holding only parties prejudiced by a consent decree can block its entry and finding prejudice exists where a party’s legal rights are affected by the decree or where the decree imposes a duty or obligation upon the party
How later courts described this case
- holding only parties prejudiced by a consent decree can block its entry and finding prejudice exists where a party’s legal rights are affected by the decree or where the decree imposes a duty or obligation upon the party
- consent decree that permitted promotions to be made without following the city’s civil-service testing procedure could not be entered over the objection of the police officer’s union to the extent that the decree altered the city ordinance governing promotion procedures incorporated into the union’s collective bargaining agreement with the city
- noting that only a party potentially prejudiced by a decree has a right to a judicial determination on the merits of its objections
- voluntary compromise affecting third parties should be approved only if the court is "satisfied that the effect on them is neither unreasonable nor proscribed"
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65 (2011)
We affirmed the district court’s judgment, and we distinguished the Fifth Circuit’s decision in City of Miami on the ground that the non-minority intervenors in Kirkland had no contractual rights that the settlement would alter.
The opinion
PER CURIAM:
The en banc court has been unable to arrive at a majority consensus as to reasoning and result in this case. Those concurring in the opinion prepared by Judge Gee would, for the reasons stated there, grant broader relief to the Appellant Fraternal Order of Police and a wider remand than would those concurring in the opinion prepared by Judge Rubin. Since all concurring in either opinion referred to agree, however, that at least the relief mandated by Judge Rubin’s opinion should be granted, and since no majority exists to grant broader relief, it is that mandate which becomes the order of the court by which the district court should be guided on the remand that we direct. Those concurring only in Judge Gee’s opinion dissent from the failure of the court’s mandate to reverse and remand more broadly. Separate opinions follow.
AFFIRMED IN PART and IN PART VACATED AND REMANDED.