James Ernstes v. Printpack, Inc.

FILED

Dec 22, 2022

12:52 PM(CT)

TENNESSEE

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

APPEALS BOARD

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

James Ernstes ) Docket No. 2020-07-0618

)

v. ) State File No. 57198-2020

)

Printpack, Inc., et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard December 2, 2022

Compensation Claims ) in Nashville, Tennessee

Amber E. Luttrell, Judge )

Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part, Reversed in Part, and Remanded

In this compensation appeal, the employer alleges the trial court erred both in denying its

post-trial motion to re-open the proof as well as in finding the claim compensable despite

its notice defense. The employee asserted he sustained work-related hearing loss after

working forty-seven years for the employer around loud machinery. The employer denied

the claim on the basis that the employee failed to give proper notice of his injury, asserting

the employee knew or should have known he suffered work-related hearing loss years

before his last day of employment with the employer. The employee asserted that he was

aware he had hearing loss but believed it to be age related until he met with his attorney in

August 2020. Following a compensation hearing but before the trial court issued its

compensation order, the employer filed a motion seeking permission to re-open the proof

and file a post-hearing brief based on new information it learned during the hearing that

contradicted the employee’s written discovery responses. The trial court denied the

employer’s motion and determined the employee provided timely notice of his hearing loss

injury once he discovered his hearing loss was work-related. The employer has appealed

both orders. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we reverse the order denying

Employer’s post-trial motion. We affirm the trial court’s compensation order with respect

to the issue of notice, but, due to the reversal of the order addressing the post-trial motion,

we vacate the award of benefits pending further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Judge Pele I. Godkin delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in which Presiding Judge

Timothy W. Conner and Judge Meredith B. Weaver joined.

Gregory H. Fuller and Adam C. Brock-Dagnan, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the employer-

appellant, Printpack, Inc.

1

Jeffrey Boyd, Jackson, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, James Ernstes

Factual and Procedural Background

James Ernstes (“Employee”) sustained work-related hearing loss after being

exposed to loud noise during his forty-seven years of employment with Printpack, Inc.

(“Employer”). Prior to working for Employer, Employee served four years in the Air Force

as an electrical engineer for diesel engines. Employee was exposed to loud noise as an

engineer and was later awarded a service disability rating for his hearing loss sustained

while in the military. 1

While working for Employer, Employee worked in a multitude of positions. He

testified that, when required, he wore hearing protection and participated in hearing

screenings at work. Although hearing test results were provided to him, Employee testified

the results were never explained to him, and he was never advised to seek medical attention

for hearing loss. 2

Employee testified that he first began to notice hearing issues when he had to

regularly turn up the volume of his television. He stated that he also had difficulty

understanding what people were saying if they had their back to him and had trouble

hearing high-pitched sounds. Employee ascribed these symptoms to aging. On December

7, 2018, Employee was evaluated by Dr. Keith Wainscott, an ear, nose, and throat

specialist, who diagnosed Employee with probable acute viral labyrinthitis, inner ear

dysfunction, and sensorineural hearing loss. Imaging revealed a cholesteatoma, which was

surgically removed in October 2019. 3

On August 3, 2020, Employee was terminated from his employment. Shortly

thereafter, on August 12, 2020, Employee met with counsel regarding a separate alleged

work-related injury. During this meeting, Employee discussed his issues with hearing loss

and came to believe his hearing loss was work-related. Employee testified that, prior to

this meeting, he thought his hearing issues were caused by aging. Subsequently, counsel

provided Employer with notice of Employee’s work-related hearing loss on August 19,

2020. A First Report of Injury was completed on August 28, 2020, and Employee filed his

petition for benefit determination on November 18, 2020.

1

Employee received medical treatment, including hearing aids, for his service-related hearing loss through

the Veterans Administration.

2

It is undisputed by the parties that annual hearing tests conducted by Employer demonstrated gradual

hearing loss.

3

According to medical testimony given by deposition, “a cholesteatoma is a benign growth inside the ear.

It enlarges over time . . . [t]hey gradually enlarge, and they can erode structures around it.”

2

In May 2021, Employee was seen by Dr. Karl Studtmann, an otolaryngologist.

During that visit, Employee stated he had no family history of hearing loss and his hearing

was “normal” when he started working for Employer. Dr. Studtmann noted Employee had

been diagnosed with a cholesteatoma and underwent surgery to correct the condition. Dr.

Studtmann performed an audiogram, which revealed a “downsloping high frequency

sensorineural or nerve type hearing loss.”

On November 15, 2021, at Employer’s request, Employee was examined by Dr.

Rande H. Lazar. Medical records reflect Employee had “hearing loss, tinnitus and

dizziness. He said he was exposed to loud noises at work for many years.” A hearing test

was performed and revealed that Employee had “sloping notched pattern hearing loss

consistent with noise exposure with greater than 40 years on his job.” The doctor noted

Employee wore hearing aids and opined “[t]his is probably job related.” Dr. Lazar stated

he would see Employee back as needed.

On November 17, 2021, the parties took Dr. Studtmann’s deposition. During his

deposition, Dr. Studtmann was asked to compare the audiogram performed by Dr.

Wainscott in 2018 to the one he performed in 2021. In doing so, he noted no conductive

hearing loss on the audiogram and testified that imaging indicated “there was not any

significant hearing loss from the cholesteatoma.” Dr. Studtmann also reviewed

Employee’s hearing screen data from 1997 through 2019. When asked to explain the

difference between a hearing screen and audiogram, he testified that a “hearing screen

tends to be more inaccurate. It’s not considered a formal audiogram. Hearing screens are

not considered adequate for assessing disability.” Dr. Studtmann noted that hearing

screens are “fairly good at giving trends. In this case we’ve got tests from over 22 years

which is enough to give you a trend.” Dr. Studtmann was asked to provide his opinion as

to the primary cause of Employee’s hearing loss, based upon his review of this data,

Employee’s physical examination, and the audiogram performed in his office. In response,

he testified that, “[g]iven the primary source of noise exposure during that time period was

through his place of employment, that’s likely the primary cause of his hearing loss in that

time period.”

When questioned further with regard to causation during cross-examination, Dr.

Studtmann stated:

Given that he had continued hearing loss throughout his time of noise

exposure at his place of employment, given that he had findings consistent

with noise exposure, given that he had a noise notch, that, yes, there’s a

reasonable medical certainty that this is from the noise exposure at his place

of employment. He had continued hearing loss. He had a noise notch. He

had continued noise exposure during that time period.

3

Dr. Studtmann testified Employee would retain a 9% whole person impairment rating

based upon the American Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent

Impairment, Sixth Edition.

A compensation hearing was held on July 7, 2022. During the hearing, Employee

testified that he initially attributed his hearing issues to aging and had no knowledge his

hearing loss was work-related until after meeting with his attorney. After learning of the

possible connection between his hearing loss and his employment, Employee provided

notice to Employer within one week. When questioned on direct examination, Employee

also testified that he was currently employed and had been working part-time. During

cross-examination, Employee asserted that, although he worked around a trash compactor

in his current job, he was not exposed to loud noises.

Four days after the compensation hearing, on July 11, Employer filed a motion to

submit a post-hearing brief and, in effect, re-open the proof. 4 In support of its motion,

Employer noted that Employee testified at trial he had been employed for over one year

with a different company after leaving his employment with Employer, which was contrary

to his discovery responses. Employer asserted that Employee’s failure to disclose or

supplement this information prejudiced its investigation of the claim and its ability to raise

applicable defenses, including the last injurious exposure rule. Employee filed a response

in opposition to Employer’s motion, arguing that Employer had the opportunity to question

Employee with regard to his current employment at trial. Further, Employee contended

during cross-examination at trial that he is not exposed to loud noise at his current

employment. Finally, Employee asserted that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-

304, upon which Employer relied in its post-hearing motion, addresses the last injurious

exposure rule in the context of occupational diseases, and hearing loss is defined as an

injury or personal injury pursuant to statute. As a result, Employee argued that the statute

relied upon by Employer is inapplicable to the facts of this case.

On August 5, 2022, the trial court issued a compensation order concluding

Employee had established by a preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a

compensable hearing loss injury. Specifically, pursuant to Tennessee’s “discovery rule,”

the court noted Employee provided notice of his injury to Employer within fifteen days of

when he knew or reasonably should have known he had suffered a work-related injury that

resulted in permanent physical impairment. The trial court also determined Employee’s

claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. In doing so, the court noted Employee’s

last day of work, August 3, 2020, was the last time Employee was exposed to any injurious

work activity. Thus, the court concluded Employee’s date of injury was August 3, 2020.

4

Although Employer did not title its motion as one to re-open the proof, the prayer for relief included a

request to “grant Employer additional time to develop and investigate this defense before issuing a final

determination.” In his written response, Employee acknowledged that the post-trial motion was “to re-open

the proof.”

4

The court next addressed the causation opinion provided by Dr. Studtmann. Dr.

Studtmann opined that Employee’s noise exposure while working for Employer was

“likely the primary cause” of Employee’s hearing loss. The court noted Employer offered

no conflicting medical proof, and, as a result, it determined Employee had proven his

hearing loss arose primarily out of and in the course and scope of his employment with

Employer. The court awarded benefits based upon the nine percent impairment rating

assigned by Dr. Studtmann.

Given that the time period for payment of an original award had expired at the time

the petition was filed, Employee also asserted he was entitled to increased benefits pursuant

to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-207(3)(B) based on his age and work status as

of the date the original compensation period ended. The trial court noted that the only

proof offered was Employee’s uncontroverted testimony that he was terminated from

employment after sustaining a separate, unrelated injury. Employer offered no proof on

this issue and made no argument disputing Employee’s entitlement to increased benefits if

Employee’s claim was deemed to be compensable. As a result, the court concluded

Employee was entitled to increased benefits, and it awarded lifetime future medical

benefits made reasonably necessary by the injury. Finally, the court ordered Employer to

offer a panel of physicians for Employee to select an authorized treating physician for

future medical care related to the work injury.

That same day, the trial court issued a separate order denying Employer’s motion to

re-open the proof and submit a post-hearing brief. 5 In doing so, the trial court noted that

Employer did not cite any authority in support of its motion. Further, the court agreed with

Employee that Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-304 does not apply because, under

Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12) and applicable Tennessee precedent,

noise-induced hearing loss is considered a gradually-occurring cumulative trauma injury,

not an occupational disease. Finally, the court noted that Employer had an opportunity to

“thoroughly” examine Employee regarding his current employment at trial and never raised

an objection during the compensation hearing regarding Employee’s failure to disclose that

employment. Employer has appealed both orders.

Standard of Review

We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing a trial court’s ruling on post-

hearing motions to re-open the proof. Simpson v. Frontier Cmty. Credit Union, 810 S.W.2d

147, 149 (Tenn. 1991). A trial court abuses its discretion when it causes an injustice by

applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.

5

The trial court’s compensation order was issued the same day as its order denying Employer’s post-trial

motion. Because these two orders, together, resolved all issues in the case, and because both orders were

appealed, we consider them contemporaneously in this appeal.

5

Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Tenn. 2011). The abuse of discretion

standard “does not permit an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial

court.” Id. Moreover, pursuant to the abuse of discretion standard, “the appellate court

should presume the [trial court’s] decision is correct and should review the evidence in the

light most favorable to the decision.” Id. at 105-06. The standard we apply in reviewing

the trial court’s decision also presumes that the court’s factual findings are correct unless

the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7)

(2022). When the trial judge has had the opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and

to hear in-court testimony, we give considerable deference to factual findings made by the

trial court. Madden v. Holland Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009).

We are also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes

“fairly, impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and

in a way that does not favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-

6-116 (2022).

Analysis

On appeal, Employer presents two issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in its

compensation hearing order in concluding Employee gave timely notice of his hearing loss,

as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-201(b); and (2) whether the trial

court abused its discretion in denying Employer’s post-hearing motion concerning

Employer’s discovery of new and material evidence.

Compensation Order

With respect to notice, Employer asserts Employee did not provide timely notice of

his gradually occurring work-related hearing loss. As relevant to this case, Tennessee Code

Annotated section 50-6-201(b) states:

In those cases where the injuries occur as the result of gradual or cumulative

events or trauma, then the injured employee or the injured employee’s

representatives shall provide notice of the injury to the employer within

fifteen (15) days after the employee:

(1) Knows or reasonably should know that the employee has

suffered a work-related injury that has resulted in permanent

physical impairment.

Employee met with counsel on August 12, 2020, and testified that this was the first time

his hearing loss and its potential correlation to his work were discussed. Notice was

provided to Employer on August 19, 2020, and a First Report of Injury was completed on

August 28, 2020.

6

Employer asserts Employee knew or should have known he had a work-related

hearing loss prior to his last day of employment. Employee admitted he previously had

received a disability award as a result of the hearing loss he sustained while serving in the

military. Moreover, he acknowledged he began having trouble hearing “eight to ten years

ago.” He testified that he saw a VA physician for hearing aids in 2018 and had left ear

surgery in 2019. However, he stated that he believed at that time his hearing issues were

related to age. In addition, Employee testified that although Employer provided him with

the results of his hearing screens, he did not look at them, and no one from Employer

explained the results to him or advised him to see a doctor.

The court noted that Employer performed hearing screens of its employees on an

annual basis and, although the screens had lines for an employee’s signature at the bottom

of the documents, none were signed by Employee. Further, some reports indicated a

“standard threshold shift” but also included a statement that read, “there can be many

reasons for a change in hearing, including medication, test problems, exposure to noise

while not wearing hearing protection, or ear problems such as wax or infection.” As such,

the court concluded this statement “would not reasonably lead” Employee to believe his

change in hearing could be related to work. 6 We agree.

Here, Employee worked for Employer for forty-seven years, and it is undisputed he

was exposed to loud noise during that time. Employee testified that he did not view his

hearing screen results and attributed his hearing issues to aging. The trial court found

Employee to be credible and determined, based upon the evidence at trial, that Employee

did not know or could not reasonably have known that his hearing loss was related to

employment until after he met with counsel. Following this meeting, Employee provided

notice within fifteen days of the discovery of his work-related condition. We conclude the

preponderance of the evidence presented at trial supports this finding. Thus, we discern no

error with the trial court’s determination that Employee provided timely notice of his work-

related hearing loss, and we affirm that finding. However, due to our resolution of

Employer’s appeal of the trial court’s order denying its post-trial motion, we vacate the

remainder of the compensation hearing order and remand the case.

Denial of Employer’s Post-Hearing Motion

The second issue we consider is the trial court’s denial of Employer’s post-hearing

motion. In support of its motion to file a post-hearing brief, Employer referenced testimony

elicited from Employee concerning his subsequent employment. Specifically, Employer

noted that on February 4, 2021, Employee provided discovery responses, signed under

oath, which included the following response to Interrogatory No. 15:

6

Certain reports did not include any statement addressing possible causes of hearing loss, and a 2017 report

specifically stated that his hearing loss was not related to workplace exposure but was age-related.

7

15. Have you worked at all in any capacity for any employer on any date

after your hearing loss? Unless your answer is an unqualified no,

please list the employer’s name, date of interview, date of job offer,

date of acceptance, hourly wage, and supervisor’s name and address.

ANSWER: No.

Approximately seventeen months later, Employee testified at trial that he had been

employed for over one year. 7 During oral argument, counsel for Employee acknowledged

an ongoing duty to supplement discovery responses in certain circumstances, see Tenn. R.

Civ. P. 26.05(2), but stated that the first time he had knowledge of Employee’s post-

termination employment was during Employee’s testimony at the compensation hearing.

Employer contends that, due to Employee’s failure to timely disclose this information, it

was prejudiced in its investigation of the claim and its ability to raise applicable defenses.

Specifically, Employer contends Employee’s new employment creates a question of fact

that implicates Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-304. 8

While motions to re-open the proof are often treated by courts as motions to alter or

amend a judgment filed pursuant to Rule 59.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure,

that rule is inapplicable in this case because the motion was filed before the trial court had

issued its decision. See Byrnes v. Byrnes, 390 S.W.3d 269, 277 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012)

(“[T]he court erred in evaluating the motion to set aside as a motion made pursuant to Tenn.

R. Civ. P. 59. It was not; we again stress that Rule 59 does not come into play until a trial

court has entered a final judgment.”). Thus, we examine Employer’s post-trial motion to

file a supplemental brief, which the parties agree should be treated as a motion to re-open

the proof, as a motion filed pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 7.02. That rule

states, in pertinent part that “[a]n application to the court for an order shall be by motion

which, unless made during a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing, shall state with

particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set forth the relief or order sought.” Tenn. R.

Civ. P. 7.02(1).

A trial court’s rulings on such motions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. As

the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained:

7

It is unclear from the record whether Employee’s subsequent employment began before or after his signed

interrogatory responses were served on Employer. During cross-examination, Employee estimated he had

been working “about a year and a half maybe.” If that testimony is accurate, his subsequent employment

would have begun prior to the serving of his interrogatory responses.

8

During oral argument, Employer’s counsel acknowledged that hearing loss is not an occupational disease

subject to the provisions of Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-304 but argued that gradually-

occurring hearing loss is subject to Tennessee’s last injurious injury rule.

8

[P]ermitting additional proof, after a party has announced that proof is

closed, is within the discretion of the trial court, and unless it appears that its

action in that regard has permitted injustice, its exercise of discretion will not

be disturbed on appeal.

It is within the discretion of the trial judge whether to reopen the proof for

further evidence, and the decision of the trial judge thereon will not be set

aside unless there is a showing that an injustice has been done.

....

This rule, in our opinion, was adopted to promote the discretion of the trial

judge in directing the course of a trial. The ascertainment of the truth and a

just determination of the respective rights of the parties insofar as this can be

accomplished consistent with rules essential to the administration of justice[]

is the purpose of all judicial inquiry. . . . [T]he function of a judge of a law

court is not limited to that of a mere referee or umpire between contestants

in a game of skill. Upon the contrary, in many respects he has wide discretion

to be exercised in the promotion of the purpose for which the trial is had. . . .

Simpson, 810 S.W.2d at 149-150 (citations omitted). The Court went on to observe that

the “Rules of Civil Procedure are not intended as a trap for the unwary, but as a means of

‘secur[ing] the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Id. at 150

(citation omitted).

As noted above, a trial court abuses its discretion when it causes an injustice by

applying an incorrect legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.

Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d at 105. The abuse of discretion standard “does not permit an

appellate court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.” Id. Moreover, pursuant

to the abuse of discretion standard, “the appellate court should presume the [trial court’s]

decision is correct and should review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

decision.” Id. at 105-06.

Although Employer styled its motion as a request for supplemental briefing, the

substance of the motion reveals that it is, in fact, a request to re-open the proof based on its

assertion that it was prejudiced due to newly discovered information at trial. In its order

denying Employer’s motion, the trial court first emphasized that Employer did not cite any

authority in support of its motion. While the citation of supporting authority is always

preferable in support of any motion, we conclude Employer’s omission of a rule reference

in this circumstance is not fatal to its motion.

9

The court next considered Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-304, which

governs occupational diseases and which Employer cited, and concluded it was

inapplicable to the facts of this case. In doing so, the court observed that the injury alleged

by Employee, namely, work-related hearing loss, is included in the definition of injury

located in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12) (“‘Injury’ and ‘personal injury’

mean an injury by accident, a mental injury, occupational disease including diseases of the

heart, lung and hypertension, or cumulative trauma conditions including hearing loss . . . .”

(Emphasis added.)).

While we agree that section 50-6-304 is inapplicable to hearing loss cases,

Tennessee law is clear that gradually occurring work-related hearing loss has been

evaluated in the context of Tennessee’s last injurious injury rule. See, e.g., Smallen v.

Arvinmeritor, Inc., No. E2007-02179-WC-R3-WC, 2009 Tenn. LEXIS 39, at *7 (Tenn.

Workers’ Comp. Panel Mar. 5, 2009) (“Although hearing loss is not an occupational

disease, a similar rule, referred to as the last injurious injury rule, applies to gradually

occurring injuries.”). 9 Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-102(12)(A),

the court must still consider whether Employee’s hearing loss arose primarily from his

employment with Employer. Relevant to that determination is whether Employee suffered

any subsequent injurious noise exposure. Because Employee failed to disclose his new

employment until the trial, Employer had no opportunity to investigate whether and to what

extent the new employment may have impacted his work-related hearing loss. In learning

this information for the first time at trial, especially when the same issue was addressed in

written discovery, Employer was deprived of any opportunity to consider and present

rebuttal testimony or other evidence material and relevant to the issue.

The trial court relied on Employee’s testimony at trial to conclude it had sufficient

information to determine Employee’s hearing loss arose primarily from his employment

with Employer. However, regardless of the extent to which Employer was able to cross-

examine Employee regarding the conditions of his new employment, it was unable to

investigate the circumstances of that employment or whether Employee’s current

employment aggravated his hearing loss. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court abused

its discretion and caused an injustice to Employer by denying it any opportunity to present

additional evidence once Employee’s new testimony was elicited at trial. We therefore

reverse the court’s order denying Employer’s motion and remand the case for the trial court

to re-open discovery and/or proof for some reasonable amount of time, as determined by

the trial court, solely to address the limited issue of whether Employee’s subsequent

employment impacted his work-related hearing loss claim.

9

Given that this issue remains undeveloped at this stage of the case, we offer no opinion at this time

regarding whether Tennessee’s last injurious injury rule remains viable following the passage of the 2013

Workers’ Compensation Reform Act.

10

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the portion of the trial court’s compensation

order concluding Employee provided timely notice, but we vacate the remainder of the

compensation order. We reverse the trial court’s order denying Employer’s post-trial

motion. We remand the matter for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs

on appeal are taxed to Employer.

11

TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD

James Ernstes ) Docket No. 2020-07-0618

)

v. ) State File No. 57198-2020

)

Printpack, Inc., et al. )

)

)

Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) Heard December 2, 2022

Compensation Claims ) in Nashville, Tennessee

Amber E. Luttrell, Judge )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the referenced

case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service on this the 22nd

day of December, 2022.

Name Certified First Class Via Via Sent to:

Mail Mail Fax Email

Adam C. Brock-Dagnan X acbrock-dagnan@mijs.com

ghfuller@mijs.com

Jeffrey P. Boyd X jboyd@borenandboyd.com

scallison@borenandboyd.com

Amber E. Luttrell, Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail

Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X penny.patterson-shrum@tn.gov

Workers’ Compensation Claims

Olivia Yearwood

Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board

220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B

Nashville, TN 37243

Telephone: 615-253-1606

Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov