explaining “when [a] choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite” (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 , 221–22 (1952))
How later courts described this case
- explaining “when [a] choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite” (quoting United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218 , 221–22 (1952))
- holding that by using the term “affecting . . . commerce,” “ ‘Congress did not define the crime described in [18 U. S. C.] § 844(i) as the explosion of a building whose damage or destruction might affect interstate commerce,’” and noting that the Court must look to other “qualifying language” in the provision to define the offense
- explaining that the different outcomes in the two cases resulted from factual differences in how the buildings were used—in Russell as a rental property and in Jones as a private residence—and not from legal differences in the meaning of “used in interstate . . . commerce”
- holding that federal arson statute does not encompass burning of owner-occupied residence not used for any commercial activity
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice Thomas,
with whom Justice Scalia joins, concurring.
In joining the Court’s opinion, I express no view on the question whether the federal arson statute, 18 U. S. C. § 844 (i) (1994 ed., Supp. IV), as there construed, is constitutional in its application to all buildings used for commercial activities.