State v. Weaver

No

No. 97-304

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1998 MT 167

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JAMES ELMER WEAVER,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,

In and for the County of Flathead,

The Honorable William Nels Swandal, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

James H. Goetz (argued), Brian M. Morris (argued), Goetz, Madden & Dunn, Bozeman, Montana;

James C. Bartlett, Kalispell, Montana

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For Respondent:

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, John Paulson, Assistant Attorney General (argued), Helena,

Montana; Thomas J. Esch, Flathead County Attorney, Ed Corrigan, Deputy Flathead County Attorney,

Kalispell, Montana

Heard: March 10, 1998

Submitted: March 10, 1998

Decided: July 1, 1998

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 James Elmer Weaver (Weaver) was tried by a jury in the District Court for the

Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, on four counts of sexual assault

involving minors. He was convicted on two of the counts and acquitted on the other

two counts. Weaver appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence. We

affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for a new trial.

¶2 The following issues were raised on appeal:

¶3 1. Did the District Court commit plain error by failing to instruct the jury, sua

sponte, that it had to reach a unanimous verdict as to at least one specific underlying

act of sexual assault for each count charged in the information?

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¶4 2. Did the District Court properly deny Weaver's motion to dismiss which was

based upon the investigating officer's failure to record her interviews with the

victims?

¶5 3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion with respect to its rulings on the

testimony of Shawn Trontel and Judy Starr?

¶6 Because we reverse on the first issue and remand for a new trial, we decline to

address the last issue regarding witness testimony.

Factual and Procedural Background

¶7 Weaver was charged by information with four counts of sexual assault in violation

of § 45-5-502(1), MCA. Weaver had been a volunteer with the Big Brothers/Big

Sisters program (Big Brothers) in Whitefish since 1984. Over a period of eleven

years, Big Brothers matched Weaver with five "little brothers." Four of these boys

were named as victims in the charges against Weaver. All of the boys were between

nine and eleven years old when they were matched with Weaver.

¶8 Weaver was first matched with J.M. in June 1984, and he acted as J.M.'s big

brother until April 1989. In April 1994, J.M. was involved in an automobile accident

wherein he sustained some brain damage and was thereafter diagnosed as mildly

retarded. One night in June 1995, J.M. told his mother that he had been molested by

Weaver during the time that he had been Weaver's little brother. J.M. had never

before mentioned any inappropriate conduct on the part of Weaver. Because Weaver

was still active in Big Brothers, J.M.'s mother reported the allegations to the director

of Big Brothers who contacted the Flathead County Sheriff's Department.

¶9 Detective Maxine Lamb interviewed J.M. and on October 4, 1995, the Flathead

County Attorney's Office filed a request for an arrest warrant. One month later, an

information was filed charging Weaver with sexual assault against J.M. The

information charged Weaver as follows:

The Defendant, James Elmer Weaver, between approximately June, 1984, and

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April, 1989, knowingly subjected another, J.M., date of birth May 2, 1975, to

sexual contact without consent, in Flathead County, Montana, contrary to

Section 45-5-502(1), M.C.A.

¶10 Detective Lamb also interviewed T.C. T.C. was matched with Weaver in

February 1991 and was Weaver's little brother until Big Brothers ended the

relationship in August 1995 due to the allegations against Weaver. Detective Lamb

interviewed T.C. at his school without first notifying his parents and without any

school officials present in contravention of school policy. Based on an allegation from

T.C. (that T.C. later said he was bullied into making) of a single incident of

inappropriate touching, the Flathead County Attorney's Office filed an amended

information on November 16, 1995, charging Weaver with sexually assaulting T.C.

This amended information contained the original charge involving J.M. and also

charged Weaver as follows:

The Defendant, James Elmer Weaver, during the summer of 1993, knowingly

subjected another, T.C., date of birth October 19, 1980, to sexual contact

without consent, contrary to Section 45-5-502(1), M.C.A.

¶11 Also included in this information was a charge involving E.B., who had been

Weaver's little brother from January 1990 until July 1990. Detective Lamb had

interviewed E.B. at his school, again without first notifying E.B.'s parents and

without any school officials present in contravention of school policy. The charge

involving E.B. stated:

The Defendant, James Elmer Weaver, between approximately January 18,

1990, and July 2, 1990, knowingly subjected another, [E.B.], date of birth

October 21, 1980, to sexual contact without consent, contrary to Section 45-5-

502(1), M.C.A.

¶12 After the allegations against Weaver had surfaced, Weaver's wife contacted the

mother of the fourth boy, D.M., to enlist their help in defending Weaver against the

pending charges. Weaver had been D.M.'s big brother from July 30, 1990, until

December 1, 1990, when D.M. moved with his mother to Shelby. D.M.'s mother

refused to support Weaver and, instead, contacted the Flathead County Attorney's

Office.

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¶13 Detective Lamb interviewed D.M. at his home on February 21, 1996. On March

19, 1996, the Flathead County Attorney's Office filed a second amended information

adding a charge of sexual assault involving D.M. This information stated, in part:

The Defendant, James Elmer Weaver, between approximately July 30, 1990,

and December, 1990, knowingly subjected D.M., date of birth August 21,

1981, to sexual contact without consent, in Flathead County, Montana,

contrary to Section 45-5-502(1), M.C.A.

¶14 The fifth boy, K.L., was Weaver's little brother beginning sometime in 1988 and

ending after one year when K.L. moved with his family to Eureka. Detective Lamb

set up an interview with K.L., but that interview was canceled when K.L.'s mother

insisted that the interview be videotaped and that she should receive a copy of the

tape. No charges were filed involving K.L.

¶15 Detective Lamb refused to videotape or audiotape the interviews of any of the

boys. Furthermore, she did not allow any witnesses present during those interviews

and did not make any written notes of the interviews. She later testified that she does

not record or take notes of the interviews in such cases so that the victims will not be

further traumatized during the process of disclosing embarrassing information.

¶16 On May 29, 1996, Weaver filed a motion to dismiss the charges on the grounds

that Detective Lamb intentionally failed to preserve evidence vital to his defense by

failing to videotape or audiotape her interviews with the boys or to make

handwritten notes of the interviews. Weaver argued that the interviews needed to be

reviewable by defense counsel and the court and that the inability to do so resulted in

a denial of his right to due process. The District Court held a hearing on June 14,

1996, and, four days later, issued an order denying the motion.

¶17 Trial before a jury was held June 20 through 27, 1996. All five boys testified at

trial. J.M. testified to several incidents of sexual assault during the five years that he

was Weaver's little brother. D.M. also testified to several incidents of sexual assault,

but provided no specific dates or times for these incidents. E.B. testified to an

incident on a fishing trip wherein Weaver touched the outside of E.B.'s pants prior to

helping E.B. unbutton the top button of his pants so that E.B. could urinate. T.C.

testified that Weaver merely explained to him that a penis had more purposes than

simply urinating. K.L. testified that there had never been any sexual contact or

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discussions between himself and Weaver.

¶18 In Weaver's defense, T.C.'s mother testified that T.C. suffered from liver cancer

and, since there existed the potential for impotency and sterility, she had given T.C. a

book on

teenage sexuality and told Weaver that T.C. might have questions regarding the book. T.

C.'s mother testified that she objected to T.C. being named as a victim in this case as

neither she nor T.C. believed that T.C. had been sexually assaulted by Weaver.

¶19 At the end of the State's case, Weaver moved for directed verdicts on the counts

involving E.B. and T.C., but the District Court denied the motions. Thereafter, the

jury found Weaver guilty on the charges involving J.M. and D.M. and not guilty on

the charges involving T.C. and E.B.

¶20 On August 20, 1996, Weaver filed a motion to disqualify District Judge

Katherine Curtis. A hearing was held on the disqualification motion on September

12, 1996, and the motion was granted the following week. On October 30, 1996,

District Judge William Nels Swandal assumed jurisdiction of the case.

¶21 After a March 14, 1997 hearing, the District Court sentenced Weaver to two

consecutive ten-year sentences. The court determined that treatment in the local

community afforded Weaver a better opportunity for rehabilitation, thus the court

suspended the entire sentence and placed Weaver on probation subject to certain

conditions. These conditions included house arrest until Weaver substantially

completed a sex-offender treatment program. Weaver appeals from the judgment of

conviction and sentence.

Issue 1.

¶22 Did the District Court commit plain error by failing to instruct the jury, sua sponte,

that it had to reach a unanimous verdict as to at least one specific underlying act of

sexual assault for each count charged in the information?

¶23 Weaver contends on appeal that the State's "vague allegations" as contained in

the amended information and the District Court's general instructions regarding

unanimity enabled the State to convict Weaver "merely by creating a bad taste in the

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jury's mouth rather than proving a specific incident of sexual assault beyond a

reasonable doubt." The State argues that since Weaver did not make a

contemporaneous objection to the District Court's instructions on unanimity and did

not propose any instructions of its own, Weaver did not preserve this issue for appeal

and this Court may properly decline to review it.

¶24 We have consistently held that we will not consider issues raised for the first time

on appeal when the appellant had the opportunity to make an objection at trial. State

v. Dahlin, 1998 MT 113, ¶ 13, ___ P.2d ___, ¶ 13, 55 St.Rep. 446, ¶ 13 (citing State v.

Weeks (1995), 270 Mont. 63, 86, 891 P.2d 477, 491). Pursuant to § 46-20-104(2),

MCA, "[f]ailure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the

objection except as provided in 46-20-701(2), [MCA,]" which provides:

(2) Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial

rights must be disregarded. A claim alleging an error affecting jurisdictional

or constitutional rights may not be noticed on appeal if the alleged error was

not objected to as provided in 46-20-104, unless the convicted person

establishes that the error was prejudicial as to the convicted person's guilt or

punishment and that:

(a) the right asserted in the claim did not exist at the time of the trial and has

been determined to be retroactive in its application;

(b) the prosecutor, the judge, or a law enforcement agency suppressed

evidence from the convicted person or the convicted person's attorney that

prevented the claim from being raised and disposed of; or

(c) material and controlling facts upon which the claim is predicated were not

known to the convicted person or the convicted person's attorney and could

not have been ascertained by the exercise of reasonable diligence.

Unquestionably, Weaver's claim does not fall within one of these narrow statutory

exceptions.

¶25 Nevertheless, while we have previously acknowledged the constraints of § 46-20-

701(2), MCA, we have also recognized this Court's "inherent power and paramount

obligation to interpret Montana's Constitution and to protect the various rights set

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forth in that document." State v. Finley (1996), 276 Mont. 126, 137, 915 P.2d 208, 215.

To that end we held in Finley that this Court may discretionarily review claimed

errors that implicate a criminal defendant's fundamental constitutional rights, even

if no contemporaneous objection is made and notwithstanding the inapplicability of

the § 46-20-701(2), MCA, criteria, where failing to review the claimed error at issue

may: (1) result in a manifest miscarriage of justice; (2) leave unsettled the question of

the fundamental fairness of the trial or proceedings; or (3) compromise the integrity

of the judicial process. Finley, 276 Mont. at 137, 915 P.2d at 215. Even so, we stated

in Finley that "given the legislature's obvious intention to restrict the use of plain

error review by its enactment of § 46-20-701(2), MCA, we will henceforth use our

inherent power of common law plain error review sparingly, on a case-by-case

basis. . . . " Finley, 276 Mont. at 138, 915 P.2d at 215.

¶26 Before we can invoke common law plain error review, we must first determine

whether the alleged error implicates Weaver's fundamental constitutional rights.

Article II, Section 26 of the Montana Constitution provides in part: "In all criminal

actions, the verdict shall be unanimous." Since the right to a unanimous verdict is

explicit in the Declaration of Rights in Montana's Constitution, it is a fundamental

right. See Gryczan v. State (1997), 283 Mont. 433, 449, 942 P.2d 112, 122.

¶27 Next, we must determine whether the failure to review the claimed error would

result in a manifest miscarriage of justice, leave unsettled the question of the

fundamental fairness of Weaver's trial, or compromise the integrity of the judicial

process. Uncertainty about the nature of the verdict in this case--i.e., whether the

jurors were unanimous in their verdict, certainly brings into question the

fundamental fairness of Weaver's trial. Hence, having met the criteria established in

Finley, we invoke common law plain error review in this case to determine whether

the District Court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it had to reach a

unanimous verdict as to at least one specific underlying act of sexual assault for each

count charged in the information.

¶28 The standard of review of jury instructions in criminal cases is whether the

instructions, as a whole, fully and fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the

case. State v. Patton (1996), 280 Mont. 278, 286, 930 P.2d 635, 639 (citing State v.

Brandon (1994), 264 Mont. 231, 237, 870 P.2d 734, 737; State v. Lundblade (1981), 191

Mont. 526, 529-30, 625 P.2d 545, 548). Moreover, we recognize that a district court

has broad discretion when it instructs a jury. Patton, 280 Mont. at 286, 930 P.2d at

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639 (citing State v. Ross (1995), 269 Mont. 347, 358, 889 P.2d 161, 167).

¶29 In the case before us on appeal, the District Court charged the jury with the

following general unanimity instruction:

The law requires the jury verdict in this case to be unanimous. Thus, all

twelve of your number must agree in order to reach a verdict on each Count

contained in the Information whether the verdict be guilty or not guilty. . . .

In addition, the court instructed the jury as follows:

Each count charges a distinct offense. You must decide each count separately.

The defendant may be found guilty or not guilty of any or all of the offenses

charged. Your findings as to each count must be stated in a separate verdict.

¶30 Weaver contends that these instructions were insufficient as the two counts for

which he was convicted broadly charged a protracted series of alleged illicit acts

spread over a lengthy period of time and, as a result, the jury may have unanimously

believed that he was guilty of something without actually agreeing unanimously on

precisely which acts he was guilty. Weaver argues that if a jury is not required to

unanimously find a defendant guilty of a specific act, the State would be relieved of

its burden to prove every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶31 The State contends, on the other hand, that the jury verdict in this case shows

unanimous agreement that Weaver committed the offense of sexual assault against J.

M. and D.M. The State argues that Weaver's reliance on federal appeals court cases

is misplaced as those cases are predicated upon federal statutes far different from the

sexual assault statute at issue here. While the federal statutes do require different

elements, the reasoning of the courts of appeals is instructive and the principles at

issue are universal.

¶32 In one of the cases cited by Weaver, United States v. Holley (5th Cir. 1991), 942

F.2d 916, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the failure to give a specific

unanimity instruction was reversible error. Holley, 942 F.2d at 923. The indictment

expressly charged that the defendant had committed perjury by making certain

specific statements. The court in Holley determined that there was a reasonable

possibility that the jury was not unanimous with respect to at least one statement in

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each count because the general unanimity instruction failed to require that all of the

jurors concur in the "knowing falsity of at least one particular statement." Holley,

942 F.2d at 929.

¶33 In its analysis of this issue, the Holley court noted:

As Justice Blackmun recently observed in his separate concurrence in McKoy

v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 1234, 1237 n.5, 108 L.Ed.2d

369(1990): "[i]n federal criminal prosecutions, where a unanimous verdict is

required, the Courts of Appeals are in general agreement that '[u]nanimity . . .

means more than a conclusory agreement that the defendant has violated the

statute in question; there is a requirement of substantial agreement as to the

principal factual elements underlying a specified offense.'" (quoting United

State v. Ferris, 719 F.2d 1405, 1407, (9th Cir. 1983)). See also United States

v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 456-459 (5th Cir. 1977). We have previously stated

that

"[t]he unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be in substantial

agreement as to just what a defendant did as a step preliminary to

determining whether the defendant is guilty of the crime charged.

Requiring the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does

little to insure that his right to a unanimous verdict is protected

unless this prerequisite of jury consensus as to the defendant's

course of action is also required." Id. at 457-58.

Holley, 942 F.2d at 925 (emphasis added).

¶34 In like manner, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a defendant's

conviction for distributing cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine even though

the trial judge had given the jury a general instruction that their verdict had to be

unanimous. United States v. Echeverry (9th Cir. 1983), 719 F.2d 974. In making this

determination, the Court of Appeals stated:

When it appears . . . that there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that

a conviction may occur as the result of different jurors concluding that the

defendant committed different acts, the general unanimity instruction does not

suffice. To correct any potential confusion in such a case, the trial judge must

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augment the general instruction to ensure the jury understands its duty to

unanimously agree to a particular set of facts.

Echeverry, 719 F.2d at 975 (emphasis added).

¶35 Federal appeals courts are not the only courts to recognize the necessity of

specific unanimity instructions. In a case factually similar to the instant case, the

Court of Appeals for the Third District of California, referring to what it called the

"either/or" rule, stated that

when the accusatory pleading charges a single criminal act and the evidence

shows more than one such unlawful act, either the prosecution must select the

specific act relied upon to prove the charge or the jury must be instructed . . .

that it must unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant

committed the same specific criminal act.

People v. Gordon (1985), 165 Cal.App.3d 839, 853, 212 Cal.Rptr. 174, 183. Even though

it did not find it applicable to the case before it, the court in Gordon also pointed out an

exception to the "either/or" rule, i.e., the continuous course of conduct:

This exception arises when the criminal acts are so closely connected that they

form part of one and the same transaction, and thus one offense. Thus, "[s]

eparate acts may also result in but one crime if they occur within a relatively

short time span. . . ." In this case, there is absolutely no evidence concerning

the timing of the two acts of sodomy, except that they allegedly occurred

between 1978 and August 1979 and that one may have occurred during a

camping trip in July 1979.

Gordon, 165 Cal.App.3d at 854-55, 212 Cal.Rptr. at 184-85.

¶36 In the present case, the State contended during oral argument before this Court

that Weaver's alleged assaults of J.M. and D.M. were just such a continuous course

of conduct, thus it was not necessary for the jury to unanimously agree upon at least

one specific underlying act of sexual assault for each count. However, Weaver was

not charged with a continuous course of sexual assault against any of the boys. He

was charged with knowingly subjecting another "to sexual contact without consent"

occurring during a specific period of time. Moreover, Weaver's alleged acts were not

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so closely connected that "they form part of one and the same transaction, and thus

one offense," nor did they occur within "a relatively short time span." The State's

proof at trial was that the alleged discrete incidents of sexual assault took place over

a five-year period in the case of J.M. and over a six-month period in the case of D.M.

¶37 In a similar fashion to the federal courts of appeal and the California Court of

Appeals, this Court has previously held a trial court in error for not properly

instructing the jury as to the unanimity of its verdict, albeit under a different basis

than at issue in the instant case. State v. Weldy (1995), 273 Mont. 68, 79, 902 P.2d 1, 7.

In Weldy, the defendant was charged with and found guilty of one count of felony

assault under § 45-5-202(2), MCA (1993), which set forth three distinct alternatives

for committing felony assault. Two of these alternatives were relevant in Weldy. We

stated in that case that although the jury was instructed as to the requirement of a

unanimous verdict, it was not clear from either the instructions or the verdict form

under which alternative the jury reached its verdict. Thus, we concluded that the

instructions and the verdict form should have been structured so that it was clear to

the jury that it was required to reach a unanimous verdict under one alternative or

the other, or both. Weldy, 273 Mont. at 78-79, 902 P.2d at 7.

¶38 While Weldy is not precisely on point with the case sub judice, our reasoning in

Weldy is analogous. The two counts on which Weaver was convicted charged him

with a series of unrelated allegations of sexual misconduct taking place over a period

of years. It is not clear from either the jury instructions or the verdict form whether

the jury unanimously agreed upon at least one specific underlying act of sexual

assault for each count. We find the sound rationale in Holley, Echeverry, Gordon and

Weldy persuasive, hence, we hold that the District Court should have given an

instruction to make it clear to the jury that it was required to reach a unanimous

verdict on at least one specific act for each count.

¶39 Having held in this manner, we are compelled to suggest some language for

future cases where a specific unanimity instruction is determined to be necessary.

Consequently, where appropriate, a trial court should charge the jury in language

similar to either of the following California model jury instructions:

The defendant is charged with the offense of __________. He may be found

guilty if the proof shows beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed any

one or more of such acts, but in order to find the defendant guilty, all the

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jurors must agree that he committed the same act or acts. It is not necessary

that the particular act or acts committed so agreed upon be stated in the

verdict.

Gordon, 165 Cal.App.3d at 852, 213 Cal.Rptr. at 183 (quoting CALJIC No. 17.01 (4th ed.

1979)).

Defendant is charged in [Count ______of] the information with the

commission of the crime of ______________, a violation of section _____ of

the [Montana] Code, on or about a period of time between _______________

and _______________. [¶] In order to find the defendant guilty, it is

necessary for the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the

commission of a specific act [or acts] constituting said crime within the period

alleged. [¶] And, in order to find the defendant guilty, you must unanimously

agree upon the commission of the same specific act [or acts] constituting said

crime within the period alleged. [¶] It is not necessary that the particular act or

acts committed so agreed upon be stated in the verdict.

Gordon, 165 Cal.App.3d at 853, 213 Cal.Rptr. at 184 (quoting CALJIC No. 4.71.5 (4th ed.

1982)).

¶40 Accordingly, we hold that the failure of the District Court to instruct the jury

that it had to reach a unanimous verdict as to at least one specific underlying act of

sexual assault for each count was error and we reverse and remand for a new trial.

Issue 2.

¶41 Did the District Court properly deny Weaver's motion to dismiss which was based

upon the investigating officer's failure to record her interviews with the victims?

¶42 In his motion to dismiss, Weaver contended that the law enforcement officers

investigating the charges against him failed to preserve evidence vital to his defense

by intentionally failing to videotape or audiotape any of the interviews with the four

boys and by failing to take or preserve handwritten notes of the interviews. Weaver

argued that some record of the interviews should have been preserved so that it could

be reviewed by defense counsel as well as the court and that the inability to preserve

a record of the interviews resulted in a denial of Weaver's right to due process. In its

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order denying Weaver's motion, the District Court noted that Weaver was unable to

cite to any cases that hold that the failure to record interviews is a denial of due

process as a matter of law. The court concluded that Weaver was not entitled to

dismissal of the charges against him because the failure to record the interviews did

not constitute destruction of material exculpatory evidence.

¶43 The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss in a criminal case is a question of law.

City of Helena v. Danichek (1996), 277 Mont. 461, 463, 922 P.2d 1170, 1172 (citing

State v. Hansen (1995), 273 Mont. 321, 323, 903 P.2d 194, 195). Our standard of

review of a district court's conclusion of law is plenary and we will review the court's

conclusion to determine whether it is correct. Danichek, 277 Mont. at 463, 922 P.2d

at 1172 (citing Hansen, 273 Mont. at 323, 903 P.2d at 195; State v. Rushton (1994),

264 Mont. 248, 255, 870 P.2d 1355, 1359).

¶44 Weaver contends on appeal that "there is strong reason to believe" that the

interviews conducted in this case were "unduly suggestive and coercive." He relies on

State v. Michaels (N.J. 1994), 642 A.2d 1372, for his contention that sufficiently

coercive or suggestive interview practices can irremediably alter the perceptions of

child victims, thus, absent exigent circumstances, all such interviews should be

recorded to insure a defendant's right to due process.

¶45 The defendant in Michaels was a nursery school teacher who had been convicted

of bizarre acts of sexual abuse against many of the children in her care. In setting

aside her conviction, the New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the interviews of

the child victims were highly improper and that investigators employed coercive and

unduly suggestive methods. The court determined that, as a result, a substantial

likelihood existed that "the children's recollection of past events was both stimulated

and materially influenced by that course of questioning." Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1380.

The court concluded that if the state intended to reprosecute the defendant, a hearing

should be held to determine whether the statements and testimony elicited by the

improper interview techniques retained a sufficient degree of reliability to warrant

admission at trial. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1384-85.

¶46 While the court in Michaels noted that videotaping the initial interview is "a

matter of sound interviewing methodology," Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1379 n.1, nothing

in Michaels suggests that the failure to record interviews with child victims is a denial

of a defendant's right to due process as a matter of law. On the contrary, failing to

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videotape or otherwise document the initial interview is just one of the factors that

the court in Michaels looked at to determine the reliability and thus the admissibility

of the child victim's statements. Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1382-83.

¶47 We, too, recognize the potential for coercive or highly suggestive interrogation

techniques to create a significant risk that the interrogation itself will distort a child's

recollection of events. However, we do not find that to be the case here. Unlike the

children in Michaels, who were all between three and five years old at the time they

were interviewed, the boys in the present case were all over 14 years old when they

were interviewed by Detective Lamb.

¶48 Furthermore, the only evidence to indicate the possibility that the interviews in

this case may have been coercive or suggestive is the testimony at trial of T.C. and T.

C.'s mother that T.C. felt bullied by Detective Lamb and of K.L.'s mother that

Detective Lamb started "firing questions" at her making their conversation "not

particularly" pleasant. Weaver was not convicted of the charges involving T.C. and

no charges were ever filed involving K.L. There is no evidence that the interviews of

the two boys that Weaver was convicted of assaulting, J.M. and D.M., were improper

in any way.

¶49 We rejected some of these same arguments in State v. Hanson (1997), 283 Mont.

316, 940 P.2d 1166, wherein the defendant raised a similar question of the reliability

of the child victim's statements based on coercive or suggestive interviewing

techniques. We noted that the failure of Detective Lamb, the investigating officer in

Hanson as well as in the present case, to preserve the record of her interview with the

victim and the effect of her interview techniques on the reliability of the victim's

testimony were raised by Hanson's defense counsel during trial and were properly

considered by the jury. In a similar fashion, these same matters were considered by

Weaver's jury since Weaver examined Detective Lamb and each victim about the

initial interviews.

¶50 Weaver suggests that we should adopt a per se rule that, absent exigent

circumstances, child testimony may not be used in a prosecution such as his unless

contemporaneous records of the interview are made. Weaver has not cited to any

decision or authority for such a rule. In fact, Michaels, which Weaver relies on for

most of his contentions, specifically states that "children, as a class, are not to be

viewed as inherently suspect witnesses. . . . [U]nder certain circumstances children's

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accounts of sexual abuse can be highly reliable." Michaels, 642 A.2d at 1376.

¶51 While we decline to adopt a per se rule that the interviews of child sexual abuse

victims must be recorded, we recognize that the better practice may be to create

some record of the interviews. In State v. Grey (1995), 274 Mont. 206, 214, 907 P.2d

951, 956, we held that

in the context of a custodial interrogation conducted at the station house or

under other similarly controlled circumstances, the failure of the police officer

to preserve some tangible record of his or her giving of the Miranda warning

and the knowing, intelligent waiver by the detainee will be viewed with

distrust in the judicial assessment of voluntariness under the totality of

circumstances surrounding the confession or admission. That is all the more

so where the evidence demonstrates that, as here, the police officer made a

conscious decision not to secure a written waiver or otherwise preserve his

giving of the Miranda warning and the detainee's waiver on the premise that

to do so would alert the accused to exercise his rights and, thus, jeopardize the

interrogation.

¶52 We specifically did not hold in Grey that the police must tape record or create an

audio-visual record of Miranda warnings or the detainee's waiver of his rights. We

did conclude, however, that this may be the better practice and would help assure

that the accused receives a constitutionally adequate Miranda warning.

¶53 In the same way, the failure of the investigating officer in child sexual abuse

cases to preserve some tangible record of the interview, in a controlled situation and

absent exigent circumstances, will be viewed with distrust in the judicial assessment

of the veracity of the child victims' statements. This is all the more so where the

evidence demonstrates that, as in the case before us, the investigating officer made a

conscious decision not to videotape or audiotape the interviews or to preserve any

other kind of record of the interviews.

¶54 Nevertheless, we agree with the District Court in this case that Detective Lamb's

failure to record the interviews did not constitute destruction of material exculpatory

evidence. It is well settled that

while a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to obtain exculpatory

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evidence and that the denial of such right is a violation of due process, this

right is only a personal right to obtain exculpatory evidence. It does not

require that the police officers take initiative or even assist in procuring

evidence on behalf of a defendant.

State v. Patton (1996), 280 Mont. 278, 284, 930 P.2d 635, 638 (citing State v. Swanson

(1986), 222 Mont. 357, 361-62, 722 P.2d 1155, 1157-58; In re Martin (Cal. 1962), 374

P.2d 801, 803). Furthermore,

[O]nly a deliberate or intentional suppression of exculpatory evidence is a per

se violation of due process. To amount to a violation of due process,

negligently suppressed evidence must be material and of substantial use, vital

to the defense, and exculpatory.

Patton, 280 Mont. at 285, 930 P.2d at 639 (citing State v. Sadowski (1991), 247 Mont. 63,

79, 805 P.2d 537, 547; State, City of Bozeman v. Heth (1988), 230 Mont. 268, 272, 750

P.2d 103, 105). There has been no indication in the present case that, had the interviews

been recorded in some way, that evidence would have cleared Weaver of the charges

against him.

¶55 Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not err in denying Weaver's

motion to dismiss based upon the investigating officer's failure to record her

interviews with the victims.

¶56 Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for a new trial.

/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ JIM REGNIER

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ W. WILLIAM LEAPHART

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Justice Terry N. Trieweiler did not participate in this decision.

District Judge John C. McKeon specially concurs.

¶57 I agree with the decision reached in the majority opinion. However, this opinion

does not fully state my views on the use of the common law plain error review in

reaching this decision. For this reason, I issue this concurring opinion.

¶58 The majority opinion fails to point out that common law plain error review

involves an analysis of whether or not the alleged error was harmless. In criminal

cases, this analysis places the burden on the State to show plain error found on

review to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶59 Although not clearly stated, it is my feeling that analysis for harmless error

played a significant part in applying the common law plain error review to this case.

The "either/or" rule and model jury instructions found in the majority opinion are

from People v. Gordon (1985), 165 Cal.App.3d 839, 212 Cal.Rptr. 174. After finding

error, one must note that the Gordon court proceeded to analyze whether the error

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Gordon, 165 Cal.App.3d at 855, 212 Cal.

Rptr. at 185. Further, this Court itself, in a prior criminal case applying plain error

review, stated clearly what is missing here; i.e., the error was not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. State v. Sullivan (1996), 280 Mont. 25, 35, 927 P.2d 1033, 1039.

¶60 The significance of involving questions of harmless error into this analytical

process is more clearly pointed out in Gordon. In Gordon, the court pointed out that

there was presented more than one explanation to the two distinct and different acts

of alleged molestation. The test applied for harmless error was "whether the case is

one in which the jury’s verdict necessarily implies that it did not believe the only

defense offered." Gordon, 165 Cal.App.3d at 855, 212 Cal.Rptr. at 185. The court

then concluded that because "the jury could have accepted one of the defenses and

not another . . . there is no basis in reason for the inference that the jury must have

believed beyond a reasonable doubt" that the defendant committed both acts of

molestation. Gordon, 165 Cal.App.3d at 856, 212 Cal.Rptr. at 186.

¶61 In this case, Weaver presented more than one explanation as a defense to the

charges against him. As such, the State was unable to prevail using the "only

defense" argument found in Gordon. Yet, the point of Gordon is that there may be

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circumstances where the State is able to show beyond a reasonable doubt that error

triggering common law plain error review is harmless. Those circumstances do not

exist in this case.

¶62 An understanding of the circumstances of each case is not only pertinent to a

review for harmless error but is also needed to address the Court’s admonition that a

common law plain error review without contemporaneous objection be used

"sparingly". Parties on appeal seeking plain error review or responding to such

efforts should make every effort to understand why contemporaneous objection was

not made. It is possible that under the circumstances of the case, a tactical decision

was knowingly made by a party not to make contemporaneous objection. In such

event, it might be implied that the party believed the error to be harmless. Again, the

burden is on the State to show the error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

and based on the record in this case it was unable to do so.

/S/ JOHN C. McKEON

District Judge, sitting for Justice Terry N. Trieweiler

Justice Karla M. Gray concurs and dissents.

¶63 I concur in the Court’s opinion on issue two, which relates to the District Court’s

denial of Weaver’s motion to dismiss. I respectfully dissent from that opinion on

issue one and, because I would not reverse and remand for a new trial on that issue, I

would reach the merits of issue three and affirm the District Court’s evidentiary

rulings regarding the testimony of Shawn Trontel and Judy Starr.

¶64 It is my view that the Court errs in reaching the merits of issue one, which is

whether the District Court erred in failing to more specifically instruct the jury. The

basis of my dissent on this issue was set forth in my special concurring opinion in

Finley and need not be repeated at length here. Suffice it to say that the Court

oversteps its bounds under the separation of powers on which our three-branch

government rests when it continues to ignore § 46-20-701, MCA, a statute duly

enacted by the Montana Legislature. Absent a successful constitutional challenge to

that statute, it is our duty to apply the statute according to its terms. Doing so here

mandates that we decline to address the first issue because no contemporaneous

objection was made in the District Court and, under § 46-20-701, MCA, the objection

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is waived unless it meets one of the exceptions set forth in subsection (2) of the

statute. As the Court correctly states, Weaver’s claim unquestionably does not fall

within any of the narrow statutory exceptions. That should be the end of our inquiry,

yet the Court goes on to apply the "common law plain error doctrine."

¶65 It is disingenuous for the Court to reiterate that "[w]e have consistently held that

we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal when the appellant had

the opportunity to make an objection," and then go on to apply a common law

doctrine which is in derogation of a duly enacted statute and which allows it to "opt

out" of both purportedly consistent holdings and its obligation to apply statutes

passed by the Legislature. Unfortunately, the Court’s continued willingness to do so

effectively precludes, as a practical matter, a constitutional challenge to § 46-20-701,

MCA. No lawyer would bother to advance such a challenge for the Court’s

consideration when it is clear that the statutory hurdle need not be overcome.

¶66 I would apply our "consistent" holdings and refuse to consider issue one.

Weaver had an opportunity to make an objection about the jury instructions at trial

and failed to do so. Nor does his failure to object fall within one of the statutory

exceptions to the rule that alleged error not objected to cannot be noticed on appeal.

Under such circumstances, our obligation is clear and I dissent from the Court’s

refusal to discharge that obligation.

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

Chief Justice J. A. Turnage concurs in the foregoing concurrence and dissent.

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

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