Benedict Mohit v. Morris West

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-12483

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

BENEDICT MOHIT,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MORRIS WEST,

Individual Capacity; Mayor of Haines City, A

Municipal Corporation in the State of Florida,

ANNE HUFFMAN,

Individual Capacity; Vice Mayor of Haines City,

HORACE WEST,

Individual Capacity; Commissioner of Haines City,

JAYNE HALL,

Individual Capacity; Commissioner of Haines City,

ROY TYLER,

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-12483

Individual Capacity; Commissioner of Haines City, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:20-cv-00813-VMC-SPF

____________________

Before GRANT, LUCK, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Benedict Mohit sued officials of Haines City in their individ-

ual capacities under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 because they required

him to obtain permits to conduct farming operations on his resi-

dentially zoned property. The district court dismissed Mohit’s reg-

ulatory takings, substantive due process, and equal protection

claims for failure to state a claim. We affirm. 1

1

Mohit also claimed that the City officials were barred from charging him an

assessment or fee for stormwater management for his farm. Because Mohit

makes no argument about this claim on appeal, we do not discuss it further.

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21-12483 Opinion of the Court 3

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Mohit was born in the Caribbean, has dark skin color, speaks

with a foreign accent, and is a naturalized United States citizen.

Mohit bought a residentially zoned abandoned farm in

Haines City and, in compliance with state agricultural regulations,

used the property to establish a commercial hay crop and to raise

horses. Haines City then adopted an ordinance that prohibited

keeping farm animals in the City and that required a conditional

use permit to use residentially zoned property for agricultural pur-

poses.

Mohit met with Haines City Development Services Director

Richard Greenwood and Deputy Director Mark Bennett to discuss

changing his hay crop and horse operations to other livestock op-

erations, and they threatened to shut down his farm for violating

the ordinance. They also threatened to impose fines and get a lien

on his farm if he continued to operate it without a permit. Before

Mohit applied for a permit, Deputy Director Bennett told him to

“list only a few animals” on his application to improve the odds for

“a person like him” to get approved.

Mohit believed that the City’s permit requirement con-

flicted with state agricultural statutes, but he applied for a permit

to maintain his hay crop and to keep twenty cows, twenty goats,

and five horses on his property. The City approved his application

in full and required him to apply to renew the permit in ten years.

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Mohit wanted to do more on his farm. For example, he

wanted to expand to twenty-five pregnant cows and ten horses; to

keep bees and poultry; to conduct sod, dairy, fish, and forestry op-

erations; to cultivate fruits and vegetables; to build a barn for his

cows, a stable for his horses, a coop for his chickens, a greenhouse

for his vegetables, and a storage building for fertilizer and other

equipment; to keep, store, and repair tractors and farm equipment;

and to put up barbed wire fencing.

Mohit alleges that his neighbor, Miguel Grullon, was treated

more favorably than he was, in that the City allowed Mr. Grullon

to keep an unlimited number of livestock animals of any species on

Mr. Grullon’s farm. Mr. Grullon’s farm and Mohit’s farm were

classified as agricultural lands under the state’s greenbelt law, were

permitted for livestock operations under the same state regulation,

and were about the same size.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Since 2014, Mohit has sued the City and its officials in state

and federal court over the regulation of his property, alleging that

the ordinance violated multiple state statutes and state and federal

constitutional provisions. Mohit lost these lawsuits.

In July 2018, Mohit sued the City for regulatory takings, sub-

stantive due process, and equal protection violations. Mohit v. City

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21-12483 Opinion of the Court 5

of Haines City, 845 F. App’x 808, 810 (11th Cir. 2021). 2 The district

court dismissed with prejudice the substantive due process and

equal protection claims because Mohit insufficiently alleged a sub-

stantive due process violation and provided an equal protection

comparator who was not similarly situated (Mr. Grullon). Id. The

district court granted summary judgment to the City on the regu-

latory takings claims because Mohit did not show that the ordi-

nance deprived his property of all economically beneficial uses. Id.

We affirmed. Id. at 812. We explained that the regulatory

takings claims failed because Mohit “was permitted to engage in

some agricultural activities, even if those activities were less exten-

sive than he would have liked,” so the ordinance did not deprive

him of all economically beneficial uses of his property. Id. at 811.

The substantive due process claims failed, we said, because Mohit

did not show that the ordinance lacked a rational basis. Id. And

the equal protection claims failed, we explained, because Mohit in-

sufficiently alleged discriminatory animus. Id. at 812.

After the dismissal of the substantive due process and equal

protection claims but before the summary judgment on the regu-

latory takings claims, Mohit filed this case against nine City officials

in their individual capacities: Director Greenwood, Deputy Direc-

tor Bennett, City Attorney Fred Reilly, City Manager Deric

Feacher, Mayor Morris West, Vice Mayor Anne Huffman, and

2

Mohit also brought a claim under the Fair Housing Act, id., but that claim is

not relevant to this appeal.

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Commissioners Horace West, Jayne Hall, and Roy Tyler. Mohit

again alleged regulatory takings, substantive due process, and

equal protection violations based on the City’s ordinance and per-

mit requirement.

The officials moved to dismiss, arguing that the complaint

was a shotgun pleading containing only unsupported legal conclu-

sions, that Mohit’s prior lawsuits precluded him from bringing this

case because the only difference here was that Mohit sued City of-

ficials instead of the City itself, that Mohit’s claims were time-

barred, and that the officials were entitled to qualified immunity,

absolute legislative immunity, and statutory immunity and were

improper defendants.

The district court granted the officials’ motion and dismissed

Mohit’s amended complaint with prejudice because it failed to

state a plausible claim for relief. 3 The district court explained that

the regulatory takings claims failed because Mohit argued only that

3

Mohit does not argue that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing

his amended complaint with prejudice instead of granting him leave to amend.

See Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001) (reviewing the de-

cision not to allow a pleading amendment for an abuse of discretion). Nor

does Mohit give us any indication of how he would amend his complaint. In

any event, we discern no abuse of discretion here because Mohit was “given

at least one chance to amend [his] complaint”—and, counting his prior related

lawsuits, much more than one chance—“before the district court dismisse[d]

the action with prejudice.” Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991),

overruled as to counseled plaintiffs by Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am.

Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2002) (en banc).

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he was deprived of all economically beneficial uses of his property,

and his allegations that he was allowed to maintain his hay crop

and to keep twenty cows, twenty goats, and five horses showed

that he was not so deprived. The substantive due process claims

failed, the district court said, because Mohit’s state-created prop-

erty rights were not fundamental rights, the officials’ enforcement

of the ordinance against him was executive, and the ordinance had

a rational basis and did not violate state law. The equal protection

claims failed, the district court explained, because “[Mohit’s] re-

quest for a conditional use permit was fully granted” and because

the complaint “lack[ed] sufficient allegations to support an infer-

ence of discriminatory animus.”

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim,

“accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and construing

them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Hill v. White, 321

F.3d 1334, 1335 (11th Cir. 2003). The complaint must plead

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that al-

lows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009). Section 1983 cases do not have a heightened plead-

ing standard. Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th

Cir. 2016).

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DISCUSSION

Mohit argues that in adopting and enforcing the ordinance

against him, the officials committed regulatory takings, substantive

due process, and equal protection violations. We discuss these

claims in turn.

Regulatory Takings

Mohit contends that the officials “den[ied] him of all eco-

nomically beneficial and productive use of his farm, making his

property worthless.”

“The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to

the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the gov-

ernment from taking private property for public use without just

compensation.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001)

(citation omitted). A government regulation may be “so onerous

that it constitutes a taking” when it (1) “denies all economically

beneficial or productive use of land” or (2) “impedes the use of

property . . . based on a complex of factors, including . . . the eco-

nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant; . . . the extent to

which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-

backed expectations; and . . . the character of the governmental ac-

tion.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1942–43 (2017) (quota-

tions omitted). Mohit proceeds under the first theory only.

Mohit’s own allegations establish that after the officials en-

forced the ordinance against him, his farm still had economically

beneficial uses in the hay crop, twenty cows, twenty goats, and five

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horses that he could keep on his property. Mohit complains that

even though his permit application was approved in full, he “did

not get what he wanted—to farm without restrictions or limita-

tions.” But property restrictions do not amount to takings unless

they (1) “den[y] all economically beneficial or productive use of

land” or (2) “impede[] the use of property . . . based on [the] com-

plex of [regulatory takings] factors.” Id. Because Mohit has not

alleged that either circumstance applies, the district court did not

err in dismissing his regulatory takings claims.

Substantive Due Process

Mohit claims that because his property was classified as ag-

ricultural under state statute and because state law preempted the

City from regulating agriculture, the officials violated his substan-

tive due process rights when they adopted the ordinance and en-

forced it against him, requiring him to apply for permits to engage

in various farming activities. The officials’ adoption of the ordi-

nance, he argues, was an arbitrary and irrational legislative act, in

violation of substantive due process, because the ordinance con-

flicted with state statutes. Mohit also contends that the officials are

not entitled to any type of immunity.

Substantive due process protects certain “fundamental”

rights created by the Constitution, and it protects state-created,

non-fundamental rights against arbitrary and irrational legislative

acts. Lewis v. Brown, 409 F.3d 1271, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2005). Lo-

cal government officials sued in their individual capacities are enti-

tled to absolute legislative immunity for their “actions taken in

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connection with promulgating zoning ordinances and classifica-

tions.” Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 997 F.2d 1369, 1392 (11th

Cir. 1993); see Brown v. Crawford County, 960 F.2d 1002, 1012 &

n.15 (11th Cir. 1992) (explaining that even “an unworthy purpose,”

like “conspiracy or bad faith,” “does not preclude absolute immun-

ity to legislators acting in their legislative capacity”). The immun-

ity “inquiry is not bound by officials’ titles and the characterizations

officials place on their own activities. Instead, we examine the facts

of each case to determine whether the [officials] . . . [were] engag-

ing in legislative activity.” Bryant v. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1305

(11th Cir. 2009) (quotation omitted).

Mohit’s substantive due process claims involve only state-

created property rights, not fundamental rights, so Mohit cannot

base the claims on the officials’ enforcement of the ordinance

against him. See Lewis, 409 F.3d at 1274 (explaining that plaintiffs

cannot bring substantive due process claims when zoning enforce-

ment infringes on state-created rights). Mohit asserts that the adop-

tion of the ordinance—a legislative act—violated substantive due

process. But because he sued the officials in their individual capac-

ities for their participation in this legislative act, they are entitled to

absolute legislative immunity. See Corn, 997 F.2d 1369, 1392 (11th

Cir. 1993) (explaining that we have “extended absolute legislative

immunity from suit under 42 U.S.C. [section] 1983 to purely local

legislators in land use and zoning cases”); see also Blackburn v.

Shire U.S. Inc., 18 F.4th 1310, 1317 (11th Cir. 2021) (“We may af-

firm the district court on any basis supported by the record.”).

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Because Mohit must base his substantive due process claims

on a legislative act and the officials are entitled to absolute immun-

ity for their legislative acts, the district court did not err in dismiss-

ing Mohit’s substantive due process claims.

Equal Protection

Mohit, finally, contends that the officials “intentionally reg-

ulate[d] [his] existing and proposed state-regulated farm activities

because: (1) he had challenged their alleged regulatory miscon-

duct, (2) he refused to obey them when they threatened to shut his

farm down and they wanted to drive him out of the city, but in

defiance, he continued his hay crop operations, and (3) because of

his minority race and foreign origin.” And Mohit contends that the

officials treated his property less favorably than Mr. Grullon’s sim-

ilarly situated farm and told Mohit to list only a few animals on his

permit application “because of [Mohit’s] minority race, dark skin

color, and foreign origin.”

“To establish an equal protection claim, a [plaintiff] must

demonstrate that (1) he is similarly situated with other [persons]

who received more favorable treatment,” Jones v. Ray, 279 F.3d

944, 946–47 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted), and (2) the de-

fendant “engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on

race, . . . national origin, . . . or some other constitutionally pro-

tected interest,” Damiano v. Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm’n, 785 F.2d

929, 932–33 (11th Cir. 1986).

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Mohit does not plead facts to support that he was treated less

favorably than Mr. Grullon or any other person. Mohit alleged that

Deputy Director Bennett told him to “list only a few animals on

[his permit] application to improve the chances for a person like

him to get an approved permit,” Mohit took this advice and applied

for “only” twenty cows, twenty goats, and five horses, and the of-

ficials approved Mohit’s application and permitted him the animals

he requested. Mohit says that in contrast, the officials “approved a

permit . . . for [Mr.] Grullon to keep an unlimited number of live-

stock animals . . . of any species on [Mr. Grullon’s] farm.”

We may reasonably infer that Mr. Grullon got what he

asked for when the officials approved his permit application. The

same is true for Mohit: he got what he asked for. The only possible

difference is that Deputy Director Bennett advised Mohit not to ask

for much. But Mohit does not claim that Mr. Grullon received any

advice—let alone better advice—from any City official. And we

will not speculate that Mr. Grullon did. See Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC,

981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e cannot act as de facto

counsel [for a pro se plaintiff] or rewrite an otherwise deficient

pleading to sustain an action.”).

Because Mohit’s allegations do not support that the officials

treated a similarly situated person more favorably than they treated

him, the district court did not err in dismissing the equal protection

claims.

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CONCLUSION

Because the district court did not err in dismissing Mohit’s

regulatory takings, substantive due process, and equal protection

claims, we affirm.

AFFIRMED. 4

4

Given the failures of Mohit’s prior related lawsuits, the defendant officials

moved to dismiss this appeal as frivolous and sought sanctions. Because our

affirmance resolves this appeal, we deny the motion to dismiss as moot. And

because we generally hesitate to impose sanctions on pro se appellants, see

Woods v. IRS, 3 F.3d 403, 404 (11th Cir. 1993), we deny the motion for sanc-

tions.