explaining that, “... parties cannot insist on strict scrutiny merely by asserting a First Amendment right that the court ultimately finds not to be violated,” and noting that, “.. in all cases commercial speech is entitled to only a limited measure of protection under a different standard of review”
How later courts described this case
- explaining that, “... parties cannot insist on strict scrutiny merely by asserting a First Amendment right that the court ultimately finds not to be violated,” and noting that, “.. in all cases commercial speech is entitled to only a limited measure of protection under a different standard of review”
- stating that A[i]n this case we have held the Mississippi law entirely legal under the First Amendment, and parties cannot insist on strict scrutiny merely by asserting a First Amendment right that the court ultimately finds not to be violated@
- stating that “[i]n this case we have held the Mississippi law entirely legal under the First Amendment, and parties cannot insist on strict scrutiny merely by asserting a First Amendment right that the court ultimately finds not to be violated”
- subjecting “the ‘fact’ findings of a trial "judge as to the .latest truths "in the social sciences” to the "clearly erroneous standard of review” is “[cjlearly not” appropriate
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GEE, Circuit Judge,
with whom
GOLDBERG, POLITZ, RANDALL and HIGGIN-BOTHAM, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting:
Judge Reavley’s opinion for a majority of the court — workmanlike and thorough as always — takes a view of the Mississippi arrangement regulating liquor advertising with which it is hard to disagree violently. Even so, I believe that the better one is expressed in our panel opinions, reported at 701 F.2d 314 and 335. Since it is there set out in great detail, I see no occasion to write further.
For the reasons there expressed, then, I respectfully dissent.