hear Defendants’ qualified immunity and Heck arguments on interlocutory

appeal; (2) whether the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity; and

(3) whether Frederick’s claims are Heck-barred. We consider each in turn.

A.

We start with jurisdiction. Frederick contends this court lacks

jurisdiction to hear Defendants’ qualified immunity and Heck challenges to

the district court order on interlocutory appeal. We disagree.

“Ordinarily, we do not have jurisdiction to review a denial of a

summary judgment motion because such a decision is not final within the

meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Williams v. City of Yazoo, 41 F.4th 416, 421

(5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). “But under the collateral order

exception to the final judgment rule, we may hear interlocutory appeals of the

small category of decisions that, although they do not end the litigation, must

nonetheless be considered final because they would be effectively

unreviewable on appeal from final judgment.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here

both the qualified immunity and Heck challenges fall within the exception.

We have jurisdiction to review the qualified immunity challenges,

though the scope of our review is limited. “District court orders denying

summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity are immediately

appealable and reviewed de novo only if they are predicated on conclusions of

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law and not genuine issues of material fact.” Solis v. Serrett, 31 F.4th 975,

980 (5th Cir. 2022) (quotation omitted). We only have jurisdiction to review

“whether the factual disputes identified by the district court are material to

the denial of qualified immunity—that is, whether the factual disputes

viewed in favor of the plaintiff make out a violation of clearly established

law.” Poole v. City of Schreveport, 13 F.4th 420, 423 (5th Cir. 2021). And so,

our jurisdiction is limited to determining whether, viewing factual disputes

in the light most favorable to Frederick, the appellants violated clearly

established law. See Williams, 41 F.4th at 422; Poole, 13 F.4th at 423.

We also have jurisdiction to hear the Heck challenge. Admittedly, our

caselaw has been “inconsistent” regarding whether we have jurisdiction to

address Heck issues on interlocutory appeal. Poole, 13 F.4th at 426. But

we’ve reaffirmed that, under our circuit’s rule of orderliness, precedent

establishing “that a district court’s ‘denial of summary judgment is

reviewable . . . if the claim is barred by Heck’” controls. Id. (quoting

Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (per curiam)).

Accordingly, we can review the district court’s decision not to apply the Heck

bar notwithstanding the interlocutory posture.

Because we have jurisdiction, we proceed to the merits.

B.

“The doctrine of qualified immunity protects officials from liability

for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established

statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation omitted).

“A public official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the plaintiff

demonstrates that (1) the defendant violated the plaintiff’s constitutional

rights and (2) the defendant’s actions were objectively unreasonable in light

of clearly established law at the time of the violation.” Porter v. Epps, 659

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F.3d 440, 445 (5th Cir. 2011). We are free to decide which prong of the

qualified immunity analysis to address first. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 242.

We proceed to review the district court’s analysis on the second

prong. For the purposes of this appeal, we assume the broad right of inmates

to be timely released from prison is clearly established. See Porter, 69 F.3d at

445 (“Our precedent establishes that a jailer has a duty to ensure that inmates

are timely released from prison.”). The objectively unreasonable in light of

clearly established law standard is not “that an official action is protected by

qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been

held unlawful; but it is . . . that in light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness

must be apparent.” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (citation

omitted). The critical consideration is fair warning. See id. at 739–41.

At summary judgment the burden is normally on the movants to show

“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [they are] entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). But when, as here,

“public official[s] make[] a good-faith assertion of qualified immunity, that

alters the usual summary-judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff

to show that the defense is not available.” Joseph ex rel. Estate of Joseph v.

Bartlett, 981 F.3d 319, 329–30 (5th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). Once

the burden is on the plaintiff, “[t]he plaintiff must show that there is a

genuine dispute of material fact and that a jury could return a verdict entitling

the plaintiff to relief for a constitutional injury.” Id. at 330.

Because both steps of the qualified immunity analysis are questions of

law, “[w]hen the district court identifies a factual dispute . . . we consider

only whether the district court correctly assessed the legal significance of the

facts it deemed sufficiently supported for purposes of summary judgment.”

Id. at 331 (cleaned up). We do not evaluate “whether the evidence in the

record would permit a jury to conclude that certain facts are true.” Id.

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(cleaned up). “The plaintiff bears the burden of negating qualified immunity,

but all inferences are drawn in his favor.” Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249,

253 (5th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

In this case the district court appears to have misplaced the burden

onto Defendants. In considering whether Defendants’ conduct was

objectively unreasonable, the district court relied on the absence of evidence

to find there were genuine disputes of material fact.

As to Defendants Lewis and Lawton—who Frederick claims were

responsible for calculating and changing his release date—the district court

found “there [was] scarce, if any, evidence that demonstrates what Lewis

and Lawton did or did not do when it comes to calculating Frederick’s release

date.” Frederick v. LeBlanc, 563 F. Supp. 3d 527, 537–38 (M.D. La. Sept. 28,

2021). The district court denied Lewis and Lawton summary judgment

because it found they did “not br[ing] forth competent summary judgment

evidence establishing that there is no dispute as to [their] conduct, let alone

whether the conduct [was] shielded by qualified immunity.” Id. at 538. It

did so despite noting it could “scarcely conclude that a Defendant’s conduct

was objectively unreasonable without knowing what the conduct was.” Id.

As to Defendants LeBlanc, Griffin, and Cooley—against whom

Frederick brought claims of supervisory liability—the district court likewise

relied on an absence of evidence to find genuine disputes of material fact.

The district court opinion notes a “a dearth of evidence regarding the

specific conduct of [Department] employees in this case that lead to

Frederick’s overdetention.” Id. at 539. The district court found that “[i]t

ha[d] not been established whether Mr. Frederick’s detention resulted from

a simple error in computation, from misapplication of state statutes, from

deficient [Department] policies, from absent [Department] policies, from

purposeful and retaliatory conduct, or some other series of events.” Id. And

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so, it “conclude[d] that the question of LeBlanc, Cooley, and Griffin’s

entitlement to qualified immunity cannot be resolved on the record before

it.” Id. at 539–40.

While the district court’s analysis may accord with the usual standard

at summary judgment, it doesn’t accord with the standard as it applies when

rebutting a qualified immunity defense. Recall that here it’s Plaintiff that

“must show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact and that a jury

could return a verdict entitling [him] to relief.” Joseph, 981 F.3d at 330. See

also Michalik v. Hermann, 422 F.3d 252, 262 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The plaintiff

bears the burden of negating the [qualified immunity] defense and cannot rest

on conclusory allegations and assertions but must demonstrate genuine

issues of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the officer’s

conduct.”). But the district court’s analysis doesn’t address whether

Frederick proffered evidence supporting a genuine dispute as to whether any

of the Defendants’ actions were objectively unreasonable. See generally

Frederick, 563 F. Supp. 3d at 537–40. Though the district court is correct that

it needn’t independently search the record to identify factual disputes, see id.

at 538, “[i]n the absence of an identification of summary judgment evidence

relied upon, we cannot affirm the denial of qualified immunity.” Dean v.

Phatak, 911 F.3d 286, 290 (5th Cir. 2018) (vacating and remanding where the

district court’s order cited allegations without reference to record evidence).

“Ideally, the district court’s order denying summary judgment based

on qualified immunity explains what facts the plaintiff may be able to prove

at trial.” Thompson v. Upshurt Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001).

When the district court fails to do this and denies the motion because fact

issues remain, “[w]e can either scour the record and determine what facts

the plaintiff may be able to prove at trial and proceed to resolve the legal

issues, or remand so that the district court can clarify the order.” Id. Here

we think that both deference to the district court and our limited jurisdiction

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counsel that we decline to search the record further. See Dean, 911 F.3d at

290. See also Poole, 13 F.4th at 423 (noting limits on our jurisdiction).

Given the lack of findings drawn from the summary judgment record

to support the district court’s denial of qualified immunity, we decline to

embark on our own analysis of the record. Cf. Dean, 911 F.3d at 290 (vacating

and remanding to the district court to reconsider the motion for summary

judgment and noting that “[i]f the record fails of facts upon which a

reasonable jury could conclude that [defendant intentionally carried out the

challenged conduct], the district court should grant” summary judgment for

defendant); White v Balderama, 153 F.3d 237, 242 (5th Cir. 1998) (remanding

where that was “more efficient” than scouring the record to discern material

fact disputes).

Finally, because the qualified immunity defense available to state

officials under § 1983 applies with equal force to Frederick’s federal and state

constitutional claims, this analysis applies to the state constitutional claims

as well. See Burge v. Par. of St. Tammy, 187 F.3d 452, 482 (5th Cir. 1999)

(“[O]rders premised on the denial of qualified immunity in actions based on

Louisiana constitutional violation are appealable in a federal court action to

the same extent as district court orders premised on the denial of federal

qualified immunity.”). See also Moresi v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Wildlife &

Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093 (La. 1990) (“The same factors that compelled

the United States Supreme Court to recognize a qualified good faith

immunity for state officers under § 1983 require us to recognize a similar

immunity for them under any action arising from the state constitution.”).

C.

Defendants also argue the district court erred because Frederick’s

claims are Heck-barred. Because we remand on the qualified immunity issue,

we don’t reach the Heck issue. Cf. Colvin v. Leblanc, 2 F.4th 494, 498–99

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(5th Cir. 2021) (reaffirming that the Heck-bar is not jurisdictional). See also

Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 190 (5th Cir. 2022) (noting that Heck isn’t

a jurisdictional bar).

***

We vacate and remand the district court’s order denying Defendants

Lewis and Lawton qualified immunity and denying Defendants LeBlanc,

Griffin, and Cooley qualified immunity on the supervisory liability claims.

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