State v. Collins

No. 13804

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1978

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs-

WILLIAM JOHN COLLINS,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from: District Court of the Eiqhth Judicial District,

Honorable Truman G. Bradford, Judqe presidinq.

Counsel of Record:

For Appellant:

Smith, Emmons, Baillie & Walsh, Great Falls, Montana

Robert J. Emmons arqued, Great Falls, Montana

For Respondent:

Hon. Mike Greely, Attorney General, Helena, Montana

Allen B. Chronister, Assistant Attorey General, argued,

Helena, Montana

J. Fred Bourdeau, County Attorney, Great Falls, Montana

Nick Browning, Deputy County Attorney, appeared, Great

Falls, Montana

Submitted: April 20, 1978

Decided :

Filed: AuC 1, 1978

Mr. J u s t i c e John C. Sheehy d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .

Defendant W i l l i a m John C o l l i n s was c h a r g e d i n t h e D i s -

t r i c t C o u r t , Cascade County, w i t h t h e o f f e n s e of d e l i b e r a t e

homicide. Upon h i s p l e a of n o t g u i l t y , a f t e r t r i a l , t h e

j u r y r e t u r n e d a v e r d i c t of g u i l t y o f m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e

homicide. Judgment of c o n v i c t i o n was e n t e r e d , and d e f e n d a n t

was s e n t e n c e d t o imprisonment f o r a term of f o r t y y e a r s .

From judgment and d e n i a l of a new t r i a l , d e f e n d a n t a p p e a l s .

Without q u e s t i o n , on A p r i l 2 3 , 1973, d e f e n d a n t s h o t

D a r r e l l David G a r d i p e e , who d i e d a s a r e s u l t . The s h o o t i n g

o c c u r r e d on Wire M i l l Road, n o r t h o f G r e a t F a l l s . The o n l y

w i t n e s s e s t o t h e e v e n t s p r i o r t o t h e s h o o t i n g were t h e

d e f e n d a n t and C a r l a Brave. Two o t h e r s , R o b e r t M. B r e t z and

h i s w i f e , d r o v e upon t h e s c e n e v e r y s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e

shooting. The o n l y w i t n e s s t o t h e a c t u a l s h o o t i n g was

defendant.

From t h e e v i d e n c e i t a p p e a r s d e f e n d a n t , a 4 8 y e a r o l d

unemployed p a i n t e r , a t and p r i o r t o t h e t i m e of t h e s h o o t i n g

w a s l i v i n g i n a camper mounted on h i s p i c k u p t r u c k . H e had

been i n G r e a t F a l l s 4 o r 5 d a y s , w i t h no d e f i n i t e l o c a t i o n ,

p a r k i n g h i s pickup and camper u n i t i n v a r i o u s p l a c e s from

time t o time. B e f o r e r e t u r n i n g t o G r e a t F a l l s , h e had been

i n Arizona s i n c e t h e p r e v i o u s September d o i n g some p r o s -

pecting there.

C a r l a Brave, t h e n i n h e r t w e n t i e s , a s i n g e r w i t h a band

t h a t p l a y e d i n l o c a l n i g h t s p o t s i n G r e a t F a l l s , met G a r d i p e e ,

t h e n 2 1 , a b o u t s i x months b e f o r e t h e i n c i d e n t . They became

good f r i e n d s . I n t h e afternoon preceding t h e shooting,

G a r d i p e e went t o t h e p l a c e where C a r l a was r e h e a r s i n g .

A f t e r t h e p r a c t i c e s e s s i o n , he i n v i t e d C a r l a t o accompany

him t o t h e B r a s s R a i l , a l o c a l b a r . There t h e y had some

d r i n k s and p l a y e d p o o l a t a t a b l e a t t h e r e a r of t h e p r e m i s e s .

While C a r l a and G a r d i p e e were a t t h e B r a s s R a i l , a b o u t

6:30 o r s o i n t h e evening, defendant e n t e r e d t h e b a r . He

had been d r i n k i n g b e f o r e h e a r r i v e d , and upon e n t e r i n g h e

o r d e r e d a round of d r i n k s f o r t h e house. He n o t e d G a r d i p e e

and C a r l a p l a y i n g p o o l and f e l l i n t o c o n v e r s a t i o n w i t h them,

a l t h o u g h h e d i d n o t know them. H e bought a round o r two of

drinks. They a l l t a l k e d and p l a y e d some p o o l and c o n t i n u e d

t o consume l i q u o r .

F i n a l l y t h e y d e c i d e d t o go t o a n o t h e r p l a c e . Defendant

had t h e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s s o he d r o v e them t o t h e

C i t y Bar, where G a r d i p e e went i n and r e t u r n e d w i t h a b o t t l e

of wine.

C a r l a t e s t i f i e d t h a t a l l t h r e e i n s p e c t e d t h e i n s i d e of

t h e camper w h i l e t h e y w e r e s t o p p e d a t t h e C i t y Bar; defend-

a n t remembers t h e l o c a t i o n a s a t t h e B r a s s R a i l . A t any

r a t e , t h e camper was i n s p e c t e d and admired by c a r l a and

Gardipee. C a r l a p a r t i c u l a r l y t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h e t i m e of

t h e i n s p e c t i o n , s h e saw no r i f l e l y i n g on a bed i n t h e

camper, nor i n d e e d d i d s h e o b s e r v e one i n t h e camper o t h e r -

wise.

When t h e y l e f t t h e C i t y Bar, C a r l a wanted t o go t o h e r

p l a c e , b u t G a r d i p e e wanted t o r i d e around. Defendant d r o v e

t h e u n i t o u t of t h e c i t y on t h e Havre highway, and t h e n

t u r n e d o f f t h a t highway t o t h e Wire M i l l Road, t h e n c e t o a

p l a c e n o t f a r from t h e M i s s o u r i R i v e r , where h e p a r k e d . All

t h r e e were s i t t i n g i n t h e c a b of t h e p i c k u p .

When t h e y s t o p p e d , C a r l a and G a r d i p e e g o t o u t and

wandered towards t h e r i v e r . The n i g h t was c o l d , b u t t h e y

t a l k e d and k i s s e d a b o u t a n hour b e f o r e s h e r e t u r n e d t o t h e

c a b , where d e f e n d a n t had remained. H e had c o n t i n u e d t o

d r i n k , consuming b e e r t h e y had b r o u g h t from t h e B r a s s R a i l ,

and some whiskey h e had p r o c u r e d from t h e camper. Gardipee

w a s d r i n k i n g from t h e wine b o t t l e .

C a r l a and d e f e n d a n t t a l k e d i n t h e c a b f o r a t i m e , w h i l e

G a r d i p e e remained o u t s i d e . Defendant t o l d C a r l a t h a t h e

t h o u g h t ''everybody s h o u l d make l o v e t o everybody". The

remark " k i n d of spooked" h e r . Then he a s k e d h e r i f s h e

would l i k e t o go t o t h e camper i n back and d r i n k whiskey

w i t h him. C a r l a a l s o t e s t i f i e d a b o u t a n o t h e r m a t t e r he

d i s c u s s e d , t o which w e w i l l a l l u d e more f u l l y l a t e r i n t h i s

opinion.

Carla l e f t t h e c a b , and d e f e n d a n t remained i n s i d e . She

r e j o i n e d G a r d i p e e , b u t d i d n o t t e l l him of t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n

i n t h e cab.

Meanwhile, G a r d i p e e was a c t i n g s t r a n g e l y . He was

r a i s i n g t h e wine b o t t l e t o t h e s k y , jumping up and down, and

he appeared t o defendant t o be " f l i p p i n g o u t . "

F i n a l l y , near midnight, they decided t o leave. All

t h r e e g o t i n t h e cab, Carla s i t t i n g i n t h e middle. Defend-

a n t d r o v e up t o t h e p o i n t of a g a i n e n t e r i n g Wire M i l l Road.

Here G a r d i p e e grabbed t h e s t e e r i n g wheel and wanted t o t u r n

r i g h t . Defendant, however, wanted t o go back t o G r e a t F a l l s ,

which was t o t h e l e f t . Meanwhile G a r d i p e e was complaining

how t h e w h i t e man had messed up t h e I n d i a n l a n d , and s a i d

" T h i s i s o u r l a n d . " Then he slammed h i s f i s t on t h e d a s h of

t h e c a b and s a i d "Even t h i s b e l o n g s t o me." ~efendant

t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t t h a t p o i n t , G a r d i p e e s t a r t e d punching him

i n t h e head w h i l e h e was d r i v i n g .

~ e f e n d a n ts t o p p e d t h e t r u c k i n t h e l a n e of t r a f f i c of

t h e roadway. G a r d i p e e g o t o u t o n h i s s i d e of t h e p i c k u p .

Defendant t e s t i f i e d h e jumped o u t of t h e t r u c k on t h e

d r i v e r ' s s i d e and r a n back t o t h e rear of t h e camper. He

opened t h e r e a r d o o r and g o t i n t o t h e camper, and a t t e m p t e d

t o l o c k t h e camper d o o r behind him.

Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e n t h e d o o r of t h e camper

was j e r k e d open by G a r d i p e e , who s a i d " I ' v e g o t you now" o r

words t o t h a t e f f e c t . Defendant was i n s i d e t h e camper,

p o s s i b l y i n t h e m i d d l e of t h e camper. G a r d i p e e was a t t h e

d o o r w i t h o n e hand o n a h a n d l e t o h e l p h i m s e l f i n and de-

f e n d a n t s a i d he saw something " b r i g h t c o l o r e d " i n h i s o t h e r

hand. Defendant d i d n o t know what it was, nor was i t e v e r

further identified a t the t r i a l .

The i n t e r i o r of t h e c a b was d a r k . Defendant had n o t

t u r n e d on t h e i n t e r i o r camper l i g h t s . The o u t s i d e l i g h t s of

t h e camper u n i t w e r e o n , i n c l u d i n g t h e c l e a r a n c e l i g h t s .

Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was d a r k enough however t h a t he

c o u l d n o t have i d e n t i f i e d t h e p e r s o n a s G a r d i p e e coming i n t o

t h e t r u c k , n o r c o u l d he see G a r d i p e e ' s e y e s .

Defendant had i n t h e camper a b o l t - a c t i o n .22 caliber

r i f l e h e had purchased i n G r e a t F a l l s , p r i o r t o g o i n g t o

Arizona f o r p r o s p e c t i n g . Defendant t e s t i f i e d t h a t a f t e r

G a r d i p e e j e r k e d t h e camper d o o r open, d e f e n d a n t r a n a s t e p

o r two t o t h e f r o n t of t h e camper and p i c k e d up t h e r i f l e

from t h e bed where i t was l y i n g . H e turned without r a i s i n g

t h e gun t o h i s s h o u l d e r , keeping i t i n h i s r i g h t hand, and

fired. H e s t a t e d he d i d n o t intend t o shoot Gardipee a t t h e

t i m e ; t h a t h e t h o u g h t i t would s c a r e him o f f ; and, t h a t t h e

gun went o f f a c c i d e n t a l l y .

Because of t h e make and t y p e of r i f l e i n v o l v e d , t h e gun

must have been r e a d y t o f i r e , w i t h a b u l l e t i n p o s i t i o n i n

t h e chamber. Defendant s a i d n o t h i n g and gave no warning

b e f o r e he f i r e d t h e s h o t .

The b u l l e t e n t e r e d t h e body of G a r d i p e e n e a r l y i n t h e

m i d d l e f r o n t a t t h e l e v e l of t h e s e v e n t h r i b and t r a v e l e d

downward a t a n approximate f o r t y - f i v e d e g r e e a n g l e t h r o u g h

h i s diaphragm, t h e p o s t e r i o r of h i s l i v e r , t h r o u g h h i s vena

cava and lodged n e x t t o h i s s p i n e i n t h e abdomen. Gardipee

f e l l back from t h e camper t o t h e ground. H e was i n a doubled-

up p o s i t i o n on t h e ground when C a r l a came from t h e c a b ,

where s h e had remained a f t e r t h e men g o t o u t , u n t i l s h e

h e a r d t h e s h o t which sounded l i k e a n " e x p l o s i o n " .

Defendant was g e t t i n g down from t h e camper when C a r l a

came t o t h e s c e n e . H e s t i l l had t h e r i f l e i n h i s hand. At

t h a t moment a n o t h e r c a r d r o v e up, d r i v e n by R o b e r t B r e t z ,

with h i s wife a s a passenger. Defendant p l a c e d t h e r i f l e on

t h e f l o o r of t h e camper, went around t o t h e c a b of t h e

p i c k u p , g o t i n , and d r o v e o f f , l e a v i n g G a r d i p e e on t h e

roadway, w i t h C a r l a bending o v e r him. Defendant d r o v e t o

t h e Cascade County s h e r i f f ' s o f f i c e , where he t u r n e d h i m s e l f

in.

Meanwhile R o b e r t B r e t z , h i s w i f e and C a r l a p u t t h e

b l e e d i n g G a r d i p e e i n t o t h e B r e t z c a r and went t o t h e h o s p i t a l ,

where he e x p i r e d of h i s wounds a t a p p r o x i m a t e l y 12:55 a.m.

An a u t o p s y w a s l a t e r performed which e s t a b l i s h e d t h e c a u s e

of d e a t h .

The f o r e g o i n g o u t l i n e of f a c t s i s t a k e n mainly from

d e f e n d a n t ' s testimony. There a r e c e r t a i n d i s c r e p a n c i e s

between h i s t e s t i m o n y and o t h e r w i t n e s s e s i n o t h e r m a t t e r s ,

b u t t h e s t o r y of t h e events surrounding t h e a c t u a l shooting

came mainly from d e f e n d a n t .

The j u r y l i s t e n e d t o t h e t e s t i m o n y , c o n s i d e r e d t h e

r e l e v a n t f a c t s proven, and b r o u g h t i n i t s v e r d i c t of g u i l t y

of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t .

D e f e n d a n t ' s a p p e a l c o n c e r n s mainly f i v e i s s u e s which

a t t a c k t h e v e r d i c t and s u b s e q u e n t judgment:

1. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y a d m i t t e d t e s t i -

mony of a n a l l e g e d s t a t e m e n t of d e f e n d a n t t h a t he had been

imprisoned f o r r a p e .

2. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e

jury .

3. Whether d e f e n d a n t was d e n i e d a speedy t r i a l .

4. Whether t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g

c e r t a i n photographs i n evidence.

5. Whether t h e e v i d e n c e s u p p o r t s t h e j u r y v e r d i c t .

The f i r s t i s s u e , t h e a l l e g e d s t a t e m e n t of d e f e n d a n t

t h a t h e had been imprisoned f o r r a p e , a r o s e d u r i n g t h e

t e s t i m o n y o f C a r l a Brave a b o u t h e r c o n v e r s a t i o n i n t h e c a b

of t h e p i c k u p w i t h d e f e n d a n t w h i l e G a r d i p e e was o u t s i d e . In

a d d i t i o n t o t h e s u b j e c t s o u t l i n e d above, C a r l a w a s p e r m i t t e d

t o t e s t i f y , over objection, t h a t defendant t o l d her during

t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n t h a t d e f e n d a n t knew Merle G a r d i p e e , t h e

b r o t h e r of D a r r e U G a r d i p e e ; t h a t he had m e t him i n p r i s o n .

She asked d e f e n d a n t "what were you i n t h e r e f o r ? " and h e

" s a i d h e was i n f o r r a p e . "

The s t a t e contended t h e e v i d e n c e was r e l e v a n t t o t h e

e v e n t s and t o t h e a t t i t u d e and i n t e n t of t h e d e f e n d a n t t h a t

evening. Defendant's counsel objected t h a t t h e o f f e r e d

t e s t i m o n y w a s h e a r s a y , and was a n a t t e m p t by t h e s t a t e t o

g e t i n t o t h e r e c o r d a s t a t e m e n t of a f a c t t h a t was n o t a

fact a t all. A l s o , t h a t i n r e b u t t i n g such t e s t i m o n y , de-

f e n d a n t would p e r f o r c e open h i m s e l f up t o q u e s t i o n i n g on

state's cross-examination a s t o a p r i o r prison record. (In

argument b e f o r e t h i s C o u r t , t h e s t a t e a r g u e d t h e e v i d e n c e i s

p a r t of t h e " r e s g e s t a e " , w h i l e d e f e n d a n t argued t h e t e s t i -

mony was a n improper showing of a n o t h e r u n r e l a t e d c r i m e . )

When s h e was cross-examined by d e f e n d a n t , C a r l a ad-

m i t t e d s h e had been t o l d i n t h e c o u n t y a t t o r n e y ' s o f f i c e

t h a t d e f e n d a n t had n o t been c o n v i c t e d of r a p e . I n defend-

a n t ' s c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n by t h e s t a t e , h e a d m i t t e d he had

been c o n v i c t e d of a p r i o r f e l o n y , n o t s p e c i f i e d , and t h e

m a t t e r was n o t f u r t h e r pursued.

The n e t e f f e c t of t h e e v i d e n c e t h e n was t h a t d e f e n d a n t

t o l d C a r l a h e had once been i n p r i s o n f o r r a p e ; s h e a d m i t t e d

t h a t l a t e r s h e was informed i t was n o t t r u e ; and d e f e n d a n t

a d m i t t e d h e had a p r i o r f e l o n y c o n v i c t i o n on h i s r e c o r d .

The o b j e c t i o n on a p p e a l t h a t t h e t e s t i m o n y c o n s t i t u t e d

proof of a p r i o r u n r e l a t e d o f f e n s e d o e s n o t b e a r a n a l y s i s .

The s t a t e d i d n o t p r o v e t h a t d e f e n d a n t committed a n un-

r e l a t e d c r i m e ; i t d i d p r o v e t h a t d e f e n d a n t claimed h e com-

m i t t e d s u c h an o f f e n s e . The d i f f e r e n c e c o u l d be monumental.

I t i s t h e same d i f f e r e n c e as a n unmarried woman who -

is

p r e g n a n t and a n unmarried woman who c l a i m s t o be p r e g n a n t .

A s u b s e q u e n t m a r r i a g e founded upon t h e r e a l i t y may be j u s t i -

f i e d ; b u t a m a r r i a g e founded upon t h e s u p p o s i t i o n may n o t

be.

The s t a t e m e n t of d e f e n d a n t i s i n t h e same c a t e g o r y of

e v i d e n c e , o c c u r r i n g a t t h e same t i m e a s t h e o t h e r v e r b a l

a c t s t e s t i f i e d t o by C a r l a , such as d e f e n d a n t ' s s t a t e m e n t

a b o u t everybody making l o v e t o everybody, and h i s i n v i t a t i o n

t o h e r t o d r i n k whiskey w i t h him i n t h e camper. These

remarks went i n w i t h o u t o b j e c t i o n .

The s t a t e m e n t o f d e f e n d a n t was r e l e v a n t as a p a r t of

t h e whole f a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n t o be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e j u r y i n

weighing t h e g u i l t o r i n n o c e n c e of d e f e n d a n t . Especially i s

t h i s t r u e where, a s h e r e , t h e d e f e n d a n t a s s e r t e d s e l f -

defense a s j u s t i f i c a t i o n . H i s s t a t e of mind l e a d i n g up t o

t h e s h o o t i n g was a m a t t e r b e a r i n g on h i s g u i l t o r i n n o c e n c e

f o r t h e j u r y t o c o n s i d e r i n t h e l i g h t of t h a t d e f e n s e . The

s t a t e m e n t was t h e r e f o r e a " v e r b a l a c t " r e l e v a n t t o t h e

i s s u e s , and t h u s a d m i s s i b l e . A s n o t e d i n Overton v . United

States, ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 403 F.2d 4 4 4 , 447, t h e v e r b a l a c t d o c t r i n e

i s technically n o t an exception t o t h e hearsay r u l e . The

words o f d e f e n d a n t w e r e n o t o f f e r e d f o r t h e purpose of

p r o v i n g t h e t r u t h of t h e a s s e r t i o n s t h e y c o n t a i n e d , b u t

merely f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e f a c t t h a t t h e

words had been s a i d by t h e d e f e n d a n t . Ward v . United S t a t e s ,

( 1 9 6 1 ) , 296 F.2d 898.

On t h e o t h e r hand, t h e s t a t e m e n t was n o t a d m i s s i b l e a s

p a r t of res g e s t a e , a s t h a t e x c e p t i o n t o t h e h e a r s a y r u l e

t a k e s i n s t a t e m e n t s made under s u c h c i r c u m s t a n c e s t h a t

r e f l e c t i o n and f a b r i c a t i o n a r e u n l i k e l y . S t a t e v. F a i r b u r n ,

( 1 9 5 9 ) , 135 Mont. 449, 340 P.2d 157. Standing alone t h e

s t a t e m e n t might n o t b e r e l e v a n t o r m a t e r i a l , b u t it formed a

p a r t of t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s , a l i n k which, when c o n n e c t e d t o

o t h e r e v i d e n c e , becomes r e l e v a n t and m a t e r i a l i n t h e c a s e .

29 Am J u r 2d, Evidence 8255. A s s u c h t h e s t a t e m e n t was

c l e a r l y a d m i s s i b l e and t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t committed no e r r o r

i n p e r m i t t i n g it. W e f i n d no s u b s t a n c e i n d e f e n d a n t ' s f i r s t

issue.

I n h i s second i s s u e , t h e d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s t h e D i s t r i c t

C o u r t committed e r r o r i n i n s t r u c t i n g t h e j u r y . This i s s u e

i n v o l v e s two sub-heads, ( a ) whether a " l a d d e r " i n s t r u c t i o n

s h o u l d have been g i v e n t o t h e j u r y , and ( b ) whether t h e j u r y

w a s properly instructed with respect t o self-defense.

I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h i s i s s u e , we f i r s t a n a l y z e t h e law

a p p l i c a b l e t o d e l i b e r a t e homicide, and t h e i n f e r i o r g r a d e s

of homicide t h e r e u n d e r , a s w e l l a s t h e a p p l i c a b l e law of

j u s t i f i c a t i o n o r exoneration.

When Montana adopted its Criminal Code of 1973 (Title

94, Chapters 1-8, Revised Codes of Montana 1947), it wiped

out the theretofore existing statutory provisions defining

the crimes of murder and of manslaughter. In lieu, the new

code provided that criminal homicide includes deliberate

homicide, mitigated deliberate homicide, and negligent

homicide. Section 94-5-101 et seq., R.C.M. 1947. In capsule,

the grades of criminal homicide can be defined as: an

unlawful death caused by a negligent actor is negligent

homicide; an unlawful death purposely or knowingly caused by

an actor under the influence of extreme mental or emotional

stress for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse

is mitigated deliberate homicide; and, an unlawful death

caused by one acting purposely or knowingly is deliberate

homicide. Section 94-5-102; 94-5-103; 94-5-104, R.C.M.

1947.

It is to be noted from the definitions that committing

the homicide "purposely or knowingly" is an element of

deliberate homicide, and also of mitigated deliberate homi-

cide. In the case of mitigated deliberate homicide, even

though the act may have been committed purposely or knowingly,

it is one that is committed under the influence of extreme

mental or emotional stress for which there is a reasonable

explanation or excuse.

In considering the instructions given by the court, we

must also look to the law on justification or exoneration,

more popularly known, perhaps, as "self-defense". Under the

old code, a homicide committed in self-defense was "excusable

homicide". Under the Criminal Code of 1973, conduct necessary

to defend oneself or another against the imminent use of

unlawful force may result in such conduct being a justifiable

u s e of f o r c e . S e c t i o n 94-3-103, R.C.M. 1947. When a p e r s o n

i n a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e u s e s such f o r c e as i s n e c e s s a r y t o

prevent o r terminate a n o t h e r ' s unlawful e n t r y i n t o t h e

o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e , even t o t h e e x t e n t of c a u s i n g d e a t h by

t h e u s e of t h e f o r c e , f o r t h e purpose of p r e v e n t i n g a n

a s s a u l t o r p e r s o n a l v i o l e n c e upon a n i n d i v i d u a l o r t o p r e -

v e n t t h e commission of a f o r c i b l e f e l o n y i n t h e o c c u p i e d

s t r u c t u r e , such u s e o f f o r c e i s j u s t i f i e d . S e c t i o n 94-3-103,

R.C.M. 1947.

A t a l l events, t h e d e g r e e of f o r c e used by t h e a c t o r

must b e r e a s o n a b l e , based upon what a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n

would b e l i e v e under t h e same c i r c u m s t a n c e s . S e c t i o n s 94-3-

103, 94-3-104, R.C.M. 1947; S t a t e v. Brooks, ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 150

Mont. 399, 436 P.2d 9 1 .

The f o r e g o i n g a r e t h e c o n c e p t s i n a c r i m i n a l homicide

c a s e , s u c h a s t h e o n e c h a r g e d h e r e , which must be conveyed

t o t h e j u r y by t h e judge i n t h e body of h i s i n s t r u c t i o n s .

He may f l e s h o u t s u c h c o n c e p t s a s may be n e c e s s a r y b u t i f

t h e body o f t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s c o n t a i n s t h e f o r e g o i n g e l e m e n t s ,

f a i r l y and f u l l y conveyed t o t h e j u r y , t h e n we must c o n s i d e r

t h e j u r y h a s been p r o p e r l y i n s t r u c t e d b o t h f o r t h e s t a t e and

t h e defendant.

A g a i n s t t h a t background, we examine t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s

given i n t h i s case. The e s s e n t i a l e l e m e n t s a r e t h e r e . The

t r i a l c o u r t d e f i n e d t h e g r a d e s of c r i m i n a l homicide ( I n s t r u c -

t i o n No. 3 2 ) ; i t d e f i n e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( ~ n s t r u c t i o n

No. 3 1 ) , m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide ( I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 8 ) ,

and n e g l i g e n t homicide, ( I n s t r u c t i o n 19) . Moreover, t h e

j u r y was i n s t r u c t e d on t h e j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e t o

d e f e n d o n e s e l f a g a i n s t t h e imminent u s e of u n l a w f u l f o r c e ,

and t h e j u s t i f i a b l e u s e of f o r c e a g a i n s t a p e r s o n b r e a k i n g

i n t o a n o c c u p i e d s t r u c t u r e , s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n t h e l a n g u a g e of

the statutes. Using t h e t e s t a p p l i e d i n S t a t e v . P o r t e r ,

( 1 9 6 4 ) , 143 Mont. 528, 539, 391 P.2d 704, t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s

g i v e n on j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e gave t h e d e f e n d a n t ample oppor-

t u n i t y t o expound t o t h e j u r y i n argument h i s t h e o r y w i t h

r e s p e c t t o t h e u s e of f o r c e a s self-defense a g a i n s t an

unlawful a c t .

On o r a l argument, d e f e n d a n t s t r e n u o u s l y a r g u e d t h a t

nowhere i n t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s d i d t h e c o u r t a d v i s e t h e j u r y ,

w i t h r e s p e c t t o m i t i g a t e d d e l i b e r a t e homicide, i n what

circumstances t h e jury should a c q u i t t h e defendant. De-

f e n d a n t p o i n t s o u t t h a t i n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1, t h e c o u r t

o u t l i n e d t h e e l e m e n t s o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide and s t a t e d t h a t

d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d be a c q u i t t e d i f t h e e l e m e n t s were n o t

proved. I n I n s t r u c t i o n No. 1 7 , i t p o i n t e d o u t t h e e l e m e n t s

of n e g l i g e n t homicide and s t a t e d t h a t i f t h o s e e l e m e n t s w e r e

n o t proven beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t h a t d e f e n d a n t s h o u l d

be found n o t g u i l t y . Contrasting those i n s t r u c t i o n s with

t h e l a c k of a s i m i l a r i n s t r u c t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o m i t i g a t e d

t. ! kf

dLX q2

de-abl-e homicide, d e f e n d a n t c o n t e n d s g r i e v o u s e r r o r on

t h e p a r t of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t . I n essence defendant i s

c o m p l a i n i n g t h a t i f t h e j u r y found a j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e used

by d e f e n d a n t t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s d i d n o t s a y t h a t i n such e v e n t

t h e jury should a c q u i t t h e defendant.

Two t h i n g s m i l i t a t e a g a i n s t t h i s p o s i t i o n of d e f e n d a n t .

F i r s t , s u c h a n i n s t r u c t i o n w a s n o t o f f e r e d by d e f e n d a n t ; and

second, t h e r u l e i n Montana i s t h a t i f t h e j u r y i s p r o p e r l y

i n s t r u c t e d on t h e law p e r t a i n i n g t o j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e i n a

homicide c a s e , t h e c o u r t need n o t go f u r t h e r and t e l l t h e

j u r y t h a t i t must a c q u i t t h e d e f e n d a n t , i f i t f i n d s t h a t

j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e was u s e d . S t a t e v . Smith, ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168

Mont. 93, 100, 541 P.2d 351; S t a t e v . London, (1957), 131

Mont. 4 1 0 , 433, 310 P.2d 571.

~ e f e n d a n tf u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t e r r e d

i n r e f u s i n g t o g i v e d e f e n d a n t ' s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n No. 6,

which would have t o l d t h e j u r y t h a t i f i t had a r e a s o n a b l e

d o u b t whether t h e homicide was j u s t i f i a b l e , t h s n i t must g i v e

t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e b e n e f i t of t h a t d o u b t and a c q u i t him.

T h a t s p e c i f i c i n s t r u c t i o n w a s r e f u s e d i n S t a t e v . Logan,

( 1 9 7 0 ) , 156 Mont. 48, 66, 473 P.2d 833, and t h i s C o u r t

approved. The C o u r t i n Logan i n d i c a t e d t h a t such i n s t r u c -

t i o n was u n n e c e s s a r y where t h e j u r y i s o t h e r w i s e p r o p e r l y

i n s t r u c t e d on r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t . In t h i s case, Instruction

No. 2 f u l l y c o v e r e d t h e j u r y ' s d u t y w i t h r e s p e c t t o r e a -

sonable doubt.

Defendant f u r t h e r a r g u e s t h a t h i s proposed i n s t r u c t i o n

No. 4 which would have i n s t r u c t e d t h e j u r y w i t h r e s p e c t t o

j u s t i f i a b l e homicide, t h a t i s t h e u s e of j u s t i f i a b l e f o r c e ,

w a s improperly refused. A s s t a t e d however, t h i s s u b j e c t was

f u l l y c o v e r e d by t h e c o u r t i n o t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s , and i t

a p p e a r s t h a t i n i t s I n s t r u c t i o n Nos. 23 and 2 4 , t h e c o u r t

p a r t i c u l a r l y i n s t r u c t e d t h e jury t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e

p e r s o n u s i n g f o r c e , i f a c t i n g a s a r e a s o n a b l e man, i s j u s t i -

f i e d i n a c t i n g a s h e d i d . I n d e e d , i n I n s t r u c t i o n flo. 2 4 , it

i s s t a t e d t h a t a p e r s o n may a c t under t h e a p p e a r a n c e of

p e r i l i f t h a t a p p e a r a n c e makes t h e p e r s o n a c t i n g b e l i e v e

t h a t he i s i n d e a d l y p e r i l of h i s l i f e o r of r e c e i v i n g g r e a t

b o d i l y harm, and i f a r e a s o n a b l e man, i n t h e same s i t u a t i o n

s e e i n g and knowing what t h e a c t o r knows, would b e j u s t i f i e d

i n b e l i e v i n g himself i n danger. Since counsel w a s not

l i m i t e d under t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s from f a i r l y p r e s e n t i n g h i s

defense t o t h e jury, t h e defendant w i l l n o t be heard t o

complain t h a t t h e c o u r t f a i l e d t o g i v e t h e many d i f f e r e n t

nuances on a t h e o r y of d e f e n s e t h a t m i g h t have been d e v i s e d .

F i n a l l y , under t h i s i s s u e , w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e c o n t e n -

t i o n made a t o r a l argument t h a t t h e c o u r t s h o u l d have g i v e n

a "ladder" i n s t r u c t i o n which would have (1) encompassed t h e

v a r i o u s g r a d e s of homicide under c r i m i n a l homicide, (2)

i n s t r u c t e d a s t o t h e e l e m e n t s , and ( 3 ) a d v i s e d t h e j u r y t o

c o n v i c t o r a c q u i t w i t h r e s p e c t t o each such p o s s i b l e o f f e n s e

o r i n f e r i o r g r a d e of o f f e n s e , t h e answer remains t h e same:

such a n i n s t r u c t i o n was n o t o f f e r e d , and i n any e v e n t t h e

i n s t r u c t i o n s a d e q u a t e l y c o v e r e d t h e o f f e n s e s of which t h e

d e f e n d a n t c o u l d b e c o n v i c t e d and h i s d e f e n s e s t h e r e t o . It

i s n o t t o be f o r g o t t e n t h a t i n t h i s c a s e t h e c o u r t s e n t four

p o s s i b l e v e r d i c t s t o t h e j u r y , i n c l u d i n g one f o r e a c h g r a d e

o f c r i m i n a l homicide and o n e f o r a c q u i t t a l , and d e f e n d a n t

made no o b j e c t i o n a t t h a t t i m e t o t h e forms of v e r d i c t s

being submitted t o t h e jury f o r i t s use.

W c o n c l u d e t h e r e f o r e t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t committed no

e

e r r o r w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e second i s s u e r a i s e d by d e f e n d a n t .

Defendant i n h i s t h i r d i s s u e a r g u e s t h a t he was d e n i e d

a speedy t r i a l a s r e q u i r e d by t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment t o

t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n and by A r t i c l e 11, S e c t i o n

2 4 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . Counsel f o r d e f e n d a n t i n

o r a l argument conceded t h a t t h e p r e j u d i c i a l d e l a y d o e s n o t

e x t e n d beyond t h e f i r s t e l e v e n months.

The f o l l o w i n g t i m e t a b l e of e v e n t s i s p e r t i n e n t t o a

d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h i s i s s u e :

A p r i l 2 3 , 1975 Date of a r r e s t .

A p r i l 2 8 , 1975 Information f i l e d .

~ p r i l

29, 1975 Defendant a r r a i g n e d .

~ p r i 3 0 , 1975

l Defendant p o s t e d bond.

May 2, 1975 Defendant f i l e d motion

t o produce c o n f e s s i o n -

s t a t e m e n t on demand f o r

d i s c o v e r y and produc-

t i o n of e v i d e n c e f o r

inspection.

May 2 1 , 1975 Defendant d i s q u a l i f i e s

Judge Nelson.

May 23, 1975 Judge Bradford c a l l e d i n .

August 23, 1975 Defendant f i l e s n o t i c e of

i n t e n t t o r e l y on s e l f -

d e f e n s e and motion f o r

order t o take t h e deposi-

t i o n of C a r l a Brave.

October 1975 Defendant l e a v e s Montana

f o r Arizona t o s e e k

employment.

J a n u a r y 29, 1976 T r i a l d a t e set f o r

March 29, 1976.

March 3, 1976 Defendant r e t u r n s t o

Montana from A r i z o n a .

March 29, 1976 T r i a l d a t e vacated a t

defendant's request.

Under d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n c e s s i o n - - t h a t only the f i r s t

e l e v e n months a r e t o be c o n s i d e r e d under t h e speedy t r i a l

i s s u e , w e have a p e r i o d of 336 d a y s e l a p s i n g from t h e d a t e

t h e I n f o r m a t i o n was f i l e d u n t i l t h e f i r s t t r i a l d a t e . This

number of d a y s i s g r e a t e r t h a n t h e p r e s u m p t i v e p e r i o d e s t a b -

l i s h e d i n S t a t e ex rel. Sanford v . District Court, (1976),

Mont. , 551 P.2d 1005, 33 St.Rep. 644, a s a prima

f a c i e c a s e of d e l a y . A c c o r d i n g l y , we a r e c a l l e d on t o

b a l a n c e t h e f a c t o r s s e t o u t i n Barker v . Wingo, ( 1 9 7 2 ) , 407

U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2128, 33 L Ed 2d 1 0 1 , t o d e t e r m i n e t h e

speedy t r i a l i s s u e . These f a c t o r s a r e - - l e n g t h of d e l a y ; t h e

r e a s o n f o r d e l a y ; d e f e n d a n t ' s a s s e r t i o n of h i s r i g h t ; a n d ,

prejudice t o t h e defendant.

The f i r s t f a c t o r , l e n g t h of d e l a y , i s e s t a b l i s h e d . The

second and t h i r d f a c t o r s we c o n s i d e r t o g e t h e r . I t appears

t h a t d e f e n d a n t s o u g h t and r e c e i v e d p e r m i s s i o n t o l e a v e

Montana f o r Arizona w h i l e h i s t r i a l was pending. The r e a -

sons f o r h i s leaving w e r e personal t o defendant. The p e r i o d

of t i m e h e was away from t h e s t a t e on p e r s o n a l b u s i n e s s

c a n n o t be counted a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e . T h a t p e r i o d encom-

p a s s e s t h e month of October 1975 t h r o u g h t h e f i r s t t r i a l

d a t e o f March 29, 1976, which d a t e was v a c a t e d a t defend-

a n t ' s request. The r e c o r d shows n e g a t i v e l y f o r t h a t p e r i o d

t h a t d e f e n d a n t wanted o r was r e a d y f o r a t r i a l , much l e s s

t h a t he was a s s e r t i n g h i s r i g h t t o t r i a l .

Of s i g n i f i c a n c e a l s o i s t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t

f i l e h i s i n t e n t t o r e l y on s e l f - d e f e n s e u n t i l August 23,

1975. I n e x p l a i n i n g h i s d e l a y i n s o f i l i n g , d e f e n d a n t s t a t e d

h e needed t h e i n t e r v e n i n g t i m e t o c o m p l e t e h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n ,

and o n l y on c o m p l e t i o n d i d h e d e t e r m i n e t o r e l y on s e l f -

defense. Again, d e f e n d a n t i s n o t i n a p o s i t i o n t o c h a r g e

t h e s t a t e w i t h t h e time he himself r e q u i r e d t o complete t h e

i n v e s t i g a t i o n necessary f o r h i s defense. I t i s obvious t h a t

i n t h e p e r i o d from h i s a r r a i g n m e n t u n t i l August 23, 1975, he

was n o t r e a d y f o r n o r d i d h e want a t r i a l of t h e c h a r g e

a g a i n s t him.

T h a t l e a v e s t h e o n l y u n e x p l a i n e d t i m e , a p e r i o d from

August 23, 1975 u n t i l a n u n s p e c i f i e d d a t e i n October 1975,

t o be a c c o u n t e d f o r . T h a t p e r i o d of t i n e , even i f i t w e r e

t o be c o u n t e d f u l l y a g a i n s t t h e s t a t e , would h a r d l y q u a l i f y

a s a p r e j u d i c i a l d e t e r r e n t t o d e f e n d a n t ' s f a i r and speedy

t r i a l , e s p e c i a l l y when i n t h a t p e r i o d d e f e n d a n t was p l a n n i n g

t o l e a v e t h e s t a t e , and no p r e j u d i c e i s shown t o t h e defend-

ant's rights.

The f o u r t h f a c t o r t o b e c o n s i d e r e d , t h e p r e j u d i c e t o

t h e d e f e n d a n t , h a s no s u p p o r t i n t h e r e c o r d . ~ o t h i n g as

h

been b r o u g h t t o o u r a t t e n t i o n t h a t would show t h e d e l a y

hampered d e f e n d a n t i n any way i n p r e s e n t i n g h i s d e f e n s e .

~ e f e n d a n tc l a i m s t h e d e l a y c a u s e d him c o n c e r n and a n x i e t y ,

b u t t h e s e a r e i n h e r e n t i n any c r i m i n a l c a s e . Barker v .

Wingo, s u p r a . Here, t h e s t a t e accommodated d e f e n d a n t t o

ease h i s anxiety. I t v a c a t e d a t r i a l d a t e b e c a u s e of h i s

up-coming s u r g e r y . I t a l l o w e d him t o l e a v e t h e s t a t e t o

s e e k a job. I f a n x i e t y and c o n c e r n w e r e p r e s e n t , t h e y were

a s much t h e r e s u l t o f t h e needs of t h e d e f e n d a n t , as of any

d e l a y i n t h e speedy t r i a l p r o c e s s .

W f i n d t h e r e f o r e t h a t d e f e n d a n t f a i l s t o meet t h e

e

c r i t e r i a n e c e s s a r y t o show h e had been d e n i e d a speedy t r i a l

by t h e s t a t e . S t a t e e x r e l . S a n f o r d v. D i s t r i c t C o u r t ,

s u p r a ; B a r k e r v. Wingo, s u p r a ; S t a t e v . Steward, ( 1 9 7 5 ) , 168

Mont. 385, 388, 5 4 3 P . 2 d 178, 181.

D e f e n d a n t ' s f o u r t h i s s u e d e a l s w i t h t h e q u e s t i o n of

whether t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n a d m i t t i n g c e r t a i n photo-

graphs i n t o evidence. Defendant a r g u e s t h e p h o t o g r a p h s were

s o highly p r e j u d i c i a l a s t o cause r e v e r s i b l e e r r o r . Defend-

a n t r e l i e s on S t a t e v. B i s c h e r t , ( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 1 Mont. 152, 308

P.2d 969, f o r t h i s c o n t e n t i o n .

In the instant case, D r . John Henneford, a p a t h o l o g i s t ,

t e s t i f i e d a s a p r o s e c u t i o n w i t n e s s t o e s t a b l i s h t h e c a u s e of

death. Two b l a c k and w h i t e p h o t o g r a p h s of t h e d e c e a s e d

taken during D r . H e n n e f o r d ' s a u t o p s y w e r e o f f e r e d and ad-

m i t t e d over d e f e n d a n t ' s o b j e c t i o n s . The d o c t o r t e s t i f i e d

t h a t w h i l e i t would be p o s s i b l e t o e x p l a i n t h e a u t o p s y and

d i a g n o s i s w i t h o u t t h e p i c t u r e s , h i s t e s t i m o n y would b e

c l e a r , p r e c i s e , and e a s i e r t o u n d e r s t a n d i f t h e p h o t o g r a p h s

w e r e used. The d o c t o r t h e n used t h e p h o t o g r a p h s t o d e s c r i b e

t h e a n g l e of t h e e n t r y wound and i t s p a t h t h r o u g h t h e body.

The d e m o n s t r a t i o n of t h e a n g l e of t h e e n t r y wound was

important in determining the credibility of defendant's

testimony that the victim was attempting entry into the

camper when the fatal shot was fired.

Bischert is distinguishable from the instant case. In

Bischert the colored photographs depicted the emaciated body

of a child with a ghastly skin disease not related to malnu-

trition, from which the child died. In the instant case

there is no showing that the black and white autopsy photo-

graphs showed any inflammatory or prejudicial conditions

unrelated to the crime charged.

In State v. Rollins, (1967), 149 Mont. 481, 428 P.2d

462, the Court upheld the admissibility of photographs of a

victim's gunshot wounds, distinguishing Bischert upon the

grounds the photographs in that case were "particularly

distasteful" and did not contribute to the development of

the case. In the instant case these photos helped the jury

to understand the facts of the case and therefore they were

properly admitted into evidence.

The final issue raised by defendant is whether the evi-

dence supported the jury verdict. One of defendant's claims

is that the prosecutor's major witnesses' testimony was in-

consistent and unreliable. There is no question that some

of the evidence in this case was contradictory; nonetheless

the jury viewed the witnesses as they testified and weighed

their testimony.

The standard of this Court in measuring a jury deter-

mination is stated in State v. Merseal, (1975), 167 blont.

"This Court remains ever mindful of one

fundamental rule--that questions of fact must

be determined solely by the jury, and that

given a certain legal minimum of evidence,

t h i s C o u r t on r e v i e w w i l l n o t s u b s t i t u t e i t s

judgment f o r t h a t of t h e j u r y . * * *

"On a p p e a l w e examine t h e e v i d e n c e t o

d e t e r m i n e whether t h e v e r d i c t i s s u p p o r t e d by

s u b s t a n t i a l e v i d e n c e . I n s o d o i n g , we view

t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e t o

t h e S t a t e . * * *"

See a l s o : S t a t e v. Farnes, (1976), Mont. , 558

P.2d 472, 3 3 St.Rep. 1270; S t a t e v . S t o d d a r d , ( 1 9 6 6 ) , 147

Mont. 402, 4 1 2 P.2d 827. Therefore, t h i s Court i s l i m i t e d

t o a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e e v i d e n c e i n t h e l i g h t most f a v o r a b l e

t o t h e s t a t e and a d e t e r m i n a t i o n of whether t h e r e was sub-

s t a n t i a l evidence t o support defendant's conviction. The

evidence supports t h e v e r d i c t .

One o t h e r c o n t e n t i o n under t h i s f i n a l i s s u e i s t h a t t h e

v e r d i c t of t h e j u r y i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e e v i d e n c e i n

t h a t s i n c e t h e d e f e n d a n t was c o n v i c t e d of m i t i g a t e d d e l i b -

era.te homicide, t h e j u r y must have found d e f e n d a n t w a s

a c t i n g under extreme m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l stress b r o u g h t

a b o u t by t h e a p p a r e n t i n t e n d e d a t t a c k upon h i s p e r s o n and

h i s property. Defendant c o n t e n d s t h e o n l y p o s s i b l e m e n t a l

o r e m o t i o n a l stress f o r which t h e r e w a s a r e a s o n a b l e e x p l a n a t i o n

o r e x c u s e s u g g e s t e d by t h e e v i d e n c e i s t h a t d e f e n d a n t f e a r e d

f o r himself i n t h e circumstances described. Therefore,

d e f e n d a n t a r g u e s , i f t h e j u r y found s u c h stress t o e x i s t , i t

c o u l d o n l y b e s u c h stress a s would p e r m i t s e l f - d e f e n s e .

Then d e f e n d a n t r e t u r n s t o h i s former argument t h a t s i n c e t h e

c o u r t d i d n o t i n s t r u c t t h e jury t h a t it should a c q u i t t h e

d e f e n d a n t when s e l f - d e f e n s e was e s t a b l i s h e d , t h e v e r d i c t i s

i n c o n s i s t e n t with t h e evidence.

What t h i s c o n t e n t i o n of d e f e n d a n t o v e r l o o k s i s t h a t

w h i l e under t h e f a c t s of t h i s c a s e t h e j u r y c o u l d have found

d e f e n d a n t was a c t i n g under m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l stress

b r o u g h t a b o u t by t h e a t t a c k by G a r d i p e e , t h e j u r y c o u l d a l s o

have found t h e c o u n t e r - f o r c e used by t h e d e f e n d a n t w a s s o

e x c e s s i v e a s n o t t o be r e a s o n a b l e and j u s t i f i e d . Section

94-3-102, R.C.M. 1947. The j u r y c o u l d have concluded t h a t

t h e f o r c e used i n s e l f - d e f e n s e by d e f e n d a n t , t h e s h o o t i n g ,

w a s n o t t h e a c t i o n o f a r e a s o n a b l e p e r s o n under t h e circum-

stances. I n t h a t s i t u a t i o n , a v e r d i c t of mitigated d e l i b -

e r a t e homicide i s j u s t i f i e d . I t i s n o t g i v e n t o u s , however,

t o l o o k i n t o t h e minds of t h e j u r o r s t o a s c e r t a i n how t h e y

arrived a t their verdict. When, a s h e r e , w e f i n d t h e j u r y

w a s f a i r l y i n s t r u c t e d , w e must l e a v e t h e weighing of t h e

e v i d e n c e and d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e f a c t s t o t h a t j u r y . It is

n o t within our province t o s e t a s i d e t h e v e r d i c t here.

The judgment of c o n v i c t i o n i s a f f i r m e d .

W Concur:

e

Chief J u s t i c e

J u d g e , s i t t i n g i n p l a c e of M r .

J u s t i c e Daly

Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting:

Defendant should be granted a new trial. Testimony

of Carla Brave relating to defendant being in prison for rape

was not only prejudicial, it was not relevant. Moreover, the

court failed to instruct the jury on the essential elements of

the offense for which defendant was convicted.

Before witness Carla Brave testified to the statement

made by defendant that he had been in prison for rape, defense

counsel moved that the statement be suppressed. The prosecution

then made an offer of proof as to the relevancy of the statement

to the following effect:

"Your Honor, we offer to prove by the

testimony of Carla Brave, in light of the

question asked her, that William Collins

volunteered that he had been in prison,

and that he had been in prison for the

-

crime of rape. And we, in that regard,

suaaest this is relevant, inasmuch as it

a a

isn't true, that that fact is not true.

It shows what was on Mr. Collins' mind

at that time, namely sex with Carla Brave.

And that certainly bears on the events

as they later transpired. Who did what

for what purpose. In that regard it is

strictly relevant, it is material. And

because it is an admission, a statement

made by the defendant, and because it is

relevant and material, we suggest that the

Court hear the testimony." (Emphasis added)

The court then let the jury hear the testimony. During

cross-examination Carla Brave admitted that in talking to a

deputy after the shooting that he had told her that defendant

had not been in prison for rape.

Defendant asserted self-defense and while testifying

in his own behalf stated that he had not made the statement to

Carla Brave. However, he was also impeached under the old rule

in Montana which was mechanically followed by trial judges which

allowed the state to ask the defendant if he had ever been convicted

of a felony. Defendant admitted that he had, but the nature

of the felony was never stated to the jury. The situation was

such that at the end of the prosecution's case the jury did not

know whether defendant had been in prison for rape. The

situation was not alleviated by the defendant's testimony. He

denied that he had been in prison for rape, but also admitted

that he had been convicted of a felony, although the jury did

not know the nature of that felony. It would certainly be

understandable that a jury would conclude that defendant did not

tell the truth when he denied making the statement to Carla Brave.

For this reason alone, the jury may have decided to distrust

defendant in the remainder of his testimony.

The majority has concluded that the statement, although

known by the prosecution to be false, was relevant to the

defendant's state of mind preceding the shooting. Relevant to

what? On this point the opinion is silent. If true, what did

the statement tend to prove? Even if made, this statement was

clearly not relevant to any issue in the case. Moreover, its

prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value it may have

had.

At trial, before going any further, the trial court

should first have made a determination that the alleged state-

ment to Carla Brave was relevant. There is nothing in the

record from which we can determine if the trial court concluded

that the alleged statement was relevant to any issue in the case.

It is true that the prosecution argued that it shows defendant's

state of mind as desiring to have sex with Carla Brave. (But

even if true, that fact, as will be explained later, had nothing

to do with issues at trial.)

It is clear here, that the state admitted (at least to

the trial judge in chambers) that defendant had not in fact been

convicted of rape. This being so, the trial court had the

further duty of determining the likelihood of defendant having

made the statement to Carla Brave. In the nature of things,

a person does not normally go around exclaiming to the world

that he has been in prison for rape. Particularly would this

be so when such is not the fact. Clearly the probabilities

were that defendant did not make this statement to Carla Brave

at all. It could be that she was deliberately not telling the

truth or that she had misinterpreted what defendant had stated

to her. She admitted that she had not revealed this in her

statement first given to the prosecution--and the statement

extensively covered the events of the evening--including the

conversation she had with defendant in his pickup truck.

Given this situation, the prejudice to defendant was

manifest. There was a strong probability that defendant did

not make this statement but if the jury heard the evidence

they might get the idea that defendant, in stating he had been

in prison for rape, was in fact implying to Carla Brave that

if she did not go along with his desire for sex that he would

force her. The further implication from this is that the state

was implying that defendant was an evil person and would stop

at nothing to have his way--including taking of another person's

life. But the fact is that the circumstances of the shooting

had nothing to do with any alleged statement made to Carla Brave

that defendant had been in prison for rape.

The events of the evening of the shooting did not

transpire at one time. There was a great deal of drinking by

all parties concerned throughout the evening and the alleged

statement of defendant to Carla Brave took place a considerable

time before the shooting. There is not a shred of evidence that

the alleged statement had any connection directly or indirectly

with the shooting. If defendant had a desire to have sex with

Carla Brave, Gardipee was not aware of his desires. There is

no evidence that Gardipee knew what defendant and Carla Brave

talked about. Indeed, the evidence is that he did not. Under

these circumstances, the desire of defendant to have sex with

Carla Brave is totally unrelated to his willingness to take

Gardipee's life. Moreover, the circumstances of the assault

upon defendant leading to the shooting are totally unrelated to

any desire of defendant to have sex with Carla Brave.

The fight in the pickup truck while defendant was driving

Carla Brave and Gardipee back to town, was instigated solely by

Gardipee. Gardipee suddenly started getting wild about the loss

of his ancestral rights and in the process started pounding on

defendant while defendant was driving the truck down the road.

It is not at all difficult to understand why defendant stopped

his truck, got out, and climbed into the back of the camper.

Whatever reasons Gardipee had for pounding on the defendant,

they certainly did not relate to any knowledge Gardipee had of

the conversations defendant had with Carla Brave. Nor does the

alleged statement by defendant to Carla Brave have any connection

to defendant's state of mind when he stopped his truck and

climbed into the back of his camper in order to avoid Gardipee's

assault. It is difficult for me to see how defendant had sex on

his mind at that time.

to

The only purpose for the prosecutor / elic2t the state-

ment from Carla Brave was to put defendant in as bad a light as

possible in the eyes of the jury. To a degree, this is always

the objective of the prosecution, but there must be a sound

evidentiary basis for doing so. Here there was none. The

testimony was not relevant and was clearly prejudicial.

I would also reverse the conviction because the trial

court failed to instruct the jury on the elements of deliberate

homicide and mitigated deliberate homicide. The jury was only

given a definition of deliberate homicide and mitigated

deliberate homicide; it was not provided with instructions

setting forth the elements of deliberate homicide and mitigated

deliberate homicide, and telling them that each of the elements

must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Without such

instructions the jury did not know what the elements of mitigated

deliberate homicide were and the burden of proof required to

prove each element. I cannot conceive that a trial court would

allow a case to go to a jury without such instruction, nor can

I conceive how an appellate court would give its stamp of approval.

The duty to instruct the jury on the law, has been

stated as follows in McBride, The Art of Instructing the Jury

(1969, Anderson Publishing Company) (quoting from California

Jury Instructions, Criminal, page 8):

"'In recent years we have witnessed a

distinct trend of decision away from the

rule of earlier days when it was held not

to be error for a court to fail to instruct

the jury, in the absence of a request, on

even such vital rules as those of reasonable

doubt and self defense. This later trend

has established as a basic principle that

the trial judge has the duty, even in the

absence of request, to instruct the jury

as to all rules of law that necessarily

will be involved in a decision of the cause.

People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 153 P.2d 21,

24. We do not have sufficient modern

precedents to enable us to make a complete

list of the instructions that must be given,

in the absence of a request therefor, under

the modern rule. Generally the trend points

to the likelihood of reversal of a conviction

if the trial court fails to give any proper

and appropriate instruction which, were it

given, might result in a different verdict.

In instructing jurors, we must assume that

they have no knowledge of the rules of law

and that, therefore, they must be instructed

on all points of law which, under any reason-

able theory, might be involved in their

deliberations, to the end that their

decision will be according to the law

and the evidence and untinged by any

private and possibly false opinion of

the law that they may entertain.'"

(Emphasis added)

Under any view of a case, the elements of the offenses

charged will be involved in a decision of the cause. The

failure to instruct the jury on those elements must be

reversible error.

It appears that this Court is holding that the duty

to properly instruct the jury can be delegated to counsel--

and if the trial court does so, he is relieved of any burden

either for erroneous instructions submitted to the jury or for

failure to instruct the jury on important aspects of the case.

While the failure of counsel to submit instructions on the

important aspects of the case is surely a sign of ill-prepared-

ness, I fail to see how this relieves the trial court of a duty

to properly instruct the jury. This is a situation where the

jury was not instructed on the essential elements of the offense

for which defendant was convicted. The duty is not only that

of defense counsel to see that proper instructions are prepared

and offered for the court's consideration; there is a correspond-

ing duty on the state to see that the jury is instructed on the

essential elements of the offenses charged. But regardless of

which side provides the instructions, or is derelict in not

providing the instructions, the ultimate duty to fairly instruct

the jury on the law resides with the trial judge. If he does

not receive proper instructions he should refuse to send the

case to the jury until he is convinced he has the proper

instructions. I cannot believe that the only duty of the trial

judge is to accept or reject the instructions which are offered

to him by counsel for both sides. If instructions are either

improperly worded, or are omitted, he should direct counsel

to properly word the instructions or to supply the omitted

instructions. Only then can we say that the trial judge has

properly discharged his obligations to the law. That was not

done in this case.