State v. McKenzie

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. 13011

..................................................

STATE OF MONTANA

VS .

DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE

J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. S h e a D i s s e n t

--------------_---_-----------------------.--

March 28, 1980

Mr. J u s t i c e D a n i e l J. Shea d i s s e n t i n g :

B e f o r e s e t t i n g f o r t h t h e b a s i s of m d i s s e n t , it would

y

p e r h a p s be h e l p f u l t o p l a c e t h i s c a s e i n i t s p r o c e d u r a l p r o s p e c t i v e .

T h i s C o u r t d e c i d e d t h e f i r s t McKenzie c a s e on November 1 2 , 1976.

S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 1 Mont. 278, 557 P.2d 1023. I was

n o t a member of t h i s C o u r t a t t h a t t i m e . The c a s e t h e n t r a v e l e d

t o t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t on a p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f

certiorari.

On J u l y 29, 1977, t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t remanded

t h e c a s e t o b e r e h e a r d i n l i g h t of P a t t e r s o n v . New York ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,

432 U.S. 1 9 7 , 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. When t h e c a s e was

a g a i n o r a l l y a r g u e d , I was a member o f t h i s C o u r t . In addition

t o a d d r e s s i n g i t s e l f t o t h e P a t t e r s o n v. New York i s s u e , t h i s

Court again i s s u e d a f u l l opinion. Other than t h e P a t t e r s o n

i s s u e , i t was f o r t h e most p a r t , s i m p l y a r e p e a t of t h e f i r s t

McKenzie d e c i s i o n .

- - S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 8 ) , Mont . I

581 P.2d 1205, 35 St.Rep. 759. I d i s s e n t e d t o t h a t o p i n i o n on

t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e q u e s t i o n and on t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y q u e s t i o n

( 5 8 1 P. 2d 1235-1277).

THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE QUESTION

I concluded t h a t t h e s e a r c h e s and s e i z u r e s i n t h i s c a s e

b l a t a n t l y v i o l a t e d d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t s under t h e

Montana and United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n s and t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e

e v i d e n c e s e i z e d and t h e f r u i t s of t h e i l l e g a l l y o b t a i n e d e v i d e n c e

s h o u l d have been s u p p r e s s e d . 581 P.2d 1235-1266. Defendant was

c o n v i c t e d by t h e u s e of i l l e g a l l y s e i z e d e v i d e n c e and was t h u s

e n t i t l e d t o a new t r i a l . M views have n o t changed on t h e

y

s e a r c h and s e i z u r e q u e s t i o n ; i n d e e d , t h e y a r e even more r e s o l u t e .

T h i s i s a v e r y s t r o n g c a s e f o r s u p p r e s s i o n of e v i d e n c e . Expressed

a s m o d e r a t e l y a s p o s s i b l e , t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e v i o l a t i o n s

which o c c u r r e d i n t h i s c a s e a r e a p p a l l i n g .

There is no need, however, to again set forth my dissent

in this opinion. My views expressed in the second McKenzie case

(581 P.2d 1235-1266) shall constitute my views here on the search

and seizure questions. No doubt I could write a stronger dissent,

but time constraints do not permit a rewriting. I think it

appropriate, however, to comment on one case that we have decided

since the second McKenzie case.

In Thomson v. Onstad (1979), Mont . , 594 P.2d 1137,

36 St.Rep. 910, this Court unanimously confirmed whatmy position

had always been in relation to Montana law and the requirement

that an application for a search warrant must contain probable

cause within the four corners of the document itself, without

reference to any extraneous oral statements or testimony. This

Court reconfirmed the four-corner requirement:

"However, regardless of whatever additional

information Hallett provided to the judge who

issued the warrant, the failure to put that

information in writing precludes our consideration

of whether it might have cured the insufficient

affidavit. This Court has previously construed

Article 11, Section 11 of the 1972 Montana Constitution

to require that - the facts relied upon by the

all

issuing magistrate be included in writing in the

sworn affidavit. State ex rel. Townsend v. District

Court (1975), 168 Mont. 357, 362-63, 543 P.2d 193,

196. See also, United States v. Anderson (9th Cir.

1971), 453 F.2d 174, 177 & n. 3; Petition of Gray

(1970), 155 Mont. 510, 520, 473 P.2d 532, 537. Cf.

Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 473, n. 3, 96 S.Ct. at

3042, n. 3, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1075, n. 3." 594 P.2d at

1139.

From this quotation there is no doubt that this Court not

only considers this to be the law, but also that this has always

been the law in this state. These constitutional requirements

under both the United States and Montana Constitutions certainly

predated the search and seizure involved in this case. For

reasons that I am unable to comprehend, this Court has suspended

the application of this law to defendant McKenzie here. This

was one of the major points of my dissent on the search and

seizure questions, and it is why I so meticulously set forth

t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s s u r r o u n d i n g t h e s e a r c h and s e i z u r e .

W e thus a r r i v e a t t h e issuance of t h e p r e s e n t opinion.

T h i s case w a s a g a i n d e c i d e d b e c a u s e t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme

C o u r t d i r e c t e d u s t o do s o . The Supreme C o u r t o r d e r e d u s t o

r e c o n s i d e r i t i n l i g h t o f Sandstrom v. S t a t e of Montana ( 1 9 7 9 ) ,

442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 6 1 L.Ed.2d 39. The s p e c i f i c o r d e r

o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t p r o v i d e d :

"WHEREAS, l a t e l y i n t h e Supreme C o u r t of t h e S t a t e

of Montana, t h e r e came b e f o r e you a c a u s e between

The S t a t e of Montana, p l a i n t i f f and r e s p o n d e n t , and

Duncan Peder McKenzie, J r . , d e f e n d a n t and a p p e l l a n t ,

No. 13011, w h e r e i n t h e judgment of t h e s a i d Supreme

C o u r t was d u l y e n t e r e d on t h e s e v e n t h day o f J u n e ,

1978, a s a p p e a r s by an i n s p e c t i o n o f t h e p e t i t i o n f o r

w r i t of c e r t i o r a r i t o t h e s a i d Supreme C o u r t and t h e

response t h e r e t o .

"AND WHEREAS, i n t h e 1978 Term, t h e s a i d c a u s e h a v i n g

been s u b m i t t e d t o t h e SUPREME COURT O THE U N I T E D

F

STATES on t h e s a i d p e t i t i o n f o r w r i t o f c e r t i o r a r i

and r e s p o n s e t h e r e t o .

"ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it was o r d e r e d and adjudged

on J u n e 25, 1979, by t h i s Court t h a t t h e judgment o f

t h e Supreme C o u r t of Montana i n t h i s c a u s e be v a c a t e d ,

and t h a t t h i s c a u s e be remanded t o t h e Supreme C o u r t

o f t h e S t a t e of Montana f o r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n

l i g h t of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. (1979).

"NOW, THEREFORE, THE CAUSE I S REMANDED t o you i n o r d e r

t h a t s u c h p r o c e e d i n g s may be had i n t h e s a i d c a u s e ,

i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e judgment of t h i s C o u r t above

s t a t e d , a s a c c o r d w i t h r i g h t and j u s t i c e , and t h e

C o n s t i t u t i o n and Laws o f t h e United S t a t e s , t h e s a i d

w r i t notwithstanding."

I n l i g h t of t h e s p e c i f i c d i r e c t i o n t o r e c o n s i d e r t h i s c a s e

i n l i g h t o f Sandstrom v . S t a t e of Montana, I do n o t know w h e t h e r

t h i s C o u r t was a g a i n r e q u i r e d t o i s s u e a f u l l o p i n i o n o r s i m p l y

t o r u l e on t h e q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d by t h e Sandstrom c a s e . Whatever

t h e c a s e may b e , t h e m a j o r i t y i s s u e d a f u l l o p i n i o n on a l l i s s u e s

r a i s e d by t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h u s I assume t h e o p i n i o n s p e a k s from

t h e d a t e o f d e c i s i o n on a l l i s s u e s d e c i d e d . If s u c h i s t h e c a s e ,

I f a i l t o u n d e r s t a n d why t h e m a j o r i t y d i d n o t c o n s i d e r t h e s e a r c h

and s e i z u r e q u e s t i o n a g a i n and d e c i d e it i n d e f e n d a n t ' s f a v o r .

Thomson v . Onstad, s u p r a , r e q u i r e s t h i s r e s u l t .

The majority opinion ignores any reference to Thomson

v. Onstad. Why?

The search and seizure violations committed

are

against Thomson/pale beside the violations committed in this

case. There is no doubt that this Court has not given the full

and fair consideration to McKenziets claims that his Fourth

Amendment rights were violated. Indeed, by its decision it

is clear beyond any doubt that the Court has carved out another

special McKenzie rule in the law of search and seizure. As to

McKenzie, the Fourth Amendment is dead and buried.

THE DEATH PENALTY STATUTES

In the second McKenzie case, I dissented on the question of

whether the sentencing statutes and appellate review statutes

in existence at the time of the commission of the crimes involved,

passed constitutional muster. I concluded that they did not.

Undoubtedly, by writing another dissent here on the same question,

I could better state my position. Time constraints, however, do

not permit me to do so. For this reason, my dissent in State

v. McKenzie (1978), Mont. , 581 P.2d 1235-1277, 35 St.Rep.

799A-799JJ shall constitute my dissent here on the same question.

I do have a few brief comments, however, in relation to the

majority adding the case of State v. Coleman (1979), - Mont. I

605 P.2d 1000, 36 St.Rep. 1134, in suport of its position on the

death penalty. The majority states:

"In short, we believe that the Montana statutory

scheme in existence at the time of the crimes

herein, affords defendant the procedural safeguards

necessary to protect the substantive rights to be

sentenced without arbitrariness or caprice. State

v. Coleman (1979), - Mont . - 1

I1

- P.2d I

3 6 St.Rep.

Other than citing Coleman, the statement made is precisely

the same as made in the second McKenzie case

Coleman has absolutely no application to this case. The question

in Coleman was whether the 1977 death penalty statutes could be

retroactively applied to crimes committed in 1974. The question

here is whether the general sentencing statutes and general

appellate review statutes in existence at the time of the

commission of the crimes (January 21, 1974) provided sufficient

procedural and substantive protections to satisfy the require-

ments set forth by the United States Supreme Court. Coleman

therefore, lends no support to the death penalty issues presented

in this case.

By concentrating in this dissent on the issues raised by

the Sandstrom-type instructions used in this case, I do not

mean to imply that I agree with all those portions of the

majority opinion upon which I have no specifically expressed

disagreement by writing a dissent. The simple fact is that

the entire opinion is lacking, but I do not have the time to

address all of those issues raised. Suffice to say that if

ever a case came to an appellate court as a monumental mess, this

is it.

I direct the remainder of this dissent to the issue of

whether the repeated use of the Sandstrom-type instructions in

this case are, beyond a reasonable doubt, harmless error. I

do not believe that any appellate court could, under the cir-

cumstances of the repeated use of these unconstitutional instructions,

declare that the error is harmless. For this reason, I believe

that the convictions must be reversed.

In Sandstrom v. State of Montana, supra, the United States

Supreme Court held that the presumption that one intends the

consequences of his voluntary act is unconstitutional. his

Court had not, however, passed on the issue of whether the con-

stitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For

this reason the United States Supreme Court did not decide this

issue and remanded the case to this Court for our initial con-

sideration. In effect, that is what the United States Supreme

Court directed this Court to do in the present case.

-60-

In granting Sandstrom a new trial after the constitutional

issue was again argued in this Court, we declared that Sandstrom

was entitled to a new trial because we could not declare beyond

a reasonable doubt that the unconstitutional presumption did

not influence to some degree the decision of the jury. State

v. Sandstrom (1979), - Mont . , 603 P.2d 244, 36 St.Rep.

2099. In Sandstrom, we also set forth what we considered the

correct test to be for the assessment of constitutional error.

I fail to see how McKenzie should not have the benefit of the

same decision--that is, granting him a new trial. The errors

comrnited in this case are overwhelming in comparison to the

one unconstitutional presumption which tainted the Sandstrom

conviction and required a reversal and new trial.

- MAJORITY APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR ELIMINATES -

THE - - - - THE

NEED TO INSTRUCT - JURY ON - - - THE CASE

-- THE - - THE LAW OF - -

In Sandstrom v. State of Montana, the United States Supreme

Court declared that in determining whether constitutional error

in instructions is harmless, an appellate court must review

the instructions as reasonable jurors would view them. 442

U.S. at 514, 99 S.Ct. at 2454, 61 L.Ed.2d at 45. The focus

is clearly on the instructions rather than on the evidence.

Indeed, any other view would ignore the issue. 'In adopting the

"overwhelming evidence" test here, the majority has totally

eliminated any need to focus on the jury instructions to assess

the possible impact they had on the decision making process of

the jury.

In holding that the unconstitutional jury instructions

constitute harmless error, the majority takes essentially a

four-step approach. The fourth step is the actual application

of the "overwhelming evidence" test for assessing the impact

of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions. The

analysis defies logic.

-61-

First, the unconstitutional instructions are analyzed

and the Court determines that a reasonable jury would conclude

the presumptions created are rebuttable rather than conclusive.

Second, the Court declares that even the rebuttable presumptions

are unconstitutional under the rationale of Mullaney v. Wilbur

(1975), 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508, and

therefore that a constitutional error analysis must be undertaken.

I note here, however, that this second step is not necessary.

The United States Supreme Court had already declared in Sandstrom

that similar instructions were unconstitutional regardless of

whether they created conclusive presumptions or rebuttable

presumptions. The case was sent back here for the sole purpose

of determining whether or not the constitutional error was

harmless. Third, the majority then decides that the best test

for assessing the impact of constitutional error inhering in

jury instructions is the "overwhelming evidence" test. Milton

v. Wainwright (1972), 407 U.S. 371, 92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d

1, is cited as authority for application of the "overwhelming

evidence test". And fourth, the Court then confines itself

solely to an analysis of the evidence (rather than to an analysis

of the unconstitutional instructions) and declares that the

evidence of guilt is overwhelming and therefore the verdicts

must be upheld. This approach constitutes a total abdication

of our duty, which is to assess the impact of the unconstitutional

instructions on the decision making process of the jury. It

is not our function to be the fact finder.

This approach to constitutional error obviates the need

to ever instruct the jury on the law, and therefore obviates

the need for the jury to ever follow the law. All that is

required now, it seems, is that the jury be provided only with

the appropriate verdict forms and a conviction will be sustained

if, in the minds of the majority of an appellate court, the

-62-

evidence of guilt is overwhelming. I do not believe the

United States Supreme Court could, in good conscience, let

this Court get away with this approach to the assessment of

constitutional error inhering in jury instructions.

It is not simply that this Court has adopted an entirely

unacceptable test for the assessment of constitutional error

inhering in jury instructions. Moreover, this Court, in two

recent cases, adopted and used a different standard to assess

the impact of jury instructions on the ultimate decision of

the jury. State v. Sandstrom (1979), - Mont . , 603 P.2d

244, 36 St.Rep. 2099; State v. Hamilton (1980), Mont .- I

605 P.2d 1121, 375 St-Rep. 70. No explanation whatsoever is

offered for the failure to use the same test in this case.

- ADOPTING THE 'OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE' - -TO APPLY - -

BY TEST TO THIS

CASE,- COURT HAS IGNORED - - V. SANDSTROM AND STATE V.

- THE STATE -

HAMILTON

In adopting the "overwhelming evidence" test, the majority

states:

"We find nothing in Sandstrom inconsistent with

adopting this approach to determing harmless

-

error. In Sandstrom the United States Supreme

-

Court expressly declined to reach the issue of

harmless error as an initial matter as the

Montana Supreme Court had not ruled on this issue.

-

- remand, we granted - - trial to Sandstrom

On a new

-

on grounds unrelated - - overwhelming evidence

to the

standard - assessing harmless error." (Emphasis

in

added. )

It is true that the United States Supreme Court did

no,tdirect us to follow any particular test in assessing the

impact of the unconstitutional instructions on the verdicts

of the jury. But it is equally true that we were directed

to consider the impact of the unconstitutional instruction on

a reasonable jury. How would a reasonable jury view the un-

constitutional instruction? We were not freed, as the majority

implies here, to confine our analysis to the so-called "over-

whelming evidence of guilt", which is precisely what the majority

has done.

-63-

Nor c a n I make any s e n s e o u t o f t h e m a j o r i t y s t a t e m e n t

t h a t "on remand, w e g r a n t e d a new t r i a l t o Sandstrom on grounds

u n r e l a t e d t o t h e overwhelming e v i d e n c e s t a n d a r d i n a s s e s s i n g

harmless e r r o r . " The f a c t i s t h a t on remand w e g r a n t e d a new

t r i a l t o Sandstrom b e c a u s e , i n a n a l y z i n g t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

i n s t r u c t i o n and i t s p o s s i b l e impact on t h e j u r y , w e c o u l d n o t

d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , t h a t t h e e r r o r w a s h a r m l e s s .

I f w e a p p l i e d t h i s s t a n d a r d i n d e c i d i n g t h e Sandstrom c a s e on

remand, why d i d n ' t w e u s e t h e same s t a n d a r d h e r e ? I s n ' t defendant

McKenzie e n t i t l e d t o an a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e same t e s t a s w e used

i n Sandstrom? I f n o t , why n o t ?

I n d i s c u s s i n g t h e impact of t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n

and t h e t e s t f o r a s s e s s i n g t h i s i m p a c t , t h i s C o u r t s t a t e d i n

t h e Sandstrom d e c i s i o n on remand:

" I n summary, t h e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d i s whether t h e

erroneous i n s t r u c t i o n c o n s t i t u t e d harmless e r r o r

a s a g a i n s t t h e defendant. The i n s t r u c t i o n r e a d s :

'The law presumes t h a t a p e r s o n i n t e n d s t h e o r d i n a r y

consequences o f h i s v o l u n t a r y a c t s . '

" B e f o r e a f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r can b e h e l d

h a r m l e s s , t h e c o u r t must b e a b l e t o d e c l a r e a b e l i e f

t h a t i t w a s h a r m l e s s beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t .

Chapman v. S t a t e of C a l i f o r n i a ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 386 U.S. 1 8 ,

87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. I n s o holding, t h e

Supreme C o u r t i n Chapman r e a f f i r m e d i t s h o l d i n g i n

Fahy v . S t a t e of C o n n e c t i c u t ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 375 U.S. 85,

86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 1 L.Ed.2d 1 7 1 , 173:1

' [ t l h e q u e s t i o n i s whether t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e

p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e complained o f might

have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n .

"Under Fahy and Chapman, u n l e s s w e can f i n d h a r m l e s s

e r r o r , t h e c o n v i c t i o n must be r e v e r s e d . To con-

s t i t u t e h a r m l e s s e r r o r , w e must b e a b l e t o a s s e n t a s

a Court t h a t t h e o f f e n s i v e i n s t r u c t i o n could n o t

r e a s o n a b l y have c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e j u r y v e r d i c t . In

c o n s i d e r i n g t h e i n s t r u c t i o n , and t h e f a c t t h a t i n t e n t

was t h e main i s s u e i n t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t r i a l w e

c a n n o t make t h a t a s s e r t i o n . The e r r o n e o u s i n s t r u c t i o n

g o e s t o a v i t a l e l e m e n t of t h e proof of t h e c r i m e ,

namely t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t Sandstrom i n com-

m i t t i n g t h e homicide. I f t h e jury followed t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n , it would have presumed t h e i n t e n t w i t h o u t

p r o o f beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " (Emphasis a d d e d . )

603 P.2d a t 245, 36 St.Rep. a t 2100.

I t i s p a t e n t l y c l e a r t h a t i n Sandstrom, t h i s C o u r t

used a d i f f e r e n t t e s t f o r measuring t h e impact o f con-

s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r t h a n what t h e m a j o r i t y h a s used i n t h e

present case. F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e C o u r t i n Sandstrom f o c u s e d

on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i t s e l f . Thus t h e s t a t e m e n t : "If the

j u r y f o l l o w e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n i t c o u l d have presumed t h e

i n t e n t w i t h o u t proof beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . " I t i s equally

c l e a r , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t t h e Sandstrom t e s t we a p p l i e d d o e s

n o t depend upon t h e q u a l i t y o r q u a n t i t y of t h e e v i d e n c e

s t a c k e d up a g a i n s t t h e d e f e n d a n t . R a t h e r , i t depends upon

t h e p o s s i b l e e f f e c t which t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i n s t r u c t i o n had

on t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s o f t h e j u r y . Any o t h e r t e s t

i s not a test f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r inherent i n jury in-

structions.

Even more r e c e n t l y , i n S t a t e v. Hamilton, s u p r a , t h i s

C o u r t a p p l i e d t h e Sandstrom t e s t a l t h o u g h w e a f f i r m e d t h e

conviction. ( I n d e e d , I f e e l now t h a t I was i n e r r o r i n

s i g n i n g t h e m a j o r i t y o p i n i o n d e c l a r i n g t h e e r r o r i n Hamilton

t o be h a r m l e s s . ) I n Hamilton, w e s t a t e d :

" R e c e n t l y , t h i s C o u r t h a s made t h e f o l l o w i n g

observation: 'To c o n s t i t u t e h a r m l e s s e r r o r , w e

must b e a b l e t o a s s e n t a s a C o u r t t h a t t h e

o f f e n s i v e i n s t r u c t i o n c o u l d n o t r e a s o n a b l y have

contributed t o t h e jury v e r d i c t . ' S t a t e v. Sandstrom

(19791, Mont . , 603 P.2d 2 4 4 , a t 245, 36

St.Rep. 2099, 2100. This statement i n d i c a t e s t h a t

t h e law i n Montana a s t o h a r m l e s s e r r o r i s c l o s e r

t o t h e H a r r i n g t o n t e s t . That i s , t h e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t

d e t e r m i n e s t h e impact of t h e e r r o r upon a r e a s o n a b l e

jury. I f t h e impact of t h e i n s t r u c t i o n c o u l d n o t

have r e a s o n a b l y c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e v e r d i c t t h e n t h e

e r r o r i s harmless. That s u c h an approach i s c o r r e c t

i s emphasized by t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t .

They s a i d t h a t t h e p r o p e r a n a l y s i s o f an i n s t r u c t i o n

b e g i n s w i t h ' t h e way i n which a r e a s o n a b l e j u r o r

c o u l d have i n t e r p r e t e d t h e i n s t r u c t i o n . ' 4 4 2 U.S. a t

. 99 S . C t . a t , 61 L.Ed.2d a t 45." 605 P.2d

T h i s language a g a i n l e a v e s no d o u b t t h a t u n t i l t h e p r e s e n t

McKenzie case, t h i s C o u r t b e l i e v e d t h a t i t s d u t y i n a s s e s s i n g

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r i n h e r i n g i n j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s , was t o

a n a l y z e and a s s e s s t h e impact of t h e o f f e n d i n g i n s t r u c t i o n on

t h e d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s of t h e j u r y .

Now, however, i n less t h a n two months' t i m e , t h i s

C o u r t h a s , a t l e a s t f o r t h e p r e s e n t c a s e , c o m p l e t e l y abandoned

t h e Sandstrom and Hamilton t e s t , and r e p l a c e d it w i t h a

m e a n i n g l e s s "overwhelming e v i d e n c e " t e s t . I f w e a r e going

t o change t h e r u l e s e v e r y c o u p l e months, w e s h o u l d a t l e a s t

e x p l a i n why w e a r e d o i n g s o by c i t i n g t h e c a s e s w e a r e

abandoning o r d i s r e g a r d i n g , and e x p l a i n why t h e s e c a s e s e i t h e r

do n o t a p p l y o r why w e choose n o t t o a p p l y them. The f a i l u r e

t o f o l l o w t h e t e s t s e t f o r t h i n Sandstrom and Hamilton can o n l y

be e x p l a i n e d a s t h e c a r v i n g o u t o f a s p e c i a l and m e a n i n g l e s s

t e s t f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r t o a p p l y t o d e f e n d a n t McKenzie.

AUTOMATIC REVERSIBLE ERROR - - -

CAN BE THE CONSEQUENCE - -

O F THE

FAILURE - STATE APPELLATE COURTS - FAITHFULLY ADHERE -

OF TO TO

THE RULE SET FORTH - CHAPMAN V . CALIFORNIA

--- IN -

Not l o n g a f t e r t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t d e c i d e d

Chapman v . C a l i f o r n i a , Chief J u s t i c e Traynor o f t h e C a l i f o r n i a

Supreme C o u r t w r o t e an i n f o r m a t i v e book e n t i t l e d , The R i d d l e

of Harmless E r r o r ( 1 9 6 9 ) , Ohio U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s .

7

H i s main

theme was t h a t t h e Chapman t e s t f o r measuring c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

e r r o r i s t o o s t r i n g e n t and t h a t a less e x a c t i n g s t a n d a r d c o u l d

and s h o u l d be a d o p t e d w i t h o u t j e o p a r d i z i n g t h e r i g h t s o f a

defendant. But he a l s o warned s t a t e a p p e l l a t e c o u r t s t h a t i f

t h e y d i d n o t a d h e r e t o t h e Chapman t e s t i t would be s u p p l a n t e d

with a r u l e of automatic r e v e r s a l . He stressed that the

s t a t e m e n t i n Chapman t h a t "'we c a n n o t l e a v e t o t h e S t a t e s t h e

f o r m u l a t i o n o f a u t h o r i t a t i v e l a w s , r u l e s , and r e m e d i e s d e s i g n e d

t o p r o t e c t p e o p l e from i n f r a c t i o n by t h e S t a t e s o f f e d e r a l l y

g u a r a n t e e d r i g h t s ' " was a s u r e s i g n t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t

demands a d h e r e n c e t o t h e Chapman t e s t . With r e f e r e n c e t o

t h i s q u o t e from Chapman, h e s t a t e d :

-66-

". . . T h a t s t a t e m e n t i s of some i m p o r t i n t h e

l i g h t of t h e C o u r t ' s l a t t e r - d a y p r o c e d u r a l s a f e -

g u a r d s f o r c r i m i n a l d e f e n d a n t s . Unless s t r i c t l y

monitored c o u r t s n o t i n sympathy w i t h t h e s e

s a f e g u a r d s c o u l d v i t i a t e them by h o l d i n g t h e i r

v i o l a t i o n harmless. The Supreme C o u r t may have

been a p p r e h e n s i v e of a n e a s y r o u t e t o a f f i r m a n c e

d e s p i t e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r , v i a t e s t s more l e n i e n t

t h a n t h e Chapman t e s t and more d i f f i c u l t t o m o n i t o r .

The v e r y s t r i n g e n c y of t h e Chapman t e s t i s enough t o

s u g g e s t t h a t u n l e s s it i s f a i t h f u l l y f o l l o w e d , t h e

Supreme C o u r t w i l l s u p p l a n t i t w i t h a r u l e o f a u t o -

matic reversal.

"The Chapman t e s t i t s e l f comes c l o s e t o a u t o m a t i c

reversal. A c o u r t f a i t h f u l t o t h e Chapman t e s t c o u l d

hold t h a t t h e v i o l a t i o n of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t d i d

n o t c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e judgment, and hence was harm-

less o n l y i f i t c o u l d d e c l a r e a b e l i e f t o t h a t e f f e c t

beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a b e l i e f a p p r o a c h i n g

certainty.. . ." 386 U . S . 43, 4 4 .

I f what t h i s C o u r t h a s done i n t h i s c a s e i s any i n d i c a t i o n

o f t h e a t t i t u d e of most s t a t e c o u r t s toward f e d e r a l c o n s t i t u -

t i o n a l r i g h t s , I c a n t h i n k of no more c o n v i n c i n g r e a s o n f o r

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t t o a d o p t a r u l e o f a u t o m a t i c

reversal. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , it a p p e a r s t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t

i s i n p a r t r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s a t t i t u d e of s t a t e c o u r t s

b e c a u s e o f i t s own f a i l u r e t o a d o p t an u n d e v i a t i n g r u l e f o r t h e

a s s e s s m e n t of t h e e f f e c t o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r on t h e d e c i s i o n

making p r o c e s s e s o f a j u r y . But whatever t h e t e s t may b e ,

I am c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t w i l l n o t

a c c e p t t h e t e s t and a n a l y s i s t h e m a j o r i t y h a s used i n t h i s c a s e .

THE. "OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE" TEST AS ADOPTED AND APPLIED HERE,

--

OMITS THE ESSENTIAL I N G R E D I E N T O ASSESSING THE IMPACT - -

-F O THE

F

UNCONSTITUTIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

Out of t h e v o i d c r e a t e d by t h e a p p a r e n t f a i l u r e o r

i n a b i l i t y o f t h e United S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t t o f a s h i o n an

u n d e v i a t i n g r u l e f o r t h e a s s e s s m e n t of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r ,

t h e m a j o r i t y h e r e h a s d e c l a r e d t h a t it i s f r e e t o a d o p t any

one o f t h r e e r u l e s t h a t a p p e a r t o have m e t t h e a p p r o v a l o f

t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t . The c h o i c e s a v a i l a b l e a r e

described a s follows:

". . . At least three definable approaches

appear in Uniked States Supreme Court cases:

(1) Focusing on the erroneously admitted

evidence or other constitutional error to deter-

mine whether it might have contributed to the

conviction. e.g., Fahy v. Connecticut (1963),

375 U.S. 85, 54 S.Ct. 229, 11 L.Ed.2d 171;

(2) excluding the constitutional infirmity where

overwhelming evidence supports the conviction

e.g., Milton v. Wainwright (1972), 407 U.S. 371,

92 S.Ct. 2174, 33 L.Ed.2d 1; (3) determining

whether the tainted evidence is merely cumulative

or duplicates properly admitted evidence e.g.,

Harrington v. California (1969), 395 U.S. 250, 89

S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284."

The majority cites two law review articles which apparently

support the conclusion that three distinct rules exist for

the assessment of constitutional error. Assessing the Harm-

-

lessness of Federal Constitutional Error--A Process - -

In Need

- -a Rationale, Univ. of Pennsylvania L.Rev., Dec. 1976, Vol.

of

125, No. 2; Harmless Error, - - - -

The Need for a Uniform Standard,

St. John's L.Rev., Vol. 53, Spring 1179, No. 3. The majority

neglects to mention, however, that neither article remotely

touches upon the issue of how to treat constitutional error

inhering in jury instructions. The most probable reason is

that the authors of both articles assumed, as most people would

assume, that unconstitutional jury instructions cannot be

treated in the same manner as evidence which has been invalidly

admitted at a defendant's trial.

Assuming, moreover, that Milton v. Wainwright, supra,

sets forth a separate "overwhelming evidence" test for the

assessment of constitutional error, I fail to see how it can

be applied to unconstitutional jury instructions.

In Milton v. Wainwright, the United States Supreme Court

held that an invalidly obtained confession admitted as

evidence was harmless error because three additional confessions

made by the defendant had been validly admitted as evidence.

There, a police officer posing as a fellow prisoner, was

confined in the same cell as the defendant in order to obtain

his confidence, and then illegally obtained the defendant's

confession. This confession was admitted as evidence at

defendant's trial in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment

rights. But the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because

the State had validly admitted three additional confessions,

the illegally admitted confession was merely cumulative to the

three validly admitted confessions, and thus the constitutional

error was declared, beyond a reasonable doubt, to be harmless.

I do not believe that Milton v. Wainwright has any

viability in relation td an application to unconstitutional

jury instructions. But if the basic analytical approach has

any application, an appellate court would then be required to

look at all the instructions together to determine if the

impact of the unconstitutional jury instructions was somehow

nullified or neutralized by additional instructions on the

same point which properly stated the law. This approach breaks

down, however, because an appellate court would then be placed

in the untenable position of declaring that the jury, beyond

a reasonable doubt, followed the valid instructions as opposed

to the invalid instructions. I doubt that an appellate court

would have the temerity to declare that beyond a reasonable

doubt, the jury disregarded the unconstitutional instructions

and followed only the constitutional instructions in its

decision making processes.

Any test for harmless error with relation to unconsti-

tutional jury instructions must minimally involve a consideration

of whether the jury was influenced by the unconstitutional

instructions. Here, the majority has omitted this analysis

in adopting its "overwhelming evidence" test.

In stating its reasons for adopting the "overwhelming

evidence" test the majority first declares that this test

"addresses the realities of the jury trial to a greater degree

-69-

than the others - context - - McKenzie case.

in of the . ."

(Emphasis added.) What does this statement mean? Is the

Court declaring that a special test must be applied to

McKenzie that would not be applied to other cases involving

unconstitutional jury instructions? What is so special

about the McKenzie case which requires a special test for

assessing the impact of constitutional error? The opinion

sheds no light on these questions.

But in the next breath, the Court seems to be adopting

an "overwhelming evidence" test to apply to all cases involving

constitutional error. This test is preferable, the Court

declares, because "an appellate court should view the case

as a whole in assessing harmless or prejudicial error and

not confine itself to a review of only one component of the

case in artificial isolation, in this case the jury instructions."

Is the Court here adopting an undeviating rule for the

assessment of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions?

If so, why didn't the court overrule State v. Sandstrom, supra,

and State v. Hamilton, where, just a short while ago, we

used a different test for the assessment of the impact of

constitutional error? Again, the opinion sheds no light on

these question.

I agree that unconstitutional jury instructions should

not be treated as in a vacuum, that is, not assessed in terms

of the evidence and issues existing in the particular case.

Nor does the United States Supreme Court require us to so

consider them. Essentially, an appellate court has three

choices in viewing the impact of the constitutional error:

to focus exclusively on the unconstitutional instructions

(a clearly unacceptable choice); to focus exclusively on

the evidence (another clearly unacceptable choice and the

one adopted by the majority here); or to focus on the un-

constitutional instructions in relation to the issues and

-701-

evidence existing in the case. In the absence of a rule

of automatic reversal for unconstitutional jury instructions,

the only meaningful choice is the last.

AN APPELLATE COURT MUST ASSUME THAT JURORS UNDERSTAND THE

-

- AND CONSCIENTIOUSLY APPLY - - - - THE CASE

LAW - - - THE LAW TO

An appellate court can, in determining whether or not

erroneous jury instructions constitute harmless error, view

them in three ways. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error

-

(19.69),the Ohio University Press, pp. 73-74. Obviously,

the impact of an erroneous instruction (or instructions)

depends upon the view taken.

Under the first view the appellate court assumes "that

a jury understands and faithfully follows the court's

instructions." (Id at 73.) This being the case, "any

substantial error in an instruction is bound to influence

the jury and therefore calls for a reversal." (Id at 73.)

This view according to Traynor, is the only respectable view

of appellate court can take if the law is to have any meaning

at all. Applied to unconstitutional error inhering in jury

instructions, this would mean that an appellate court must

assume that the jury followed the unconstitutional instructions

and thus a reversal would be required.

On the other hand, the opposite view operates on the pre-

mise "that a jury in the main is mystified by the legal abstractions

in an instruction even when the instruction is not unduly

complicated by abtruse language." (Id at 73.) Operating

on this assumption, an appellate court could then declare

that "errors [in the instructions] would have no more influence

on the jury than the instruction itself and hence would

ordinarily be harmless." (Id at 73.) Although the majority

here has not adopted this position in so many words, it is

clear that the adoption of and application of the "overwhelming

-71-

evidence" test to this case is premised on an assumption

that jury instructions are nothing more than window dressing.

underlying the court's opinion is an assumption that the

jury paid no attention to any of the trial court's instructions,

and therefore that the jury could not have paid any attention

to the unconstitutional instructions.

The middle ground position operates on the premise

that "instructions are indeed mystifying but it is impossible

to know whether or not a jury managed to comprehend them."

Id at 72. This being the case, "an appellate court is

unable to declare a belief one way or the other as to the

effect on the verdict of an error in an instruction. Hence

the error would ordinarily be deemed prejudicial rather than

harmless." Id at 73.

Traynor suggests, however, that the only honorable

choice is to assume that juries do understand and follow

the instructions.

"In the absence of definitive studies to the

contrary, we must assume that juries for the most

part understand and faithfully follow instructions.

The concept of a fair trial encompasses a decision

by a tribunal that has understood and applied the

law to all material issues in the case.. . ." Id

at 73-74.

If a jury is not required to follow the law as instructed

by the trial court it is freed to decide the case on any

basis it chooses as long as the appellate court can, on appeal,

make a determination that the verdict is supported by "over-

whelming evidence." Obviously, if a jury does not have to

follow the law, there is no need to give the law to the jury

to follow. This approach has as its bedrock, an assumption

that jury instructions are nothing more than window dressing.

But if the law is to have any meaning at all the legal system

cannot tolerate this state of affairs for it would mean no less

than jury anarchy condoned by the judiciary.

Here, the unconstitutional jury instructions (eight

in number) played no role whatsoever in the majority

opinion finding harmless error. The majority jumped over

the unconstitutional instructions, landed on the "overwhelming

evidence" and in the same breath affirmed the convictions.

I cannot believe for one moment that the United States Supreme

Court would declare this to be an acceptable test for assessing

the impact of constitutional error.

Aside from the unconstitutionality of several jury

instructions, there is a very real problem existing in this

case with.relation to the instructions. The instructions

were long, confusing, and often contradictory. No doubt

much of the confusion was caused by the horrible form in

which the charges were filed. This situation alone, absent

the unconstitutional instructions, would be sufficient to

reverse the case and grant a new trial. My analysis of the

jury instructions, however, rests on the assumption that the

jury understood (or attempted to understand as best it could)

the jury instructions and conscientiously applied them (as

best it could) to the issues existing in this case.

THE CHARGES FILED - - -CASE

IN THIS

The charges filed in this case, together with the

jury instructions attempting to cover the charges involved,

permit only one rational conclusion--total confusion. In

the context of this case there is no way that one can plod

his way through the morass of instructions and determine the

processes by which the jury reached its guilty verdicts.

On January 1, 1974, the new substantive crimes code

went into effect in this state. The offenses charged in

this case were allegedly committed on January 21, 1974, and

therefore the crimes were charged under the new criminal code.

Perhaps the new code helps to a degree in explaining the

confusion surrounding this case.

- 7 3-

The c h a r g e s f i l e d i n t h i s c a s e a r e v i r t u a l l y

incomprehensible. Out o f a r e l a t i v e l y s i m p l e f a c t p a t t e r n

comes s u c h a s c a t t e r gun a p p r o a c h t h a t i t would a g r e a t amount

o f t i m e f o r t h e b e s t law f i r m t o u n r a v e l . A t t h e conclusion

of t h e t r i a l , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y i n t h e

p r e c i s e wording o f t h e c h a r g e s as f i l e d . Instruction 6,

ment

~ t a t e / o f the Case. One can a p p r e c i a t e t h e c o m p l e x i t y and

i n t r i c a c y o f t h e c h a r g e s o n l y by v i e w i n g t h e c h a r g e s a s g i v e n

t o t h e jury. They r e a d a s f o l l o w s :

" T h a t Duncan P e d e r McKenzie, J r . , l a t e o f t h e

County o f P o n d e r a , on o r a b o u t t h e 2 1 s t o f J a n u a r y ,

A.D. 1974, a t t h e County o f Pondera i n t h e S t a t e

o f Montana, committed t h e crimes c h a r g e d i n t h e

f o l l o w i n g c o u n t s , a l l a t l o c a t i o n s i n Pondera

County, Montana:

"COUNT I : THAT DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE J R . , committed

t h e c r i m e o f DELIBERATE H O M I C I D E , a f e l o n y by

p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f L N

AA

HARDING, a human b e i n g ; i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-101

and S e c t i o n 94-5-102, R.C.M. 1947.

"COUNT 11: THAT DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . , committed

t h e c r i m e o f DELIBERATE H O M I C I D E , a f e l o n y , by

p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f L N

AA

HARDING, a human b e i n g , w h i l e t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER

M c K E N Z I E , J R . , was engaged i n t h e commission o f , o r

i n an a t t e m p t t o c o m m i t , o r f l i g h t a f t e r committing

o r a t t e m p t i n g t o commit:

"1. SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT CONSENT, a f e l o n y ,

by knowingly h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u s e w i t h t h e s a i d

LANA HARDING, a f e m a l e n o t h i s s p o u s e , w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ,

t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , b e i n g a male

person; o r

"2. A G A A E ASSAULT, a f e l o n y i n v o l v i n g t h e u s e

G R V TD

o r t h r e a t of p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t t h e

s a i d LANA HARDING by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g :

"a. S e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d LANA HARDING:

or L

"b. B o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d LANA H A R D I N G w i t h a

weapon, namely:

" (1) a r o p e by p l a c i n g s a i d r o p e around t h e neck

o f t h e s a i d LANA HARDING: o r

"(2) a heavy o b j e c t , by s t r i k i n g t h e s a i d L N

AA

HARDING upon h e r head w i t h s a i d heavy o b j e c t ; o r

" t h a t t h e s a i d DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , committed t h e

c r i m e of DELIBERATE H O M I C I D E , a f e l o n y a s above a l l e g e d ,

by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly c a u s i n g t h e d e a t h o f t h e

s a i d LANA HARDING:

"1. by means o f t o r t u r e ; o r

"2. by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush i n v i o l a t i o n o f

S e c t i o n 94-5-101, 94-5-102, 94-5-503, and 94-5-202,

R.C.M. 1947.

"Count 3. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . committed

t h e c r i m e o f AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a f e l o n y , by

knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y and w i t h o u t l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y

r e s t r a i n i n g L N HARDING by e i t h e r s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g

AA

t h e s a i d LANA H A R D I N G i n a p l a c e o f i s o l a t i o n , o r by

using or threatening t o use physical f o r c e with t h e

p u r p o s e of f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e commission, o r f l i g h t t h e r e -

a f t e r , of t h e f e l o n y :

"1. SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT CONSENT, by knowingly

h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h t h e s a i d LANA HARDING

a female n o t h i s spouse, without consent, t h e s a i d

DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , b e i n g a m a l e p e r s o n ; o r

"2. AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, by p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly

causing:

" (a) s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d L N HARDING;

AA or

" ( b ) b o d i l y i n j u r y t o t h e s a i d LANA HARDING w i t h a

weapon, namely:

"1. a r o p e , by p l a c i n g s a i d r o p e a r o u n d t h e neck

of t h e s a i d L N HARDING: o r

AA

"2. a heavy o b j e c t , by s t r i k i n g t h e s a i d LANA

HARDING upon h e r head w i t h t h e s a i d heavy o b j e c t ;

" i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n s 94-5-303, 94-5-503, and 94-

5-202, R.C.M. 1947, t h e s a i d LANA HARDING h a v i n g d i e d

a s a r e s u l t of s a i d c r i m i n a l conduct.

"COUNT 4 . T h a t DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , J R . , committed

t h e c r i m e o f AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING, a f e l o n y , by

knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y and w i t h o u t l a w f u l a u t h o r i t y

r e s t r a i n i n g LANA HARDING by e i t h e r s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g

t h e s a i d LANA HARDING i n a p l a c e o f i s o l a t i o n , o r by

using or threatening t o use physical force, with t h e

p u r p o s e of i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y on t h e s a i d L N

AA

HARDING o r t e r r o r i z i n g t h e s a i d LANA HARDING, i n

v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-303, R.C.M. 1947, t h e s a i d

L N HARDING h a v i n g d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f s a i d c r i m i n a l

AA

conduct .

"COUNT 5. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, JR. a m a l e p e r s o n

committed t h e crime o f SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WITHOUT CONSENT,

a f e l o n y , by knowingly h a v i n g s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h

LANA HARDING, a f e m a l e n o t h i s s p o u s e , w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ,

i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-503, R.C.M. 1947.

"COUNT 6 . T h a t DUNCAN PEDER McKENZIE, J R . , committed

t h e c r i m e o f AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a f e l o n y , by p u r p o s e l y

o r knowingly c a u s i n g s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y t o LANA

HARDING, i n v i o l a t i o n o f s e c t i o n 9-5-202, R.C.M. 1947.

"COUNT 7. T h a t DUNCAN PEDER M c K E N Z I E , JR. committed

t h e crime o f AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a f e l o n y , by p u r p o s e l y

o r knowingly c a u s i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y t o LANA HARDING w i t h

a weapon, namely

" 1 . a r o p e , by p l a c i n g s a i d r o p e around t h e neck

o f t h e s a i d LANA HARDING: o r

"2. a heavy o b j e c t , by s t r i k i n g t h e s a i d LANA

HARDING upon h e r head w i t h s a i d heavy o b j e c t ;

" i n v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n 94-5-202, R.C.M. 1947."

From t h i s maze o f c h a r g e s t h e t r i a l c o u r t was e x p e c t e d t o

p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t t h e j u r y on t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. A formidable

task t o say the l e a s t . B e f o r e t h e c a s e was s u b m i t t e d t o t h e

j u r y f o r i t s d e c i s i o n t h e " c h a r g e " o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by

l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" was d i s m i s s e d . I n s t r u c t i o n 52 t o l d t h e

jury:

"The c h a r g e of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Lying i n W a i t

o r Ambush h a s been d i s m i s s e d by t h e C o u r t and you v

are n -

- -o t t o c o n c e r n v o u r s e l v e s w i t h t h i s c h a r ~ e n

-- -I

Count I1 o f t h e ~ n f o r m a t i o nf i l e d a g a i n s t t h e

defendant." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

The i s s u e b e f o r e t h i s Court on t h e remand from t h e U n i t e d

S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i s whether t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Sandstrom-

t y p e p r e s u m p t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n a t l e a s t e i g h t i n s t r u c t i o n s , had

any e f f e c t on t h e v e r d i c t s of t h e j u r y . T h a t i s , d i d t h e un-

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s u m p t i o n s p l a y any p a r t i n t h e d e c i s i o n making

processes of t h e jury i n reaching i t s v e r d i c t s ? Before an

a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c a n uphold t h e c o n v i c t i o n s i t must be p r e p a r e d

t o s t a t e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt t h a t t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s w e r e

n o t a f f e c t e d a t a l l by t h e u s e of t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r e s u m p t i o n s .

I t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o make t h i s d e c l a r a t i o n , and f o r t h i s r e a s o n

t h e v e r d i c t s must be r e v e r s e d .

One o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g problems i n t h i s c a s e which sub-

s t a n t i a l l y d e f e a t s t h e a b i l i t y o f an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o c o n d u c t

meaningful r e v i e w i s t h a t i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o d e t e r m i n e which

p a t h o r p a t h s t h e j u r y t o o k t o e a c h of t h e c o n v i c t i o n s . Here,

t h e r e w e r e m u l t i p l e c h a r g e s and t h e j u r y was p e r m i t t e d t o a d o p t

one o r more t h e o r i e s i n f i n d i n g d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of e a c h o f

the offenses. I n a b i l i t y t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p a t h s which a j u r y t o o k

s u b s t a n t i a l l y i m p a i r s , i f it does n o t make i t i m p o s s i b l e , t h e

a b i l i t y o f a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t t o d e c l a r e o n e way o r t h e o t h e r

whether t h e Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s e n t e r e d i n t o t h e

d e c i s i o n making p r o c e s s o f t h e j u r y .

Of n e c e s s i t y , an a n a l y s i s of t h e p o s s i b l e impact o f t h e un-

c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s on t h e j u r y v e r d i c t s ,

must be based on s p e c u l a t i o n . Indeed, s i n c e t h e t r i a l c o u r t

f a i l e d t o p r o v i d e a b a s i s by which i t can be d e t e r m i n e d how

t h e j u r y r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t , it i s , i n m judgment,

y sufficient

t o r e v e r s e t h e c a s e on t h i s b a s i s a l o n e . The b e n e f i t o f any

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t a s t o how t h e j u r y r e a c h e d i t s v e r d i c t s s h o u l d

be g i v e n t o t h e d e f e n d a n t , and t h u s it must be assumed t h a t t h e

j u r y v e r d i c t s w e r e impacted by t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n s .

According t o t h e enumerated c h a r g e s , t h e r e w e r e seven

s e p a r a t e counts: Count 1, D e l i b e r a t e Homicide; Count 2 , D e l i -

b e r a t e Homicide; Count 3 , Aggravated Kidnapping; Count 4 ,

Aggravated Kidnapping; Count 5 , S e x u a l I n t e r c o u r s e Without Consent;

Count 6 , Aggravated A s s a u l t ; and Count 7 , Aggravated A s s a u l t .

But t h e c h a r g e s a r e even more c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n t h i s , f o r w i t h i n

e a c h broad c h a r g e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ,

and a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , a r e s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e methods by which

t h e d e f e n d a n t i s c h a r g e d w i t h having committed t h e crimes. A l l

t o l d , d e f e n d a n t i s c h a r g e d w i t h committing t h e c r i m e s i n v o l v e d

i n a t l e a s t s e v e n t e e n a l t e r n a t i v e ways.

The e v i l s i n h e r e n t i n r e v i e w under t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s a r e

compounded by t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h (and

may have been c o n v i c t e d ) of t h e c r i m e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide

-

"by means - t o r t u r e w - - a n o n e x i s t e n t c r i m e i n t h i s s t a t e .

of

F u r t h e r m o r e , i n b o t h of t h e a g g r a v a t i n g k i d n a p p i n g c o u n t s t h e

a d d i t i o n a l a l l e g a t i o n was thrown i n t h a t d e f e n d a n t c a u s e d t h e

death of t h e victim. The d e a t h o f t h e v i c t i m i s n o t , however,

an e l e m e n t o f t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . It is,

r a t h e r , an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e which, - - - - t h e

i f found by

c o u r t , may r e s u l t i n t h e i m p o s i t i o n of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y a b s e n t

m i t i g a t i n g circumstances.

- 77 -

-- INSTRUCTIONS

THE JURY

~ h e

unconstitutional Sandstrom-type presumptions permeate

the instructions given to the jury in this case. Instruction

31 sets the general tone by covering in great detail the use

of presumptions as a tool in satisfying the proof in relation

to the mental element involved with the particular crime. Further-

more, almost every count charged has corresponding instructions

whereby Sandstrom-type presumptions are set forth.

In Count 1, Deliberate Homicide, the jury was told by

Instruction 33 that the mental element involved could be proved

by use of these Sandstrom-type presumptions. Count 2, Deliberate

Homicide, involves essentially the invocation of the felony-

murder rule, charging that defendant committed the homicide while

committing, attempting to commit, or in withdrawing from the

felonies of sexual intercourse without consent or aggravated

assault. By Instruction 37, the jury was told that the element

involved in sexual intercourse without consent could be proved

by use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. By Instruction 38,

the jury was told that the mental element involved in aggravated

assault could be proved by use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions.

A more detailed analysis will follow in another section of this

dissent.

In Count 3, Aggravated idn nap ping, Instructions 37 and 38,

supra, also have a direct bearing on this charge. Defendant

was charged with aggravated kidnapping while attempting to commit,

committing, or withdrawing from bhe felonies of sexual inter-

course without consent or aggravated assault. Thus Instruction

37, mental element in relation to sexual intercourse without

consent, and instruction 38, mental element in relation to

aggravated assault, must also be applied in the context of this

charge of aggravated kidnapping. Again, the Sandstrom-type

presumptions are involved. A more detailed analysis will follow

in another section of this dissent.

-73-

The only count which possibly was not impacted by the

unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions is Count 4,

Aggravated Kidnapping. It appears that a jury could have fought

its way through the maze of instructions and not used any of the

Sandstrom-type presumptions to determine defendant's guilt under

this count. But because of the deficient jury verdict forms,

an appellate court does not know if the jury found defendant

guilty of Count 4. Thus an appellate court would have to

speculate that the jury did in fact convict defendant on Count

4 before it could undertake an analysis of the effect of the

unconstitutional Sandstrom-type presumptions on the ultimate

determination of guilt. A more detailed analysis will follow

in another section of this dissent.

Count 5 charges sexual intercouse without consent, and

Instruction 37 directs the jury to use the Sandstrom-type

presumptions to find proof of the mental element involved.

Counts 6 and 7 charge aggravated assault in alternative ways,

and Instruction 38 applies to both counts and directs the jury

to use the Sandstrom-type presumptions as proof of the mental

element involved.

VERDICT FORM INSTRUCTIONS AND VERDICT FORMS

In seeking to explain the maze of charges to the jury,

the trial court attempted to put them in some kind of per-

spective by explaining in Instruction 6, Statement of the Case,

the number of counts, and the number of potential convictions:

"Although defendant is charged with two counts in

each of the offenses of Deliberate Homicide,

Aggravated Kidnapping and Aggravated Assault, only

one offense of Deliberate Homicide and one offense

of Aggravated Kidnapping and one offense of Aggravated

Kidnapping and one offense of Aggravated Assault are

involved in this case. Leave was granted - State

the

of Montana to charge - -

in this manner, and to also

charqe the offense of Sexual Intercourse Without Consent,

- o;der - - - problems of proof that arise when

in to meet the

an offense or offenses - - committed in different

- can be

--

ways, or bydifferent means, - - different purposes.

or for

"The d e f e n d a n t - - c o n v i c t e d o r a c q u i t t e d

can be

on - - r a l l of s a i d o f f e n s e s -y o u may f i n d

- any o - - - as ---

t h e a l l e g a t i o n s - e a c h - - c o u n t s proved

i n -- of s a i d

- -t proved, b u t i n no e v e n t may be s e n t e n c e d

o r no

f o r more t h a n one o f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide

and more t h a n one o f f e n s e o f Aggravated Kidnapping

and more t h a n one o f f e n s e o f A s s r a v a t e d A s s a u l t

even though you may f i n d b o t h of t h e c o u n t s w i t h

which he i s c h a r g e d t o have been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt." Instruction 6. ( ~ m p h a s i sa d d e d . )

By t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e j u r y w a s f r e e t o

f i n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of b o t h c o u n t s of d e l i b e r a t e homicide

(Counts 1 and 2 ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e j u r y was f r e e t o f i n d

d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y on b o t h c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g (Counts

3 and 4 ) . The j u r y was f r e e t o f i n d d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y on b o t h

c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t (Counts 6 and 7 ) . The c o u r t s t a t e d :

"The d e f e n d a n t c a n be c o n v i c t e d o r a c q u i t t e d on - o r a - f

any - l l o

said offenses. . ." Instruction 6. (Emphasis a d d e d . )

But even I n s t r u c t i o n 6 i s m i s l e a d i n g a s t o t h e number o f

c h a r g e s , f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t was c h a r g e d w i t h many a l t e r n a t i v e ways.

Count 1 c h a r g e s o n l y one method of h a v i n g committed d e l i b e r a t e

homicide. But Count 2 a l l e g e s t h a t t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide was

committed i n a t l e a s t f i v e a l t e r n a t i v e ways. One o f t h e a l l e g a t i o n s

w i t h i n Count 2 i s t h a t t h e homicide was committed und-er c i r -

cumstances which would c a l l f o r t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e f e l o n y -

(0

murder r u l e p r o v i d e d f o r i n s e c t i o n 94-5-102(b),

n R.C.M. 1947.

The f e l o n i e s a l l e g e d l y committed w e r e s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t

consent o r aggravated a s s a u l t .

The d e l i b e r a t e homicide c h a r g e s c o n t a i n e d i n Count 2 are

f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t e d by t h e a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e homicide was

committed "by means o f t o r t u r e " o r "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush."

I n d e e d , n e i t h e r d e a t h c a u s e d "by means o f t o r t u r e " , o r d e a t h

c a u s e d as a r e s u l t of " l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush", i s an e l e m e n t of

t h e crime o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide. Rakher, e a c h o f t h e s e e l e m e n t s

i s an a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e under s e c t i o n 94-5-105, R.C.M.

1947, whereby t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y may b e imposed upon a f i n d i n g of

-813-

t h e e x i s t e n c e of t h a t c i r c u m s t a n c e , u n l e s s t h e s e n t e n c i n g

c o u r t f i n d s m i t i g a t i n g circumstances. Notwithstanding t h i s

r a t h e r fundamental f a c t , t h e S t a t e c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h a

s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e "

- -

and "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" and b o t h w e r e t r e a t e d t h e r e a f t e r

a s separate substantive offenses.

Although t h e c h a r g e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by l y i n g i n

w a i t o r ambush" was d i s m i s s e d b e f o r e it r e a c h e d t h e j u r y , the

c h a r g e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e " w a s con-

s i s t e n t l y t r e a t e d a s a separate substantive offense. The j u r y

was i n s t r u c t e d t h a t i t was a s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e , and

a p p e a r s t h a t t h e j u r y found d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y o f s u c h c h a r g e .

Of a l l t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s a v a i l a b l e t o t h e j u r y , there is

no way o f d e t e r m i n i n g . w h i c h one o r more o f t h e a l t e r n a t i v e

methods t h e j u r y u s e d i n c o n v i c t i n g d e f e n d a n t of d e l i b e r a t e

homicide and of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . Indeed, t h e t r i a l c o u r t

s p e c i f i c a l l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t h a t t h e v e r d i c t s it reached

d i d n o t have t o r e v e a l t h e p a t h o r p a t h s i t c h o s e i n r e a c h i n g

the verdicts.

With r e l a t i o n t o t h e s e p a r a t e c o u n t s o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide,

t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e jury:

". . . even though you may f i n d more t h a n one o r

more o f s a i d c h a r g e s t o have been proved beyond

a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a s o n l y one d e a t h i s a l l e g e d ,

o n l y one G u i l t y o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide v e r d i c t

form i s r e q u i r e d . . ." I n s t r u c t i o n 5 4 , p a r t 11--

V e r d i c t Forms--Deliberate Homicide.

And, o f c o u r s e , t h e v e r d i c t form r e t u r n e d and s i g n e d by t h e j u r y ,

i s equally a s nonrevealing a s t o t h e p a t h o r paths taken t o

reach i t s verdict:

"A. W e , t h e j u r y i n t h e above e n t i t l e d c a u s e f i n d

t h e d e f e n d a n t g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e

Homicide a s c h a r g e d .

"B. W e f u r t h e r f i n d t h a t t h e D e l i b e r a t e Homicide

was [ues n e t ] by Means o f T o r t u r e .

" ( S t r i k e o u t t h e b r a c k e t e d word o r words which do

not apply.) "

The same is true of the aggravated kidnapping charges.

It cannot be determined which alternative or alternatives were

used in reaching its verdict. The trial court instructed the

jury :

"Since only one Aggravated Kidnapping is alleged,

though in different ways and for different purposes,

you are to consider all of the charges of Aggravated

Kidnapping made against the defendant and even though

you may find more than - - all of the charges of

- - - - - - - - one or

Aggravated Kidnapping to have been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt - - furnished with only one

you are ---

verdict form upon which to return a verdict of Guilty

of Aggravated Kidnapping.

"If you adopt the Guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping form

you will be required to find on that form whether

Lana Harding did or did not die as a result of the

Aggravated Kidnapping." Instruction 5 4 , part 111--

Verdict Forms--Aggravated Kidnapping. (Emphasis added.)

The guilty of aggravated kidnapping verdict form which

the jury adopted and signed, reads as follows:

"A. We, the jury, in the above-entitled cause,

find the defendant Guilty of the offense of Aggravated

Kidnapping as charged.

"B. We further find that Lana Harding (did) (d*d n e t )

die as a result of said Aggravated Kidnapping.

"(Strike out bracketed word or words that do not apply)."

Thus, the trial court's own instructions, combined with

the verdict forms he provided to the jury, present a situation

on appeal where the appellate court has no way of determining

the theory or theories used by the jury in finding defendant

guilty of deliberate homicide and in finding him guilty of

aggravated kidnapping. It is impossible'to say, under these

circumstances, that the Sandstrom-type presumptions did not

figure in the decision making processes of the jury. For this

reason alone, an appellate court should declare that under these

circumstances constitutional error will be presumed to have

affected the decisions of the jury. Accordingly, the convictions

should be reversed.

The jury could have, furthermore, failed to unanimously

agreed to any single theory or set of theories in arriving

at its decision. If this is the case defendant was deprived

of his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict. Mon-

tana Constitution, Art. 11, 826; section 95-1901, R.C.M. 1947.

$3.

As stated in United States v. Gipson (1977), 553 F.2d 457:

A

"The unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be

in substantial agreement as to just what a

defendant did as a step preliminary to deter-

mining whether the defendant is guilty of the

crime charged. Requiring the vote of twelve

jurors to convict a defendant does little to

insure that his right to a unanimous jury verdict

is protected unless this prerequisite of jury

concensus as to the defendant's course of action

is also required." 553 F.2d at 4-5+-%9.

457 -459

In reversing a defendant% conviction because the

court was not able to ascertain the basis of the jury

verdict, the court in Gipson, further stated:

"During argument, the government admitted,

and the record shows that the prosecution

presented evidence tending to show that

Gipson performed each of these six acts

prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 82313. The pos-

sibility that the jury may have returned

a guilty verdict in the face of a substantial

rift among the jurors over the facts in the

case, is, therefore, a real one. Because it is

impossible to determine whether all of the jurors

agreed that the defendant committed acts falling

within one of the two conceptual groupings, we

cannot say that the district court's instruction

was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under

Chapman v. California, 1967, 386 U.S. 18, 87

S. Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 7 - M . " 553 F.2d 459.

705

Here, defendant was charged alternatively under two

broad theories: (1) Deliberate homicide with the element

required of "knowingly or purposely"; (2) Deliberate homicide

under the felony murder rule where the state does not have to

prove the mental element of "knowingly or purposely." Con-

ceivably the jury could have avoided the Sandstrom-type pre-

sumptions by taking the felony-murder route to its verdict. But

since there is no way of knowing that the jury did take this

route, the rule of Chapman v. California, cited in Gipson, above,

requires that the deliberate homicide conviction be reversed.

Furthermore, because one cannot state beyond a reasonable doubt

that the jury followed a constitutional path in reaching the

aggravated-kidnappingverdict, it too, must be reversed.

Analysis of the impact of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-

type instructions should not have to proceed beyond this

point. Where the path or paths the jury took to its verdict

cannot be determined beyond a reasonable doubt, any analysis

of the path or paths it could have taken, is pure speculation.

Nonetheless, because the majority has omitted entirely any

analysis of the unconstitutional instructions in relation to

their possible use by the jury in reaching its verdicts, I will

do so. First, I will discuss the deliberate homicide conviction,

and second the aggravated kidnapping conviction.

DELIBERATE HOMICIDE--IMPACT - - SANDSTROM-TYPE INSTRUCTIONS

OF THE

- - DELIBERATE HOMICIDE CONVICTION

ON THE

As I previously stated, at some point before the case

reached the jury for its deliberations, the charge of deliberate

homicide "by lying in wait or ambush" was dismissed (see Instru-

ction 52, supra). However, the so-called charge of deliberate

- -

homicide "by means of torture" remained for the jury's decision.

I must digress at this point to a vitally important and

fundamental fact. Defendant was charged with deliberate homicide

"by means of torture", the jury was instructed that it was a

separate offense, and instructions were given defining this so

called offense. Furthermore, there is a reasonable likelihood

that the jury may have convicted him of this offense. If this

is so, defendant has been sentenced to death for a crime which

does not exist in the statutes of this state.

The statute defining deliberate homicide at the time of

the alleged crimes in this case, is section 94-5-102, R.C.M.

1947. The entire statute reads as follows:

"94-5-102. Deliberate homicide.

" (1) Except as provided in section 94-5-103 (1)(a),

criminal homicide constitutes deliberate homicide if:

"(a) it is committed purposely or knowingly; or

"(b) it is committed while the offender is engaged

in or is an accomplice in the commission of, or an

attempt to commit, or flight after committing or

attempting to commit robbery, sexual intercourse without

consent, arson, burglary, kidnapping, felonious escape

or any other felony which involves the use or threat

of physical force or violence against any individual.

" ( 2 ) A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d of t h e o f f e n s e o f

d e l i b e r a t e homicide s h a l l be p u n i s h e d by d e a t h

as p r o v i d e d i n s e c t i o n 94-5-105, o r by imprisonment

i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any t e r m n o t t o exceed one

hundred (100) y e a r s . "

There i s no o t h e r s t a t u t e which c r e a t e s o r d e f i n e s d e l i b e r a t e

homicide. I t i s r e a d i l y a p p a r e n t t h a t d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by

means o f t o r t u r e " i s n o t a s u b s t a n t i v e c r i m e . I t i s , however,

one o f t h e s t a t u t o r y l i s t o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s which, i f found by

t h e c o u r t a f t e r a c o n v i c t i o n of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, may j u s t i f y

t h e i m p o s i t i o n o f t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , a b s e n t m i t i g a t i n g circum-

stances. S e c t i o n 94-5-105, r e f e r r e d t o i n s e c t i o n 94-5-102(2)

above, p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s :

"94-5-105. S e n t e n c e o f Death f o r D e l i b e r a t e Homicide.

" (1) When a d e f e n d a n t i s c o n v i c t e d of t h e o f f e n s e o f

d e l i b e r a t e homicide t h e c o u r t s h a l l impose a s e n t e n c e

of death i n t h e following circumstances, unless t h e r e

a r e m i t i g a t i n g circumstances:

" ( a ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by a

p e r s o n s e r v i n g a s e n t e n c e o f imprisonment i n t h e s t a t e

prison; o r

" ( b ) The d e f e n d a n t was p r e v i o u s l y c o n v i c t e d o f

a n o t h e r d e l i b e r a t e homicide; o r

" ( c ) The v i c t i m of t h e d e l i b e r a t e homicide was a

peace o f f i c e r k i l l e d while performing h i s duty o r

-

" ( d ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed by means

of t o r t u r e ; o r

- 7

" ( e ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed - -a

by

p e r s o n l y i n g - - i t o r ambush; o r

i n wa-

" ( f ) The d e l i b e r a t e homicide was committed a s a

p a r t of a scheme o r o p e r a t i o n which, i f completed,

would r e s u l t i n t h e d e a t h o f more t h a n one p e r s o n . "

(Emphasis added. )

I t i s abundantly c l e a r t h a t t h e prosecutor mistakenly

c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e "

o r "by l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush" when t h e r e was no s t a t u t o r y

b a s i s t o c h a r g e him w i t h s u c h a s a s u b s t a n t i v e c r i m e . Nonethe-

l e s s , t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e chance t h a t t h e j u r y may have

convicted defendant of t h i s so-called offense.

I n t h e v e r d i c t form i n s t r u c t i o n s ( I n s t r u c t i o n 54, P a r t

11, V e r d i c t Forms--Deliberate Homicide) t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d

t h e jury:

-85-

" I f you a d o p t t h e G u i l t y of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide

v e r d i c t form you a r e asked t o f i n d on t h a t form

whether t h e D e l i b e r a t e Homicide was o r was n o t by

Means o f T o r t u r e - -i- i s t h e most s e r i o u s o f

as th s --

t h e r e m a i n i n s c h a r s e s o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide made

-

a g a i n s t t h e defendant.

" A f t e r you have r e a c h e d a v e r d i c t on t h e c h a r g e s

of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide, whether G u i l t y o r Not

G u i l t y , you are s t i l l r e q u i r e d t o r e t u r n a v e r d i c t

on t h e c h a r g e s o f a g g r a v a t e d Kidnapping. Have y o u r

foreman d a t e and s i g n t h e v e r d i c t form upon which

you a g r e e on t h e c h a r g e s of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide and

t a k e up t h e Charges of Aggravated Kidnapping."

I n s t r u c t i o n 11, V e r d i c t Forms--Deliberate Homicide.

(Emphasis added. )

The v e r d i c t form r e q u i r e d t h e j u r y t o u s e a two-step p r o c e s s

i n i t s decision. F i r s t , t h e j u r y w a s t o d e t e r m i n e whether o r

n o t d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y of t h e o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide

( w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o any t h e o r i e s o r t h e o r i e s used i n a r r i v i n g

a t t h i s decision). ( P a r t A , j u r y v e r d i c t form, s u p r a . ) Second,

t h e j u r y was t h e n t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e homicide w a s committed

"by means o f t o r t u r e " ( P a r t B, j u r y v e r d i c t form, s u p r a ) .

I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e v e r d i c t form c o n t r a d i c t s I n s t r u c t i o n

54, p a r t 11. I n s t r u c t i o n 54, P a r t 11, t o l d t h e j u r y t o f i r s t

d e t e r m i n e i f d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y o f t h e s u b s t a n t i v e o f f e n s e

o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e " . On t h e o t h e r hand,

t h e v e r d i c t form s i m p l y r e q u i r e s t h e j u r y t o f i r s t f i n d d e f e n d a n t

g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide, and c o n t a i n s no r e f e r e n c e t o t h e

t h e o r y o r t h e o r i e s by which t h e j u r y c o u l d r e a c h t h i s r e s u l t .

Second, upon a d e t e r m i n a t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y o f

d e l i b e r a t e homicide t h e j u r y was t h e n t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h e

o f f e n s e was committed "by means o f t o r t u r e . " Furthermore, it

a p p e a r s t h a t I n s t r u c t i o n 5 4 , P a r t 11, above c o n t r a d i c t s I n s t r u c -

t i o n 6 , supra. I n any e v e n t , one can s a f e l y s a y t h a t t h e s e

i n s t r u c t i o n s g i v e no c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n a s t o t h e p a t h o r p a t h s

t h e jury took i n reaching i t s v e r d i c t .

Count 1 of d e l i b e r a t e homicide, a l l e g e d t h a t d e f e n d a n t

"knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y " c a u s e d t h e d e a t h of Lana Harding. This

()

1

a l l e g a t i o n was made on t h e b a s i s of s e c t i o n 94-5-10

5( a ) . On

t h e o t h e r hand, p a r t of t h e a l l e g a t i o n s under Count 2 , d e l i -

b e r a t e homicide, were p r e d i c a t e d upon t h e felony-murder r u l e

p r o v i d e d f o r i n s e c t i o n 94-5-102(b). This subsection of

Count 2 a l l e g e d a t l e a s t two ways i n which t h e d e f e n d a n t

committed a f e l o n y murder: e i t h e r sexual intercourse without

-

consent, o r aggravated a s s a u l t . The f e l o n y o f a g g r a v a t e d

a s s a u l t was f u r t h e r d i v i d e d i n t o a l t e r n a t i v e methods o f com-

mission.

I n s t r u c t i o n 22 p r o v i d e d t h e b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n s of d e l i b e r a t e

homicide a s c h a r g e d i n Count 1 and a s c h a r g e d i n a p o r t i o n of

Count 2 . T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s a v e r b a t i m s t a t e m e n t of s e c t i o n

94-5-102(a) and ( b ) . This i n s t r u c t i o n i s l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t .

But a r e a l w r i n k l e i s thrown i n t o a p o r t i o n of t h e Count 2

c h a r g e s b e c a u s e t h e a d d i t i o n a l c h a r g e i s made t h a t t h e d e l i -

b e r a t e homicide was committed "by means o f t o r t u r e . " In filing

t h e c h a r g e s and by t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , t h i s d e l i b e r a t e homicide

"by means o f t o r t u r e " was t r e a t e d a s a s e p a r a t e s u b s t a n t i v e

offense.

I n s t r u c t i o n 23 a t t e m p t s t o d e f i n e t h e p u r p o r t e d s e p a r a t e

o f f e n s e o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e . " It

provides :

" D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means o f T o r t u r e i n s o f a r

a s we a r e concerned w i t h t h e d e f i n i t i o n t h e r e o f

i n t h i s case is:

"Whoever p u r p o s e l y a s s a u l t s a n o t h e r p h y s i c a l l y

f o r t h e p u r p o s e of i n f l i c t i n g c r u e l s u f f e r i n g upon

t h e person s o a s s a u l t e d f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r purpose

of e n a b l i n g t h e a s s a i l a n t t o e i t h e r :

"(a) e x t o r t a n y t h i n g from s u c h a p e r s o n ;

" ( b ) o r t o persuade such person a g a i n s t h i s o r

her w i l l , o r

" ( c ) t o s a t i s f y some o t h e r untoward p r o p e n s i t y

of t h e a s s a i l a n t ,

-87-

"and i n s o d o i n g t h e a s s a i l a n t c a u s e s t h e d e a t h

o f t h e p e r s o n h e a s s a u l t s , i n t h e law i s g u i l t y

of t h e o f f e n s e o f D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means

of T o r t u r e , whether o r n o t i t w a s t h e p u r p o s e o r

i n t e n t i o n of t h e a s s a i l a n t t o c a u s e s u c h d e a t h .

"'Untoward p r o p e n s i t y ' means any p e r v e r s e , wrong,

bad o r c o r r u p t i n c l i n a t i o n o r t e n d e n c y . " Instruction

2 3 - - D e l i b e r a t e Homicide By Means o f T o r t u r e D e f i n e d . )

There i s a b s o l u t e l y no s t a t u t o r y b a s i s f o r t h e l a n g u a g e

used i n I n s t r u c t i o n 23 a t t e m p t i n g t o d e f i n e t h e c r i m e o f

d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means of t o r t u r e . " I do n o t know where

t h e t r i a l c o u r t found t h e s e d e f i n i t i o n s . I n s t r u c t i o n 3 4 , Methods

- Proof A p p l i c a b l e - D e l i b e r a t e Homicide by Means o f T o r t u r e ,

of to ---

n o t o n l y r e p e a t s most o f t h e language c o n t a i n e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n

2 3 , above, b u t a l s o a t t e m p t s t o set f o r t h t h e methods by which

t h e e l e m e n t o f t h i s o f f e n s e can b e proved. The t r i a l c o u r t

s p e c i f i c a l l y t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t s i n c e a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e had

t o be p r o v e d , p r e s u m p t i o n s c o u l d n o t be used t o p r o v e t h e m e n t a l

element involved. The l a s t p a r a g r a p h o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n p r o v i d e s :

"And i f you f i n d one o r more of s a i d p a r t i c u l a r

p u r p o s e s t o have been proved beyond a r e a s o n a b l e

d o u b t and t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t k i l l e d h e r w h i l e

p u r p o s e l y s o i n f l i c t i n g c r u e l s u f f e r i n g upon h e r ,

h e h a s committed t h e o f f e n s e of D e l i b e r a t e Homicide

by means o f T o r t u r e , whether - -s- r- - n o t h i s

i t w a o was -

purpose - i n t e n t i o n - -l l h e r . "

or to ki - (Emphasis added.)

I w i l l have more t o s a y c o n c e r n i n g t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n b u t

p r e s e n t l y it i s s u f f i c i e n t t o s t a t e t h a t any a n a l y s i s o f t h e

impact o f t h e Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s must s t a r t o u t w i t h

t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t t h e r e i s no c r i m e i n t h i s s t a t e e n t i t l e d

d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e . " One c a n n o t t e l l

whether o r n o t t h e j u r y a c t u a l l y c o n v i c t e d d e f e n d a n t o f t h i s

crime. But even i f t h e r e i s a r e a s o n a b l e c h a n c e , t h e c o n v i c t i o n

must be r e v e r s e d f o r t h i s r e a s o n a l o n e , t h e Sandstrom-type

i n s t r u c t i o n s notwithstanding. Minimum s t a n d a r d s of due p r o c e s s

of l a w c a n n o t t o l e r a t e a r e a s o n a b l e chance t h a t d e f e n d a n t may

have been c o n v i c t e d of and s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h f o r a c r i m e t h a t

does not e x i s t .

For purposes of a Sandstrom analysis however, I will

operate on the assumption that whether or not there is a sub-

stantive crime of deliberate homicide "by means of torture",

is not an issue.

I start this analysis with what I believe is a required

premise: unless an appellate court can declare beyond a reason-

able doubt that the jury took a constitutional path to its

deliberate homicide verdict (thereby avoiding application of

the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type instructions), the conviction

must be reversed. I see no other respectable way to approach

the problem of constitutional error inhering in jury instructions.

Instruction 31 set the stage for all the Sandstrom-type

presumptions which were to follow. It went into great detail

as to how the mental element is proven in a criminal case. Part

2 of Instruction 31 specifically sets forth the Sandstrom type

instructions and tells the jury how it is to use them:

"2. Proof by Presumption - -

of Law. (Deductions

which the law expressly directs you to make from

particular facts):

" [TIhe law presumes, that is, the law expressly

directs the jury to reason: That an unlawful act

was done with an unlawful intent and also that a

person is presumed to intend the ordinary consequences

of his voluntary act.

"Further, unless you are otherwise instructed with

regard to a particular presumption, all presumptions

are rebuttable; that is, they may be controverted

and overcome by other evidence."

The trial court then zeros in on the particular offenses

charged. Instruction 33, entitled Method --

of Proof Applicable

- - Offense of Deliberate Homicide, sets forth two of the

to the -

Sandstrom-type presumptions. The first presumption declares

that:

".

. .the law presumes that an unlawful act was

done with an unlawful intent; that is, the law

expressly directs you to reason from such unlawful

act that the defendant acted with unlawful intent

or purpose."

Thus, by t h i s p r e s u m p t i o n , i f t h e j u r y found t h a t d e f e n d a n t

e i t h e r a s s a u l t e d t h e v i c t i m o r i n j u r e d t h e v i c t i m , i t was

d i r e c t e d t o f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had an u n l a w f u l i n t e n t . The

t r i a l c o u r t a l s o t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h i s was a r e b u t t a b l e

presumption.

I n s t r u c t i o n 33 t a k e s a n o t h e r s t e p and sets f o r t h a n o t h e r

u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l presumption t h a t would f a l l w i t h i n t h e

p r o s c r i p t i o n of Sandstrom v. S t a t e o f Montana:

". . . i f you f i n d . . . t h a t t h e defendant, . . .

v o l u n t a r i l y and u n l a w f u l l y a s s a u l t e d o r i n j u r e d

Lana Harding, and i f you f u r t h e r f i n d beyond a

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e d e a t h would r e s u l t as t h e

o r d i n a r y consequence o f such an a s s a u l t o r i n j u r y ,

t h e l a w presumes t h a t , and e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you

t o reason therefrom t h a t t h e defendant intended t o

c a u s e s a i d d e a t h r e g a r d l e s s of whether o r n o t h e

a c t u a l l y had such an i n t e n t o r p u r p o s e . "

The t r i a l c o u r t f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y t h a t t h i s a l s o i s

a r e b u t t a b l e presumption.

These f a t a l Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s w e r e a g a i n d r i l l e d

home t o t h e j u r y by I n s t r u c t i o n 38, Methods - Proof A p p l i c a b l e

of

- - O f f e n s e of Aggravated A s s a u l t .

t o the - The t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e

j ury :

" S i n c e t h e o f f e n s e o f a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t may be

committed e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y , t h e

o f f e n s e may be proved by showing t h e a c t was know-

i n g l y done, and t h e l e g a presumption t h a t : 'An

u n l a w f u l a c t w a s done w i t h a n u n l a w f u l i n t e n t , and

t h e l e g a l p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t a p e r s o n i s presumed t o

i n t e n d t h e o r d i n a r y consequences o f h i s v o l u n t a r y

a c t , ' can b e used t o prove t h e m e n t a l s t a t e o f

knowingly. "

" T h e r e f o r e , i f you r e a s o n from f a c t s proved i n t h e

evidence ... t h a t t h e defendant ... unlawfully

c a u s e d Lana Harding b o d i l y i n j u r y e i t h e r w i t h o r

w i t h o u t a weapon, t h e l a w e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you t o

reason therefrom t h a t he a c t e d w i t h unlawful i n t e n t

t h a t i s p u r p o s e l y ; and i f you f u r t h e r r e a s o n from f a c t s

beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e harm i n f l i c t e d

by him was such a s o r d i n a r i l y r e s u l t s from an a c t s u c h

a s d e f e n d a n t ' s t h e l a w e x p r e s s l y d i r e c t s you t o r e a s o n

t h a t he i n t e n d e d t h e consequences o f h i s a c t . "

I n s t r u c t i o n 38.

The t r i a l c o u r t a l s o t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s a r e

rebuttable. ( I n s t r u c t i o n 38 becomes i m p o r t a n t when c o n s t r u e d

a l o n g w i t h I n s t r u c t i o n 3 4 , which a n a l y s i s w i l l be s e t f o r t h

later i n this dissent.)

~ n s t r u c t i o n34 c o n t a i n s t h e methods o f proof f o r t h e

n o n s t a t u t o r y o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f

torture." The j u r y i s s p e c i f i c a l l y t o l d t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r

p u r p o s e o r p u r p o s e s which must be proved under t h i s c h a r g e ,

c a n n o t be proved by p r e s u m p t i o n s , b u t o n l y i n f e r e n c e s can be

used. The t r i a l c o u r t t e l l s t h e j u r y t h a t t h e s p e c i f i c

purpose t o i n f l i c t " c r u e l s u f f e r i n g " (also a nonstatutory

t e r m ) , can be found by t h e u s e of i n f e r e n c e s o n l y . The t r i a l

c o u r t a l s o d e f i n e s t h e term " c r u e l s u f f e r i n g " ( a g a i n a non-

statutory definition). I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e e s s e n c e of t h i s

i n s t r u c t i o n i s the d i r e c t i o n t o t h e jury t h a t defendant i s

g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide "by means o f t o r t u r e " i f t h e

j u r y f i n d s t h a t h e "had p u r p o s e l y a s s a u l t e d " Lana Harding and

i n f l i c t e d "--r u e l s u f f e r i n g " - t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t had t h e

c and

p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o i n f l i c t " c r u e l s u f f e r i n g " by h i s a s s a u l t .

(Emphasis added. )

These i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e e x c e e d i n g l y c o n f u s i n g , m i s l e a d i n g

and i n c o n s i s t e n t . N o n t h e l e s s , I must assume t h a t t h e j u r y under-

s t o o d I n s t r u c t i o n s 31, 33, 34, and 3 8 , o r a t l e a s t d i d i t s b e s t

t o follow t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s . The q u e s t i o n t h e n a r i s e s : By

which p r o c e s s d i d t h e j u r y r e a c h i t s v e r d i c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t was

g u i l t y o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide? I t appears t h a t t h e j i n y could

have t a k e n s e v e r a l p a t h s , and t h a t o n l y o n e of t h e p a t h s m i g h t

n o t have been a f f e c t e d by t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l Sandstl-om-type

presv.mptions. Unless an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c a n d e t e r x i n e beyond a

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t which p a t h t h e j u r y c h o s ~ ;i t i s i n no p o s i t i o n

t o d e c l a r e t h a t a j u r y c h o s e t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t h and i g n o r e d

the unconstitutional

I n s t r u c t i o n s a s t o t h e u s e of j u r y v e r d i c t forms g i v e some

c l u e with r e l a t i o n t o t h e s t e p s taken i n reaching t h e verdict,.

b u t n o t t o t h e p a t h o r p a t h s which t h e j u r y f o l l o w e d . Instruction ,

no. 5 4 , V e r d i c t --

Forms and I n s t r u c t i o n s A s - T h e i r U s e , s t a t e d

- to

i n the introduction:

-91-

"In order to return a verdict, all twelve jurors

must agree to the decision, including the

additional findings - - asked - -

you are to make on the

Guilty of Deliberate Homicide verdict form and on

the Guilty of Aggravated Kidnapping verdict form."

(Emphasis added. )

This can be interpreted as requiring that the jury first deter-

mine whether or not defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide

and then to determine if the homicide was committed "by means

of torture." Instruction 54, Part 11, Verdict Forms--Deliberate

Homicide provides additional support for this two-step process.

Instruction 54, Part 11, provides in relevant part:

". . . as only one death is alleged, only one

Guilty of Deliberate Homicide verdict form is

required.

"If you adopt the Guilty of Deliberate Homicide

verdict form you are asked to find on that form

whether the Deliberate Homicide was or was not by

Means of Torture as this is the most serious of the

remaining charges of Deliberate Homicide made against

the defendant.''

Again, a two step process is clearly indicated by this instru-

ction.

When combining the two step process set forth in the verdict

form with these instructions, a reasonable conclusion is that

the jury first reached its decision that defendant was guilty

of deliberate homicide and then found in the second step that

the deliberate homicide was committed "by means of torture."

It remains a mystery, of course, which path or paths the jury

took in finding defendant guilty of deliberate homicide. There

are, however, several more obvious possibilities. If one assumes

that the jury followed this two step process in reaching its

verdict, the probabilities are clearly in favor of the con-

clusion that the jury's verdict was tainted by use of the

Sandstrom-type instructions.

Count 1 charged defendant with "knowingly or purposely"

causing the victim's death. Instruction 31 told the jury that

a voluntary act could be proved by the use of Sandstrom-type

presumptions. Instruction 33, Part 11, specifically told

the jury that the mental state required for proof of deliberate

homicide could be proved by use of Sandstrom-type presumptions.

Thus, if the jury did find defendant guilty of Count 1, an

appellate court must assume that the jury reached this verdict

by use of the unconstitutional presumptions contained within

Instructions 31 and 33.

Several possibilities arise if the jury found defendant

guilty of any of the alternative charges contained in Count 2.

One of the alternative allegations in Count 1 is that defendant

is guilty of deliberate homicide by reason of the application

of the felony-murder rule. The State alleged that defendant

had attempted, had committed, or was withdrawing from the com-

mission of sexual intercourse without consent, a felony, or

aggravated assault, a felony. If the jury followed a strict

application of the felony-murder rule and thus found defendant

guilty of deliberate homicide, it is possible that its verdict

was not tainted by the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type in-

structions.

The felony-murder rule is set forth in Instruction 22,

part (b) (a verbatim recitation of the statute), and in ~nstruction

33, Part 111. Under Instruction 33, Part 111, "knowingly or

purposely) is not an element of the offense. Technically, the

jury was therefore not required to consult or use either

Instruction 31 or 33 in reaching a verdict that defendant is

guilty under the felony-murder rule. But an appellate court

cannot determine whether the jury took this path to its verdict.

Surely no appellate court could declare beyond a reasonable doubt

that the jury took only the felony-murder route just described

as its only path to its verdict.

Furthermore, if the jury took the felony-murder rule path

to its verdict (thereby avoiding the use of the unconstitutional

presumptions contained in Instruction 33) there is still a

-93-

strong chance that it used the unconstitutional instructions

contained in Instructions 37 and 38. Assuming the jury deter-

mined that defendant was guilty of deliberate homicide by

committing, attempting to commit, or withdrawing from the

commission of the felony of sexual intercouse without consent,

the jury would have been required to use Instruction 37, Methods

- Proof Applicable - Sexual Intercourse Without Consent.

of to

Instruction 37, part 11, specifically declares that proof that

----

the act was "knowingly" committed "can be made by presumption."

The Sandstrom-type presumption was set forth as the applicable

presumption. Thus a felony-murder verdict in relation to

sexual intercourse without consent would still not assure that

the verdict was untainted by the unconstitutional presumptions.

The same analysis can be made in relation to a felony-

murder conviction under the theory that defendant killed the

victim while committing, attempting to commit, or withdrawing

from the commission of aggravated assault. Instruction 38,

-

Part 11, Methods of Proof Applicable - - Offense of-Aggravated

to the -

Assault, specifically declares that proof that an assault was

committed "knowingly or purposely" can be made by the presumptions

either that "an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent",

or "the legal presumption that a person is presumed to intend

the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act." Accordingly,

a felony murder verdict in relation to aggravated assault would

be tainted by the reasonable possibility that the jury used the

unconstitutional presumptions contained in Instruction 38.

Another possibility is that the jury reached its verdict

through the path cut in relation to the charge of deliberate

homicide "by means of torture." Aside from the fact that such

offense does not exist in this state, the State did charge that

this offense was committed (Count 2, last paragraph), and the

trial court defined the offense for the jury (Instruction 23)

-94-

and set forth the method of proof required for this offense

(Instruction 34, supra). Whether the jury took this path,

is, of course, another mystery. Assuming that it did however,

it could have followed an unconstitutional path or a consti-

tutional path.

Instruction 34 permitted the jury to find defendant guilty

of the offense of deliberate homicide "by means of torture" if

it found the following elements: (1) That defendant had

"purposely assaulted Lana Harding and inflicted cruel suffering"

and

- (2) that defendant had one of the particular purposes to

inflict "cruel suffering." The phrase "purposely assaulted" is

important in relation to how the jury may have reached its

decision.

If the jury first found that defendant "purposely assaulted"

Lana Harding, and then found that the particular purpose of

the assault was to inflict "cruel suffering" it followed an

unconstitutional path. A "purposeful assault" is defined by

Instruction 38, Method - -

of Proof Applicable To - Offense of

- The -

Aggravated Assault. Part I1 of Instruction 38 specifically

directs that the mental element of "purposely or knowingly"

is established by the use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions.

The trial court specifically told the jury that:

"Since the offense of aggravated assault may be

committed either knowingly or purposely, the

offense may be proved by showing the act was

knowingly done, and the legal presumptions that:

'An unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent,

and the legal presumption that a person is

presumed to intend the ordinary consequences of

his voluntary act,' can be used to prove the mental

state of knowingly.

"Therefore, if you reason from facts proved in the

evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant

. . . unlawfully caused Lana Harding bodily injury

either with or without a weapon, - - expressly

the law

directs you- reason therefrom - -he acted with

- to that

unlawful intent - -is purposely; and if you further

that

reason from facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt

that the harm inflicted by him was such as ordinarily

results from acts such as defendant's, - -

the law

- to --

expressly directs you- reason that he intended the

- his act." (Emphasis added.)

consequences of - -

The instruction further provided that these are rebuttable

presumptions.

It is clear therefore, that Instruction 38 permits the

element of "purposely or knowingly" to be proved by the use

of the Sandstrom-type presumptions. Thus, if the jury used

either one of these presumptions in determining the first step

that defendant committed a "purposeful assault", the verdict

cannot stand. Any finding that defendant had the particular

purpose to inflict "cruel suffering" would be tainted by the

initial determination that defendant had committed a "purposeful

assault" by the use of the Sandstrom-type presumptions.

It is possible, on the other hand, to construe the special

jury finding that the deliberate homicide was committed "by

means of torture", as embracing the general purpose of the

defendant to assault the victim. If the jury followed this

path, it need not have used the unconstitutional presumptions

contained in Instruction 38, supra. It is, however, quite

unlikely that the jury followed this path to its verdict.

Initially, it must be emphasized again that it remains

a mystery as to the path or paths chosen by the jury in

reaching its verdict. But neither do the instructions telling

the jury how to proceed, or the verdict form itself, support

a conclusion that the jury found defendant guilty of deliberate

homicide "by means of torture" in one fell swoop. Rather,

Instruction 54, Part 11, tells the jury to first determine

if defendant is guilty of deliberate homicide and if it is so

to then determine if the deliberate homicide was committed "by

means of torture." The two step process in the verdict form

itself indicates, moreover, that the jury followed this process

directed by the instruction.

There are, of course, many additional possibilities that

the jury found defendant guilty of more than one count or that

it found him guilty of having committed the deliberate homicide

-96-

in several alternative ways. The trial court specifically

instructed the jury that this was permissible. Instruction

6, supra; Instruction 54, part 11, supra. Unfortunately, the

trial court did not see fit to provide the appropriate verdict

forms for the jury's use.

Because of the deficient record, only the jury knows

which path or paths it followed in reaching the guilty verdict.

An appellate court can only speculate as to what the jury did

or did not do. It is impossible to determine therefore, that

the Sandstrom-type presumptions which were sprinkled so liberally

throughout the instructions used in this case, did not have an

impact on the decision making process of the jury. Certainly

no self-respecting appellate court can declare beyond a reason-

able doubt that the Sandstrom-type instructions had no impact

on the decision of the jury. As a matter of fact, because of

the prevalence of these unconstitutional instructions, the

probabilities are clearly in favor of a determination that the

jury did use these presumptions as part of its decision making

process.

I cannot in good conscience declare that beyond a reasonable

doubt the Sandstrom-type presumptions had no effect on the jury's

verdict. Indeed, the probabilities are that they did. But I

must emphasize again, that separate basis exists to reverse the

deliberate homicide conviction aside from the Sandstrom issue.

There is a reasonable chance that the jury convicted defendant

of the so-called offense of deliberate homicide "by means of

torture." Such statutory offense does not exist in this state.

If the jury did in fact convict him of this nonoffense it is

a

a frightening prospect indeed thatldefendant has been sentenced

to death for a crime which does not exist. Due process of law

requires for this reason alone that this conviction be reversed.

THE KIDNAPPING STATUTES AND CHARGES FILED I N THIS CASE

---

The k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e s i n v o l v e d i n t h i s c a s e t o o k

e f f e c t on J a n u a r y 1, 1976. The c r i m e s w e r e a l l e g e d l y committed

on J a n u a r y 21, 1974. The k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e s a r e c o n t a i n e d

i n s e c t i o n s 94-5-201 t h r o u g h 94-5-305, R.C.M. 1947. Three

of t h e s e s t a t u t e s a r e p e r t i n e n t t o t h i s case: s e c t i o n 94-5-302,

c r e a t i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e crime o f k i d n a p p i n g ; s e c t i o n 94-5-303,

c r e a t i n g and d e f i n i n g t h e crime o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ; and

s e c t i o n 94-5-304, which p r o v i d e s t h a t t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y s h a l l

be imposed i f t h e v i c t i m i s dead a s a r e s u l t of a n a g g r a v a t e d

k i d n a p p i n g , and p r o v i d e d t h e r e a r e no m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

The S t a t e c h a r g e d d e f e n d a n t w i t h two c o u n t s o f a g g r a v a t i n g

k i d n a p p i n g (Counts 3 and 4 ) . S e c t i o n 94-5-303, reads a s follows:

" ( 1 ) A p e r s o n commits t h e o f f e n s e o f a q g r a v a t e d

k i d n a p p i n g i f h e knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y - a n d

without lawful a u t h o r i t y r e s t r a i n s another person

by e i t h e r s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g him i n a p l a c e o f

i s o l a t i o n , o r by u s i n g o r t h r e a t e n i n g t o u s e p h y s i c a l

f o r c e , w i t h any of t h e f o l l o w i n g p u r p o s e s :

" ( a ) t o h o l d f o r ransom o r reward, o r a s a s h i e l d

o r hostage; o r

" ( b ) t o f a c i l i t a t e commission o f - f e l o n y o r

- any -

flishtthereafter; or

" ( c ) t o i n f l i c t bodily i n j u r y - - - t e r r o r i z e

on o r t o

t h e victim - another; o r

of

" ( d ) t o i n t e r f e r e w i t h t h e performance of any

governmental o r p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n ; o r

" ( e ) t o h o l d a n o t h e r i n a c o n d i t i o n of i n v o l u n t a r y

servitude." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

The p e n a l t y i s p r o v i d e d f o r i n s u b s e c t i o n ( 2 ) , which p r o v i d e s :

" ( 2 ) A p e r s o n c o n v i c t e d o f t h e o f f e n s e of a g g r a v a t e d

k i d n a p p i n g s h a l l be p u n i s h e d by d e a t h a s p r o v i d e d

i n s e c t i o n 94-5-304, o r be i m p r i s o n e d i n t h e s t a t e

p r i s o n f o r any t e r m n o t t o exceed one hundred (100)

y e a r s u n l e s s he has v o l u n t a r i l y r e l e a s e d t h e v i c t i m ,

a l i v e , i n a s a f e p l a c e , and n o t s u f f e r i n g from s e r i o u s

b o d i l y i n j u r y , i n which e v e n t h e s h a l l be i m p r i s o n e d

i n t h e s t a t e p r i s o n f o r any t e r m n o t t o exceed t e n

(10) years."

S e c t i o n 94-5-304, r e f e r r e d t o i n s e c t i o n 94-5-303(2)

above, s e t s f o r t h t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s under which t h e d e a t h

p e n a l t y may be imposed:

"A c o u r t s h a l l impose t h e s e n t e n c e of d e a t h

f o l l o w i n g c o n v i c t i o n of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g

i f it that the i s dead

- - f i n d s -- v i c t i m - - as t h e r e s u l t

o f t h e c r i m i n a l conduct u n l e s s t h e r e a r e m i t i q a t i n q- -

circumstances." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

Count 3 of t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e s , s u p r a ,

i n v o k e s s e c t i o n 94-5-303(b)

0 and a l l e g e s s e v e r a l a l t e r n a t i v e

n

ways by which t h e o f f e n s e was committed. First, the State

a l l e g e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t had t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o commit

o r f l e e from t h e commission of t h e f e l o n y o f s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e

without consent. Second, t h e S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t

had t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o commit o r f l e e from t h e commission

of t h e felony of aggravated a s s a u l t . The a l l e g a t i o n s w i t h

r e s p e c t t o aggravated a s s a u l t a r e f u r t h e r divided i n t o a l t e r n a t i v e

a l l e g a t i o n s r e l a t i n g t o t h e p a r t i c u l a r purpose. By Count 3 ,

2 ( a ) , s u p r a , t h e S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e k i d n a p p i n g w a s committed

f o r t h e purpose of causing " s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y " t o t h e victim.

"?

(See s e c t i o n 94-5-202A a ) , R.C.M. 1947.) By Count 3 , 2 ( b ) , t h e

S t a t e a l l e g e s t h a t t h e k i d n a p p i n g was committed f o r t h e p u r p o s e

o f c a u s i n g " b o d i l y i n j u r y " ( a s opposed t o s e r i o u s b o d i l y i n j u r y ,

above) " w i t h a weapon". (See s e c t i o n 94-5-202(b), R.C.M. 1947.)

F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e " w i t h a weapon" a l l e g a t i o n i s d i v i d e d i n t o an

a l l e g a t i o n t h a t t h e weapon used w a s " a r o p e " o r " a heavy

weapon. "

Count 3 a d d s , i n t h e l a s t a l l e g a t i o n , t h a t t h e v i c t i m d i e d

a s a r e s u l t of t h e k i d n a p p i n g . The v i c t i m ' s d e a t h , however,

i s n o t a n e l e m e n t of t h e c r i m e o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g .

Count 4 o f t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e s , s u p r a , i n v o k e s

>!C

s e c t i o n 94-5-30$(c), and a l l e g e s t h a t d e f e n d a n t , i n k i d n a p p i n g

t h e v i c t i m , had " t h e p u r p o s e o f i n f l i c t i n g b o d i l y i n j u r y " on

t h e victim, o r "threatening o r t e r r o r i z i n g t h e victim. Count

4 a l s o adds, i n t h e l a s t a l l e g a t i o n , t h a t t h e victim d i e d a s

a r e s u l t of t h e kidnapping. Again, however, t h e v i c t i m f s deatl!

i s n o t an e l e m e n t of t h e crime o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g .

The S t a t e a l l e g e d t h a t t h e v i c t i m d i e d a s a r e s u l t o f

t h e k i d n a p p i n g b e c a u s e i t wanted t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y t o be

imposed s h o u l d t h e d e f e n d a n t be c o n v i c t e d . But u n d e r s e c t i o n

94-5-304, supra, it i s t h e function of t h e c o u r t , n o t t h e jury,

t o make t h a t f i n d i n g i n t h e e v e n t of a c o n v i c t i o n .

AGGRAVATED KIDNAPPING--IMPACT - - SANDSTROM-TYPE INSTRUCTIONS

O THE

F

I t would o f c o u r s e be p r o p e r t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t n o t i c e

t h a t t h e S t a t e would s e e k t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i n t h e e v e n t o f a

c o n v i c t i o n , b u t t h e i s s u e s h o u l d n e v e r have been s u b m i t t e d t o

t h e jury. The p l a i n meaning of s e c t i o n 94-5-305, is t h a t t h e

c o u r t must make t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether t h e v i c t i m i s

dead a s a r e s u l t o f t h e k i d n a p p i n g .

The j u r y had t h e c h o i c e of a t l e a s t e i g h t s e p a r a t e p a t h s

it c o u l d have t a k e n t o t h e v e r d i c t , a s t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s

eight

c h a r g e d i n a t l e a s y a l t e r n a t i v e ways. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s

i n s t r u c t i o n s a l s o p e r m i t t e d t h e j u r y t o t a k e two o r more p a t h s

t o its verdict. An a n a l y s i s of Count 3 r e v e a l s t h a t t h e j u r y

had s i x s e p a r a t e c h o i c e s ; an a n a l y s i s o f Count 4 r e v e a l s t h a t

t h e j u r y had two s e p a r a t e c h o i c e s . However, t h e a p p l i c a b l e

i n s t r u c t i o n s p r o v i d e no c l u e s a s t o t h e c h o i c e o r c h o i c e s

t h e j u r y may have chosen. And t h e v e r d i c t form upon which t h e

jury returned i t s v e r d i c t , reveals absolutely nothing a s t o

which p a t h o r p a t h s it c h o s e i n r e a c h i n g i t s v e r d i c t .

The t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t i t c o u l d c o n v i c t t h e

d e f e n d a n t on o n e o r a l l of t h e s e p a r a t e c h a r g e s ( I n s t r u c t i o n 6 ,

S t a t e m e n t o f -e Case, s u p r a ) .

- th - But even i f t h e j u r y c h o s e

more t h a n one p a t h i n r e a c h i n g i t s v e r d i c t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d

t h e j u r y t o r e t u r n o n l y one v e r d i c t form ( I n s t r u c t i o n 54, P a r t

111, V e r d i c t Forms--Aggravated Kidnapping, s u p r a ) . And t h e

v e r d i c t i t s e l f i s a simple d e c l a r a t i o n t h a t t h e jury f i n d s t h e

defendant g u i l t y of aggravated kidnapping:

-100-

"A. We, the jury, in the above-entitled cause,

find the defendant Guilty of the offense of

Aggravated Kidnapping as Charged.

"B. We further find that Lana Harding (did)

(did A&) die as a result of said Aggravated

Kidnapping) .

"(Strike out bracketed word or words that do

not apply. ) "

Assuming that the jury chose only one path by which

it reached its verdict, because of the multiple charges and

alternative ways alleged, it had at least eight choices.

Furthermore, if the jury chose more than one path to reach

its verdict, and the instructions of the trial court explicitly

allowed this approach, the possible combination of choices is

multiplied many times over. Needless to say, it is impossible

to determine which path or paths the jury chose. Before an

appellate court can affirm the conviction here, it must be able

to declare beyond a reasonable doubt which path or paths the

jury chose and that the path or paths chosen were not impacted

by the use of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type jury instructions.

An appellate court cannot in good conscience, make that de-

claration, and therefore the only choice is to reverse the

conviction.

It should be sufficient to stop the analysis at this

point and simply declare that the multiple choices available

to the jury without any indication of what its choice or

choices were, makes review impossible. Nonetheless, I will

set forth some of the more obvious paths the jury could have

taken, assuming, of course, that the jury followed or attempted

to follow the applicable instructions.

The charges of aggravated kidnapping are set forth in

Counts 3 and 4 of the Information, supra. There are quite a

number of jury instructions which have a bearing on these charges.

-101-

I n s t r u c t i o n 25 d e f i n e s b o t h t h e c r i m e of k i d n a p p i n g

and t h e crime of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . The t r i a l c o u r t

t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e c r i m e of k i d n a p p i n g r e q u i r e s t h a t

t h e a c t i n v o l v e d by done "knowingly - p u r p o s e l y and w i t h o u t

or

lawful authority. . ." This d e f i n i t i o n i s a verbatim r e c i t a -

t i o n o f s e c t i o n 54-5-302(1). I n defining t h e c r i m e of

aggravated kidnapping t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e jury t h a t t h e

a c t must b e done "knowingly - p u r p o s e l y , and f u r t h e r , t h a t

or

i t be done t o a c c o m p l i s h one of t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s c h a r g e d ,

namely :

"(a) t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e commission of a f e l o n y ,

or

" (b) t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on t h e v i c t i m ,

or

"(c) t o t e r r o r i z e t h e victim."

T h i s i n s t r u c t i o n i s , f o r t h e most p a r t , a v e r b a t i m r e c i : k a t i o n o f

the

/aggravated k i d n a p p i n g s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 94-5-302(2), R.C.M.

I n s t r u c t i o n 29, e n t i t l e d Requirement o f - V o l u n t a r y Act

-a

--

With a Mental S t a t e , i s a t h r e e page i n s t r u c t i o n s e t t i n g f o r t h

t h e v a r i o u s m e n t a l s t a t e s which must be proved f o r e a c h o f

t h e charges f i l e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant. In relation t o the

o f f e n s e of k i d n a p p i n g , P a r t I V of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t e l l s t h e

jury t h a t :

". . . the voluntary - ( t h e s e c r e t i n g o r holding

act

of a v i c t i m i n a p l a c e of i s o l a t i o n w i t h o u t l a w f u l

a u t h o r i t y , o r t h e h o l d i n g o f s a i d p e r s o n by p h y s i c a l

f o r c e o r t h r e a t s t h e r e o f ) be done e i t h e r knowingly

- purposely."

or (Emphasis a d d e d . )

I n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated kidnapping, P a r t V

of t h i s i n s t r u c t i o n t e l l s t h e j u r y t h a t :

". . . the voluntary a c t (the secreting o r

holding the victim without lawful authority i n

a place of i s o l a t i o n , o r t h e holding of s a i d

p e r s o n by p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r t h r e a t s t h e r e o f ) ,

- done e i t h e r p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly - -

be - and i n

a d d i t i o n t h e r e t o t h a t i t be done f o r one of t h e

following p a r t i c u l a r purposes: either

"(a) to facilitate the commission of any felony

(in this case sexual intercourse without consent

of the victim, or an aggravated assault upon the

victim), or

" (b) to inflict bodily injury on the victim, or

"(c) to terrorize the victim." (Emphasis added.)

Instruction 29, Part VI, provides that for the offense

of sexual intercourse without consent, "that the voluntary

- (sexual intercourse without consent) be done knowingly."

act

(Emphasis added.) Instruction 29, Part VII, provides that

for the offense of aggravated assault:

". .

. the voluntary act (the infliction of serious

bodily injury either with or without a weapon, or

the infliction of bodily injury with a weapon) be

done either knowingly or purposely." (~mphasis-

added.

With these statements as to mental state out of the

way, the trial court then gave a long series of instructions

as to the methods of proof which can be used to prove the

mental element involved for each crime. The unconstitutional

Sandstrom-type presumptions permeate this series of instructions.

Instruction 31, entitled Mental State--Methods - Proof,

of

set the stage by explaining the kinds of evidence: Direct

Evidence; Indirect Evidence; Presumptions; and Inferences. Part

I1 of Instruction 31, entitled Proof by Indirect or Circumstantial

- -

Evidence, subheading (2), is entitled Proof by Presumption of

-

Law. There, the trial court sets forth the unconstitutional

Sandstrom-type instructions. In essence the trial court told

the jury that it is presumed that the defendant intended the

consequences of his "voluntary act", and that it is presumed

that an unlawful act was done with unlawful intent. (Note:

I have previously set out these presumptions in the discussion

relating to the deliberate homicide conviction, supra.)

In each of the instructions containing the uncon-

stitutional presumptions the jury was told that the presumptions

were rebuttable. But the jury was not told that it could

accept or reject the presumptions as it saw fit. The clear

meaning of the instructions taken together is that the jury

must use these presumptions to find the mental element and that

it was within the power of the defendant alone to rebut these

presumptions. Instruction 31 stated:

"2. Proof bv Presum~tionof law. (Deductions

which the l ; expres;ly directs - - -

a to be made

from particular facts):

'I.. . in addition thereto the law Dresumes,

that is, - - expressly directs - - - to

the law the jury

reason: That an unlawful act was done with an

unlawful intend and also that a person is presumed

to intend the ordinary consequences of his voluntary

act." (Emphasis added.)

From these general instructions as to methods of proof

the trial court then provided a long series of instructions

describing for the jury the use of the presumptions in relation

to each of the offenses charged. In this respect the words or

phrases "voluntary act", "unlawful act", and "purposely or

knowingly", or "intent", take on a real importance because

the trial court told the jury to find the requisite mental

element by the use of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type

instructions. These presumptions were hammered home to the

jury again and again.

The State charged in one of the deliberate homicide counts

and in the aggravated kidnapping counts that the defendant had

a particular purpose in mind by committing the act. With

respect to this particular purpose, the trial court in Instruction

32, told the jury that such particular purpose could never be

presumed:

"in offenses which require proof of a particular

-

purpose the particular purpose required may never

be proved by means of -

- - legal presumptions, --

but must

be proved by means - inferences only. In this

- - of

c a s e t h e o f f e n s e s o f : D e l i b e r a t e Homicide

by Means o f T o r t u r e , and Aggravated Kidnapping

a l l r e q u i r e proof t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t committed

t h e p a r t i c u l a r a c t charged f o r a p a r t i c u l a r

p u r p o s e , i n a d d i t i o n ---- a t he committed

t o proof t h

--t e i t h e r knowingly - p u r p o s e l y . "

said ac or

(Emphasis a d d e d . )

-

I n s t r u c t i o n 36, e n t i t l e d Method of Proof--Aggravated

Kidnapping, p r o v i d e s a s f o l l o w s :

"The o f f e n s e of Aggravated Kidnapping, i n a d d i t i o n

- the

t o - proof r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e - o f f e n s e o f

the

k i d n a p p i n g , r e q u i r e s that t h e k i d n a p p i n g wascom-

m i t t e d f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose.

" I n t h i s c a s e Count 4 r e q u i r e s p r o o f t h a t t h e

kidnapping w a s f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose e i t h e r t o

i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on Lana Harding, o r t o

t e r r o r i z e h e r and Count 3 r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e k i d -

napping have been f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e o f

f a c i l i t a t i n g t h e commission o f a f e l o n y : e i t h e r

sexual intercourse without her consent, o r t o

commit a n Aggravated A s s a u l t on h e r .

" T h e r e f o r e , - - -i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e doubt

i f you f

t h a t the defendant,.

-- . . d i d k i d n a p Lana Harding,

b e f o r e he c a n be found g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e o f

a a a r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n s a s charqed i n t h e I n f o r m a t i o n ,

-- f u r t h e r - f i n d beyond

must a reasonable doubt t h a t

he a c t e d w h i l e h a v i n g - l e a s t o n e- - e p a r t i c u l a r

at - of t h

purposes charged.

" S i n c e a p a r t i c u l a r purpose may n e v e r be presumed i n

l a w , t h e m e n t a l s t a t e of e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y

s e c r e t i n g o r h o l d i n g f o r a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e must

be proved by i n f e r e n c e o n l y w i t h o u t t h e u s e o f any

presumptions.

" T h i s means t h a t i f you f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t ,

t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d k i d n a p Lana Harding, you are

p e r m i t t e d t o deduce o r r e a s o n from any and a l l f a c t s

and c i r c u m s t a n c e s proved i n c o n n e c t i o n t h e r e w i t h t h a t

h e d i d s o w i t h one o r more of t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s

charged i n Counts 3 and 4 , and t o f i n d beyond a

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t h e committed t h e o f f e n s e as

charged." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

Although it may b e o t h e r w i s e d e f i c i e n t , I n s t r u c t i o n 36,

standing alone, i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l . I t c o n t a i n s no Sandstrom-

type presumptions. I f an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d d e t e r m i n e

beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e j u r y used I n s t r u c t i o n 36 as

i t s s o l e g u i d e i n f i n d i n g t h e e l e m e n t s of t h e o f f e n s e , i t

would t h e n have t o t a k e a l o n g , h a r d l o o k a s t o w h e t h e r t h e

r e m a i n i n g Sandstrom-type i n s t r u c t i o n s would o r would n o t have

t a i n t e d the jury v e r d i c t . I f i t knew t h e p a t h chosen by t h e

jury, an a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d d e c l a r e t h a t t h e j u r y ' s

f i n d i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , i n o r d e r t o c o n v i c t

d e f e n d a n t of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g , embraced by n e c e s s i t y

t h e g e n e r a l i n t e n t o r general purpose t o kidnap. The

conscious o b j e c t t o restrain t h e v i c t i m (required f o r t h e

c r i m e of k i d n a p p i n g ) c o u l d a r i s e by n e c e s s i t y from a f i n d i n g

of a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e t o e i t h e r commit a f o r c i b l e f e l o n y

o r t o t e r r o r i z e t h e victim. See s e c t i o n 94-5-303, supra.

T h i s would be a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t h , f o r t h e s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g

o f a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e would i n d i c a t e t h a t t h e j u r y found

t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e o n l y by t h e u s e o f p e r m i s s i v e i n -

f e r e n c e s a s d i r e c t e d by I n s t r u c t i o n 36.

The most o b v i o u s d e f e c t i n t h i s a n a l y s i s i s t h a t no s e l f -

r e s p e c t i n g a p p e l l a t e c o u r t c o u l d e v e r d e c l a r e beyond a

reasonable doubt t h a t t h e jury took t h i s path t o i t s v e r d i c t .

There a r e , moreover, s t r o n g r e a s o n s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e

Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s had an e f f e c t on t h e d e c i s i o n

making p r o c e s s of t h e j u r y .

No one knows o f c o u r s e , which one o r more p a r t i c u l a r

p u r p o s e s t h e j u r y may have found under t h e c h a r g e s . For

example, under Count 3 d i d t h e j u r y f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had

t h e " p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e e i t h e r t o i n f l i c t b o d i l y i n j u r y on

Lana Harding, o r t o t e r r o r i z e h e r ? " O r d i d it f i n d b o t h s u c h

purposes? Under Count 4 d i d t h e j u r y f i n d t h a t d e f e n d a n t had

t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e " t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e commission o f a

felony: e i t h e r s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h Lana ~ a r d i n g i t h o u t

w

h e r c o n s e n t , o r t o commit Aggravated A s s a u l t upon h e r ? " Or

d i d it f i n d both? O r d i d t h e j u r y f i n d one o r more o f t h e

p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e s under Count 3 and one o r more of t h e

p u r p o s e s under Count 4? O r d i d it f i n d a l l of t h e p a r t i c u l a r

p u r p o s e s under Count 3 and Count 4? No a p p e l l a t e c o u r t would

be s o i r r e s p o n s i b l e t o d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t which

t h e o r y o r t h e o r i e s t h e j u r y used i n r e a c h i n g i t s v e r d i c t .

-106-

I t a p p e a r s from I n s t r u c t i o n 36, on t h e o t h e r hand,

t h a t t h e j u r y was t o l d t o make a two s t e p a n a l y s i s i n d e t e r -

mining whether d e f e n d a n t w a s g u i l t y of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g .

First, t h e j u r y was t o d e t e r m i n e i f d e f e n d a n t committed t h e

o f f e n s e o f k i d n a p p i n g ( a s opposed t o a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g ) .

Second, i f t h e j u r y found h e d i d commit t h e o f f e n s e o f k i d -

napping, i t was t h e n t o d e t e r m i n e i f i t c o n s t i t u t e d a g g r a v a t e d

kidnapping. Thus t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y by I n s t r u c t i o n

36, supra:

"The o f f e n s e o f Aggravated Kidnapping, i n a d d i t i o n

t o t h e proof r e q u i r e d t o p r o v e t h e o f f e n s e o f

k i d n a p p i n g , r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e k i d n a p p i n g w a s com-

m i t t e d f o r a p a r t i c u l a r purpose.

" T h e r e f o r e , - - -i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t

i f you f

t h a t the defendant,. . . --d k i d n a p Lana Harding,

di

b e f o r e he c a n be found g u i l t y o f t h e o f f e n s e o f

aggravated kidnapping a s charged i n t h e Information,

you must f u r t h e r f i n d beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t

--

t h a t h e a c t e d w h i l e h a v i n g a t l e a s t one of t h e

p a r t i c u l a r purposes charged." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

T h i s two s t e p p r o c e s s f o r t h e j u r y ' s f i n d i n g s i s f u r t h e r

s u g g e s t e d by I n s t r u c t i o n 29, P a r t V , and by I n s t r u c t i o n 32,

s u p r a , which r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e be proved

"in a d d i t i o n - proof t h a t he committed s a i d a c t e i t h e r know-

- to

i n g l y o r purposely." (Emphasis a d d e d . )

I n s t r u c t i o n s 25, 29 ( P a r t I V , and 35, a r e p e r t i n e n t t o

t h e o f f e n s e of k i d n a p p i n g (as opposed t o t h e o f f e n s e o f

aggravated kidnapping). I n s t r u c t i o n 25 sets f o r t h t h e

s t a t u t o r y d e f i n i t i o n o f k i d n a p p i n g ( s e c t i o n 94-5-302, supra)

and s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t t h e m e n t a l a c t r e q u i r e d f o r i t s

commission i s " p u r p o s e l y o r knowingly." I n s t r u c t i o n 29, P a r t

IV, provides t h a t :

". . . t h e voluntary - ( t h e secreting o r holding

act

of t h e v i c t i m i n a place of i s o l a t i o n without

lawful a u t h o r i t y , o r t h e holding of s a i d person

by p h y s i c a l f o r c e o r t h r e a t s t h e r e o f ) - -

be done

-

e i t h e r knowingly o r p u r p o s e l y . " (Emphasis a d d e d . )

Instruction 35, Part 11, - - by Presumption sets out

Proof

the Sandstrom-type presumptions:

". . . if you find that the defendant,. . .

without lawful authority, restrained Lana

Harding, either by secreting her in a place

of isolation, or by usinq physical force to hold

- - -

her, the law presumes - -he acted therein with

that

an unlawful intent, purpose or knowledge, a n d

expressly directs - - - reason." (~mphasis

you to so

added. )

If the jury took a two step process to its verdict,

and it appears that it was directed to do so, there can be

no question that the jury may well have used the unconstitutional

presumptions contained within Instruction 35 in reaching its

decision that defendant committed the offense of kidnapping.

Thus, the finding of intent (herein classified as "purposely

or knowingly") to kidnap could well have been affected by the

unconstitutional presumption. Certainly no court could declare

beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's finding as to

"purposely or knowingly" was not affected by the unconstitutional

presumption whereby the jury was specifically directed to

"presume that he acted therein with an unlawful intent, purpose,

or knowledge. . ."

Thus, if the jury first found the offense of kidnapping

before proceeding to the next question of whether defendant

had committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping, its finding

of a particular purpose for aggravated kidnapping would be

tainted by its reliance on the unconstitutional presumption

in its first finding. Clearly, the verdict would then be

built in part upon the use of an unconstitutional presumption.

It is perhaps more reasonable to view the instructions

in a fashion that permits the general purpose to commit

kidnapping to be embraced by the more specific particular

purpose finding which is necessary for a conviction of

aggravated kidnapping. If the question were not a con-

stitutional one perhaps an appellate court could reach this

conclusion. But our duty here is confined to a determination

-108-

beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , a s t o whether o r n o t t h e j u r y

c h o s e a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p a t h and i g n o r e d t h e u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

paths t o reach i t s v e r d i c t . There i s abundant r e a s o n a b l e

doubt i n t h i s c a s e t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l e r r o r

i n h e r i n g i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s , was n o t h a r m l e s s .

I t i s , moreover, n o t l i k e l y t h a t t h e j u r y , i n reaching

i t s d e c i s i o n a s t o a p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e , would n o t have r u n

i n t o t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s . I f one assumes t h a t

t h e j u r y found t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e a s a l l e g e d under Count

4 , t o e i t h e r commit s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t o r

a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t , o r b o t h , a s p a r t of i t s d e c i s i o n making

p r o c e s s t h e j u r y c o u l d w e l l have used t h e Sandstrom-type

p r e s u m p t i o n s c o n t a i n e d i n I n s t r u c t i o n s 37 ( s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e

w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ) and 38 ( a g g r a v a t e d a s s a u l t ) .

By I n s t r u c t i o n 37, t h e t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t

t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s c o u l d be used t o p r o v e t h e

v o l u n t a r y a c t o f "knowingly" i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e o f

sexual intercourse without consent. By I n s t r u c t i o n 38, t h e

t r i a l c o u r t t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t t h e Sandstrom-type p r e s u m p t i o n s

c o u l d be used t o p r o v e t h e v o l u n t a r y a c t of "knowingly o r

purposely" i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e o f f e n s e of aggravated a s s a u l t .

Thus, t h e j u r y c o u l d have used t h e s e p r e s u m p t i o n s t o c o n c l u d e

t h a t d e f e n d a n t was g u i l t y of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t ,

o r aggravated a s s a u l t , o r both. With t h i s d e c i s i o n made it

would n o t be a t a l l d i f f i c u l t t o c o n c l u d e t h a t d e f e n d a n t

kidnapped t h e v i c t i m f o r t h e p a r t i c u l a r p u r p o s e of a c c o m p l i s h i n g

these offenses. A t l e a s t , one c a n n o t i n good c o n s c i e n c e

d e c l a r e beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t t h e s e Sandstrom-type

i n s t r u c t i o n s had no i n f l u e n c e w h a t e v e r on t h e d e c i s i o n

making p r o c e s s e s of t h e j u r y .

SUMMARY AND POSTSCRIPT

-

I concluded in my dissent in McKenzie - that we had

I1

denied defendant's constitutional rights at both ends of

the procedural spectrum. First, we did not begin to fairly

consider defendant's assertions that his rights had been

violated under the Fourth Amendment and under Art. 11, S11

of the Montana Constitution. Second, this Court did not fairly

apply and fairly analyze the existing laws in relation to

the death penalty. My views on these two questions are even

more resolute. Now we can add to this our failure to fairly

consider whether the barrage of unconstitutional Sandstrom-

type instructions was prejudicial error. Our analysis and

conclusion that the instructions were harmless can never be

accepted by the United States Supreme Court as an appropriate

standard. And now we can add to this the strong and frighten-

ing possibility that defendant may have been convicted of an

offense and sentenced to death for a crime that does not

exist in the laws of this state--deliberate homicide by means

of torture. Never have I seen a case more replete with con-

stitutional error.

I end this dissent with a postscript. In McKenzie - and

I

McKenzie - we held that defendant's procedural rights in

11,

relation to the death penalty are adequately protected by

his right to take his case before the Sentence Review Board

after we had reviewed his case on direct appeal. I dissented

to this view because the sentence review statutes (sections

95-2501 through 95-2504, R.C.M. 1947; 581 P.2d 1235 through

1266), clearly show on their face that they do not apply to

review of a death penalty. Moreover, assuming that they do,

they are defective because the defendant does not have a right

to appeal to this Court from any decision made by the Sentence

Review Board, a panel of district judges. Indeed, after

-110-

d e f e n d a n t took h i s c a s e t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board, he

p e t i t i o n e d t h i s C o u r t t o r e v i e w t h e B o a r d ' s d e c i s i o n , and

w e declined. I d i s s e n t e d b e c a u s e any s y s t e m o f meaningful

r e v i e w must p r o v i d e t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s h i g h e s t c o u r t w i l l review

the f i n a l death penalty decision. See o r d e r e n t e r e d i n S t a t e

v. McKenzie, Cause No. 13011, d a t e d February 20, 1979.

The m a j o r i t y view i n McKenzie - and McKenzie - and i n

I 11,

Cause no. 13011, s u p r a , rests, o f c o u r s e , on an assumption

t h a t t h e s e n t e n c e r e v i e w s t a t u t e s i n d e e d do a p p l y t o r e v i e w

a death sentence. But l o and b e h o l d , s t r a n g e a s it may seem,

i t i s now t h e view o f t h e Montana Supreme C o u r t t h a t s e n t e n c e

r e v i e w s t a t u t e s do n o t a p p l y t o a s e n t e n c e of d e a t h and

t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board c a n n o t r e v i e w a d e a t h

sentence. T h i s i s , o f c o u r s e , a 180 d e g r e e s h i f t from McKenzie

- and McKenzie - and from S t a t e v . McKenzie, Cause No. 13011.

I 11,

T h i s d e c i s i o n was r e c e n t l y made i n t h e Coleman o r d e r : State

of Montana e x r e l . Dewey Eugene Coleman v. S e n t e n c e Review

D i v i s i o n of t h e Supreme C o u r t o f Montana, No. 80-89, dated

March 2 1 , 1980.

I n t h e Coleman c a s e , t h i s C o u r t d e n i e d an a p p l i c a t i o n o f

a n o t h e r d e a t h p e n a l t y d e f e n d a n t f o r a w r i t of s u p e r v i s o r y

c o n t r o l , and p r o p e r l y s o . Defendant i s under s e n t e n c e of

d e a t h b u t a l s o h e h a s been s e n t e n c e d t o imprisonment by con-

v i c t i o n on a s e p a r a t e c o u n t . Defendant p e t i t i o n e d t h i s

Court t o s t a y proceedings i n D i s t r i c t Court f o r an execution

d a t e f o r t h e r e a s o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t f i r s t had t h e r i g h t t o go

' t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board t o have it r e v i e w a nonideakh

penalty sentence. W e declined, holding t h a t should h i s death

p e n a l t y s e n t e n c e be o v e r t u r n e d i n t h e F e d e r a l C o u r t s y s t e m , he

c o u l d t h e n a p p l y t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review Board t o r e v i e w h i s

na-death penalty sentence. What i s i m p o r t a n t however, i s what

w e s a i d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e s e n t e n c e r e v i e w

s t a t u t e s t o a death sentence:

-111-

"The review application by relator was denied

by the Sentence Review Division on the ground

of lack of jurisdiction. It pointed out that

review - sentences - available - -to persons

of is only

sentenced - -a term of - - - - - - in the

to - - one year or more

state prison, section 46-18-903, MCA, and that

it had-no jurisdiction to review death sentences.

It also pointed to section 46-18-307, MCA, which

provides for automatic review of death sentences

by the Montana Supreme Court.

"We hold that the denial of review by the Sentence

Review Division was correct. With respect to

the death sentence, the only statutory agency with

power to review is this Court. We have fulfilled

our duties in that connection. It would --

not only

- extra-statutory - - anomalywere we to hold

be but an ----

-- conclusions - - Court on review bv

that the of this review of

death sentences were subiect to later --

the Sentence Review ~ivisionof -

- this Court."

(Emphasis added) .

Needless to say, a judicial system having fundamental

fairness as one of its underpinnings, cannot long tolerate

this kind of inconsistency--particularly where death itself

is the underlying issue.

I leave it for others more perceptive and scholarly than

myself to determine the status of constitutional law in this

state in the wake of McKenzie - and McKenzie - and now

I 11,

McKenzie 111. Perhaps, however, an appropriate title for an

article or book on the subject would be: The McKenzie Rules:

Not - General Application--Apply Sparingly.

- For