addressing contract that only contained terms required by statute rather than any negotiated agreement; as compared to Section 42 that provides a floor regarding affordability requirements that parties—like Defendants—may negotiate to make more stringent
How later courts described this case
- addressing contract that only contained terms required by statute rather than any negotiated agreement; as compared to Section 42 that provides a floor regarding affordability requirements that parties—like Defendants—may negotiate to make more stringent
- holding ’’[s]tatutory intent, therefore, is more relevant to the interpretation of these conditions than are common law contract principles”
- in a federal scholarship program, holding that principles of statutory interpretation rather than contract law governed where parties’ obligations stemmed from a statute, not a negotiated agreement, contract contained no terms that were not in the statute, and statute contained obligations beyond contract terms
- “the plain language of the statute demonstrates that Congress did not intend that contract principles govern the interpretation of the relationship between the Secretary and a scholarship recipient”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
SKOPIL, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the court’s decision. I write separately only to express my opinion that this case should be remanded to the agency for its limited consideration of a waiver pursuant to section 254o (c)(3).
We properly conclude that Rendleman breached his contract. We also note, however, that he established a medical clinic in a poverty area of Portland that was eventually designated as an HMSA. This circumstance apparently led the district court to conclude that Rendleman’s service at the Eastside Community Clinic, although technically not in compliance with the NHSC contract, nevertheless fulfilled Rendleman’s obligations under the Act. Rendleman v. Heckler, 653 F.Supp. 316, 320 (D.Or.1986).
The record does not indicate that the agency has considered crediting Rendleman with his service at the Eastside Community Clinic by waiving all or part of his obligation. I would include in our remand order a direction to the district court to return this case to the agency for that limited determination.