sheriff's statement to tribal members that county ordinance prohibiting gambling would be enforced within his jurisdiction insufficient
How later courts described this case
- sheriff's statement to tribal members that county ordinance prohibiting gambling would be enforced within his jurisdiction insufficient
- no standing where the record did not reveal if there had been a history of prosecution under the county ordinance
- Indian tribe alleging threatened enforcement of state gambling restrictions on tribal land must show specific, immediate threat to establish injury in fact; *883 threat of a general nature is not enough without “specificity or immediacy”
- court held local ordinance prohibiting gambling was within ambit of phrase “laws of such state” of Public Law 280 so that gambling provisions could apply to Indians on the reservation
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
BROWNING, Circuit Judge:
• I concur except as to Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, No. 71-1927. The controversy in Rincon is as real and immediate as those in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 , 93 S.Ct. 739 , 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973), and Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 , 89 S.Ct. 266 , 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968). Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 , 81 S.Ct. 1752 , 6 L.Ed.2d 989 (1961), and United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 , 67 S.Ct. 556 , 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947), are distinguishable. Unlike Poe v. Ullman, Rincon involves a challenge to a fairly recent ordinance (effective April, 1960). There is nothing to indicate the ordinance was not being enforced. On the contrary, the sheriff stated, though perhaps not as directly as he might, that the ordinance was being enforced and would continue to be. The holding in United Public Workers v. Mitchell rested not only on a lack of a threat of enforcement but also on plaintiffs’ failure to specify the kinds of proscribed political activity they intended to engage in. As the Supreme Court noted, the plaintiffs’ “generality of objection [was] really an attack on the political expediency of the Hatch Act, not the presentation of legal issues.” 330 U.S. at 89 , 67 S.Ct. at 564 .