Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue

NO. 90-106

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1990

STEER, INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF

THE STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the First Judicial District,

In and for the County of Lewis and Clark,

The Honorable Dorothy McCarter, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant:

Eric J. Fehlig, Esq., Department of Revenue, Helena,

Montana

For Respondent:

Bryan L. Asay, Esq., Kelley & Asay, Helena, Montana

Submitted: October 25, 1990

Decided: December 11, 1990

Filed: 0

Clerk

Chief Justice J. A. Turnage delivered the Opinion of the Court.

The Department of Revenue (DOR) appeals an order of the First

Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, which grantedtax-

exempt status to cattle owned by Steer, Inc. (Steer), on the basis

that the cattle were property owned by an "institution of purely

public charityn under §§ 15-6-201(1)(e), and -201 (2)(a), MCA. This

holding reversed a prior decision of the State Tax Appeal Board

(STAB). We reverse the ~istrictCourt's order.

DOR raises the following issues:

1. Did the District Court err in finding STAB'S Findings of

Fact IX and XI clearly erroneous?

2. Did the District Court err by failing to remand the case

to STAB for suitable findings when it found STAB'S Findings of

Facts IX and XI clearly erroneous?

3. Did the ~istrictCourt err when it held that tax-exempt

property of an institution of purely public charity need only be

owned, and not used, by the institution?

4. Did the District Court err when it found that the

requirements of a purely public charity did not preclude uses that

are significantly non-charitable in nature?

5. Did the ~istrict Court hold that the dissemination of

religious teachings is a charitable purpose qualifying the

institution for a property tax exemption, and if so, was this an

error?

6. Did the District Court err when it found that the

production of revenue from property is a charitable purpose

qualifying the institution for a property tax exemption?

7. Did the District Court err when it found that the

beneficiaries of an institution of purely public charity do not

have to be persons who would otherwise be the recipients of aid

from local or state Montana governments?

FACTS

Steer, a non-profit North Dakota corporation, conducts a

stewardship program that raises funds, and in turn, donates these

funds to member evangelical organizations. This unique stewardship

program, which originated in 1 9 5 6 and is currently operating in

twenty-eight states, creates a three-way partnership between a

donor, a farmer, and a member evangelical organization.

A donor contributes $ 6 0 0 . 0 0 increments to Steer, and receives

a one-time tax deduction for the charitable contribution. Steer

then purchases a livestock unit with each $ 6 0 0 . 0 0 contribution.

Steer places the livestock unit with a farmer. The farmer

agrees to provide free feed and care to the livestock unit, as well

as its offspring. The farmer sells the livestock's offspring in

Steer's name, and forwards all of the profits from the sale to

Steer. The farmer's costs associated with the care of the

livestock unit are tax deductible.

Steer then donates all profits, less twenty-seven percent for

administrative and insurance costs, to a member evangelical

organization, which can be designated by the donor or farmer. To

be a member, an evangelical organization must complete an applica-

tion and be approved by Steer's Board of Directors. Once selected,

the member evangelical organization must pay Steer an annual

membership fee .

The livestock unit is reinvested in this stewardship program

and continues to yield profit which is donated to member evangeli-

cal organizations until it is too old to produce. The old

livestock is then culled and sold, whereby, again, all sale profits

go to Steer for distribution to member evangelical organizations.

Steer currently has approximately 100 head of cattle in Garfield

County, Montana.

From 1982 to 1987, Garfield County's Assessor classified

Steer's then approximate seventeen cattle as taxable property under

5 15-6-136, MCA, and assessed Steer $485.92 in taxes. Steer

appealed to the Garfield County Tax Appeal Board for a refund on

April 22, 1987--this appeal was denied. On June 29, 1987, Steer

further appealed to STAB.

On January 30, 1989, STAB denied Steer's appeal on the basis

that Steer did !'not advance a charitable purpose. The evidence

establishes that the cattle are raised and sold for a profit. The

profit is used to advance and further evangelical gospel and

doctrine.

4

Steer petitioned for judicial review on March 24, 1989. On

December 18, 1989, the District Court reversed and remanded STAB'S

decision, and held that ind dings of Fact IX and XI were clearly

erroneous:

Steer, Inc. objects to STAB'S Finding of Fact

IX which states that I1[e]ach missionary reci-

pient has as its principal purpose the dis-

semination of evangelical gospel and prin-

ciples." Because this finding ignores its

commitment to providing services and goods to

the needy, Steer, Inc. argues, it shows that

STAB failed to look beyond the religious

aspect of Steer Inc.'s organization. STAB

also found in Finding of Fact XI that I1[t]he

evidence in the case establishes that the

cattle and the property owned by Steer, Inc.

are not used for any purpose other than the

purposes set forth in the Findings of Fact

above." These findings are clearly erroneous

based upon the evidence on the record.

The District Court further stated that STAB ignored testimony that

stated that Steer's funds were used in projects "that were

charitable rather than strictly evangel is ti^^^ such as a hospital

construction and educational contributions. From this decision,

DOR appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We recognize that in the past this Court has interpreted 5 2-

4-704, MCA, the standards for judicial review of an administrative

ruling, to mean that an agency's findings of fact are subject to

a ''clearly erroneous1'standard and agency's conclusions of law are

subject to a broader ''abuse of discretion1I standard. City of

Billings v. Billings Firefighters (1982), 200 Mont. 421, 430, 651

P.2d 627, 632; P.W. Berry Co., Inc. v. Freese (1989), 239 Mont.

183, 188, 779 P.2d 521, 524 (citations omitted). "[A] finding is

'clearly erroneous1 when, although there is evidence to support it,

a review of the record leaves the court with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed." Wage Appeal of

Montana State Highway Patrol Officers v. Board of Personnel Appeals

(1984), 208 Mont. 33, 40, 676 P.2d 194, 198 (citations omitted).

"Appellants carry the burden of showing prejudice from a clearly

erroneous decision.'' Terry v. Board of Regents of Higher Education

(1986), 220 Mont. 214, 217, 714 P.2d 151, 153 (citations omitted).

An agency's conclusions of law will be reversed for abuse of

discretion I1[w]here it appears that the legislative intent is

clearly contrary to agency interpretation." Billinqs Fireficrhters,

200 Mont. at 431, 651 P.2d at 632.

In the future, we will continue to use the "clearly erroneous1'

standard for reviewing findings of fact. However, in reviewing

conclusions of law, our standard of review will be merely to

determine if the agency's interpretation of the law is correct,

instead of applying the inappropriate abuse of discretion standard.

In the past, we have applied this standard when reviewing

conclusions of law of the Workers1 Compensation Court. See Sharp

v. Hoerner Waldorf Corp. (1978), 178 Mont. 419, 423, 584 P.2d 1298,

1301; Wassberg v. Anaconda Copper Company (1985), 215 Mont. 309,

315, 697 P.2d 909, 912; Schaub v. Vita Rich Dairy (1989), 236 Mont.

6

389, 391, 770 P.2d 522, 523. The reasoning for simply determining

if the court's conclusions are correct is that no discretion is

involved when a tribunal arrives at a conclusion of law--the

tribunal either correctly or incorrectly applies the law. For that

reason, this Court concludes that our standard of review relating

to conclusions of law, whether the conclusions are made by an

agency, workers' compensation court, or trial court, is whether the

tribunal's interpretation of the law is correct.

Our standard of review relating to conclusions of law is not

to be confused with our review of discretionary trial court

rulings. This has been defined as "encompassing the power of

choice among several courses of action, each of which is considered

permissible." See ~ldisert,

The Judicial Process, 1976, page 759.

Such rulings are usually trial administration issues, scope

of cross-examination, post-trial motions, and similar rulings. The

standard of abuse of discretion will be applied to these rulings.

ANALYSIS

Because we find reversible error involving two of the seven

issues presented on appeal, we will limit our discussion to 1)

whether the District Court erred in finding STAB'S Findings of Fact

IX and XI clearly erroneous, and, 2) whether the District Court

erred when it held that tax-exempt property of an institution of

purely public charity need only be owned, and not used, by the

institution.

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1. Did the District Court err in finding STAB'S Findings of

Fact IX and XI clearly erroneous?

STAB'S Findings of Fact IX and XI read as follows:

IX

Each missionary recipient has as its principal

purpose the dissemination of evangelical

gospel and principles.

XI

The evidence in the case establishes that the

cattle and the property owned by Steer, Inc.

are not used for any purpose other than the

purposes set forth in the Findings of Fact

above.

DOR asserts that the District Court incorrectly found Findings

of Fact IX and XI clearly erroneous because contrary to the

District Court's holding, STAB did not ignore the fact that Steer,

in part, supports charitable projects. Rather, DOR argues that

STAB correctly found that Steer's member evangelical organizations1

principal purpose is to disseminate evangelical gospel and

principles. "Principal, here, does not mean llexclusivell--STAB

used the word "principal" to put into perspective Steer's religious

activities compared to its charitable activities.

Additionally, DOR argues that STAB'S Finding of Fact XI

properly distinguishes that when considering whether personal

property is tax-exempt under Mont. Const. art. VIII, 5 5 (1), and

§ 15-6-201(1) (e) and -201 (2)(a), MCA, it is the use of the

personal property and not the ownership that is determinative.

Here, DOR argues that Steer used its cattle exclusively as a

capital investment for the production of revenue, which in turn,

was donated to member evangelical organizations--Steer was not

directly using the cattle as a source of food for the needy.

Finally, DOR argues that the record is void of evidence that

Steer was prejudiced by STAB'S decision or that STAB made a

mistake. Accordingly, DOR argues that the District Court had no

basis to find Findings of Fact IX and XI clearly erroneous in light

of Terry and Waqe, supra.

We agree with DOR1s arguments. The record indeed contains

substantial evidence to support STAB'S finding that Steer's member

evangelical organizations1 principal purpose was the dissemination

of evangelical gospel and principles. This finding does not ignore

the fact that Steer conducts charitable activities; it does,

however, properly balance its charitable activities in relation to

its primary, religious activities. Furthermore, we agree with DOR

that when considering tax-exempt status, it is the use of the

property that is determinative rather than the ownership of the

property. See Flathead Lake Methodist Church Camp v. Webb (1965),

144 Mont. 565, 570, 399 P.2d 90, 93. Steer exclusively used the

cattle as a capital investment to produce funds, which in turn,

were donated to member evangelical organizations that provide

beneficial services to the needy; Steer did not directly use the

cattle to feed needy people. Finally, we hold that STAB'S decision

did not prejudice Steer and the record does not reveal that STAB

made a clearly erroneous mistake. Therefore, based on the

standards of review under Terry and Waqe, the District Court

9

incorrectly found STAB'S Findings of Fact IX and XI clearly

erroneous.

2. Did the District Court err when it held that tax-exempt

property of an institution of purely public charity need only be

owned, and not used, by the institution?

Steer, through its innovative stewardship program, provides

a valuable service by raising funds which, in turn, are donated to

needy people world-wide. However, the fact that Steer's unique

fund-raising method produces worthwhile results through its member

evangelical organizations does not negate its tax obligations under

Montana constitutional and statutory mandate. We have already

held that Steer's use of its cattle as a capital investment was

determinative in deciding that it did not qualify for a tax-

exemption based on being an "institution of purely public charity.''

We feel, however, that this case requires us to further clarify

"institutions for purely public charity."

In order to receive tax-exempt status, Steer's cattle must

qualify as "institutions of purely public charity1' under Mont.

Const. art. VIII, 5 5(1), and 5 5 15-6-201(1) (e) and -201(2) (a) MCA,

The primary focus is whether "institutionI1 means entity or

property.

Mont. Const. art. VIII, 5 5(1) provides:

(1) The legislature may exempt from taxation:

(a) Property of the United States, the state,

counties, cities, towns, school districts,

municipal corporations, and public libraries,

but any private interest in such property may

be taxed separately.

(b) Institutions of purely public charity,

hospitals and places of burial not used or

held for private or corporate profit, places

for actual religious worship, and property

used exclusively for educational purposes.

(c) Any other classes of property. [Emphasis

added. ]

Section 15-6-201(1)(e), MCA, provides:

(1) The following categories of property are

exempt from taxation:

(e) institutions of purely public charity

[Emphasis added].

Section 15-6-201(2)(a), MCA, provides:

( 2 ) (a) The term llinstitutions of purely

public charity1'includes organizations owning

and operating facilities for the care of the

retired or aged or chronically ill, which are

not operated for gain or profit.

Exemptions from property taxation are to be strictly con-

strued. Cruse v. Fischl (1918), 55 Mont. 258, 265-66, 175 Pac.

878, 881; Town of Cascade v. Cascade County (1926), 75 Mont. 304,

308, 243 Pac. 806, 807; Flathead Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb

(1965), 114 Mont. 565, 573, 399 P.2d 90, 94-95; Old Fashion Baptist

Church v. Montana Deplt of Revenue (1983), 206 Mont. 451, 455, 671

P.2d 625, 627. Taken together, the Montana Constitution and the

Montana legislative acts intend llinstitutionsll mean property or

to

place employed for purely public charitable purposes or activities

rather than an entity. The cattle are property and tax is imposed

on property. If it is charitable property in its purpose and

employment and not for profit or gain of income, taxes are not

imposed. Here, the cattle1 employment was for the gain of income,

s

and therefore, the cattle are taxable.

Mont. Const. art. VIII, § 5(1) provides that the legislature

mav exempt property from taxation. The exemptions of property from

taxation is clearly left to the discretion of the legislature and

as noted, are to be strictly construed. The history and provisions

of 3 15-6-201, MCA, reflect the many times when this section of the

code has been amended to add property to the list of exempted

items, which includes such items as residences of the clergy to a

bicycle used for personal transportation of the owner. The

judiciary may not add livestock to the list of exemptions.

Accordingly, we reverse the District Court and hold that Steer's

cattle do not qualify as "institutions of purely public charity,"

and therefore, are not tax-exempt.

Reversed.

We concur:

Justices

Justice John C. Sheehy, dissenting:

The majority take a very narrow view of the charitable

exemption from taxation provided by our State Constitution and our

statutes. The majority interpretation of that exemption gives it

a twist that will certainly be a troublemaker in the future.

First, we must recognize that the constitutional and

legislative language is imprecise. Montana Constitution, Art.

VIII, 5 5 (1)(b), provides:

(1) The legislature may exempt from taxation:

. . . (b) Institutions of purely public charity,

hospitals and places of burial not used or held for

private or corporate profit, places for actual religious

worship, and property used exclusively for educational

purposes.

With regard to the meaning of the constitutional exemption for

purely public charity institutions, the intent is open to argument.

While other clauses of the constitutional permission for tax

exemptions refer to property of the entities, with respect to

charity organizations it merely exempts llinstitutions.ll could

It

be argued and some members of this Court think that the exemption

is only to the "institutionw as an entity, and not to the property

of the institution. That position is akin to arguing that the

taxation exemption is applicableto an abstraction, the entity, and

not to its property, which has a physical existence.

The majority Opinion rejects that argument, holding that the

Constitution and the legislature intended llinstitutionsll mean

to

property or place and not the entity itself. That position, of

course, is correct. Having reached the proper interpretation of

the imprecise language, however, the majority then reverse their

logic, holding that the entity's property is taxable. On the one

hand, the majority hold that the property of an institution is what

is intended to be exempted though held by a purely public charity;

on the other hand, they take away that exemption by holding the

property of such an institution is taxable.

What that position means for other property held by purely

public charities is threatening. One can think of examples. If

a donor gives shares of corporate stock to a purely public charity,

and the charity holds the stock for income to accomplish its

purposes, under the logic of the majority the stock itself is

taxable as property, unless other statutory provisions intervene.

The donor of a bed to a purely public charity, to be used by the

charity to acquire income for the charity's purposes would find the

bed also taxable, although in Bozeman Deaconess Foundation v.

Gallatin County (1968), 151 Mont. 143, 439 P.2d 915, this Court

held that such property was not taxable. (Of course, a bed in a

charity organized for the care of the retired, the aged or the

chronically ill is specifically exempted under S 15-6-201 (2)(a),

MCA, but what of a bed used by a charity to gain funds for the

homeless or needy transients?)

Judge McCarter, sitting in the District Court in this case,

saw the issue quite clearly. She said: "The question is whether

Steer, Inc. is a purely charitable organization pursuant to 5 15-

6-201(l) (e), MCA. Necessarily, the definition of a purely

charitable organization is crucial to answering this question."

Such a simple and direct statement of the issue, if followed by the

majority, would have led to a correct conclusion. If <he

institution is truly a purely charitable organization, it and its

property are entitled to exemption from taxation as intended, I

submit, by the constitutional framers and the legislature.

The fact that the charity holds its property to gain income

which in turn is used for charitable purposes should not destroy

the exemption. This Court indicated that solution in Bozeman

Deaconess Foundation v. Gallatin County, supra, 151 Mont. at 148.

This Court said:

To qualify as a charity does not require that it have an

exclusive relationship to the poor, and its charitable

status is not destroyed by the charging of fees for

admission and maintenance. The case of Frederica Home

for the Aged v. San Diego County, 35 Cal.2d 789, 221 P.2d

68, summarizes the modern view of these points:

"The concept of charity is not confined to the relief of

the needy and destitute, for 'aged people require care

and attention apart from financial assistance, and the

supply of this care and attention is as much a charitable

and benevolent a purpose as the relief of their financial

wants.' (Citing case.) So the charge of fees by such an

institution as a home for the aged will not necessarily

prevent its classification as charitable if such sums 'go

to pay the expenses of operation and not to the profit

of the founders or shareholders, for all persons may

'under certain conditions be proper objects of charity.

(Citing cases.)''

These same authorities demonstrate that neither its

public nature nor its standing as a charity is destroyed

by the admission requirements imposed. Such requirements

apply to all of a particular class and are consistent

with charitable methods, motives and purposes.

No one can demonstrate for me a substantial difference between

charging fees by an institution in its home for the aged (which

fees go to pay the expenses of operation and not to the profit of

the founders or the shareholders) and the holding of property by

I

such a charitable organization to gain income, which in turn

llgo[es] pay the expenses of operation and not to the profit of

to

the founders and shareholders. Indeed, there is no difference.

Bozeman Deaconess, supra.

The proper rule in this case should be that once an

institution is shown to be one of purely public charity, without

dispute, then its property, of whatever kind, is not subject to

taxation under the exemption granted by the Constitution and our

legislature.

On another point, the Department of Revenue has argued

strenuously that the purpose of Steer, Inc. in the use of its

property in this case was to disseminate its religion, and that

therefore the plan violated the First Amendment if a tax exemption

were granted. The majority opinion is silent on this subject, and

I hope by implication, quite properly, rejects that contention.

The Department argued that dissemination of religion was the

llprinci~algl

objective of Steer, Inc. in its plan. STAB, in its

Finding of Fact No. IX stated that: "each missionary recipient

has as its principal purpose the dissemination of evangelical

gospel and principles.It On that basis, the Department claimed that

the First Amendment was violated. The District Court disagreed

with the Department's contention, pointing out that there was

substantial testimony from Steer, Inc. about how its funds were

used by its member organizations and that charitable purposes other

than the dissemination of religion were involved. There is no

reason to deny the exemption even though the "charity may be

devoted to bringing people into religious influencetfl long as

as

d

the funds are truly used for what all recognize as charitable

purposes not necessarily bound by religion, the aid of the poor,

the homeless, the aged, the ill, and the misfortunate. Flathead

Lake Methodist Camp v. Webb (1965), 144 Mont. 565, 399 P.2d 90.

Another argument of DOR of no merit is its contention that

the tax exemption should not be allowed if the charitable

activities take place out of Montana. DOR is in the farcical

position of claiming a parochial reason for its anti-parochial

stance.

It is my view that the District Court should be affirmed.

+L 4 &bb/

Justice

Justice Fred J. Weber dissents as follows:

I join in all aspects of the dissent of Justice Sheehy. In

addition to the elements of his dissent, I desire to comment on a

fundamental aspect of the majority opinion.

The majority opinion in Issue 1 concludes that STAB1sFindings

of Fact IX and XI are correct, and therefore overrules the

conclusion of the District Court. In substance Finding of Fact IX

found that each missionary recipient to whom Steer, Inc.

contributed had as its principal purpose the "dissemination of

evangelical gospel and principles." In substance Finding of Fact

XI concluded that the cattle and property owned by Steer, Inc. were

not used for any other purpose than set forth above in the Findings

of Fact. The conclusion of fact to be drawn from these two

Findings is that STAB found that the cattle owned by Steer, Inc.

were used for the principal purpose of the dissemination of

evangelical gospel and principles. The substance of the majority

opinion comment on this aspect is as follows:

... Rather, DOR argues that STAB correctly found that

Steer's member of evangelical organizations1 principal

purpose is to disseminate evangelical gospel and

principles. "Principalw here does not mean Hexclusivell-

-STAB used the word nprincipalll put into perspective

to

Steer's relisious activities compared to its charitable

activities.

We agree with DORIS arguments. The record indeed

contains substantial evidence to support STAB1s finding

that Steer's member evangelical organizations' principal

purpose was the dissemination of evangelical gospel and

principles. This finding does not ignore the fact that

Steer conducts charitable activities; it does, however,

properly balance its charitable activities in relation

.

to its ~ r i m a r ~ ,

relisious activities. ... (Emphasis

supplied.)

STAB bases its entire analysis on an invalid assumption that

religious activities cannot be charitable. The majority opinion

has fallen into the same error when it concludes that the Finding

properly balances the charitable activities of STAB in relation to

its primary, religious activities. To state the conclusion in a

different way, the assumption is that charitable activities cannot

include religious activities. The assumption that charitable

principles or purposes somehow exclude religious principles or

purposes is incorrect.

In order to demonstrate that the assumed contradiction is not

correct, I will review some basic Christian religious principles.

The gospel according to Matthew, Chapter 25 starting at verse 31

(Revised Standard Version of the Bible) describes the last judgment

when Jesus Christ returns:

When the Son of man [Jesus Christ] comes in his glory,

and all the angels with him, then he will sit on his

glorious throne. Before him will be gathered all the

nations, and he will separate them one from another as

a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats, and he

will place the sheep at his right hand, but the goats at

the left. Then the King [Jesus Christ] will say to those

at his right hand, ffCome blessed of my Father, inherit

0

the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the

world; for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was

thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a stranger and you

welcomed me, I was naked and you clothed me, I was sick

and you visited me, I was in prison and you came to me."

Then the righteous will answer him, "Lord, when did we

see thee hungry and feed thee, or thirsty and give thee

drink? And when did we see thee a stranger and welcome

thee, or naked and clothe thee? And when did we see thee

sick or in prison and visit thee?" And the King will

answer them, "Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one

of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me."

"

From the foregoing, we may conclude that a principle of

Christianity is that Jesus Christ will judge Christians upon the

manner in which they treat the least of people. More

specifically, the gospel establishes the religious principle that

Christians are to feed the hungry, to give drink to the thirsty,

to clothe the naked, to visit the sick and those in prison. We may

therefore conclude that the feeding of the hungry, the clothing of

those without clothes, and the caring for the sick are essential

principles of the Christian religion. Note that these also

constitute charitable activities.

The evidence in this case with regard to the religious basis

for the activities of Steer, Inc. and the missionary recipients was

all presented by Steer, Inc. No contrary information was presented

by any opposing parties. It is true the evidence did establish

that Steer, Inc. as well as the missionary recipients have a

strong set of Christian principles which motivate and guide them.

As I trust appears from the foregoing gospel quotation, the

obligation felt by believers in Christianity that they are to feed

the hungry, clothe the naked, and care for the sick and visit those

in prison does not convert those activities into some form of

religious activity which thereby becomes a =-charitable activity.

This is recognized in the holdings of the District Court which

are now reversed by the majority opinion. The ~istrict Court

pointed out that Finding of Fact IX ignored the commitment to

provide services and goods to the needy by STAB'S failure to look

beyond the religious aspect of the organization. The District

a

Court correctly saw that religious activities can also properly be

charitable activities, and that charitable activities can of course

include religious activities, such as providing for the needy.

In accord with the above described Christian religious

principles, Mother Theresa and a number of women working with her

provide food, clothing and shelter for the poorest of the poor in

cities throughout the world. They do so based upon the above

quoted gospel principle that when they do this for the least of

human beings, they are doing it for Jesus ~hrist. Would those

religious principles disqualify their charitable activities from

tax exemption?

In his dissent, Justice Sheehy has clearly set forth the error

on the part of the majority in assuming that the property of an

institution of public charity is subject to tax. I conclude that

the majority also makes a foundational error when it assumes that

religious principles of Steer, Inc. and its missionary recipients

disqualifies their activities from being classed as charitable.

I too would affirm the District Court.

Justice John C. Sheehy joins in the foregoing dissent.