affirming denial of Rule 11 sanctions because “[i]t would be particularly difficult to fault plaintiffs for a lack of prefiling inquiry when, as here, defendants have refused plaintiffs access to material information that would bear on certain allegations made in the complaint”
How later courts described this case
- affirming denial of Rule 11 sanctions because “[i]t would be particularly difficult to fault plaintiffs for a lack of prefiling inquiry when, as here, defendants have refused plaintiffs access to material information that would bear on certain allegations made in the complaint”
- “It would be particularly difficult to fault plaintiffs for a lack of prefiling inquiry when, as here, defendants have refused plaintiffs access to material information that *340 would bear on certain allegations made in the complaint.”
- “[A] breach of fiduciary duty alone, without the ‘something more’ of fraudulent intent, cannot constitute mail fraud.”
- “breach of a fiduciary duty alone, without the ‘something more’ of fraudulent intent, cannot constitute mail fraud”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
KRUPANSKY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the disposition of the instant case, but write separately to express my view that state courts possess concurrent jurisdiction in civil RICO cases. See Chivas Products Ltd. v. Owen, 864 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir.1988) (Krupansky, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the state court in the instant case possessed jurisdiction, the removal to federal court was proper and this court need not address the waiver analysis in the majority’s opinion, predicated on Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699 , 92 S.Ct. 1344 , 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
Although I adhere to a jurisdictional rationale different from that of the majority, I concur in the majority’s analysis of the merits of the case and, accordingly, I concur in the disposition.