holding that “[a]t a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that [an] official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “[a]t a minimum, a § 1983 plaintiff must show that [an] official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers”
- noting that an official may be held liable for failure to supervise and control subordinates even though the official was not directly involved in the specific incident of misconduct
- “The jury could have believed that Locke displayed deliberate indifference to Hick’s serious medical needs both by failing to address them herself and by implicitly authorizing, approving, or knowingly acquiescing in the unconstitutional conduct Of others”
- “It is clear that a private entity which contracts with the state to perform a traditional state function such as providing medical services to prison in-manes may be sued under § 1983 as one acting ‘under color of state law.’ ”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by Christine Warren v. Prison Health Services, Inc., 576 F. App'x 545 (2014)
992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993), abrogated on other grounds by Warren v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 576 F. App’x 545
The opinion
RYAN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Although I agree in large part with the majority opinion, I am constrained to register my respectful disagreement with that part of the opinion upholding the judgment against Richard Frey. I therefore "write separately.
In concluding that there was sufficient evidence that Frey was deliberately indifferent to Hicks’s serious medical needs, the majority opinion relies, appropriately to be sure, on Hays v. Jefferson County, 668 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 833 , 103 S.Ct. 75 , 74 L.Ed.2d 73 (1982), in which this court held that in order for liability to lie in this type of case, a plaintiff must show that a prison official “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it. At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official ... implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional con-duct____” Id. at 874 (emphasis added). The majority opinion nonetheless postulates, despite acknowledging that “[t]he case with respect to Frey is much closer because he had little direct, personal contact with Hicks,” op. at 1457, that a jury could.have concluded Frey was required to act and inquire into Hicks’s condition in order to avoid a constitutional violation. I, however, find no basis in existing law for imposing this type of affirmative obligation on a prison official. It resonates, in fact, of the type of negligence standard which courts are prohibited from imposing.
Hicks produced no evidence that Frey was aware of the violations Hicks asserts were occurring. The only evidence of knowledge that the majority opinion identifies is one statement by Frey that Hicks’s condition and complaints “were daily topics of conversation.” This statement certainly raises suspicions about the nature and extent of Frey’s knowledge about Hicks’s condition. 1 However, it requires a considerable leap to conclude that the complaints to which Frey referred were complaints concerning acts or omissions amounting to unconstitutional conduct. Thus, even considering this statement, I do not think, that Hicks met his burden. The law, in my view, requires, at the very least, that a plaintiff produce, for example, the testimony of even one guard that Frey was informed of Hicks’s problems, or evidence that Hicks had complained to Frey, or any evidence at all tending to show that Frey had specific knowledge of constitutional violations.
This Hicks entirely failed to do. I therefore must respectfully dissent only from that portion of the majority opinion in which it affirms the judgment with regard to Frey.