explaining that “[bjefore it was amended in 1987, [29 U.S.C. § 1113] contained a constructive knowledge provision, stating that the three-year limitations period began when a plaintiff ‘could reasonably be expected to have obtained knowledge’ from certain reports filed with the Secretary of Labor” (citing removed statutory language)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that “[bjefore it was amended in 1987, [29 U.S.C. § 1113] contained a constructive knowledge provision, stating that the three-year limitations period began when a plaintiff ‘could reasonably be expected to have obtained knowledge’ from certain reports filed with the Secretary of Labor” (citing removed statutory language)
- finding that renewal of a contract gave rise to a new independent cause of action because to relegate the date of accrual to the first date the contract was agreed upon would ignore “the continuing nature of a trustee’s duty under ERISA to review plan investments and eliminate imprudent ones”
- stating that “it is not necessary for a potential plaintiff to have knowledge of every last detail of a transaction, or knowledge of its illegality” for the actual knowledge requirement to be satisfied
- stating that before it was amended in 1987, § 1113 contained a constructive knowledge provision
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RIPPLE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join the judgment of the court and the essential reasoning of the principal opinion. Because the elements of laches have not been met in the case before us, there is no necessity to confront definitively whether such a defense is ever available when the Secretary of Labor brings an ERISA action. I note, however, that it would be an overreaction to read the principal opinion as suggesting the inevitability of a holding that the doctrine of laches does apply. As the principal opinion notes, there are several good reasons that justify treating the ERISA situation as substantially different from EEOC cases.