finding that in-house counsel’s responsibility regarding advising his employer on “a gamut of legal issues, including contracts, marketing, and employment[]” constituted the sort of competitive decision-making which warrants non-disclosure
How later courts described this case
- finding that in-house counsel’s responsibility regarding advising his employer on “a gamut of legal issues, including contracts, marketing, and employment[]” constituted the sort of competitive decision-making which warrants non-disclosure
- affirming the district court's finding that " '[p]laintiffs may not claim copyright protection of an ... expression that is, if not standard, then commonplace in the computer software industry.' "
- affirming district court’s finding that “[plaintiffs may not claim copyright protection of an ... expression that is, if not standard, *536 then commonplace in the computer software industry”
- finding balancing test will best resolve discovery disputes relating to protection of trade secrets
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SNEED, Senior Circuit Judge,
Concurring Separately:
I concur in Parts I and III of Judge Tang’s opinion, and in the judgment with respect to Part II.
My difference as to Part II is rooted in my belief that Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.1990), provides a poor analytic structure by which to determine the substantial similarity of an allegedly infringing computer program. This is a message already dispatched by District Judge Orrick of the Northern District of California in Broderbund Software Inc. v. Unison World Inc., 648 F.Supp. 1127, 1136 (1986). He preferred Circuit Judge Becker’s approach in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S.Ct. 877 , 93 L.Ed.2d 831 (1987). That approach was described by Judge Or-rick as “an integrated substantial similarity test pursuant to which both lay and expert testimony would be admissible.” Broderbund, 648 F.Supp. at 1136 .
*1479 I remain convinced, however, that even were we to travel the road pointed to by Judge Orrick, we would end up precisely where we now are. The trip would be unnecessary; therefore, I concur in the result reached in Part II.