“Binding precedent establishes that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision rendered by a federal district court.”
How later courts described this case
- “Binding precedent establishes that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision rendered by a federal district court.”
- “The Court of Federal Claims ‘does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts.’”
- requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 22-1835C
(Filed: January 25, 2023)
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
)
GREGORY JOSEPH PODLUCKY, )
)
Plaintiff, ) Pro Se Complaint; Sua Sponte Dismissal
) for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction;
v. ) RCFC 12(h)(3); Transfer Not Warranted;
) Anti-Filing Injunction.
THE UNITED STATES, )
)
Defendant. )
)
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
On December 19, 2022, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint, ECF No. 1, and a
motion to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, in this case. Plaintiff’s motion for
joinder, filed on January 5, 2023, ECF No. 11, is also pending before the court. Because
the court lacks jurisdiction over the claims made in plaintiff’s complaint, the court must
dismiss this case pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of the United States Court of
Federal Claims (RCFC) sua sponte. See RCFC 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any
time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”).
I. Background
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that defendant failed to return to him personal
property that was seized, apparently in connection with a criminal proceeding in the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. See ECF No. 1 at
1-4. Specifically, he alleges that, “[o]n March 30, 2022, the [district court] ruled in favor
of the United States causing all the available assets for returning to [plaintiff] and/or
assigns forfeited consequently causing there to be no available assets to satisfy the
promise to return the Certain Personal Pieces.” Id. at 4 (emphasis omitted). According to
plaintiff, this ruling “is a manifest injustice because [the district court] made specific
findings that are unreasonably harsh and shocking to the conscience of a reasonable
person . . . because any ambiguity in a plea agreement must be resolved against the
government.” Id.
Although plaintiff does not identify the case in which the challenged March 30,
2022 order was entered, see generally ECF No. 1, it appears to the court that plaintiff is
referring to United States v. Various Items of Jewelry, Case No. 12-cv-1171 (W.D. Pa.).
On March 30, 2022, the district court entered an order granting defendant’s motion for
judgment and final order of forfeiture against property to which plaintiff claims he is
entitled and entered judgment on the same date. See Various Items of Jewelry, Case No.
12-cv-1171, ECF No. 65 (order), ECF No. 66 (judgment).
Plaintiff characterizes his present claim as one for breach of contract, alleging that
defendant breached its plea agreement with plaintiff by not returning to him certain
property. See ECF No. 1 at 14-16. Plaintiff contends that he “entered into a government
contract with the United States for the return of the Certain Personal Pieces valued at
$22,749,978.85 and the United States failed to return the Certain Personal Pieces
allowing the forfeiture of such in violation of paragraph B. 5 of his plea agreement for the
‘free and clear of the forfeiture rights of the United S[t]ates.’” Id.at 16. As a remedy,
plaintiff requests that the court award him $22,749,978.85. Id.
The instant complaint is not the first that plaintiff has filed in this court seeking to
recover seized property. The court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
plaintiff’s complaint filed on May 17, 2021. See Podlucky v. United States, Case No. 21-
1377C, ECF No. 7 (June 25, 2021 order of dismissal). It appears to the court that
plaintiff’s May 17, 2021 complaint sought the return of, or compensation for, the same
property at issue in the present case. Compare, ECF No. 1 with Podlucky, Case No. 21-
1377C, ECF No. 1.
This court has dismissed at least four additional cases filed by plaintiff for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See Podlucky v. United States, Case No. 22-30T; Podlucky v.
United States, 21-cv-1686C; Podlucky v. United States, Case No. 21-1634C; and
Podlucky v. United States, Case No. 21-1633T.
II. Legal Standards
A. Pro Se Litigants
The court acknowledges that plaintiff is proceeding pro se and is “not expected to
frame issues with the precision of a common law pleading.” Roche v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
828 F.2d 1555, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Pro se plaintiffs are entitled to a liberal
construction of their pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)
(requiring that allegations contained in a pro se complaint be held to “less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). Accordingly, the court has
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examined the complaint thoroughly to discern all of plaintiff’s claims and legal
arguments.
B. Jurisdiction
This court is one of limited jurisdiction. Specifically, the Tucker Act grants the
court the authority to consider, “any claim against the United States founded either upon
the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or
upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or
unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). “A court
may and should raise the question of its jurisdiction sua sponte at any time it appears in
doubt.” Arctic Corner, Inc. v. United States, 845 F.2d 999, 1000 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(citation omitted).
Because the Tucker Act “does not create any substantive right enforceable against
the United States for money damages,” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398
(1976), a plaintiff asserting a claim before this court “must identify a contractual
relationship, constitutional provision, statute, or regulation that provides a substantive
right to money damages” against the United States. Khan v. United States, 201 F.3d
1375, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The Tucker Act itself does not create a substantive cause of action; in
order to come within the jurisdictional reach and the [sovereign immunity] waiver of the
Tucker Act, a plaintiff must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the
right to money damages.”).
III. Analysis
A. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction in this Case
This court lacks jurisdiction to collaterally review the actions of federal district
courts. As described above, the gravamen of this complaint is plaintiff’s dissatisfaction
with the proceedings in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania. The Tucker Act, however, does not give this court jurisdiction to
consider the merits of a collateral attack on those proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. §
1491(a); see, e.g., Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Binding precedent establishes that the Court of Federal Claims has
no jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision rendered by a federal district court.”);
Vereda, Ltda. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The Court of
Federal Claims ‘does not have jurisdiction to review the decisions of district courts.’”)
(quoting Joshua v. United States, 17 F.3d 378, 380 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In order to
challenge such proceedings, a plaintiff must rely on “the statutorily defined appellate
process.” Shinnecock, 782 F.3d at 1353 (citation omitted). As such, this court must
dismiss plaintiff’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
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B. Transfer
Because the court has concluded that it lacks jurisdiction in this case, it must
consider whether transfer to a court with jurisdiction is in the interests of justice:
[w]henever a civil action is filed in [this] court . . . and [this] court finds that
there is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
transfer such action or appeal to any other such court . . . in which the action
or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1631. “Transfer is appropriate when three elements are met: (1) the
transferring court lacks subject matter jurisdiction; (2) the case could have been filed in
the court receiving the transfer; and (3) the transfer is in the interests of justice.” Brown
v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 546, 550 (2006) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631).
The court has already determined that it lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff’s claims.
Although plaintiff did not attach the allegedly breached plea agreement to his complaint,
he states that the challenged decision was made by the United States District Court for
the Western District of Pennsylvania. See ECF No. 1 at 1. Therefore, it appears that the
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania would be the
appropriate forum if transfer were warranted.
As to the final element, because the district court has already considered the
proper fate of the seized items in the order plaintiff now seeks to challenge before this
court, see Various Items of Jewelry, Case No. 12-cv-1171, ECF No. 65, a transfer would
result in duplicative litigation before the district court and would not serve the interests of
justice. For this reason, the court finds that transfer is not appropriate.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons:
(1) Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is
GRANTED for the limited purpose of determining this court’s jurisdiction;
(2) Plaintiff’s motion for joinder, ECF No. 11, is DENIED as moot;
(3) The clerk’s office is directed to ENTER final judgment DISMISSING
plaintiff’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, without
prejudice, pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3);
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(4) The clerk’s office is further directed to RETURN any future filings not in
compliance with this court’s rules to plaintiff, UNFILED, without further
order of the court;
(5) The court CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any
appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith because, as alleged,
plaintiff’s claims are clearly beyond the subject matter of this court; and
(6) Because plaintiff has repeatedly filed complaints that needlessly
consume the resources of the court, the court ENTERS the following anti-
filing injunction:
Gregory Joseph Podlucky is immediately ENJOINED from filing
any new complaints with this court without first obtaining leave from
the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims to do so.
Any motion for leave to file must include as an attachment a full
complaint that meets all of the requirements of RCFC 8; in particular
the complaint must identify the source of law supporting this court’s
jurisdiction over the claims asserted. Thus, the clerk’s office is
directed to REJECT all future complaints from Mr. Podlucky unless
filed by leave of the Chief Judge.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Patricia E. Campbell-Smith
PATRICIA E. CAMPBELL-SMITH,
Judge
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