Opinion

Miller v. Amusement Enterprises, Inc.

  • 394 F.2d 342
  • 7 A.L.R. Fed. 399
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Filed
Apr 8, 1968
Status
Published
Author
Clayton
On the bench
Clayton, Coleman, Dyer, Gewin, Rives, Simpson, Whom
Cited by
43 cases
Authority
More cited than 18.4%

holding that amusement park was covered because, among other reasons, parents are “people watchers”, and go to the park to watch their kids “perform” in kiddie rides and ice skating rinks

How later courts described this case

  • holding that amusement park was covered because, among other reasons, parents are “people watchers”, and go to the park to watch their kids “perform” in kiddie rides and ice skating rinks
  • holding that an amusement park was a “place of enjoyment, fun and recreation, and thus [was] a place of entertainment”
  • “We are unable to agree with those concepts which would prefer, or those which would demand, that the Civil Rights Act be narrowly construed ... We find that the phrase ‘place of entertainment’ as used in 201(b)(3) includes both establishments which present shows, performances and exhibitions to a passive audience and those establishments which provide recreational or other activities for the amusement or enjoyment of its patrons.”
  • “We do not read [Title II] with narrowed eye but with open minds attuned to the clear and strong purpose of the Act, namely, to secure for all citizens the full enjoyment of facilities described in the Act which are open to the general public.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

DISSENTING OPINION

CLAYTON, Circuit Judge:

I dissent, not for the purpose of saying that the majority has reached an undesirable result, since that is not the question. The problem, as I see it, is one of law, not emotion, nor sociology, nor even philosophy. I recognize, as I must, that the facts which started this case on its journey to this court have a strong appeal to our sympathies — mistreatment of a small child, too young to know, or even care whether there is any real difference between a place for the entertainment of spectators only and a place for the entertainment of spectators and participants also. There may well be no such difference. But on the facts here, when viewed objectively, Congress made a difference which we have no right to disregard.

From the bills as introduced in both houses to the law as passed, legislative metamorphosis, which is normal with respect to all proposed legislation of a controversial nature, in this instance, as it has in others, may have resulted in a law less sweeping, less inclusive than many may have hoped. However, courts should take statutes as written, not as proposed nor as they might have been.

I agree with the fine objective opinion of Judge Rives, who wrote for the majority on original hearing. I also agree with the conclusions reached by the district court as reported in 259 F.Supp. 523 under the same style as the case here. Amusement parks, such as the one here, which offer no exhibitions for the entertainment of spectators are not places of entertainment as contemplated by Section 201(b) (3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge:

Judge Clayton has exactly stated the views I entertain with reference to this case. I therefore join in his dissent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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