Reeves v. Ille Electric Company

No, 13191

I N THE SUPREME C U T OF T E STATE O MONTANA

OR H F

1976

J O H N 0 . REEVES, A d m i n i s t r a t o r of t h e

E s t a t e of Douglas M. Reeves, Deceased,

P l a i n t i f f and Respondent,

-vs -

ILLE ELECTRIC COMPANY, YELLOIfi7STONE

ELECTRIC COMPANY, and OSbJALD BERG,

Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court of t h e Eighteenth J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,

Honorable W , W, Less l e y , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel of Record:

For Appellants :

Morrison & Hedman, Whitefish, Montana

J e r r y T r i e w e i l e r argued, W h i t e f i s h , Montana

or Respondent :

C o r e t t e , Smith and Dean, B u t t e , Montana

R. D. C o r e t t e J r , argued, B u t t e , Montana

Berg, Angel, Andriolo & Morgan, Bozeman, Montana

Charles F. Angel argued, Bozeman, Montana

K e l l e r , Reynolds and Drake, Helena, Montana

Glen L. Drake argued, Helena, Montana

For Amicus Curiae:

Hon. Robert L. Woodahl, Attorney General, Helena,

Montana

Donald Smith appeared, A s s i s t a n t Attorney General,

Helena, Montana

Submitted: A p r i l 21, 1976

Decided :.J UN 8 1 1976

2

Filed: ,ji~[j 1976

Xr. J u s t i c e Frank I . Haswell d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

The a d m i n i s t r a t o r of d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e brought a s u r v i v a l

a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h r e e defendants seeking damages f o r p e r s o n a l i n -

j u r i e s and death of decedent, who was e l e c t r o c u t e d i n a w h i r l p o o l

bath. The d i s t r i c t c o u r t , G a l l a t i n County, e n t e r e d a judgment of

d i s m i s s a l a s t o one defendant and s e p a r a t e summary judgments i n favor

of t h e o t h e r two defendants. P l a i n t i f f a p p e a l s from t h e s e judgments.

P l a i n t i f f Reeves i s t h e f a t h e r of decedent Douglas H. Reeves

and t h e a d m i n i s t r a t o r of h i s e s t a t e . Decedent was a s t u d e n t a t

Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y a t Rozeman, Montana i n 1973. I n October of

t h a t y e a r , he was t a k i n g a w h i r l p o o l b a t h i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y f i e l d

house when an e l e c t r i c a l charge emanated from t h e machine, e l e c t r i f i e d

the water and e l e c t r o c u t e d him.

Defendant I l l e E l e c t r i c Company, a f o r e i g n c o r p o r a t i o n , manu-

f a c t u r e d t h e w h i r l p o o l b a t h machine involved h e r e and shipped i t t o

Yontana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y . I t was i n s t a l l e d i n t h e f i e l d house by

defendant Yellowstone E l e c t r i c Company. The Montana S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y

f i e l d house was designed by a r c h i t e c t Oswald Berg. The i n s t a l l a t i o n

o f t h e w h i r l p o o l machine and c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e f i e l d house were sub-

s c a n t i a l l y completed p r i o r t o 1960.

The complaint a l l e g e s I l l e f u r n i s h e d t h e w h i r l p o o l machine w i t h

a t e n f o o t c a b l e and plug e l e c t r i c a l connection. In installing the

w h i r l p o o l , Yellowstone made t h e e l e c t r i c a l connection by plugging t h e

c a b l e and plug i n t o a w a l l r e c e p t a c l e , d e s i g n e d by Berg,

The a l l e g a t i o n s of negligence upon which l i a b i l i t y i s p r e d i c a t e d

are :

I ) I L l e f a i l e d t o warn t h e purchaser of i n h e r e n t dangers i n

che machine w i t h r e s p e c t t o e l e c t r i c a l connections and f a i l e d t o provide

unmistakable i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r proper i n s t a l l a t i o n ; and provided t h e

whirlpool w i t h an e l e c t r i c a l cord r a t h e r than a d i r e c t w i r i n g a p p a r a t u s .

2) Y e l l o w s ~ o n e f a i l e d t o w i r e t h e whirlpool d i r e c t l y , and

i n s r a l l e d t h e cord and plug i n a manner which c r e a t e d t h e c o n d i t i o n

causing t h e e l e c t r o c u t i o n of decedent.

3) Berg f a i l e d t o design a d i r e c t w i r i n g system f o r t h e

whirlpool and designed and approved t h e e l e c t r i c a l w a l l r e c e p t a c l e

t o which t h e w h i r l p o o l was connected.

P l a i n t i f f seeks recovery of income t o d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e l o s t

a s a d i r e c t r e s u l t of t h e concurring negligence of d e f e n d a n t s , i n t h e

amount of $900,000.

The i s s u e s i n t h i s c a s e t u r n on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y and

a p p l i c a b i l i t y of s e c t i o n 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, commonly r e f e r r e d t o a s

t h e " a r c h i t e c t s ' and b u i l d e r s ' s t a t u t e " which defendants contend b a r s

this suit.

Berg moved t o d i s m i s s t h e complaint on t h e b a s i s of s e c t i o n

93-2619, which provides:

" ~ x c e p ta s provided i n s e c t i o n s 2 and 3 [93-2620 and 93-

26211 of t h i s a c t , no a c t i o n t o recover damages ( o t h e r

than an a c t i o n upon any c o n t r a c t , o b l i g a t i o n , o r l i a b i l i t y ,

founded upon an instrument i n w r i t i n g ) r e s u l t i n g from o r

a r i s i n g out o f t h e d e s i g n , planning, s u p e r v i s i o n , i n s p e c t i o n ,

c o n s t r u c t i o n , o r o b s e r v a t i o n of c o n s t r u c t i o n o f , o r land

surveying done i n connection w i t h , any improvement t o r e a l

p r o p e r t y s h a l l b e commenced more than t e n (10) y e a r s a f t e r

completion of such improvement. 11

The d i s t r i c t c o u r t granted erg's motion without l e a v e t o

amend, on t h e grounds t h e conduct complained of took p l a c e p r i o r

t o 1960 and t h e a c t i o n was n o t commenced u n t i l 1975, more than t e n

y e a r s a f t e r completion of t h e improvement. O September 19, 1975,

n

judgment was e n t e r e d i n f a v o r of Berg. Subsequently, s e p a r a t e summary

judgments were e n t e r e d i n favor of Yellowstone and I l l e based on t h e

same s t a t u t e .

The t h r u s t of p l a i n t i f f ' s appeal i s a broad c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

a t t a c k on s e c t i o n 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947. He c i t e s c a s e s from o t h e r

s t a t e s on t h e same q u e s t i o n s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e i r " a r c h i t e c t s ' and

builders' statutes1'. He a l s o q u e s t i o n s t h e summary judgment a s t o

I l l e , assuming t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n 93-2619. Specifically,

the issues a r e :

1. Is section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, unconstitutional

in violation of:

a. Article 11, Section 16, 1972 Montana Constitution,

by denying plaintiff access to the courts, and denying him a speedy

remedy for the injuries and damages to the estate which he represents?

b. Article V, Section 11, 1972 Montana Constitution,

by embracing more than one subject and by not clearly expressing

that subject in the title of the act7

c. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment to the United States Constitution, by granting immunity from

suit to one class of defendants and denying immunity to other possible

defendants3

, d. The due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment

to the United States Constitution and Article 11, Section 17, 1972

Montana Constitution, by depriving plaintiff of a common law right

without providing a reasonable substitute?

2. If section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, is constitutional does

it bar a claim against the manufacturer of personal property once

that property is attached to real property?

We commence inquiry into the constitutional questions with

the well-settled rule that when the constitutionality of a statute

is under scrutiny, the statute is presumed to be constitutional

and the party attacking it has the burden of proving its invalidity.

In the matter of Estate of Kujath, Mont . 9 545 P. 2d 662, 33

St.Rep, 117. This presumption of validity applies to all legislative

enactments and it is the duty of the court to resolve all conceivable

doubts in favor of validity whenever possible. State Highway Commission

v. Chapman, 152 Mont. 79, 446 P.2d 709; State ex rel. Abel v. District

Court, 140 Mont. 117, 368 P.2d 572. Additionally, some forty-two state

legislatures and the United States Congress for the District of

Columbia, have enacted architects' and builders' statutes similar to

Montana's.

The f i r s t c h a l l e n g e invokes A r t i c l e T I , 9ection 16, 1972

Xontana C o n s t i t u t i o n , which provides i n p e r t i n e n r p a r t :

II

The a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of j u s t i c e . Courts of J u s t i c e

s h a l l be open t o every person, and speedy remedy

a f f o r d e d f o r every i n j u r y of person, p r o p e r t y , o r

c h a r a c t e r , JC >Y +r"

P l a i n t i f f contends s e c t i o n 93-2619 v i o l a t e s A r t i c l e 11,

Section 16, by b a r r i n g p l a i n t i f f ' s cause of a c t i o n b e f o r e i t a r o s e .

A r t i c l e 11, Section 16, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n has n o t been

i n t e r p r e t e d by t h i s Court. However, A r t i c l e 111, Section 6 , 1889

Xontana C o n s t i t u t i o n , i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t c o n t a i n s i d e n t i c a l language.

This language was i n t e r p r e t e d i n Shea v. North-Butte Mining Co., 55

Yont. 522, 532, 179 P. 499. I n Shea i t was argued t h e workmen's

Compensation Act was repugnant t o A r t i c l e 1 1 of t h e 1889 C o n s t i t u t i o n

1

i n t h a t i t denied i n j u r e d workmen t h e r i g h t t o maintain an a c t i o n i n

the courts. This Court s t a t e d :

II

But counsel a r e i n e r r o r i n supposing t h a t f o r t h i s

reason t h e Compensation Act i s repugnant t o t h e s e c t i o n

of t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n quoted. T h e i r c o n t e n t i o n i s based

upon a misconception of t h e scope of t h e guaranty t h e r e i n

contained. A r e a d i n g of t h e s e c t i o n d i s c l o s e s t h a t i t i s

addressed e x c l u s i v e l y t o t h e c o u r t s , The c o u r t s a r e i t s

s o l e s u b j e c t m a t t e r and i t r e l a t e s d i r e c t l y t o t h e d u t i e s

of t h e j u d i c i a l department of t h e government. I t means

no more nor l e s s than t h a t under t h e p r o v i s i o n s of t h e

C o n s t i t u t i o n and laws c o n s t i t u t i n g them, t h e c o u r t s must

be a c c e s s i b l e t o a l l persons a l i k e , without d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,

a t t h e time o r times and t h e p l a c e o r p l a c e s appointed f o r

t h e i r s i t t i n g , and a f f o r d a speedy remedy f o r every wrong

recognized by law a s being remediable i n a c o u r t . The

term 1 i n j u r y ' a s t h e r e i n used, means such an i n j u r y a s t h e

law recognizes o r d e c l a r e s t o be a c t i o n a b l e . *** I f the

c o n t e n t i o n of counsel should be upheld, t h e consequence

would b e t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e would be s t r i p p e d of a l l power

t o a l t e r o r r e p e a l any p o r t i o n of t h e common law r e l a t i n g t o

a c c i d e n t a l i n j u r i e s o r t h e d e a t h of one person by t h e

negligence of a n o t h e r . I t i s t r u e t h e l e g i s l a t u r e cannot

d e s t r o y v e s t e d r i g h t s . Where an i n j u r y has a l r e a d y occurred

f o r which t h e i n j u r e d person h a s a r i g h t of a c t i o n , t h e

l e g i s l a t u r e cannot deny him a remedy. But a t t h i s l a t e day

i t cannot be c o n t r o v e r t e d t h a t t h e remedies recognized by t h e

common law i n t h i s c l a s s of c a s e s , t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l r i g h t s

of a c t i o n t o a r i s e i n f u t u r e may be a l t e r e d o r a b o l i s h e d t o t h e

e x t e n t of d e s t r o y i n g a c t i o n s f o r i n j u r i e s o r d e a t h a r i s i n g

from n e g l i g e n t a c c i d e n t , so long a s t h e r e i s no impairment of

r i g h t s a l r e a d y accrued. This n e c e s s a r i l y follows from t h e

p r o p o s i t i o n , w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e c o u r t s everywhere, t h a t

no one has a vested r i g h t i n any r u l e of t h e common-law.* * *"

See a l s o : Stewart v. Standard Publishing Co., 102 Mont. 43,

Assuming arguendo, t h a t p l a i n t i f f would have a c l a i m under

common Law, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e i s n o t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y p r o h i b i t e d

from e l i m i n a t i n g a common law r i g h t a s i t d i d i n Shea and S t e w a r t .

I n s e c t i o n 93-2619, t h e l e g i s l a t u r e d i d n o t i n t e r f e r e w i t h any

v e s t e d r i g h t o f p l a i n t i f f , b u t simply c u t o f f a c c r u a l o f t h e r i g h t

t o sue a f t e r t e n y e a r s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , s e c t i o n 93-2620, R.C.M. 1947,

g r a n t s a n a d d i t i o n a l y e a r t o s u e a s t o any a c c r u e d r i g h t s w i t h i n t h e

ten year period. I n t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , p l a i n t i f f ' s a l l e g e d c a u s e of

a c t i o n a r o s e more t h a n t e n y e a r s a f t e r c o m p l e t i o n ; hence t h e s t a t u t e

i s a v a l i d b a r t o h i s s u i t a g a i n s t d e f e n d a n t s p r o t e c t e d by i t .

P l a i n t i f f asserts s e c t i o n 93-2619 v i o l a t e s A r t i c l e V , S e c t i o n

11, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , because t h e s t a t u t e embraces more t h a n

one s u b j e c t , one o f which i s n o t c l e a r l y e x p r e s s e d i n i t s t i t l e .

However, p l a i n t i f f invokes p a r t of S e c t i o n 1 w i t h o u t a b i d i n g by

1

a n o t h e r of i t s p r o v i s i o n s :

"(6) A law may b e c h a l l e n g e d on t h e grounds o f non-

compliance w i t h t h i s s e c t i o n o n l y w i t h i n two

years a f t e r i t s e f f e c t i v e date." A r t i c l e V,

S e c t i o n 1 1 ( 6 ) , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .

S e c t i o n 6 , Chapter 60, Laws o f Montana 1971, provided s e c t i o n

93-2619 became e f f e c t i v e on January 1, 1972. T h i s c a s e was commenced

June 5 , 1975, o v e r t h r e e y e a r s l a t e r . Because s e c t i o n 93-2619 was

n o t c h a l l e n g e d w i t h i n two y e a r s a f t e r i t s e f f e c t i v e d a t e , p l a i n t i f f

i s p r e c l u d e d from t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a l l e n g e .

The e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n a t t a c k upon s e c t i o n 93-2619 i s based

on t h e f a c t t h e s t a t u t e a p p l i e s t o t h o s e who a r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r

making improvements t o r e a l p r o p e r t y b u t does n o t b a r a c t i o n s a g a i n s t

nzaterialmen and owners of r e a l p r o p e r t y who may l a t e r b e made t o

answer f o r n e g l i g e n t l y made improvements. P l a i n t i f f c i t e s t h r e e cases

which h o l d t h a t such a d i s t i n c t i o n i s i r r a t i o n a l c l a s s l e g i s l a t i o n

v i o l a t i v e o f t h e e q u a l p r o t e c t i o n c l a u s e of t h e F o u r t e e n t h Amendment,

United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n . Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I11.2d 455,

231 N.E.2d 588; Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Hawaii 7 , 514 P,2d 568; K a l l a s

Xillwork Corp. v. Square D Co., 66 Wisc.2d 382, 225 N.W.2d 454.

However, this Court finds other contrary authorities more

persuasive and compatible with Montana law. Rosenberg v. Town

of North Bergen, 61 N.J. 190, 293 A.2d 662; Grissom v. North Amer-

ican Aviation, Inc., 326 F.Supp. 465; Josephs v. Burns, 260 0r.493,

491 P.2d 203; Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Central Heating

& Plumbing Co., 81 Wash.2d 528, 503 P.2d 108; Good v. Christensen,

(Utah 1974), 527 P.2d 223; Housing Authority of Town of Limon v. Leo

A . Daly Co., (Colo.App. 1975), 533 P.2d 937; Carter v. Hartenstein,

248 Ark. 1172, 455 S.W.2d 918, 920, cert.den. 401 U.S. 901, 91 S.

Ct. 868, 27 L ed 2d 800. In Carter, the Arkansas Supreme Court con-

sidered the contention that a statute similar to section 93-2619,

violated due process, was discriminatory, contravened equal protection

of the laws, and was local and special legislation. The court stated:

his Act only cuts off action after fdur years. But,

even then, if an accident or injury occurs before the

expiration of that four year period, it may still be

brought within an additional 12 months against those

furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observa-

tion of construction, or the construction and repairing

of any improvement to real property. All of the defendants

in this action are within this definition. However, it

does not include owners of buildings or materialmen who

-arenot othefiise involved. Such materialmen and the owners

of buildings or structures who are in sole control of

premises after completion of the work are not similarly

situated with the defendants in this case. They are not

in the same class with those described in the act. Parti-

cularly is this true after construction is substantially

completed and accepted by the owners. Part of acceptance

is to accept some future responsibility for the condition

of the premises.

"We have carefully considered Skinner v. Anderson, 38 I11.2d

455, 231 N.E.2d 588, (1967), concerning this appeal.

In all deference and in respect to the decision of the

Supreme Court of Illinois, we cannot apply its reasoning to

this case. That court held the Illinois Statute, there

challenged, to be discriminatory against others similarly

situated. * * * Further, a vital distinction, nonetheless,

exists between owners or suppliers and those engaged in the

professions and occupations of design and building. This

is not arbitrary or unreasonable. It is a legitimate and

practical exercise of the legislative function.11

The reasoning in Carter is consistent with the law of Montana.

The test of the constitutionality of class legislation is whether

the classification has some reasonable, just and practical basis

and whether the law operates equally upon every person within the

class. Gullickson v.Mitchel1, 113 Mont. 359, 126 P.2d 1106; City

of Missoula v. Swanberg, 116 Mont. 232, 149 P.2d 248. A statute

will not be stricken down upon constitutional grounds unless its

violation of the fundamental law is clear and palpable, and the

classification it makes is illusory and unreal. Victor Chemical

v. Silver Bow County, 130 Mont. 308, 301 P.2d 730. Applying these

tests, section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, does not violate equal protection

of the laws.

Plaintiff's fourth constitutional attack upon section 93-2619

II

is that the statute impairs due process" guarantees by depriving

plaintiff of a common law right without providing a reasonable

substitute. This argument is without merit. Section 93-2621,

R.C.M. 1947, part of the same enactment as section 93-2619 (Ch.60,

Laws 1971), states:

"The limitation prescribed by this act shall not

affect the responsibility of any owner, tenant, or

person in actual possession and control of the im-

provement at the time a right of action arises. I1

The plain words of section 93-2621, refute the implication of

plaintiff's argument that he is without a remedy. As indicated in

Shea and Stewart, the legislature is not constitutionally prohibited

from eliminating common law rights which have not accrued or vested.

The Constitution does not freeze common law rights in perpetuity.

For these reasons, we hold section 93-2619, R.C.M. 1947, consti-

tutional.

The final issue is whether Ille is immune from this suit by

virtue of its inclusion in the class protected by section 93-2619.

The section by its terms applies to those involved in the "design,

planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of

construction of * 7k * any improvement to real property,* * *'

.I

Ille contends that it is sued as part of the design or con-

struction team, therefore it is protected by the statute. Ille also

I1

emphasizes the whirlpool in question was a fixture1'and "improvement"

a t t h e time o f che e l e c t r i c a l charge which i s a l l e g e d t o have

caused t h e death of p l a i n t i f f ' s decedent.

O t h e o t h e r hand, p l a i n t i f f argues t h a t I l l e i s sued a s a

n

manufacturer of a hazardous machine and t h a t i n h e r e n t d e f e c t s

e x i s t e d p r i o r t o i n s t a l l a t i o n i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y f i e l d house.

P l a i n t i f f c h a r a c t e r i z e s I l l e a s a materialman, excluded from

t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e a r c h i t e c t s ' and b u i l d e r s ' s t a t u t e .

A review of c a s e s concerned w i t h t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of

a r c h i t e c t s ' and b u i l d e r s ' s t a t u t e s r e v e a l s t h a t t h e c o u r t s , whether

f i n d i n g t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s t a t u t e s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o r n o t , recog-

n i z e t h a t materialmen a r e n o t w i t h i n t h e c l a s s p r o t e c t e d by t h e

sLatute. See t h e language of t h e Arkansas Supreme Court i n

Carter, heretofore s e t out. Thus, we look t o p l a i n t i f f ' s complaint

t o determine whether I l l e was sued a s a materialman; we f i n d t h a t i t

was.

I l l e took no p a r t i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e f i e l d house o r

i n t h e r e l a t e d phases of t h e w h i r l p o o l i n s t a l l a t i o n , I t simply

manufactured t h e w h i r l p o o l machine and shipped i t t o Montana S t a t e

University. P l a i n t i f f a l l e g e s negligence i n f a i l u r e t o warn of

i n h e r e n t dangers, f a i l u r e t o n o t i f y and i n s t r u c t a s t o proper i n -

s t a l l a t i o n , and negligence i n design of t h e w h i r l p o o l machine by

providing only a c a b l e and plug r a t h e r than a d i r e c t w i r i n g system.

These a l l e g a t i o n s r e l a t e t o design and manufacture of t h e I l l e

I l l e was

w h i r l p o o l machine,/no p a r t of t h e f i e l d house c o n s t r u c t i o n team.

I l l e simply f u r n i s h e d an a p p l i a n c e t h a t was subsequently i n s t a l l e d

i n t h e f i e l d house. A s such, I l l e was simply a materialman whose

product was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Accordingly, p l a i n -

t i f f has s t a t e d a c l a i m a g a i n s t I l l e n o t b a r r e d by s e c t i o n 93-2619.

The d i s t r i c t c o u r t e r r e d i n g r a n t i n g summary judgment i n favor of

Ille. (This Court, of c o u r s e , e x p r e s s e s no opinion a s t o t h e u l t i -

mate l i a b i l i t y of I l l e i n t h i s c a s e . )

W a f f i r m the judgment o f dismissal i n favor of Berg and

e

he summary judgment i n f a v o r of Yellowstone. W reverse the

e

summary judgment i n f a v o r of I l l e E l e c t r i c Company and remand

t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of G a l l a t i n County f o r f u r t h e r proceedings.

Justice

W Concur:

e

-

.

Hon ~ o b % ? t - ~ T ~ e l s o,n- ~ y s t r i t

Judge, s i t t i n g f o r Chief J u s t i c e

James T. Harrison.

J u s t i c e C a s t l e s c o n c u r r i n g and d i s s e n t i n g , i n p a r t .

I concur i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e m a j o r i t y e x c e p t a s it

a p p l i e s t o t h e f i n a l i s s u e concerning defendant, I l l e E l e c t r i c

Co. The t h r u s t of t h e c o m p l a i n t i s a g a i n s t t h e i n s t a l l a t i o n

of t h e w h i r l p o o l machine o v e r which I l l e E l e c t r i c had no c o n t r o l .

To h o l d t h a t o v e r 1 3 y e a r s a f t e r i n s t a l l a t i o n , and summary judg-

ment f o r t h e o t h e r two d e f e n d a n t s , I l l e E l e c t r i c remains l i a b l e

under t h e s t a t u t e s i n v o l v e d i s n o t p r o p e r . I would a f f i r m

t h e judgments.

R. J. Nelson, Judge o f t h e E i g h t h J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t ,

s i t t i n g i n p l a c e o f H o n o r a b l e James T . Harrison, concurring

and d i s s e n t i n g i n p a r t .

I c o n c u r i n t h e o p i n i o n o f t h e m a j o r i t y e x c e p t as i t

applies t o t h e f i n a l issue concerning defendant, I 1l e E l e c t r i c

Company. I would a f f i r m t h e Judgments.