affirming injunction against prison officials from refusing to mail communications by inmate to any court, public official or agency, or lawyer with respect *79 to inmate’s conviction or any complaint concerning “administration of prison” where incarcerated
How later courts described this case
- affirming injunction against prison officials from refusing to mail communications by inmate to any court, public official or agency, or lawyer with respect *79 to inmate’s conviction or any complaint concerning “administration of prison” where incarcerated
- finding diets of 2,800 to 3,300 5 calories per day constitutionally adequate
- upholding finding of liability for sending inmate to segregated housing in retaliation, in part, for inmate’s past litigation against prison officials and inmate’s threat to sue over censorship of his correspondence
- noting that availability of exercise is an important consideration in determining whether conditions of segregated confinement violate the Eighth Amendment
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled on other grounds by Ronald Davidson v. Charles J. Scully, Superintendent, and Edward Bollinger, Correction Officer, 114 F.3d 12 (1997)
See, e.g., Green v. Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770-71 (5th Cir.1986) (finding two meals a day sufficient if nutritionally and calorically adequate); see also Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 186, 193-94 (2d Cir.1971) (finding diets of 2,800 to 3,300 calories per day constitutionally adequate), overruled on other grounds in Davidson v. Scully, 114 F.3d 12 (2d Cir.1997); Cunningham v. Jones, 667 F.2d 565, 566 (6th Cir.198…
Abrogated on other grounds by Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)
442 F.2d 178, 189 (2d Cir.1971) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974), and
The opinion
WATERMAN, Circuit Judge
(concurring) :
I concur in each of the results reached in the majority opinion. Nevertheless, I am concerned that the discussion there with reference to Due Process rights of a state prisoner who is threatened with loss of good time credit or with a loss of the chance to earn such credit because of an alleged infraction of prison rules would seem inaccurately to portray the obligation of a federal court asked to “interfere with state administrative processes” on constitutional grounds. I submit that it is our duty, mandated by the U. S. Constitution, authorized by Congress, 1 and demanded by conscience, to strike down any practice sanctioned by a State which does not conform to at least minimally acceptable levels of due process. The court, aptly noting that appellant has asked us to determine what process is constitutionally due him, a convicted and imprisoned felon, declines to determine the “truly decisive issue” because it lacks empiric information. 2 While I most assuredly agree that studies and surveys and the presentation thereof to us might provide further information of value in balancing competing interests, their absence should never mean that the federal courts will ignore or condone state activity obviously violative of individual rights when that activity is indulged in under the guise of preserving order.
. See, e. g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 .
. It may be that despite t,liis disclaimer in the majority opinion we have in fact decided that minimum standards are not met if the prisoner is not at least confronted with an accusation, informed of the evidence against him, and is afforded a reasonable opportunity to explain his actions. See pp. 196, 198, 203, supra. However, it does seem clear that decision as to what are wholly acceptable minimum standards is left for another day through case-by-ease development.