noting that 25 percent contingency fee is “a starting point for the court’s analysis . . . [but] not to be viewed as per se reasonable” and that deductions are appropriate in “situations in which counsel would otherwise enjoy a windfall 5 because of either an inordinately large benefit award or from minimal effort expended”
How later courts described this case
- noting that 25 percent contingency fee is “a starting point for the court’s analysis . . . [but] not to be viewed as per se reasonable” and that deductions are appropriate in “situations in which counsel would otherwise enjoy a windfall 5 because of either an inordinately large benefit award or from minimal effort expended”
- defining a windfall as resulting from "either an inordinately large benefit award or from minimal effort expended," and noting that "with the best of will on the part of the claimant's lawyer, these disability cases are frequently drawn out over a considerable period of time."
- justifying reductions from a 25 percent contingency based on “improper conduct or ineffectiveness of counsel” or “situations in which counsel would otherwise enjoy a windfall because of either an inordinately large benefit award or from minimal effort expended.”
- noting that when evaluating a petition for fees under § 406(b), the court “should [] look to whether a fee agreement has been executed by the claimant and the claimant’s attorney”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ENGEL, Chief Judge.
I fully join Judge Guy in his opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. I also join Judge Wellford in his separate opinion except to the extent it appears to advocate the use of a benchmark, albeit at a reduced percentage. While sympathetic with the motives of the majority of the court in seeking to employ a benchmark approach, I believe this is a matter for the Congress, or the Secretary, if the Congress sees fit to delegate that responsibility.