Opinion

Rep. B. Cutler v. L.M. Chapman, Acting Sec'y. of the Com.

Court
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jan 25, 2023
Status
Published
On the bench
Wojcik, J.
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.5%

holding that special election scheduled for the 69th day following issuance of writ would proceed on that date given “election machinery [was] already in motion”

How later courts described this case

  • holding that special election scheduled for the 69th day following issuance of writ would proceed on that date given “election machinery [was] already in motion”
  • citing, inter alia, Summit Towne Centre, Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc., 828 A.2d 995, 1001 (Pa. 2003)

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Representative Bryan Cutler, :

Leader of the Republican Caucus :

of the Pennsylvania House of :

Representatives, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 588 M.D. 2022

: Argued: January 11, 2023

:

Leigh M. Chapman, Acting Secretary :

of the Commonwealth, The :

Pennsylvania Department of State, :

and The Board of Elections of :

Allegheny County, :

:

Respondents :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge

HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

OPINION

BY JUDGE WOJCIK FILED: January 25, 2023

On December 9, 2022, Representative Bryan Cutler, Leader of the

Republican Caucus of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives (Petitioner),1 filed

a Petition for Review in the Nature of a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment

(Petition) in this Court’s original jurisdiction against Leigh M. Chapman, Acting

Secretary of the Commonwealth (Acting Secretary), the Pennsylvania Department

of State (Department), and the Board of Elections of Allegheny County (Board)

(collectively, Respondents), challenging the validity of three writs of election

1

Petitioner is the duly elected member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives for

the 100th Legislative District. (Stipulated Facts ¶ 1.)

(McClinton Writs) issued to the Department and the Board on December 7, 2022,

by Joanna E. McClinton, Leader of the Democratic Caucus of the Pennsylvania

House of Representatives (Intervenor McClinton),2 in her purported capacity as

“Majority Leader,” relating to three vacancies in the House of Representatives

(House). (Petition ¶¶ 1-2.) Intervenor McClinton issued the McClinton Writs

following the adjournment sine die of the House on November 30, 2022, but prior

to the House convening for the 2023-2024 Legislative Session, and set February 7,

2023, as the date for special elections to fill three vacant House seats in the 32nd,

34th, and 35th Legislative Districts in Allegheny County. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 18-21, 26, 38-

41.) Put succinctly, Petitioner alleged that Intervenor McClinton issued the

McClinton Writs without constitutional or statutory authority to do so, as she is

neither the Speaker nor the Majority Leader of the House. Petitioner therefore

sought a declaration under the Declaratory Judgments Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 7531-

7541,3 that the McClinton Writs are invalid as a matter of law, and that Respondents

may not proceed with holding the February 7, 2023 special elections. (Id. ¶¶ 6-8,

35-37, 52-54, 69.)

Also on December 9, 2022, Petitioner filed an Emergency Application

for Special Relief in the Nature of a Preliminary Injunction (Cutler Emergency

Application), and thereafter a Brief in Support thereof, in which he averred the same

facts as in the Petition and sought an order preliminarily enjoining Respondents from

effectuating the McClinton Writs and holding the February 7, 2023 special elections

2

Intervenor McClinton is the duly elected member of the Pennsylvania House of

Representatives for the 191st Legislative District. (Stipulated Facts ¶ 3.)

3

Petitioner cited Section 7532 of the Declaratory Judgments Act, which states, in relevant

part, that “[c]ourts of record, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to declare

rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.” 42

Pa.C.S. § 7532; (Petition ¶¶ 36-37).

2

until the Court could issue a decision on the merits of the Petition. (Cutler

Emergency Application (Cutler Emerg. Appl.) ¶¶ 3-22, 23.)

I. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Before delving into the background and procedural history of this case,

we initially observe that this case touches upon important constitutional principles,

namely, that “[e]lections shall be free and equal; and no power, civil or military,

shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.”

Article I, section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, § 5. In

considering election-related matters, we note it is “[t]he longstanding and overriding

policy in this Commonwealth to protect the elective franchise[,]” and that “[o]ur

goal must be to enfranchise and not to disenfranchise.” Pennsylvania Democratic

Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 360-61 (Pa. 2020) (citing Shambach v. Bickhart,

845 A.2d 793, 798 (Pa. 2004), and In re Luzerne County Return Board, 290 A.2d

108, 109 (Pa. 1972)). Furthermore, our Supreme Court has recognized that as far as

writs of election for special elections to fill vacant House seats are concerned, “[t]he

right at issue is the fundamental right to representation in these House districts[,] . .

. which right must be vindicated at special elections.” Fagan v. Smith, 41 A.3d 816,

817, 819 (Pa. 2012) (citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)). Therefore,

considering these overarching principles, and for purposes of transparency and,

ultimately, clarity to citizens of the Commonwealth, we briefly explain the

procedural history of this case and the factual predicate underlying our decision,

followed by the averments of the Petition and the Cutler Emergency Application, as

well as our reasoning for our January 13, 2023 Order.

3

By Order dated December 12, 2022, this Court directed, inter alia,

answers to the Cutler Emergency Application and the filing of applications for leave

to intervene, and scheduled a status conference for Wednesday, December 21, 2022.

Respondents filed answers and memoranda of law in opposition to the Cutler

Emergency Application, pursuant to this Court’s directive, generally denying that

Petitioner was entitled to the preliminary injunctive relief he sought and instead

arguing that the public interest warrants holding the three special elections on

February 7, 2023, a date chosen by both Petitioner and Intervenor McClinton, given

that election preparations are already well underway in Allegheny County and

because enjoining such elections would cause significant harm to the public interest.

They further alleged that Petitioner’s request for an injunction fails as a matter of

law, because it did not meet all six of the mandatory prerequisites for preliminary

injunctive relief.

The Pennsylvania Democratic Party (Proposed Intervenor PDP) filed a

Petition for Intervention and accompanying memorandum of law in support thereof

on December 15, 2022, alleging that it meets the standard for intervention under

Pa.R.Civ.P. 2327(4) because it possesses a “legally enforceable interest” that may

be affected by a judgment in this action, and, further, it does not meet any of the

elements that would foreclose its intervention under Pa.R.Civ.P. 2329. (Petition for

Intervention ¶¶ 15, 20-24.) Only Petitioner opposed Proposed Intervenor PDP’s

intervention in this case.

Intervenor McClinton also filed an application to intervene and a

memorandum of law in support thereof on December 16, 2022, to which there was

no objection, and which the Court granted on the record at the status conference held

on Wednesday, December 21, 2022, and confirmed by subsequent order. The Court

4

additionally noted at the conference that it would take Proposed Intervenor PDP’s

Petition for Intervention under advisement.4 Also during the status conference, the

parties and Proposed Intervenor PDP generally agreed that the issues in this matter

are purely legal ones, and that a hearing on the Cutler Emergency Application was

likely not necessary.5 They were ultimately unable to reach an agreement as to any

of the three special elections then at issue; they did, however, agree to an expedited

briefing schedule.

Thus, by Order dated December 22, 2022, the Court confirmed its

intervention ruling, and its decision to defer ruling on Proposed Intervenor PDP’s

intervention, and directed the Prothonotary to docket Intervenor McClinton’s POs.

By separate Order, also issued on December 22, 2022, the Court, noting the exigency

of the matter, set an expedited briefing schedule; further directed the parties and

Proposed Intervenor PDP to file a stipulation of facts; and indicated that the Court

would schedule expedited argument/hearing in the matter for a date and time after

January 4, 2023, by separate order, if necessary. Given that one of the House Caucus

Leaders would have clearly had authority to issue a writ, and that both Leader Cutler

and Leader McClinton had issued writs scheduling the special election for February

7, 2023, to fill former Representative Anthony DeLuca’s vacant seat in the 32nd

Legislative District, the parties and Proposed Intervenor PDP continued their best

efforts to reach a stipulation or proposed stipulation regarding that special election.

Pursuant to this Court’s December 22, 2022 directive, the parties filed

comprehensive briefs in support of and/or in opposition to the Cutler Emergency

4

Although the Court took Proposed Intervenor PDP’s Petition for Intervention under

advisement, we nevertheless allowed it to participate in these proceedings and file responsive

pleadings or Preliminary Objections (POs) and briefs in response to the parties’ other filings.

5

The parties indicated some disagreement as to the facts with respect to Proposed

Intervenor PDP’s certification of votes theory, discussed briefly infra.

5

Application; Proposed Intervenor PDP filed POs and a brief in support thereof; and

Petitioner filed briefs, and an omnibus brief, in opposition to Intervenor McClinton’s

and Proposed Intervenor PDP’s respective POs. The parties and Proposed

Intervenor PDP also filed a Stipulation on December 23, 2022, stipulating and

agreeing that the special election for the 32nd Legislative District shall be held on

February 7, 2023, which we adopted as an Order of the Court on January 3, 2023.

(See Stipulation filed Dec. 23, 2022.) Therefore, the only issues that remained in

this case at the time we issued our January 13, 2023 Order concerned two of the

McClinton Writs scheduling special elections for February 7, 2023, to fill the vacant

House seats in the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts.

On December 30, 2022, the parties and Proposed Intervenor PDP filed

Stipulated Facts, as directed, agreeing to the authenticity of Exhibits A, C-G, and I6

attached to the Petition (see Stipulated Facts at 6-7), as well as Exhibits 1-67 attached

to the Stipulated Facts (see Stipulated Facts at 7-8). They additionally agreed in

large part to a number of facts set forth in Petitioner’s Petition and the parties’

6

These exhibits include: (1) the writ of election issued by Petitioner on November 30,

2022 (Pet’r Ex. A); (2) former Representative Austin A. Davis’s resignation letter (Pet’r Exhibit

(Ex.) C); (3) former Representative Summer L. Lee’s resignation letter (Pet’r Ex. D); (4)

Intervenor McClinton’s December 7, 2022 writs of election scheduling special elections for the

32nd (Pet’r Ex. E), 34th (Pet’r Ex. G), and 35th (Pet’r Ex. F) Legislative Districts; and (5) the

Acting Secretary’s letter rejecting Petitioner’s November 30, 2022 writ of election (Pet’r Ex. I).

7

These exhibits include: (1) the writ of election issued by Petitioner on December 15,

2022, regarding the 34th district, setting May 16, 2023, as the date for the special election (Ex. 1);

(2) the writ of election issued by Petitioner on December 15, 2022, regarding the 35th district,

setting May 16, 2023, as the date for the special election (Ex. 2); (3) the calendar for the special

election in the 32nd district, as published by the Acting Secretary on December 9, 2022 (Ex. 3);

(4) the calendar for the special election in the 34th district, as published by the Acting Secretary

on December 9, 2022 (Ex. 4); (5) the calendar for the special election in the 35th district, as

published by the Acting Secretary on December 9, 2022 (Ex. 5); and (6) a map of the 32nd, 34th,

and 35th Legislative Districts in Allegheny County (Ex. 6).

6

various pleadings and other filings for purposes of disposition of the Cutler

Emergency Application, as follows.

All 203 seats of the House were up for election in the November 8,

2022 General Election; 102 Democrats, including former Representative DeLuca, 8

and 101 Republicans won House seats. (Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 5-9; Petition ¶¶ 15-17,

62.) Notwithstanding former Representative DeLuca’s reelection on November 8,

2022, his death created a vacancy in the 32nd Legislative District as of December 1,

2022, i.e., the day the terms of service for members elected to the 207th General

Assembly began. (Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 8-9, 11-12; Petition ¶¶ 24, 63.) On November

30, 2022, the last day of the 206th General Assembly, then-Speaker Cutler issued a

writ of election to the Department and the Board setting February 7, 2023, as the

date for a special election to fill former Representative DeLuca’s seat in the 32nd

Legislative District. (Stipulated Facts ¶ 10; Petition ¶¶ 22-23 & Exhibit (Ex.) A

(Cutler Nov. 30, 2022 Writ of Election).) However, on December 7, 2022, the

Acting Secretary rejected then-Speaker Cutler’s writ as untimely and premature.

(Stipulated Facts ¶ 18; Petition ¶ 32 & Ex. I (Acting Secretary’s Dec. 7, 2022

Letter).)9

Also on December 7, 2022, Intervenor McClinton was sworn in on the

House floor for the 207th General Assembly. (Stipulated Facts ¶ 14; Petition ¶¶ 25,

50.) On the same date, former Representative of the 35th Legislative District and

Lieutenant Governor-elect Austin A. Davis and former Representative of the 34th

8

Former Representative DeLuca’s death occurred too close in time to the November 8,

2022 General Election, such that his name could not be removed from the ballot. (Petition ¶ 19.)

9

The Acting Secretary cited numerous reasons why she rejected then-Speaker Cutler’s

writs. (See Petition, Ex. I (Acting Secretary’s Dec. 7, 2022 Letter).) Although Petitioner purports

to challenge the Acting Secretary’s action in this regard (see Petition ¶ 33), it is not part of his

overall request for relief. Given the Stipulation and the lack of controversy, we therefore decline

to address the issue, or the Acting Secretary’s other reasons, further in this opinion.

7

Legislative District and member-elect of the United States House of Representatives

Summer L. Lee resigned their House seats,10 following which Intervenor McClinton

issued the McClinton Writs to the Department and the Board setting special elections

for February 7, 2023, to fill former Representatives DeLuca (32nd), Davis (35th),

and Lee’s (34th) vacant House seats for the duration of the 207th General Assembly.

(Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 15-16; Petition ¶¶ 26-28, 50-51 Exs. C (Rep. Davis’s resignation

letter), D (Rep. Lee’s resignation letter), E-G (Intervenor McClinton’s Dec. 7, 2022

writs).11) In accordance with the McClinton Writs, the Department and the Board

scheduled the three special elections for February 7, 2023. (Stipulated Facts ¶ 17.)

On December 12, 2022, Petitioner was sworn in on the House floor for

the 207th General Assembly, after which, on December 15, 2022, Petitioner issued

two writs of election to the Department and the Board scheduling special elections

for May 16, 2023, which is the next ensuing primary election, to fill the vacancies

in the 34th (Lee) and 35th (Davis) Legislative Districts. (Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 21-22.)

On or before December 19, 2022, nomination certificates were filed with the

Department on behalf of both Democratic and Republican candidates vying for the

vacant seats in the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts. (Stipulated Facts ¶ 19.)

In addition, the parties and Proposed Intervenor PDP acknowledged

their prior Stipulation adopted as an Order of this Court regarding the special election

for the 32nd Legislative District, and further agreed that as of December 30, 2022,

there was no Speaker of the House; that the 10-day statutory deadline to issue writs

of election for special elections in the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts had

10

Petitioner alleged that these two resignations further reduced the House Democratic

Caucus’s membership to 99 members. (Petition ¶¶ 26-27, 67.)

11

These writs were attested to by Chief Clerk Brooke Wheeler. (See Petition, Exs. E, F,

& G.)

8

expired; that all three Legislative Districts are in Allegheny County and are

contiguous; and that the Board is preparing for all three elections to be held on

February 7, 2023. (Stipulated Facts ¶¶ 13, 20, 23-25 & Ex. 6 (a map of the 32nd,

34th, and 35th Legislative Districts in Allegheny County); Petition ¶¶ 45-46, Exs.

E-G (recognizing there is no Speaker).)

Following the filing of the Stipulated Facts, Intervenor McClinton filed

an Emergency Application for Disposition on Motion Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1972

(McClinton Emergency Application) on January 4, 2023, requesting an order

dismissing this matter as moot on the basis there is no longer any case or controversy

in light of Representative Mark Rozzi being elected as Speaker on January 3, 2023,

and his subsequent issuance of two new writs of election on that date (attested to on

January 4, 2023), commanding that the special elections for the 34th and 35th

Legislative Districts be held on the date set by the McClinton Writs, i.e., February

7, 2023. (McClinton Emerg. Appl. ¶¶ 6, 8-10, 14, 16, 18.) Petitioner opposed the

McClinton Emergency Application.

By Order dated January 3, 2023, as amended and supplemented on

January 6, January 9, and January 10, 2023, the Court scheduled oral argument on

the Cutler Emergency Application; Intervenor McClinton’s and Proposed Intervenor

PDP’s respective POs; Proposed Intervenor PDP’s Petition for Intervention; and the

McClinton Emergency Application for January 11, 2023, via WebEx

videoconferencing, before a panel of Judges.

Following oral argument, on January 13, 2023, the Court issued an

Order denying the Cutler Emergency Application on the basis that Petitioner failed

to establish he is entitled to the emergency preliminary injunctive relief he seeks,

noting that he failed to prove a clear right to the relief he seeks, that he will suffer

9

immediate and irreparable harm without the preliminary injunction, and that the

preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest. In so doing, this

Court ordered that the special elections to fill the two vacancies in the 34th and 35th

Legislative Districts of the House shall be held on February 7, 2023. This

Memorandum Opinion explains our reasoning for denying the Cutler Emergency

Application in our January 13, 2023 Order, as confirmed by the attached Order.12

II. PETITION FOR REVIEW

In the sole count of the Petition, as mentioned above, Petitioner alleged

that Intervenor McClinton issued the McClinton Writs without constitutional or

statutory authority to do so, as she was neither the Speaker of the House, nor the

Majority Leader of the House at the time the Writs were issued. (Petition ¶¶ 52-54,

68-69.) In support, Petitioner cited article II, section 2 of the Pennsylvania

Constitution, Pa. Const. art. II, § 2,13 and Section 628 of the Pennsylvania Election

Code (Election Code), 25 P.S. § 2778,14 which provide that the authority to issue

12

We vacate those provisions of our January 13, 2023 Order that sustained Intervenor

McClinton’s PO, and dismissed as moot Proposed Intervenor PDP’s Petition for Intervention and

POs, and McClinton’s Emergency Application.

13

Article II, section 2 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Election of Members; Vacancies)

states:

Members of the General Assembly shall be chosen at the general election every

second year. Their term of service shall begin on the first day of December next

after their election. Whenever a vacancy shall occur in either House, the presiding

officer thereof shall issue a writ of election to fill such vacancy for the remainder

of the term.

Pa. Const. art. II, § 2.

14

Act of June 3, 1937, P.L. 1333, as amended, 25 P.S. § 2778. Section 628 of the

Pennsylvania Election Code (Election Code) states, in relevant part:

Whenever a vacancy shall occur in either house of the General Assembly whether

or not it then be in session, the presiding officer of such house shall, within ten (10)

(Footnote continued on next page…)

10

writs of election rests with the presiding officer of the House. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 42-43.) Rule

1 (Speaker Presiding) of the 2021-2022 General Operating Rules of the House15 also

provides that the Speaker of the House is the presiding officer. (Id. ¶ 44.) However,

where there is a vacancy in the office of the Speaker, as there was here, Section 21.13

of the Act of January 10, 1968, P.L. (1967) 925, No. 417 (Act 417), 46 P.S. §

42.121m,16 authorizes the Majority Leader to carry out the duties of the Speaker,

days after the happening of the vacancy, issue a writ of election to the proper county

board or boards of election and to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, for a special

election to fill said vacancy, which election shall be held at the next ensuing

primary, municipal or general election scheduled at least sixty (60) days after the

issuance of the writ or such other earlier date which is at least sixty (60) days

following the issuance of the writ as the presiding officer may deem appropriate[.]

25 P.S. § 2778.

15

House Rule 1 (Speaker Presiding) states as follows:

The Speaker shall preside over the sessions of the House. The Speaker may name

a member to preside, but the substitution shall not extend beyond an adjournment.

The Speaker may appoint a member as Speaker pro tempore to act in the Speaker’s

absence for a period not exceeding ten consecutive legislative days. As presiding

officer and in accordance with Article II § 2 of the Constitution of Pennsylvania

and the act of June 3, 1937 (P.L. 1333, No. 320), known as the Pennsylvania

Election Code, within ten days after the occurrence of a vacancy the Speaker shall

issue a writ for a special election to be held on a date which shall occur on or before

the date of the first primary, municipal or general election which occurs not less

than 60 days after the issuance of the writ. The Speaker shall not be required to

issue a writ of election if the election cannot be scheduled until after the general

election. In case of failure to make an appointment, the House shall elect a Speaker

pro tempore to act during the absence of the Speaker. The Speaker pro tempore

shall perform all the duties of the Chair during the absence of the Speaker.

See https://www.house.state.pa.us/rules.cfm (last visited January 17, 2023).

16

Section 21.13 of the Act of January 10, 1968, P.L. (1967) 925, No. 417, as amended,

added by the Act of December, 10, 1979, P.L. 488, No. 104, provides that “[i]f any vacancy shall

occur during the recess of the Legislature in the office of the Speaker of the House of

Representatives, the duties of said office shall be performed by the Majority Leader of the House

of Representatives.” 46 P.S. § 42.121m.

11

including the authority to issue writs of election for special elections. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 45-

46, 48.) Petitioner observed that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held, in Perzel

v. Cortes, 870 A.2d 759 (Pa. 2005), that Section 21.13 authorizes the Majority

Leader to issue writs of election between adjournment of the House and the start of

the next legislative session. (Id. ¶ 49.) He acknowledged, however, that the term

“Majority Leader” is not defined in Act 417 but asserts that under 1 Pa.C.S. §

1903(a), “[w]ords and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and

according to their common and approved usage.” (Id. ¶ 56.) He pointed to Black’s

Law Dictionary’s definition of “Majority Leader,” which defines that term as “[t]he

legislator in charge of the legislative caucus that has the most members . . . .” (Id.

¶¶ 57-58.) Because article II, section 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const.

art. II, § 16 (Legislative districts),17 sets the number of House seats at 203, the

Majority Leader is the leader of either the caucus with 102 members, or, if neither

caucus has 102, the Majority Leader is the leader of the caucus with the most

members. (Id. ¶¶ 59-61.)

Further, citing Zemprelli v. Daniels, 436 A.2d 1165 (Pa. 1981), for the

proposition that only “members elected, living, sworn, and seated” qualify as

members of the House, Petitioner contended that as of December 1, 2022, the first

day of the 207th General Assembly, the House Democratic Caucus could seat only

17

Article II, section 16 of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Legislative districts) provides:

The Commonwealth shall be divided into fifty senatorial and two hundred three

representative districts, which shall be composed of compact and contiguous

territory as nearly equal in population as practicable. Each senatorial district shall

elect one Senator, and each representative district one Representative. Unless

absolutely necessary no county, city, incorporated town, borough, township or ward

shall be divided in forming either a senatorial or representative district.

Pa. Const. art. II, § 16.

12

101 members due to former Representative DeLuca’s pre-election death. (Petition

¶¶ 63-65.) He asserted that the two other resignations further reduced that number

to 99 members, and, as such, the House Democratic Caucus “cannot claim to have

ever had a majority of 102 living members or more members than the Republican

Caucus[,]” and it follows that Intervenor “McClinton has no basis to claim the title

of Majority Leader.” (Id. ¶¶ 66-68.) Petitioner claimed this conclusion is consistent

with the nonpartisan Pennsylvania Legislative Reference Bureau’s (LRB) “Legal

Opinion,” issued on December 7, 2022, in which the LRB opined that the House

Democratic Caucus does not hold a majority of the seats in the House because it is

only able to seat 101 living members due to Representative DeLuca’s death. (Id. ¶¶

29-31, 70 & Ex. H (Pa. LRB Legal Op.).)18 Petitioner thus sought an order from this

Court declaring that the McClinton Writs are invalid as a matter of law, and that

Respondents may not proceed with holding the February 7, 2023 special elections.

(Petition ¶¶ 37, 71 & Prayer for Relief.)19

III. CUTLER EMERGENCY APPLICATION

The gravamen of this dispute is the Cutler Emergency Application,

which sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the special elections scheduled for

February 7, 2023, in the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts, until the Court could

issue a full decision on the merits of the Petition. “The sole object of a preliminary

18

The December 7, 2022 LRB Opinion is not explained herein because it is merely

advisory and not binding on this Court.

19

The Acting Secretary and the Department filed an Answer with New Matter to the

Petition, informing that December 19, 2022, was the last day to file nomination certificates and

papers for the special elections scheduled for February 7, 2023; that multiple candidates had filed

nomination certificates for the special elections in the 34th and 35th districts; that the last day to

file objections was December 22, 2022; and that the Acting Secretary would certify the names and

residences of the candidates on or before January 8, 2023. (Answer & New Matter ¶¶ 76-78.)

They also argued that the Petition failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted because

it raised nonjusticiable political questions. (Id. ¶ 79.)

13

injunction is to preserve the subject of the controversy in the condition in which it is

when the order was made, it is not to subvert, but to maintain the existing status until

the merits of the controversy can be fully heard and determined.” Appeal of Little

Britain Township From Decision of Zoning Hearing Board of Little Britain

Township, 651 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). A preliminary injunction is a

temporary remedy granted until the parties’ dispute can be fully resolved. Id. The

party seeking a preliminary injunction bears a heavy burden of proof and must

establish all of the following criteria:

(1) the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable

harm that cannot be compensated adequately by damages; (2) greater

injury would result from refusing the injunction than from granting it,

and, concomitantly, the issuance of an injunction will not substantially

harm other interested parties in the proceedings; (3) the preliminary

injunction will properly restore the parties to their status as it existed

immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct; (4) the party

seeking injunctive relief has a clear right to relief and is likely to prevail

on the merits; (5) the injunction is reasonably suited to abate the

offending activity; and[] (6) the preliminary injunction will not

adversely affect the public interest.

SEIU Healthcare Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 104 A.3d 495, 502 (Pa. 2014)

(citing, inter alia, Summit Towne Centre, Inc. v. Shoe Show of Rocky Mount, Inc.,

828 A.2d 995, 1001 (Pa. 2003)). “Because the grant of a preliminary injunction is a

harsh and extraordinary remedy, it is to be granted only when and if each [factor]

has been fully and completely established.” Pennsylvania AFL-CIO by George v.

Commonwealth, 683 A.2d 691, 694 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996) (emphasis in original).

However, “if the petitioner fails to establish any one of them, there is no need to

address the others.” Lee Publications, Inc. v. Dickinson School of Law, 848 A.2d

14

178, 189 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004) (en banc) (emphasis in original) (quoting County of

Allegheny v. Commonwealth, 544 A.2d 1305, 1307 (Pa. 1988)).

Petitioner alleged he has a clear right to relief and a strong likelihood

of success on the merits of his challenge to the validity of the McClinton Writs

because the constitutional and statutory authority to issue writs of election rests with

the presiding officer of the House of Representatives, which is either the Speaker of

the House or the Majority Leader of the House if the Speaker’s office is vacant;

Intervenor McClinton was neither the Speaker nor the Majority Leader at the time

the McClinton Writs were issued; and Intervenor McClinton issued the McClinton

Writs without constitutional or statutory authority. (Cutler Emerg. Appl. ¶¶ 30(A)-

(D), 38; Br. in Supp. at 11-17.) He next claimed an injunction is necessary to prevent

immediate and irreparable harm because Intervenor McClinton’s issuance of the

McClinton Writs without statutory authority constitutes per se irreparable harm, and,

further, her exercise of authority not delegated to her would deprive Petitioner of his

statutory right to issue the writs as possible Majority Leader of the House and Leader

of the House Republican Caucus, which also constitutes per se irreparable harm.

(Cutler Emerg. Appl. ¶¶ 32, 34-35; Br. in Supp. at 17-18 (adding that neither of these

harms can be compensated by damages).) Petitioner further claimed that greater

injury would result from refusing the injunction than from granting it, because

Intervenor McClinton’s issuance of the writs constitutes a violation of Section 21.13

of Act 417 and thus per se irreparable harm; it would prevent the possible waste of

taxpayer resources and erosion of public confidence in the election system by

holding a potentially unlawful special election; and Respondents will not be harmed.

(Cutler Emerg. Appl. ¶¶ 33, 36-37; Br. in Supp. at 19-20.) Petitioner asserted an

injunction would restore the status quo, which he identified as the time before

15

Intervenor McClinton issued the writs when special elections had not yet been

scheduled for the two districts at issue. (Cutler Emerg. Appl. ¶¶ 36, 40; Br. in Supp.

at 20-21.) He claimed that an injunction is reasonably suited to abate the offending

activity, as the Court need only enjoin the execution of the two writs of election at

issue, and that the injunction will not adversely affect the public interest, as there is

a greatly relaxed standard of proof for this factor given the violation of law. (Cutler

Emerg. Appl. ¶ 39; Br. in Supp. at 21-24.) Petitioner did not dispute Intervenor

McClinton’s assertion that the public interest would be best served by a full House;

however, he claimed that the elections needed to fill the vacancies must arise from

valid writs, such as those he issued on December 15, 2022. (Cutler Emerg. Appl. ¶¶

38, 40; Br. in Supp. at 24-25.)

In response, Respondents and Proposed Intervenor PDP asserted that

Petitioner failed to satisfy any of the six essential prerequisites for granting

preliminary injunctive relief. The Acting Secretary and the Department have

identified the sole issue here as being whether the right of citizens in the 34th and

35th Legislative Districts to elect their representatives should be delayed. (DOS

Memo. of Law in Opp. at 11.) With regard to the injunction criteria, the Acting

Secretary and the Department contended that the harm of issuing an injunction

significantly outweighs the harm of denying one, as Petitioner did not assert any

specific injury that would result if the special elections are held as scheduled. Even

if he is harmed, it is de minimis at best, and greater harm would befall Pennsylvania

citizens, and candidates who have already submitted nomination paperwork and

begun campaigning, if the already scheduled and publicized elections are cancelled.

(DOS Ans. to Emerg. Appl. ¶¶ 32, 36, 40; DOS Memo. of Law in Opp. at 11, 13-

14.) Granting the injunction is also against the public interest because it will deprive

16

citizens of Allegheny County of representation in the House for a longer time, sow

voter confusion, and undermine the promotion of stability and clarity in elections.

(DOS Memo. of Law in Opp. at 14-16.) The Acting Secretary and the Department

further contended that the injunction would not maintain the status quo and is not

reasonably suited to abate the offending activity. (Id. at 16-17.) They took no

position, however, on the legal issues in the case and asserted that they have acted

appropriately in proceeding with special election preparations pursuant to the

facially valid McClinton Writs. (Id. at 12.)20

The Board contended this matter is moot in light of new Speaker

Rozzi’s writs confirming the special election date established by the McClinton

Writs. (Bd. Memo. of Law at 5.) In the alternative, the Board specifically argued

that Petitioner failed to establish that greater injury would result from refusing rather

than granting the injunction, and that the injunction will not harm the public interest.

(Id. at 7-10.) The Board highlighted that it still needed to secure printed, mail-in,

and absentee ballots and contact and secure polling locations for 178 polling

locations (which locations will develop their own plans for community access); that

candidates for the open seats have budgeted and staffed their campaigns and

coordinated campaign activities and outreach; that mail-in and absentee ballots will

need to be sent to voters and that any delay in doing so would risk voters having to

reapply and re-request those ballots; and that the Board has already expended

considerable resources preparing for these special elections. (Bd. Memo. of Law at

8-10.)

20

The Acting Secretary and the Department also pointed out that if the special elections

are held after February 20, 2023, then voters who indicated back in 2022 that they wished to

receive mail-in or absentee ballots for the remainder of the year will need to reapply to receive

those ballots. (DOS Memo. of Law in Opp. at 7-8.)

17

Intervenor McClinton agreed with the Acting Secretary and

Respondent that Petitioner failed to establish irreparable harm; that greater injury

would result from refusing rather than granting the injunction; and that the public

interest would be harmed, and added that Petitioner’s request for the extraordinary

remedy of disrupting special elections that are already underway is based on

speculative assertions that he might possibly become Majority Leader and that the

election might possibly be unlawful. (McClinton Ans. to Cutler Emerg. Appl. at 2-

5, 8-9.) Further, Intervenor McClinton asserted, the status quo would be destroyed;

Petitioner cannot establish a clear right to relief or likelihood of success on the merits

because the issues involved are nonjusticiable political questions, as to which Perzel

controls, and Zemprelli is distinguishable; and the injunction is not reasonably suited

to abate the offending activity because the relief he seeks is not available as a matter

of law. (McClinton Ans. to Cutler Emerg. Appl. at 5-8; Memo. of Law in Opp. at

2-4, n.2.)21

Proposed Intervenor PDP’s arguments in opposition to the Cutler

Emergency Application tracked those of Intervenor McClinton with respect to

nonjusticiability and Petitioner’s failure to establish a clear right to relief. (PDP Br.

in Opp. at 7-8.) However, Proposed Intervenor PDP injected a new theory into this

case that Petitioner is unlikely to prevail on the merits as Intervenor McClinton

issued the writs pursuant to her statutory authority under Section 21.13 of Act 417,

because, as of December 7, 2022, the Democrats held a majority of certified winners

of the November 8, 2022 General Election. (PDP Br. in Opp. at 9-11.)

21

Intervenor McClinton also alleges “unclean hands” as a basis for denying the Cutler

Emergency Application. (See McClinton Ans. to Emerg. Appl. at 10.) Given our disposition, we

found it unnecessary to address this argument.

18

Considering the parties’ and Proposed Intervenor PDP’s arguments, we

address each of the prongs required for a preliminary injunction, and our reasoning

in concluding they were not met, in turn.

Clear Right to Relief/Likely to Prevail on Merits

As noted above, in the sole count of the Petition, Petitioner sought a

declaration under the Declaratory Judgments Act that the McClinton Writs are

invalid as a matter of law, and that Respondents may not proceed with holding the

February 7, 2023 special elections. (Petition ¶¶ 37, 71 & Prayer for Relief.) The

longstanding rule is that declaratory judgments are not obtainable as a matter of

right. Ronald H. Clark, Inc. v. Township of Hamilton, 562 A.2d 965, 968-69 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1989). Rather, whether a court should exercise jurisdiction over a

declaratory judgment proceeding is a matter of sound judicial discretion. Id. at 969.

“To establish a clear right to relief, the party seeking an injunction need

not prove the merits of the underlying claim, but need only demonstrate that

substantial legal questions must be resolved to determine the rights of the parties.”

SEIU Healthcare, 104 A.3d at 506 (citing Fischer v. Department of Public Welfare,

439 A.2d 1172 (Pa. 1982)). “For a right to be clear, it must be more than merely

viable or plausible . . . .” Wolk v. School District of Lower Merion, 228 A.3d 595,

611 (Pa. Cmwlth.), appeal denied, 240 A.3d 108 (Pa. 2020). “If the party has met

the other requirements for a preliminary injunction and the underlying cause of

action raises important legal questions, the right to relief is clear.” Lieberman

Organization v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 638, 640 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)

(emphasis added).

Upon our review of the facts and the parties’ arguments in this case, the

relevant case and constitutional and statutory law, we are not convinced that

19

Petitioner satisfies this prong of the test to grant a preliminary injunction. We note

that the parties and Proposed Intervenor PDP have all raised viable arguments

regarding the appropriate method for determining which House Caucus Leader

should be considered the Majority Leader and whether that is justiciable. Thus,

Petitioner’s right to relief is not clear. Moreover, while there are undoubtedly

important legal questions implicated in this case, for the reasons set forth below,

Petitioner has not met the other requirements for a preliminary injunction.

Greater Injury by Refusing the Injunction; Maintaining the Status Quo;

Injunction Reasonably Suited to Abate Offending Activity; Public Interest

As noted above, in order to grant a preliminary injunction, Petitioner

had to prove each of the following:

(2) greater injury would result from refusing the injunction than from

granting it, and, concomitantly, the issuance of an injunction will not

substantially harm other interested parties in the proceedings;

(3) the preliminary injunction will properly restore the parties to their

status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful conduct;

....

(5) the injunction is reasonably suited to abate the offending activity;

and[]

(6) the preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public

interest.

SEIU Healthcare, 104 A.3d at 502. Because these four prongs are closely related

and involve similar issues and analysis, we will address them together.

The injunction requested by Petitioner did not satisfy these four prongs

or effectively address the concerns raised by the parties to this action. In this regard,

we concluded that greater harm would clearly result from granting the injunction,

20

rather than denying it; granting the injunction would not maintain the status quo; the

injunction was not reasonably suited to abate the offending conduct; and the

injunction would adversely, and significantly, affect the public interest.

The sweeping relief sought by Petitioner in the form of halting two

already scheduled and publicized, and extensively prepared-for, special elections for

vacant House seats in the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts in Allegheny County a

mere 25 days22 before those elections are set to occur would clearly have caused

greater injury than refusing the injunction, precisely because it would have seriously

harmed the public interest and orderly administration of special elections, which, as

we have repeatedly stated, are already well underway. Enjoining the special

elections at this point would have, as the parties have pointed out, deprived voters in

the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts of their “clear right to elected representation[

in the House], which right must be vindicated at special elections[,]” Fagan, 41 A.3d

at 819, and caused voter confusion; harmed the candidates in those districts who

have already submitted their nomination paperwork, budgeted and staffed their

campaigns, coordinated campaign activities and outreach efforts, and begun

campaigning; and harmed Respondents, and even their employees, in their critical

work of preparing for and ultimately administering the special elections in the 34th

and 35th Legislative Districts, the delay and disruption of which would result in

almost certain disenfranchisement of the nearly 100,000 voters residing in those

districts. Simply put, there are actual harms identified by the parties in their

comprehensive filings that almost certainly would have occurred if the injunction

had been granted.

22

This is as of January 13, 2023, the date we issued our Final Order in this case.

21

As for the status quo, which we did not address in our January 13, 2023

Order, we have stated that it is “‘the last peaceable and lawful uncontested status

preceding the underlying controversy.’” Hatfield Township v. Lexon Insurance Co.,

15 A.3d 547, 555 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (quoting In Re Milton Hershey School Trust,

807 A.2d 324 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002)). Stated otherwise, one purpose of a preliminary

injunction is to keep the parties in the same positions they had when the case began

in order to preserve the Court’s ability to decide the issues before it. It is clear that

when this case began on December 9, 2022, the status quo was that Intervenor

McClinton had already issued the McClinton Writs two days earlier, which the

Acting Secretary accepted at some point thereafter as facially valid as she was

required to do under Perzel, 870 A.2d at 765. Respondents thereafter acted on the

writs by scheduling and preparing for the special elections pursuant to various

provisions of the Election Code requiring them to do so under very specific time

constraints. An order enjoining the special elections at this late stage would have

clearly disrupted the ongoing administration of the elections and fundamentally

altered the status quo that existed at the time the writs were issued on December 7,

2022. See Marston v. Kline, 301 A.2d 393, 397, 399 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973) (holding

that special election scheduled for the 69th day following issuance of writ would

proceed on that date given “election machinery [was] already in motion”).

Although also not explicitly stated in our January 13, 2023 Order, we

further concluded that Petitioner failed to show that the injunction was reasonably

suited to abate the offending activity. Petitioner sought an injunction barring

Respondents, as well as all persons working in concert with them, from effectuating

the McClinton Writs and proceeding with holding the special elections. However,

as we have already observed above, the special elections at issue are already well

22

underway, and while Petitioner raises important legal questions in this case, we do

not believe enjoining the elections pending a decision on the merits is reasonable at

this point in light of the election preparations that have already occurred. At oral

argument in this matter, the Board informed that it confirmed the nearly 178 polling

places in the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts and that those polling places were

at least 97% staffed; that logistics and accuracy testing had been done on nearly 850

ballot machines before members of the public and published; that other machines

had been programmed and observed; and that voters had already begun receiving

notifications for their pending mail-in ballots in those districts. Accordingly, for

these reasons, we concluded that Petitioner failed to meet his burden as to these four

prongs of the preliminary injunction test.

Immediate and Irreparable Harm

We next examined whether Petitioner demonstrated that “the injunction

is necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot be compensated

adequately by damages.” SEIU Healthcare, 104 A.3d at 502. To meet this burden,

Petitioner was required to present “concrete evidence” demonstrating “actual proof

of irreparable harm.” Greenmoor, Inc. v. Burchick Construction Co., Inc., 908 A.2d

310, 314 (Pa. Super. 2006). A claim of irreparable harm cannot be based on

speculation and hypothesis, and for purposes of a preliminary injunction, the harm

must be irreversible before it is deemed irreparable. Id. at 314; see also Kiddo v.

American Federation of State (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 468 C.D. 2019, filed August 3,

2020), 2020 WL 4431793, at *23 (quoting Novak v. Commonwealth, 523 A.2d 318,

320 (Pa. 1987), and stating that “the alleged harm or consequences must not be

speculative in nature and [that] ‘speculative considerations . . . cannot form the basis

for issuing [a preliminary injunction]’”).

23

As mentioned above, Petitioner asserted that an injunction was

necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm because Intervenor

McClinton’s issuance of the McClinton Writs without constitutional or statutory

authority constitutes per se irreparable harm and, further, because her exercise of

authority not delegated to her would deprive Petitioner of his statutory right to issue

writs as “possible” Majority Leader of the House and as Leader of the House

Republican Caucus, which also constitutes per se irreparable harm. In support of

these assertions, Petitioner cited Wyland v. West Shore School District, 52 A.3d 572

(Pa. Cmwlth. 2012), and Grine v. County of Centre, 138 A.3d 88 (Pa. Cmwlth.

2016). (Emerg. Appl. ¶ 32, 34; Br. in Supp. of Emerg. Appl. at 17-19.)

We acknowledge that the failure to comply with a statute and the

deprivation of a statutory right may constitute irreparable harm per se under Wyland

and Grine. However, we note, Wyland dealt with a school district’s refusal to

provide transportation to school children despite their status as resident pupils, where

the applicable statute mandated school transportation to resident pupils. Wyland, 52

A.3d at 583. This Court found that the asserted harm was irreparable per se, because

the school district deprived the resident children of their statutory right to

transportation, and that an injunction was necessary to mandate compliance with the

statute. Id. Here, however, there does not appear to be any statute that has been

violated, as Section 21.13 of Act 417, 46 P.S. § 42.121m, provides only that the

Majority Leader assumes the Speaker’s duties when the Speaker’s office is vacant.

At this point, we cannot say who the Majority Leader is or who it should be.

Petitioner therefore has not shown a clear right to relief or immediate and irreparable

harm.

24

Grine dealt specifically with requests for records under the Right-to-

Know Law (RTKL),23 that implicated records and related to activities of the

judiciary, and a county agency’s failure to fully comply with the RTKL’s disclosure

provisions, which has been held to be sufficiently injurious to constitute irreparable

harm. Grine, 138 A.3d at 100-01. Notably, the harm asserted in Grine, i.e., the

violation of the RTKL’s statutory scheme, a potential separation of powers violation,

and interference with the judicial agency’s power of supervision over its records, as

well as the county agency’s improper disclosure of protected information of the

judiciary, was found not to be speculative because the county agency already

received other requests, and likely would receive more in the future, implicating

judiciary records. Id.

Unlike in Grine, Petitioner’s allegation that he would be deprived of his

statutory right to issue writs of election as potential Majority Leader of the House

is, at best, a speculative consideration, which cannot form the basis for issuing the

extraordinary preliminary injunctive relief sought here. See Kiddo, slip op. at *23.

Petitioner has otherwise failed to produce any “concrete evidence” demonstrating

“actual proof of irreparable harm” that is irreversible. Greenmoor, Inc., 908 A.2d at

314. As such, Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving immediate and

irreparable harm for purposes of the preliminary injunction.

However, even assuming the legitimacy of Petitioner’s asserted harm,

we note that, in issuing our January 13, 2023 Order, we found such harm paled in

comparison to the harms to the public interest and the electoral process asserted by

the other parties that almost certainly would have resulted had we granted the

injunction.

23

Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§ 67.101-67.3104.

25

IV. CONCLUSION

As the United States Supreme Court, our own Supreme Court, and this

Court have previously recognized regarding elections, albeit in the context of

legislative reapportionment:

In three of the reapportionment cases cited hereinbefore, . . . , the courts

clearly stated that when the [s]tate’s election machinery is already in

motion, equitable considerations permit a court to consider the factual

circumstances, the mechanics and complexities of the law. Those cases

held that, if in the discretion of the court, justice and practical

considerations deem it appropriate to proceed with the pending

election, the court may permit an election to proceed even though it be

technically unlawful or unconstitutional.

Marston, 301 A.2d at 399. We found no reason not to apply this same logic here

given the facts of this case, in which it has already been established that the special

elections for the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts have been scheduled for

February 7, 2023, since December 7, 2022, when Intervenor McClinton issued the

McClinton Writs, that Respondents have undertaken vast measures to prepare for

the special elections since that date, that political parties and bodies likewise have

undertaken to nominate candidates, and that those candidates have begun

campaigning and taking the required steps to comply with various provisions of the

Election Code in seeking to be placed on the special election ballots. If we were to

grant the injunctive relief Petitioner seeks and halt these two special elections, there

is no question that the electors of the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts in Allegheny

County would be without representation in the House for an unreasonable period of

time. Notwithstanding the validity or invalidity of the McClinton Writs, and the

purported invalidity of holding these special elections as scheduled given the

26

uncertainty surrounding the McClinton Writs, we believed the public interest was

better served by permitting the special elections to go forward as scheduled.

Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we issued our Order on January

13, 2023, denying Petitioner’s Emergency Application for Special Relief in the

Nature of a Preliminary Injunction, as confirmed in the attached Order.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

Judge McCullough did not participate in the decision of this case.

Judge Covey did not participate in the decision of this case.

Judge Wallace did not participate in the decision of this case.

27

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Representative Bryan Cutler, :

Leader of the Republican Caucus :

of the Pennsylvania House of :

Representatives, :

:

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 588 M.D. 2022

:

Leigh M. Chapman, Acting Secretary :

of the Commonwealth, The :

Pennsylvania Department of State, :

and The Board of Elections of :

Allegheny County, :

:

Respondents :

ORDER

AND NOW, January 25, 2023, upon consideration of the Emergency

Application for Special Relief in the Nature of a Preliminary Injunction (Emergency

Application for Special Relief), filed by Petitioner Representative Bryan Cutler,

Leader of the Republican Caucus of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives; the

Preliminary Objections filed by Intervenor Joanna E. McClinton, Leader of the

Democratic Caucus of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives (Intervenor

McClinton), and Proposed Intervenor Pennsylvania Democratic Party (Proposed

Intervenor PDP), respectively; the Petition for Intervention filed by Proposed

Intervenor PDP, which Petitioner opposes; and Intervenor McClinton’s Emergency

Application for Disposition on Motion Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1972 (Emergency

Application for Disposition), and the answers and Briefs in Support of and/or in

Opposition thereto, and upon further reflection of this matter following argument

before a panel of this Court on January 11, 2023, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. This Court’s January 13, 2023 Order is VACATED, in part, to the

extent that Order sustained Intervenor McClinton’s Preliminary

Objection as to nonjusticiability of the claims made by Petitioner in his

Petition for Review in the Nature of a Complaint for Declaratory

Judgment, and dismissed as moot Proposed Intervenor PDP’s Petition

for Intervention and Preliminary Objections, and Intervenor

McClinton’s Emergency Application for Disposition. Intervenor

McClinton’s Preliminary Objections, Proposed Intervenor PDP’s

Petition for Intervention and Preliminary Objections, and Intervenor

McClinton’s Emergency Application for Disposition shall now be

considered by the Court in due course.

2. The Court’s January 13, 2023 Order is otherwise CONFIRMED to the

extent that Order denied Petitioner’s Emergency Application for

Special Relief on the basis he failed to establish that he is entitled to an

emergency preliminary injunction, and directed that the special

elections to fill the vacancies in the 34th and 35th Legislative Districts

of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives shall be held on February

7, 2023. The Court notes that the appeal period triggered by the January

13, 2023 Order with respect to the Court’s denial of the requested

preliminary injunction shall begin anew from the date of this Order.

3. Nothing in this Order is to be read as affecting the Court’s January

13, 2023 ruling that the enumerated special elections shall be held

on February 7, 2023.

__________________________________

MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

2

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