holding, without examining § 201(c)(2), that a “contingency fee arrangement is not per se impermissible,” and relying on the safeguards of cross-examination and jury instruction to “ferret out-any false testimony”
How later courts described this case
- holding, without examining § 201(c)(2), that a “contingency fee arrangement is not per se impermissible,” and relying on the safeguards of cross-examination and jury instruction to “ferret out-any false testimony”
- recognizing that there is no federal requirement of corroboration of an informant's testimony -11- provided the testimony is not "incredible or insubstantial on its face" (internal quotations omitted)
- recognizing that there is no federal requirement of corroboration of an informant’s testimony provided the testimony is not “incredible or insubstantial on its face” (internal quotations omitted)
- concluding that "[t]he evidence against the two defendants was very strong if the jury believed [the lengthy testimony of the witness who made the improper remark]"
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WISDOM, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result and in almost all of the language of the opinion. I disagree only with certain language that might imply a retreat from this Court’s holding in United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir.1985).