finding that [while] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not have express language authorizing a federal court to enjoin a state court, it had a detailed legislative history demonstrating an intent of interposing the federal courts between improper state action and the people when state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals
How later courts described this case
- finding that [while] 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not have express language authorizing a federal court to enjoin a state court, it had a detailed legislative history demonstrating an intent of interposing the federal courts between improper state action and the people when state courts were being used to harass and injure individuals
- explaining that exceptions to Younger apply when (1) prosecution will cause “great and immediate” irreparable injury; (2) the state law at issue flagrantly and patently violates the federal constitution; (3) there is a showing of bad faith or harassment; or (4) other unusual circumstances exist that require equitable relief
- holding that while § 1983 constitutes an exception to the anti-injunction statute, the Court did not “question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding”
- explaining that “[t]he very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people's federal rights–to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color of state law”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Reported overruled by Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522 (1987) — not on the Supreme Court's list
” Id. n. 14 (emphasis added) (citing Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880) and Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), overruled by Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 107 S.Ct. 1391, 94 L.Ed.2d 533 (1987)).
Distinguished
Distinguished by Roberts v. American Bank & Trust Co., 835 F. Supp. 2d 183 (2011)
Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiffs response, arguing that the precedent set by Mitchum is inapplicable to the case at bar.
Distinguished by Halstead, Fauss & Potter, Inc. v. Murphy, 348 F. Supp. 380 (1972)
The case of Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (decided June 19, 1972), is distinguishable.
The opinion
Mr.. .Chief Justice Burger,
with whom Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Blackmun join, concurring.
I concur in the opinion of . the Court and add a few words to emphasize what the Court is and is not de-ckling today as I read the opinion. The Court holds *244 only tliat 28 U. S. C. § 2283 , which is art absolute bar to injunctions against state court proceedings in most suits, does not apply to a suit brought under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 seeking an injunction of state proceedings. But, as the Court’s opinion has noted, it does nothing to “question or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity, and federalism that must restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding.” Ante, at 243. In the context of pending state criminal proceedings, we held in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), that these principles allow a federal court properly to issue an injunction in only a narrow class of circumstances. .We have not yet reached or decided’ exactly how great a restraint is imposed by these principles on a federal court.asked to enjoin state civil proceedings. Therefore, on remand in this case, it seems to me the District Court, before reaching, a decision on the merits of appellant’s claim, should properly consider whether general notions of equity or .principles of federalism, similar to those invoked in Younger , prevent the issuance of. an injunction against the state “nuisance abatement” proceedings in the circumstances of this case.