holding that a consent order entered by a state court in Texas requiring the dismissal of an action in a United States District Court in Tennessee must be accorded full faith and credit in the federal forum
How later courts described this case
- holding that a consent order entered by a state court in Texas requiring the dismissal of an action in a United States District Court in Tennessee must be accorded full faith and credit in the federal forum
- Recognizing the proposition that under § 1738 “full faith and credit will not be accorded state court judgments regular on their face, where to do so would defeat a vital or overriding federal interest.”
- recognizing that turning child over to someone who will abscond with the child outside of the jurisdiction of the court constitutes a de facto deprivation of post-deprivation remedy
- holding that “full faith and credit extends to state court determinations of subject matter jurisdiction over a controversy, as well as the merits of the controversy itself.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Norman Quincy Wright v. Janet McCaslin, 810 F.2d 204 (1986)
Defendant argues that Hooks v. Hooks, supra, is distinguishable from the present circumstances because there the children were removed from the state and, therefore, there was available no post-deprivation remedy under state law; whereas, in the instant case, since the child stayed in Tennessee, plaintiff could have relied upon state courts.
The opinion
WELLFORD, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority, but write separately to express my doubt about the necessity of any discussion regarding personal jurisdiction over defendant Churchill. Because we hold that there is no federal claim against Churchill, I would hold we lack subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state claim against him. The rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 , 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806), requiring complete diversity, precludes application of diversity jurisdiction. See C. Wright, Law of Federal Courts 95 (3d ed. 1976). Moreover, I doubt seriously that the state claim against Churchill and the federal claim against the Tennessee defendants can be said to arise from a ‘common nucleus of operative fact’ so as to support any form of “pendent party” jurisdiction, see Wright, supra at 76, assuming that such a theory would be applied in this circuit.