Opinion

Eric Griffin v. Anthony Ventriere

Court
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Filed
Dec 28, 2022
Status
Unpublished
Nature of suit
NEW
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 22.3%

The opinion

USCA11 Case: 22-11197 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/28/2022 Page: 1 of 8

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-11197

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

ERIC GRIFFIN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

ANTHONY VENTRIERE,

ROBERT BELL,

Detectives,

SHERIFF ORANGE COUNTY, FLORIDA,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

USCA11 Case: 22-11197 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/28/2022 Page: 2 of 8

2 Opinion of the Court 22-11197

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-00737-WWB-LHP

____________________

Before WILSON, JORDAN, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Eric Griffin appeals the district court’s order granting sum-

mary judgment to Detectives Anthony Ventriere and Robert Bell

(Detectives), and Sheriff John Mina based on qualified immunity,

in Griffin’s 10-count malicious prosecution and false arrest suit. Af-

ter careful review of the record, we affirm.

I. Factual Background

Trevor Glover reported to the Orange County Sheriff’s Of-

fice that two men fired handguns at him as he walked towards his

apartment building on April 27, 2016. Ventriere responded to the

scene and corroborated Glover’s story. At the scene, Glover ad-

vised Officer Robert Fischer that “he has never met or saw either

of the men who attacked him, and they did not say anything or

attempt to take any of his possessions.” Glover expressed his belief

that the two men were friends of Gino Nicholas, his girlfriend’s

brother, who had been shot and killed, and that Nicholas’s friends

thought Glover was friendly with Nicholas’s shooter. Glover de-

scribed the perpetrators as two black men, one under six feet tall

and the other six feet and two inches tall.

USCA11 Case: 22-11197 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/28/2022 Page: 3 of 8

22-11197 Opinion of the Court 3

Several hours after the initial interviews, Glover notified

Ventriere that he remembered more information and could iden-

tify the two suspects. Glover then identified Appellant Griffin as

the suspect who shot at him at close range. It is undisputed that

Griffin is six feet and nine inches tall. Thereafter, Glover identified

Griffin in a photograph lineup, stating he was “absolutely sure”

Griffin was the individual who shot at him. Glover also informed

Ventriere of a text message Griffin sent to Glover’s girlfriend on

April 25, 2016, in which Griffin indicated that Glover refused to

look him in the eye at the night club the previous day.

The arrest affidavit that led to Griffin’s arrest warrant did not

include Glover’s initial statement verbatim, nor the height discrep-

ancy, but did state, at first “Mr. Glover was unable to provide any

further information at that time.” The affidavit stated that Glover

was able to remember the shooters after the adrenaline and pain

wore off. It also included that Glover had selected Griffin from a

photograph lineup, the text messages Griffin sent to Glover’s girl-

friend, and an eyewitness account that the shooters fled in a Dodge

Charger. A Florida judge signed an arrest warrant and Griffin was

subsequently arrested by a warrant unit.

During his post arrest interview, Griffin admitted that he

had rented a Dodge Charger and did not know if he returned it

before or after the shooting occurred. Ventriere confirmed the fol-

lowing week, based on information he was unable to obtain the

night he interviewed Griffin, that the car was returned before the

shooting. After FLDE testing of the weapon Griffin had on his

USCA11 Case: 22-11197 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/28/2022 Page: 4 of 8

4 Opinion of the Court 22-11197

person at the time of arrest, it was confirmed it was not the same

gun used in the shooting. Griffin gave an alibi that surveillance

video would show he was at his parents’ house at the time the

shooting occurred, but Ventriere could not remember what he did

with the information Griffin gave him about his parents’ surveil-

lance camera. Ventriere completed the investigation after he re-

ceived search warrants for Griffin’s phone days later. Griffin was

later released.

Griffin filed a ten-count complaint against Ventriere, Bell,

and Sheriff Mina. 1 Counts I and II are claims against Ventriere and

Bell for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts III and IV are

claims against Ventriere and Bell for malicious prosecution under

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Counts V, through VIII are Florida law claims

against Ventriere, Bell, and Mina for false arrest. Counts IX and X

are Florida law claims against Ventriere and Bell for malicious pros-

ecution.

The district court granted summary judgment on qualified

immunity grounds, concluding that Griffin was arrested pursuant

to a valid arrest warrant and therefore cannot assert false arrest,

finding that probable cause or arguable probable cause would have

existed even if the omissions were included in the affidavit. Griffin

timely appealed.

1 Sheriff Mina was sued in his official capacity as the Sheriff of Orange County

for the actions for Ventriere and Bell.

USCA11 Case: 22-11197 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/28/2022 Page: 5 of 8

22-11197 Opinion of the Court 5

II. Standard of Review

We “review[] de novo a district court’s disposition of a sum-

mary judgment motion based on qualified immunity, applying the

same legal standards as the district court.” Durruthy v. Pastor, 351

F.3d 1080, 1084 (11th Cir. 2003). All issues of material fact are re-

solved in favor of the plaintiff, and then, under that version of the

facts, the legal question of whether the defendant is entitled to

qualified immunity is determined. Id.

To receive qualified immunity, a public official must prove

that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority

when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred. Lee v. Ferraro, 284

F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002). We must determine “whether the

act complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within,

or reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of an official’s discre-

tionary duties.” Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295,

1303 (11th Cir. 2006). If the official was acting within his discre-

tionary duties with respect to the claims raised in the complaint,

the burden shifts to the Plaintiff to prove “(1) the defendant[s] vio-

lated a constitutional right, and (2) this right was clearly established

at the time of the alleged violation.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman

v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004).

III. Discussion

Griffin argues on appeal that summary judgment was im-

proper here for two overarching reasons. First, he argues genuine

issues of material fact exist in two instances: (1) as to whether a

USCA11 Case: 22-11197 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/28/2022 Page: 6 of 8

6 Opinion of the Court 22-11197

judge would have signed a warrant if the omitted information was

included, and (2) as to the timing of Griffin’s arrest. Second, he

argues that qualified immunity cannot attach because the defend-

ants withheld exonerating evidence from the arrest warrant and

failed to investigate such evidence. We consider each issue in turn.

Griffin first contends that a jury should decide whether the

omissions from the arrest affidavit would cause a judge not to sign

the warrant. He is mistaken. The standard for determining the

existence of probable cause is the same under both Florida and fed-

eral law. Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998).

The Florida Supreme Court has held that when analyzing alleged

omissions from probable cause affidavits, “(1) the reviewing court

must determine whether the omitted material, if added to the affi-

davit, would have defeated probable cause, and (2) the reviewing

court must find that the omission resulted from intentional or reck-

less police conduct that amounts to deception.” Johnson v. State,

660 So.2d 648, 656 (Fla. 1995) (emphasis added). Further, the pro-

hibition of police officers knowingly making false statements in an

arrest affidavit applies when the resulting affidavit is “insufficient

to establish probable cause” without an officer’s false statements.

United States v. Kirk, 781 F.2d 1498, 1502 (11th Cir. 1986). Here,

the affidavit included enough information to support a warrant.

The detectives relied on text messages suggesting motive, the vic-

tim picking Griffin out of a photo lineup, and an eyewitness state-

ment that the perpetrators fled in a Dodge Charger and knowledge

USCA11 Case: 22-11197 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/28/2022 Page: 7 of 8

22-11197 Opinion of the Court 7

that Griffin was driving a Dodge Charger around the time of the

incident to support a finding of probable cause.

Griffin also argues that his false arrest claim was wrongly

dismissed because there are genuine issues of material fact as to the

timing of the arrest. However, because Griffin was arrested pursu-

ant to a valid arrest warrant, and all questioning by the detectives

occurred subsequent to the lawful arrest, there are no material is-

sues of fact and his false arrest claim was properly dismissed.

Second, Griffin maintains that arguable probable cause does

not exist because reasonable officers in the same circumstances

could not have believed that probable cause existed as to Griffin.

To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983,

Griffin must prove a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to

be free from unreasonable seizures in addition to the elements of

the common law tort of malicious prosecution. Wood v. Kessler,

323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). The elements of malicious pros-

ecution are: “(1) a criminal prosecution instituted or continued by

the present defendant; (2) with malice and without probable cause;

(3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor; and (4) caused

damage to the plaintiff accused.” Id. at 882.

Here, Griffin alleges that the detectives’ disregard of

Glover’s initial statement that he had never met the shooters and

reliance on the subsequent statement where Glover identifies Grif-

fin as the shooter are enough to defeat probable cause. To deter-

mine if probable cause, or arguable probable cause, exists with re-

spect to a malicious prosecution claim, the court looks to the

USCA11 Case: 22-11197 Document: 28-1 Date Filed: 12/28/2022 Page: 8 of 8

8 Opinion of the Court 22-11197

crimes charged in the arrest warrant. Williams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d

1147, 1163–64 (11th Cir. 2020). To succeed, Griffin must also es-

tablish “(1) that the legal process justifying his seizure was consti-

tutionally infirm and (2) that his seizure would not otherwise be

justified without legal process.” Id. at 1165. Griffin cannot meet

this burden, however, because the legal process justifying his sei-

zure was proper. Based on the experience and explanations of the

detectives, sufficient probable cause existed. 2

Because the false arrest claims were properly dismissed and

the detectives demonstrated probable cause for the remaining ma-

licious prosecution claims, we AFFIRM.

AFFIRMED.

2 Griffin also argues that qualified immunity is improper because the detec-

tives failed to investigate readily available exonerating evidence. This argu-

ment fails because the evidence Griffin relies on was obtained after his lawful

arrest and was investigated in a timely manner.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.