explaining that prisoners can seek relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) only “when they face some extraordinarily severe exigency, not foreseeable at the time of sentencing, and unique to the life of the prisoner.” (citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that prisoners can seek relief under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) only “when they face some extraordinarily severe exigency, not foreseeable at the time of sentencing, and unique to the life of the prisoner.” (citation omitted)
- holding that prisoners can demonstrate “extraordinary and compelling” reasons “only when they face some extraordinarily severe exigency, not foreseeable at the time of sentencing, and unique to the life of the prisoner”
- holding that “a prisoner cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge the legality or the duration of his sentence” and, instead, must be use the avenues provided in Chapter 153 of Title 28, such as § 2255
- denying release where the district court’s order stated that the court “consider[ed] the applicable factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) and the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Case: 21-50870 Document: 00516613569 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/17/2023
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
January 17, 2023
No. 21-50870
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
United States of America,
Plaintiff—Appellee,
versus
Michael Anthony Escajeda,
Defendant—Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 7:18-CR-239-1
Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge:
Michael Escajeda appeals the denial of his motion for compassionate
release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1). In doing so, however, Escajeda presses
arguments that must instead be channeled through direct appeal or 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. We affirm.
I.
In 2018, Michael Escajeda sold drugs to police informants. Police
searched his residence, where they found both cocaine and a gun.
Subsequently, Escajeda pleaded guilty to three drug distribution counts, in
Case: 21-50870 Document: 00516613569 Page: 2 Date Filed: 01/17/2023
No. 21-50870
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846, and to one count of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). In 2019, the
district court gave him a within-Guidelines sentence of 162 months in prison.
We affirmed Escajeda’s conviction and remanded only for correction of a
“scrivener’s error” in his supervised-release term. United States v. Escajeda,
8 F.4th 423, 428 (5th Cir. 2021).
Five days after our decision in Escajeda’s direct appeal, the district
court denied his motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1).
Escajeda again timely appealed. We review the ultimate decision to deny
compassionate release for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Chambliss,
948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020). “[A] court abuses its discretion if it bases
its decision on an error of law or a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence.” Ibid (quotation omitted).
II.
We first consider whether Escajeda filed a cognizable claim under
§ 3582(c)(1). We (A) discuss the relevant statutory scheme. Then we (B)
hold Escajeda’s claims are not cognizable as a matter of law under
§ 3582(c)(1).
A.
The First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), allows
a prisoner to move for a sentence reduction under certain circumstances. One
such circumstance is when “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant”
a sentence reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). We often refer to this
as “compassionate release” because courts generally use it for prisoners with
severe medical exigencies or infirmities. See Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693
(describing § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) motions as “compassionate release claims”
and suggesting terminal illness may qualify); United States v. Shkambi, 993
2
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No. 21-50870
F.3d 388, 390–92 (5th. Cir. 2021) (detailing the statutory history of
compassionate release).
We understand “extraordinary” to mean “beyond or out of the
common order,” “remarkable,” and synonymous with “singular.”
Extraordinary, Webster’s New International Dictionary 903
(2d. ed. 1934; 1950) (“Webster’s Second”); see also United States v.
Jenkins, 50 F.4th 1185, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (Katsas, J.) (defining
“extraordinary” as “most unusual,” “far from common,” and “having little
or no precedent” (quotation omitted)). “Compelling” is a participle of
“compel,” which means “to drive or urge with force, or irresistibly,” “to
force,” and “to subjugate.” Compel, Webster’s Second, supra, at 544.
These terms explain why prisoners can seek relief under § 3582(c)(1) only
when they face some extraordinarily severe exigency, not foreseeable at the
time of sentencing, and unique to the life of the prisoner. See Chambliss, 948
F.3d at 693 (discussing terminal illness).
Section 3582(c)(1)’s authorization for compassionate release stands in
contradistinction to other statutes that Congress passed to govern prisoners’
postconviction proceedings. In Chapter 153 of Title 28, Congress provided
specific avenues for post-conviction relief that permit prisoners to challenge
the legality of their confinement in federal court. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241,
2244, 2254, 2255. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that by codifying
these specific provisions, Congress required prisoners to bring their legality-
of-custody challenges under Chapter 153 and prohibited prisoners from
bringing such claims under other, more-general statutes like 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See, e.g., Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486 (1973) (noting that
when a prisoner alleges unlawful restraint, “habeas corpus has been accepted
as the specific instrument to obtain release” (emphasis added)); Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481–82 (1994) (holding a prisoner cannot use § 1983
where “establishing the basis for the damages claim necessarily demonstrates
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No. 21-50870
the invalidity of the conviction”); Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81 (2005)
(describing habeas as an “exclusive” remedy for challenging the lawfulness
of imprisonment and indicating that the Supreme Court “has focused on the
need to ensure that state prisoners use only habeas corpus” when they seek
relief from confinement).
Judge Katsas has astutely referred to this as the “habeas-channeling
rule” and held it likewise “forecloses using compassionate release to correct
sentencing errors.” Jenkins, 50 F.4th at 1202. Judge Katsas explained:
The writ of habeas corpus—including section 2255, the habeas
substitute for federal prisoners—traditionally has been
accepted as the specific instrument to obtain release from
unlawful confinement. As a result, an inmate may not rely on a
generally worded statute to attack the lawfulness of his
imprisonment, even if the terms of the statute literally apply.
This includes both direct attacks seeking an injunction
compelling speedier release and indirect attacks seeking a
judicial determination that necessarily implies the
unlawfulness of the [Government]’s custody.
Ibid. (quotation and internal citations omitted). The reason for the habeas-
channeling rule is simple: If a prisoner could avoid the strictures Congress
imposed in Chapter 153 by bringing their release-from-confinement claims
under a different, more general, and more permissive statute, he obviously
would. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 531–32 (2005) (noting the
habeas-channeling rule prevents prisoners from “impermissibly
circumvent[ing] the requirement[s]” Congress imposed in Chapter 153); see
also, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) (limiting a prisoner to one habeas petition); id.
§ 2244(d)(1) (imposing a one-year limitation period); id. § 2255 (imposing
various restrictions on postconviction relief for federal prisoners).
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No. 21-50870
B.
Escajeda’s claims are the province of direct appeal or a § 2255 motion,
not a compassionate release motion. Specifically, he argues that his sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum and that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel. These are quintessential arguments for challenging the fact or
duration of a prisoner’s confinement under Chapter 153. Further, Escajeda
admits in his § 3582(c)(1) motion that he moved for compassionate release
because he worried that he could not win relief under § 2255. The habeas-
channeling rule, however, prevents a prisoner from so easily steering around
Chapter 153’s strictures.
We therefore hold that a prisoner cannot use § 3582(c) to challenge
the legality or the duration of his sentence; such arguments can, and hence
must, be raised under Chapter 153. We join several of our sister circuits in
reaching that result. See Jenkins, 50 F.4th at 1202; United States v. King, 40
F.4th 594, 595 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582, 586
(8th Cir. 2022); United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 567 (6th Cir. 2021).
Because Escajeda’s claims would have been cognizable under § 2255, they
are not cognizable under § 3582(c).
III.
Even assuming Escajeda raised cognizable arguments in his § 3582(c)
motion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting them. On
appeal, Escajeda’s principal argument to the contrary is that the district court
committed procedural error by perfunctorily denying his motion in a one-
page order.
We’ve repeatedly held that perfunctory orders justify a discretionary
decision to deny relief under § 3582(c)(1). See United States v. Shorter, 850 F.
App’x 327, 328 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam); United States v. White, 2022 WL
1699467, *1 (5th. Cir. 2022) (per curiam); United States v. Franco, 2022 WL
5
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No. 21-50870
1316218, *1 (5th. Cir. 2022) (per curiam); see also Chavez-Meza v. United
States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965–66 (2018) (affirming a district court’s brief
denial of a motion under § 3582(c)(2)); Chambliss, 948 F.3d at 693–94
(affirming where a district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors).
In this case, the district court denied Escajeda’s motion for
compassionate release as follows: “After considering the applicable factors
provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and the applicable policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission, the Court DENIES the Defendant’s
Motion on its merits.” ROA.128. The district court thus considered the
applicable factors and denied relief. It did not need to say more.
Nor did it need to say less. Escajeda’s final argument is that the district
court erred by saying it considered “applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.” True, there are no policy statements
applicable to prisoners’ compassionate-release motions. See Shkambi, 993
F.3d at 392. But the district court did not say that it considered or relied on
an inapplicable policy statement; it just said it considered any applicable ones.
And in any event, even if the district court considered an inapplicable policy
statement, it’s harmless error where the court gave due consideration to the
applicable § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Coats, 853 F. App’x 941, 942
(5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam).
AFFIRMED.
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No. 21-50870
Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I write separately to emphasize that nothing in this opinion addressing
federal review of a federal case should be read as addressing the respective
roles of § 1983 and habeas review of state convictions. Heck addresses the
respective roles of § 1983 and writs of habeas corpus challenging state court
judgments.1 In that sense, Heck plays a habeas-channeling role—§ 1983 is not
available to attack the legality of sentences of convicting state courts.2 Here,
Heck has no role to play.
1
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 480 (1994).
2
Id. at 486–87.
7