In Re the Marriage of Herron

No. 14743

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1980

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF

PAUL W. HERRON,

Petitioner and Respondent,

SHARON M. HERRON,

Respondent and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District,

In and For the County of Flathead.

Honorable Robert C. Sykes, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record:

For Appellant:

Murphy, Robicson, Heckathorn and Phillips, Kalispell,

Montana

For Respondent:

Hash, Jellison, O'Brien and Bartlett, Kalispell,

Montana

Submitted on briefs: November 11, 1979

Decided: MAR 1c 198C

Mr. J u s t i c e John Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f

t h e Court.

T h i s i s a n a p p e a l by Sharon M. Herron on t h e d i s t r i -

b u t i o n of p r o p e r t y i n t h i s m a t t e r . H e r former husband,

r e s p o n d e n t D r . P a u l Herron, b r o u g h t a n a c t i o n f o r d i s s o l u -

t i o n , c u s t o d y , and a d i v i s i o n o f t h e c o u p l e ' s p r o p e r t y i n

t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t of t h e E l e v e n t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , i n and

f o r t h e County o f F l a t h e a d . By agreement of t h e p a r t i e s ,

and w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l of t h e c o u r t , t h e w i f e r e t a i n e d c u s t o d y

of t h e f o u r minor c h i l d r e n . Upon t r i a l , t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,

s i t t i n g without a jury, d i s s o l v e d t h e marriage and, s u b j e c t

t o c e r t a i n minor e x c e p t i o n s , d i v i d e d t h e p r o p e r t y e q u a l l y

between t h e p a r t i e s . The c o u r t r e t a i n e d j u r i s d i c t i o n i n

t h e matter f o r t h e s o l e p u r p o s e of e f f e c t u a t i n g t h e "even

division." The c o u r t a l s o o r d e r e d c h i l d s u p p o r t i n t h e

amount o f $300 p e r month p e r c h i l d and maintenance payments

of $400 p e r month f o r 48 months.

A t t h e t i m e o f t h e m a r r i a g e on J u l y 2 1 , 1962, D r .

Herron w a s a b o a r d - c e r t i f i e d t h o r a c i c and v a s c u l a r s u r g e o n

p r a c t i c i n g i n S e a t t l e , Washington. Mrs. Herron w a s a

r e g i s t e r e d n u r s e employed a s a s u r g i c a l n u r s e i n S e a t t l e .

T h i s w a s D r . H e r r o n ' s second m a r r i a g e and t h e f i r s t m a r r i a g e

f o r M r s . Herron. Dr. Herron had a f a m i l y by h i s p r e v i o u s

marriage. The t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h r o u g h t h e e a r l y

y e a r s o f t h i s m a r r i a g e D r . Herron s u p p o r t e d a n o t h e r f a m i l y ,

b u t d o e s n o t i n d i c a t e t h e amount of s u p p o r t o r f o r what

p e r i o d of time.

The p a r t i e s l i v e d i n S e a t t l e where D r . Herron p r a c t i c e d

u n t i l 1967 when t h e f a m i l y moved t o C o n n e c t i c u t where he d i d

r e s e a r c h f o r t h e S t e r l i n g Drug Company f o r 18 months. he

f a m i l y t h e n moved t o N e w York where D r . Herron c o n t i n u e d t o

do r e s e a r c h .

In 1972 the family moved to Kalispell, Montana, where

Dr. Herron joined the surgical practice of a Dr. Lipinski.

In recent years, Dr. Herron's net income from his medical

practice has been in excess of $45,000 per year.

As previously noted, Mrs. Herron was working as a

registered nurse in Seattle when she married Dr. Herron. She

continued to work as an R.N. until November 1963, when she

quit work because of a physical disability. From that time

until August 1965, she maintained four foster children in

the household. There are four children of this marriage:

~eid,born August 27, 1965; Mark, born March 9, 1966;

Shelbey, born September 4, 1967; and, Jamey, born September

25, 1970. Jamey, the youngest, has a learning disability

that requires special care and special education.

At the time of the dissolution of this marriage, the

parties owned the following assets:

(1) The Ranch - This consists of some 80 acres and a

home with a swimming pool, located in the Flathead Valley

between Columbia Falls and Kalispell.

(2) The Lake Place - This consists of approximately 3-

1/3 acres with 135 feet of Flathead Lake front near Big

Fork, Montana.

(3) The Paul Herron Medical Practice and Ownership in

the Kalispell Medical Arts Building.

(4) The Sharon Herron Home - This is the home occupied

by Mrs. Herron and the four children.

(5) The George Robbin Estate - Mrs. Herron's father,

George Robbin, willed his property to Dr. and Mrs. Herron.

Dr. Herron acquired an interest in the real and personal

property of a gross value of approximately $143,000 and ~ r s .

Herron acquired an equal amount, but in addition, life

insurance in the amount of $19,841.39 and other joint assets

in the amount of $4,234.84, or a gross estate of $167,242.46,

which was subject to costs and taxes.

(6) Miscellaneous Property - Both parties have miscel-

laneous personal property which has been divided between

them. The division of the miscellaneous property is not

contested on appeal.

The Herrons acquired many of the above-listed assets as

a result of gifts from Mrs. Herron's father. The Herrons

purchased a home while living in Seattle. Mrs. Herron sold

several life insurance policies held in her name to provide

a partial downpayment on the home. Her father gave the

couple the money necessary for the remainder of the down

payment. When the Herrons moved to Connecticut, they sold

the Seattle home and used the proceeds of the sale for a

downpayment on a home in Connecticut. The couple repeated

the process when they moved to New York. The Herrons used

the proceeds from the sale of their New York home to make a

downpayment on the Flathead Lake property when they moved to

Kalispell. Thus, the acquisistion of the lake property is

traceable to a gift from Mr. Robbin.

When the couple moved to Kalispell, Mr. Robbin bought a

house for the family. He paid $46,000 for the home. The

Herrons subsequently sold the house for $46,000 and used the

money from the sale as a downpayment on their ranch property.

Mr. Robbin also gave the Herrons approximately $59,000 to

build an addition onto the house located on the ranch.

Therefore, approximately $105,000 of the equity the Herrons

have accumulated in the ranch came from gifts from Mr.

Robbin.

I n addition, Mr. Robbin g a v e D r . H e r r o n $7,500 which

was u s e d by D r . H e r r o n t o buy i n t o t h e o f f i c e b u i l d i n g and

p a r t n e r s h i p owned by D r . L i p i n s k i when D r . H e r r o n s e t u p

practice i n Kalispell. The c o u p l e a l s o r e c e i v e d a s u b s t a n -

t i a l s m o f money from M r . R o b b i n ' s e s t a t e .

u The s a l e o f t h e

home owned by M r . Robbin p r o v i d e d t h e f u n d s f o r t h e down-

payment o n t h e home M r s . Herron p r e s e n t l y occupies. The

r e m a i n d e r o f t h e e s t a t e r e p r e s e n t s a m a j o r i t y of t h e c o u p l e ' s

liquid assets.

The i s s u e b e f o r e t h e C o u r t i s w h e t h e r a b a s i c a l l y 50/50

d i v i s i o n o f m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y between D r . and M r s . Herron i s

e q u i t a b l e under t h e circumstances r e l a t i n g t o t h e a c q u i s i -

t i o n o f t h e p r o p e r t y by t h e p a r t i e s .

W e c l e a r l y and a c c u r a t e l y set o u t t h e s t a n d a r d f o r

reviewing property d i v i s i o n s i n d i s s o l u t i o n proceedings i n

I n R e t h e M a r r i a g e o f Brown ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . , 587

P.2d 361, 35 S t . R e p . 1733. I n Brown w e s a i d :

"The a p p o r t i o n m e n t made by t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t w i l l n o t b e d i s t u r b e d on r e v i e w

u n l e s s t h e r e h a s been a c l e a r abuse of

d i s c r e t i o n a s m a n i f e s t e d by a s u b s t a n -

t i a l l y i n e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of t h e mari-

t a l assets resulting i n substantial

i n j u s t i c e . " Brown, 587 P.2d a t 364, 35

S t . R e p . a t 1736.

S e e a l s o I n Re t h e M a r r i a g e o f Aanenson ( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont .

, 598 P.2d 1 1 2 0 , 1 1 2 3 , 36 St.Rep. 1 5 2 5 , 1528; I n R e t h e

M a r r i a g e o f Kaasa ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont . - 5 9 1 P.2d 1 1 1 0 ,

1 1 1 3 , 36 S t - R e p . 425, 428; I n R e t h e M a r r i a g e o f K r a m e r

(1978) r - Mont. , 580 P.2d 439, 442, 35 St.Rep. 700,

704. I n r e v i e w i n g t h e p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n o r d e r e d by t h e

D i s t r i c t C o u r t i n t h i s case, w e f i n d t h e l o w e r c o u r t a b u s e d

its discretion.

The b a s i s f o r t h e e r r o r i n t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e

H e r r o n s ' p r o p e r t y i s t h e f a i l u r e of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o

f o l l o w t h e p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 40-4-202, MCA. S e c t i o n 40-

4-202(1) d i r e c t s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o a p p o r t i o n m a r i t a l

assets ". . . b e l o n g i n g t o e i t h e r o r b o t h , however and

whenever a c q u i r e d and whether t h e t i t l e t h e r e t o i s i n t h e

name o f t h e husband o r w i f e o r b o t h . " That language c l e a r l y

i n d i c a t e s t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t s h o u l d c o n s i d e r a l l t h e Herron

p r o p e r t y , i n c l u d i n g t h a t r e c e i v e d by g i f t o r b e q u e s t from

George Robbin, i n d i v i d i n g t h e m a r i t a l e s t a t e . See a l s o

Brown, 587 P.2d a t 365, 35 St.Rep. a t 1737; I n re t h e Mar-

r i a g e of Vivian (1978), - Mont. , 583 P.2d 1072, 1074,

35 St.Rep. 1359, 1362; Morse v . Morse ( 1 9 7 7 ) , - Mont. ,

571 P.2d 1147, 1149, 34 St.Rep. 1334, 1337. The D i s t r i c t

Court here included a l l t h e g i f t property i n t h e m a r i t a l

assets, t h u s complying w i t h t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t o f s e c t i o n 40-

,

4-202 (1) MCA.

The s t a t u t e g o e s on t o s t a t e :

". . . I n d i s p o s i n g of p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d

p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e ; p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by

g i f t , bequest, devise, o r descent; property

a c q u i r e d i n exchange f o r p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d

b e f o r e t h e m a r r i a g e o r i n exchange f o r

p r o p e r t y a c q u i r e d by g i f t , b e q u e s t , d e v i s e ,

o r descent; t h e increased value of property

a c q u i r e d p r i o r t o m a r r i a g e ; and p r o p e r t y

a c q u i r e d by a spouse a f t e r a d e c r e e of

l e g a l separation, the court s h a l l consider

t h o s e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e o t h e r s p o u s e t o

t h e marriage, including:

" ( a ) t h e nonmonetary c o n t r i b u t i o n of

a homemaker;

" ( b ) t h e e x t e n t t o which such c o n t r i b u -

t i o n s have f a c i l i t a t e d t h e m a i n t e n a n c e

o f t h i s p r o p e r t y ; and

" ( c ) whether o r n o t t h e p r o p e r t y d i s -

postion serves a s an a l t e r n a t i v e t o

maintenance a r r a n g e m e n t s . " S e c t i o n 40-

,

4-202 (1) MCA.

This p a r t of t h e p r o p e r t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s t a t u t e e s t a b -

l i s h e s t h e c r i t e r i a f o r determining an e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n of

p r o p e r t y b r o u g h t t o t h e m a r r i a g e , a c q u i r e d by g i f t o r be-

q u e s t d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e and a c q u i r e d a f t e r a d e c r e e o f

l e g a l s e p a r a t i o n . The s t a t u t e r e q u i r e s t h e c o u r t t o c o n s i d e r

t h e c o n t r i b u t i o n s of t h e non-acquiring s p o u s e t o t h e mar-

r i a g e i n d i v i d i n g t h e s e t y p e s of p r o p e r t y . I n re t h e Mar-

r i a g e of Herring (1979), Mont. r 602 P.2d 1 0 0 6 , 1 0 0 7 ,

36 S t . R e p . 2052, 2054. I n determining t h e exact d i s t r i b u -

t i o n o f t h i s t y p e o f m a r i t a l a s s e t , no s e t f o r m u l a c a n be

e s t a b l i s h e d a s t o how t h e assets s h o u l d b e e q u i t a b l y d i s -

tributed. Each c a s e h a s t o b e d e c i d e d o n i t s own m e r i t s . In

re t h e Marriage of Metcalf ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. -, 598 P.2d

1140, 1143, 36 St.Rep. 1 5 5 9 , 1563; V i v i a n , 583 P.2d a t 1 0 7 4 ,

35 St.Rep. a t 1362; Morse, 571 P.2d a t 1 1 4 7 , 1150, 34

St.Rep. a t 1338.

I t i s i n t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s a s p e c t of t h e d i s -

p o s i t i o n s t a t u t e t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t f a i l e d t o comply

w i t h s e c t i o n 40-4-202(1), MCA. I n l i g h t of t h i s section,

the property distribution order i s so inequitable a s t o

r e p r e s e n t an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n .

The i n e q u i t y o f t h e 50/50 p r o p e r t y d i v i s i o n becomes

a p p a r e n t a f t e r c o n s i d e r i n g t h e s o u r c e o f t h e m a r i t a l assets

of t h e p a r t i e s . Almost a l l o f t h e p r o p e r t y a c c u m u l a t e d by

t h e H e r r o n s c a n b e t r a c e d t o g i f t s o r b e q u e s t s from George

Robbin.

The c o u p l e p u r c h a s e d t h e r a n c h p r o p e r t y f o r $65,000,

added a p p r o x i m a t e l y $59,000 w o r t h o f improvements t o t h e

r a n c h h o u s e , and i n s t a l l e d a p o o l on t h e p r o p e r t y a t a c o s t

o f $15,000. T o t a l e x p e n d i t u r e s f o r t h e r a n c h and improve-

m e n t s t h u s e q u a l a p p r o x i m a t e l y $140,000. Mr. ~ o b b i n ave

g

t h e Herrons o v e r $100,000 o f t h e $140,000 t h e y s p e n t on t h e

Property. The F l a t h e a d Lake p r o p e r t y was p u r c h a s e d w i t h

money from t h e s a l e o f homes f o r which M r . Robbin o r i g i n a l l y

gave t h e H e r r o n s a p a r t of t h e downpayment. Mr. Robbin gave

Dr. Herron t h e money he needed t o buy i n t o h i s m e d i c a l

practice i n Kalispell. Mrs. Herron bought t h e home s h e and

t h e c h i l d r e n now r e s i d e i n w i t h t h e p r o c e e d s from t h e s a l e

o f t h e R o b b i n ' s f a m i l y home, which t h e c o u p l e i n h e r i t e d from

George Robbin. The o t h e r main m a r i t a l a s s e t , t h e George

Robbin E s t a t e , o r i g i n a t e d from a d e v i s e from M r s . Herron's

father.

George Robbin t h u s g i f t e d o r bequeathed o v e r a q u a r t e r

o f a m i l l i o n d o l l a r s t o t h e Herrons d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f

t h e i r marriage. The p r o p e r t y was g i v e n t o t h e Herrons

jointly, but Mr. Robbin c e r t a i n l y d i d s o t o p r o v i d e f o r h i s

o n l y d a u g h t e r . The p r o p e r t y s h o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d a s p r i n -

cipally g i f t s to M r s . Herron.

Given t h e f a c t t h a t most of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s w e r e

accumulated v i a g i f t s from M r s . Herron's f a t h e r , D r . Herron's

c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e m a r r i a g e from o t h e r s o u r c e s would have

t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y outweigh M r s . H e r r o n ' s t o r e n d e r e q u i t a b l e

a 50/50 d i v i s i o n of t h e c o u p l e ' s a s s e t s . T h a t s i m p l y i s n o t

t h e case here. For t h e f i r s t y e a r o f t h e m a r r i a g e , b o t h t h e

p a r t i e s worked. Mrs. Herron t h e n assumed t h e d u t i e s of

c a r i n g f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s home. She a l s o c a r e d f o r f o s t e r

c h i l d r e n b r o u g h t i n t o t h e home and l a t e r f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s

four natural children. Dr. Herron s u p p o r t e d t h e f a m i l y

f i n a n c i a l l y w i t h income from h i s m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e . The

m a r r i a g e had a l l t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a c o u p l e working

t o g e t h e r and c o n t r i b u t i n g e q u a l l y toward t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n

and maintenance o f t h e m a r i t a l assets. M r s . Herron main-

t a i n e d t h e f a m i l y home and c a r e d f o r t h e c o u p l e ' s c h i l d r e n ,

e n a b l i n g D r . Herron t o p r a c t i c e h i s p r o f e s s i o n . Dr. Herron

p r a c t i c e d m e d i c i n e , p r o v i d i n g t h e income t o s u p p o r t M r s .

Herron and t h e c h i l d r e n . There i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t D r .

Herron c o n t r i b u t e d more t o t h e m a r r i a g e t h a n M r s . Herron.

I n f a c t , t h e e v i d e n c e i s t o t h e c o n t r a r y , a s D r . Herron

t e s t i f i e d t h a t p a r t o f h i s income went t o pay alimony and

c h i l d s u p p o r t f o r h i s f o r m e r w i f e and t h e c h i l d r e n o f h i s

f i r s t marriage.

W e have c o n s i d e r e d s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n s i n s e v e r a l r e c e n t

cases. I n I n re t h e M a r r i a g e of Balsam ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont .

,

- 589 P.2d 652, 36 St.Rep. 79, M r . Balsam's p a r e n t s gave

him some s h a r e s i n t h e f a m i l y b u s i n e s s v a l u e d i n e x c e s s o f

$50,000. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t h e s t o c k a p a r t o f

t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s , b u t awarded M r s . Balsam no i n t e r e s t i n

t h e s t o c k s on d i s s o l u t i o n of t h e marriage. The D i s t r i c t

C o u r t r e a s o n e d t h a t s i n c e t h e s t o c k s had n o t a p p r e c i a t e d

d u r i n g t h e m a r r i a g e , none o f t h e i r v a l u e c o u l d be a p r o d u c t

o f c o n t r i b u t i o n from t h e m a r i t a l e f f o r t . Balsam, 589 P.2d

a t 654, 36 St.Rep. a t 83. W e a f f i r m e d t h e d e c i s i o n and

r a t i o n a l e of t h e lower c o u r t .

I n Brown, s u p r a , M r . Brown i n h e r i t e d a r a n c h from h i s

father. H e and M r s . Brown worked t h e r a n c h t o g e t h e r f o r

14 y e a r s . The r a n c h was v a l u e d between $350,000 and $450,000

a t t h e t i m e o f d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e Browns' m a r r i a g e . The

D i s t r i c t C o u r t awarded M r s . Brown $25,000, o r between 5 and

7 p e r c e n t o f t h e t o t a l v a l u e of t h e r a n c h , a s h e r e q u i t a b l e

s h a r e of t h e property. T h i s C o u r t found t h a t M r s . Brown

acquired a vested i n t e r e s t i n the ranch property regardless

o f i t s s o u r c e by v i r t u e o f h e r 1 4 y e a r s a s a m o t h e r , house-

w i f e and p a r t t i m e r a n c h hand. Brown, 587 P.2d a t 365, 35

St.Rep. at 1737. We held that awarding her such a small

amount of the total valuation of the ranch represented an

inequitable division of the marital asset. Brown, 587 P.2d

at 365, 35 St-Rep. at 1737-1738.

In Metcalf, supra, Mr. Metcalf had received an inheri-

tance five years prior to dissolution of the marriage. The

Metcalfs' earnings at the time they received the inheritance

were such that they spent the money for the normal expenses

of the marriage. We found it impossible for the District

Court to trace the inheritance under these circumstances.

Metcalf, 598 P.2d at 1143, 36 St.Rep. at 1563. We held that

a District Court faced with this predicament could not be

required to "I. . .become an appraiser, an accountant, a

computer, and an all-around genius .. . ' " and enter spe-

cific findings regarding an inheritance expended in this

fashion. Metcalf, 598 P.2d at 1143, 36 St.Rep. at 1563

(citing Downs v. Downs (1979), - Mont. , 592 P.2d 938,

939, 36 St.Rep. 577, 579).

These cases set out some broad guidelines for an

equitable division on dissolution of property acquired via

gift or bequest to one party to the marriage.

The gift must be traceable before the District Court

will be required to make specific findings regarding the

property. Metcalf, supra. If none of the value of the

property is a product of contribution from the marital

effort, the District Court can justifiably find that the

non-acquiring spouse has no interest in the property.

Balsam, supra. If, on the other hand, both parties to the

marriage contribute to the maintenance and thus the appre-

ciated value of the gift property, it is inequitable to

award the non-acquiring spouse only a fraction of the value

of the asset on dissolution. Brown, supra.

The f a c t s h e r e do n o t f a l l s q u a r e l y under any of t h e

previously decided cases. Unlike Metcalf, t h e g i f t property

is definitely traceable. W e a r e not presented with t h e

Balsam s i t u a t i o n o f no c o n t r i b u t i o n t o t h e maintenance of

t h e a s s e t and no a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e p r o p e r t y d u r i n g t h e

marriage. W e do have a s e t of f a c t s i n v o l v i n g e q u a l c o n t r i -

b u t i o n t o t h e maintenance o f t h e g i f t a s s e t s and a p p r e c i -

a t i o n of t h e a s s e t s a s i n Brown. The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e r e ,

however, h a s n o t awarded s u b s t a n t i a l l y a l l t h e g i f t p r o p e r t y

t o t h e a c q u i r i n g spouse.

The s i t u a t i o n l i e s somewhere between t h e r e s u l t s

r e a c h e d i n Balsam and Brown. The f a c t s do n o t w a r r a n t t h e

t o t a l d e n i a l of any i n t e r e s t i n t h e g i f t e d m a r i t a l a s s e t s by

t h e non-acquiring s p o u s e j u s t i f i e d i n Balsam. Both p a r t i e s

h e r e c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e maintenance o f t h e a s s e t s , and t h e

a s s e t s have a p p r e c i a t e d . By t h e same t o k e n , j u s t a s i n

Brown, t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t would n o t be j u s t i f i e d i n awarding

t h e n o n - a c q u i r i n g s p o u s e o n l y a s m a l l f r a c t i o n of t h e t o t a l

v a l u e o f t h e g i f t p r o p e r t y b e c a u s e of t h e j o i n t c o n t r i b u t i o n

t o m a i n t a i n i n g t h e p r o p e r t y and t h e a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h e

property. Both p a r t i e s h e r e s h o u l d s h a r e e q u a l l y i n t h e

p o r t i o n o f t h e v a l u e of t h e g i f t p r o p e r t y a t t r i b u t a b l e t o

c o n t r i b u t i o n from t h e m a r r i a g e and a p p r e c i a t i o n d u r i n g t h e

marriage. The Herrons s h o u l d n o t , however, s h a r e e q u a l l y i n

t h e t o t a l v a l u e of t h e p r o p e r t y s i n c e t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s

came t o t h e m a r r i a g e p r i n c i p a l l y a s g i f t s f o r M r s . err on's

benefit.

W e t h e r e f o r e remand t h e c a s e t o D i s t r i c t C o u r t f o r

retrial.

On remand, we d i r e c t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t o c o r r e c t two

a d d i t i o n a l e r r o r s i n i t s h a n d l i n g of t h i s c a s e . W have

e

r e p e a t e d l y s t a t e d t h e t r i a l c o u r t must d e t e r m i n e t h e n e t

w o r t h o f t h e p a r t i e s a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v o r c e t o have a

proper d i s t r i b u t i o n of t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s . H e r r i n g , 602

P.2d a t 1 0 0 7 , 36 St.Rep. a t 2054; Brown, 587 P.2d a t 365, 35

St.Rep. a t 1738; V i v i a n , 583 P.2d a t 1074, 35 St.Rep. at

1361; Kramer, 580 P.2d a t 443, 35 St.Rep. a t 704. The

n a t u r e o f some o f t h e p r o p e r t y i n v o l v e d h e r e i l l u s t r a t e s t h e

r e a s o n a n e t w o r t h d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e an

e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y c a n b e made. For ex-

ample, D r . H e r r o n i n t r o d u c e d a n e x h i b i t and g a v e t e s t i m o n y

a t t r i a l v a l u i n g h i s m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e a t $7,500. To v a l u e

a t $7,500 a n i n t e r e s t i n a m e d i c a l p r a c t i c e t h a t i n c l u d e s

p a r t ownership i n a c l i n i c b u i l d i n g , goodwill, accounts

r e c e i v a b l e t o t a l i n g o v e r $50,000, and a c a p a c i t y f o r g e n e r -

a t i n g o v e r $45,000 p e r y e a r i n income i s , o f c o u r s e , r i d i c u -

lous. L i k e w i s e , t o award M r s . H e r r o n 50 p e r c e n t o f $7,500

a s h e r e q u i t a b l e s h a r e of t h e medical p r a c t i c e , even a b s e n t

t h e f a c t t h a t h e r f a t h e r gave D r . Herron t h e money t o buy

i n t o the practice, i s patently inequitable.

T h e r e must b e a j u d i c i a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e t r u e

worth of a s s e t s l i k e D r . Herron's medical p r a c t i c e b e f o r e an

e q u i t a b l e d i v i s i o n o f t h e m a r i t a l a s s e t s c a n b e made.

D e s p i t e o u r r e p e a t e d s t a t e m e n t s o f t h e n e c e s s i t y o f de-

termining n e t worth b e f o r e d i v i d i n g m a r i t a l p r o p e r t y , t h e

District C o u r t f a i l e d t o do s o here. W e advise the court t o

d o s o on remand. I n considering t h e family a s s e t s under t h e

f a c t s o f t h i s c a s e , t h e c o u r t on remand s h o u l d t a k e i n t o

c o n s i d e r a t i o n how t h e j o i n t e s t a t e o f t h e c o u p l e w a s a c -

q u i r e d and make a n e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e same. The

50/50 r u l e i s n o t a b s o l u t e when i t b r i n g s a b o u t a n i n e q u i -

table distribution.

The second error by the District Court involves the

maintenance award made in this case. Maintenance can only

be awarded to parties lacking sufficient property to provide

for their needs and unable to support themselves through

appropriate employment. Section 40-4-203(1), MCA. The

court cannot determine if the parties possess sufficient

property to support themselves until the marital assets have

been valued and divided. Therefore, the District Court

should not award final maintenance payments until the

marital assets have been valued and equitably apportioned.

Vivian, 583 P.2d at 1075, 35 St.Rep. at 1362; In re the

Marriage of Johnsrud (1977), - Mont. , 572 P.2d 902,

907, 34 St.Rep. 1417, 1423-1424. Here the marital assets

have been neither valued nor equitably apportioned. The

maintenance award should therefore be reviewed on remand.

In reviewing the maintenance award, we recommend that

the District Court carefully consider the advisability of

placing any time restrictions on the duration of the main-

tenance to Mrs. Herron. Section 40-4-203(2), MCA, sets out

the considerations relevant to the amount and duration of a

maintenance award. That sub'section states:

"The maintenance order shall be in such amounts

and for such periods of time as the court deems

just, without regard to marital misconduct, and

after considering all relevant facts including:

"(a) the financial resources of the party seek-

ing maintenance, including marital property ap-

portioned to him, and his ability to meet his

needs independently, including the extent to

which a provision for support of a child living

with the party includes a sum for that party as

custodian;

" (b) 'the time necessary to acquire sufficient

education or training to enable the party seek-

ing maintenance to find appropriate employment;

"(c) the standard of living established during

the marriage;

"(dl the duration of the marriage;

" (e) the age and the physical and emotional

condition of the spouse seeking maintenance;

and

" (f) the ability of the spouse from whom

maintenance is sought to meet his needs while

meeting those of the spouse seeking main-

tenance. "

Considering these factors, Mrs. Herron is now 45 years

old. She left the job market over 15 years ago in part

because a physical disability made it difficult for her to

work as a nurse. Her recent efforts to obtain and hold a job

have met with minimum success at best. Mrs. Herron main-

tains a home for four children, the youngest of whom has a

learning disability and may require Mrs. Herron's care for

quite some time. Dr. Herron, on the other hand, is a prac-

ticing surgeon in the prime of his professional career. His

employment allows him to earn in excess of $45,000 annually.

This level of income would allow him to pay the support and

maintenance ordered by the District Court and still retain

approximately $25,000 annually for his own expenses. Addi-

tionally, the couple established a relatively high standard

of living during their 16 years of marriage.

The court should also consider whether the property

awarded to the parties is income consuming or income pro-

ducing in determining the amount and duration of maintenance

payments. Johnsrud, 572 P.2d at 905, 34 St.Rep. at 1421;

Brawman v. Brawrnan (1962), 199 Cal.App.2d 876, 19 Cal.Rptr.

106, 110. Brawman illustrates the rationale for considering

the nature as well as the amount of distributed property in

determining adequate maintenance. The California court

points out that the practical effect of a property division

awarding income consuming property to one spouse and income

producing property to the other leaves one spouse in pos-

session of property the spouse is unable to maintain while

placing the other party in control of assets that generate a

comfortable living. Brawman, 19 Cal.Rptr. at 110. The

Brawman court found this situation inequitable and held that

maintenance should be employed as a remedy. 19 Cal.Rptr. at

111.

Here we find the property awarded to Mrs. Herron,

although possibly substantial in quantity, is income con-

suming in nature. The primary income producing marital

asset, the medical practice and attendant goodwill, will be

awarded to Dr. Herron. The danger exists of creating a

situation in which Mrs. Herron would be "property poor",

i.e. in possession of a large quantity of property but

unable to generate the income to maintain the property. In

contrast, the marital assets received by Dr. Herron should

allow him to continue making a handsome salary. We agree

with the Brawman court that maintenance payments to Mrs.

Herron should be employed to compensate for the inequities

inherent in this situation.

The considerations set forth in section 40-4-203(2),

MCA, and the nature of the Herron marital assets to be

distributed militate against limiting the duration of main-

tenance payments to Mrs. Herron. On remand we advise the

District Court to reconsider its decision to do so.

For the above reasons, we remand the case for retrial

on the issues of property disposition and maintenance.

We concur:

Justices

Mr. Justice John C. Sheehy concurring in part and dissenting

in part:

I must respectfully dissent from the majority in concluding

that the gifts from the wife's father to the couple must be

counted as the wife's contribution in dividing the marital

estate. The record shows that the gifts were made irrevocably

to the couple. That being so, ownership of one-half of the

gifts was vested in the husband at the time of the gifts. It

may be in the light of after-events that the father would not

have made those gifts to the husband had the father known

what was in the future, but we cannot cure that with our

hindsight. This Court is in no better position to reverse the

ownership of the gifts than the father's executor would be.

We might wish it otherwise, but that is the law.

Justice