Opinion

Keller v. Smith

  • 170 Mont. 399
  • 553 P.2d 1002
  • 1976 Mont. LEXIS 616
Court
Montana Supreme Court
Filed
Aug 30, 1976
Status
Published
On the bench
Haswell, Castles, Daly, Harrison, Dussault
Cited by
38 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.9%

“[W]e have not relied on the minutes of the Constitutional Convention proceedings as indicative of the intent of the delegates. We have purposely refrained from using this basis of interpretation as excerpts from various portions of these minutes, among other things, can be used to support either position, or even a third position ....”

How later courts described this case

  • “[W]e have not relied on the minutes of the Constitutional Convention proceedings as indicative of the intent of the delegates. We have purposely refrained from using this basis of interpretation as excerpts from various portions of these minutes, among other things, can be used to support either position, or even a third position ....”
  • the intent of the framers “shall first be determined from the plain meaning of the words used”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

No. 13382

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A

OTN

1976

ROBERT S . KETdLER,

P l a i n t i f f and P e t i t i o n e r ,

ETHYL SMITH, i n h e r c a p a c i t y a s C l e r k and

R e c o r d e r o f F l a t h e a d County, Montana,

Defendant and Respondent.

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING :

Counsel of Record:

For P e t i t i o n e r :

R o b e r t S. K e l l e r a r g u e d , K a l i s p e l l , Montana

F o r Respondent :

Hon. R o b e r t L. Woodahl, A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l , Helena,

Montana

W i l l i a m Anderson, A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ,

a r g u e d , Helena, Montana

P a t r i c k S p r i n g e r , County A t t o r n e y , K a l i s p e l l ,

Montana

S t e w a r t P e a r c e , Deputy County A t t o r n e y , a p p e a r e d ,

Ka l i s p e l l , Montana

F o r Amicus C u r i a e :

D a n i e l J. Shea a r g u e d , M i s s o u l a , Montana

Submitted: August 1 0 , 1976

Filed :

s n 4rTf

Mr. J u s t i c e Frank I . H a s w e l l d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion o f t h e C o u r t .

This i s an o r i g i n a l proceeding seeking a d e c l a r a t o r y

judgment from t h i s C o u r t on t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n s

23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947. These s t a t u t e s p r o v i d e

f o r a g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n b a l l o t on r e t e n t i o n o r r e j e c t i o n o f a l l

unopposed incumbent d i s t r i c t c o u r t judges and supreme c o u r t

j u s t i c e s seeking e l e c t i o n .

P e t i t i o n e r i s Robert S. K e l l e r , a v o t e r , r e s i d e n t and

t a x p a y e r of F l a t h e a d County, Montana. Defendants who have e n t e r e d

a p p e a r a n c e s h e r e a r e t h e Governor, S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e and C l e r k

and Recorder of F l a t h e a d County i n t h e i r o f f i c i a l c a p a c i t i e s .

Ex p a r t e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e p e t i t i o n was made and t h i s

Court s e t t h e matter f o r adversary hearing. W granted leave t o

e

D a n i e l J. Shea, a r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r and t a x p a y e r of Missoula

County, Montana t o a p p e a r a s amicus c u r i a e ; o r d e r e d t h e Governor

and S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e j o i n e d a s a d d i t i o n a l d e f e n d a n t s ; and o r d e r -

ed n o t i c e t o be g i v e n t o t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l and t h e 56 c o u n t y

a t t o r n e y s i n Montana. B r i e f s were f i l e d and o r a l arguments h e a r d .

T h e r e a f t e r t h i s Court accepted o r i g i n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n of

t h i s p r o c e e d i n g ; o r d e r e d t h e p e t i t i o n amended; o r d e r e d a l l un-

opposed incumbent d i s t r i c t judges j o i n e d ; o r d e r e d s e r v i c e on a l l

t h e above p e r s o n s ; and o r d e r e d r e s p o n s i v e p l e a d i n g s t o be f i l e d

by a l l d e f e n d a n t s . Supplemental b r i e f s w e r e f i l e d and a d d i t i o n a l

o r a l argument p r e s e n t e d on b e h a l f of t h e p a r t i e s and amicus

curiae. A t t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e f i n a l h e a r i n g on August 1 0 ,

1976, t h e c a s e w a s t a k e n under advisement.

The i s s u e i s whether s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2 are

u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l a s a p p l i e d t o unopposed incumbent d i s t r i c t c o u r t

judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s r u n n i n g i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n

who w e r e n o t o r i g i n a l l y a p p o i n t e d by t h e Governor t o f i l l v a c a n c i e s

and confirmed by t h e s t a t e s e n a t e .

The c r u x o f p e t i t i o n e r ' s argument i s t h a t A r t i c l e V I I ,

S e c t i o n 8 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , p r o v i d i n g f o r r e t e n t i o n

o r r e j e c t i o n of unopposed incumbent j u d g e s and j u s t i c e s by t h e

v o t e r s i s c l e a r and unambiguous; t h a t it a p p l i e s o n l y t o unopposed

incumbent judges and j u s t i c e s o r i g i n a l l y s e l e c t e d by t h e Governor

t o f i l l v a c a n c i e s and s u b s e q u e n t l y confirmed by t h e s t a t e s e n a t e ;

and t h a t s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2 a r e t h e r e f o r e unconsti-

t u t i o n a l . a s a p p l i e d t o unopposed incumbent judges and j u s t i c e s

n o t o r i g i n a l l y s e l e c t e d by t h e Governor and confirmed by t h e s t a t e

s e n a t e t o f i l l v a c a n c i e s by r e a s o n of A r t i c l e I V , S e c t i o n 5 , 1972

Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , p r o v i d i n g t h a t t h e p e r s o n r e c e i v i n g t h e

l a r g e s t number of v o t e s s h a l l be d e c l a r e d e l e c t e d .

D e f e n d a n t s , on t h e o t h e r hand, c o n t e n d t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e

o f A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n , i s ambig-

uous; t h a t t h e meaning o f t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n c a n be

a s c e r t a i n e d from t h e p r o c e e d i n g s a t t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention;

t h a t t h e s e p r o c e e d i n g s c l e a r l y show t h a t a s u b s t a n t i a l m a j o r i t y

of t h e d e l e g a t e s intended t o g i v e t h e v o t e r s an opportunity t o

measure a l l incumbent d i s t r i c t c o u r t j u d g e s and supreme c o u r t

j u s t i c e s a g a i n s t e i t h e r a c h a l l e n g e r o r t h e i r own j u d i c i a l r e c o r d ;

t h a t t h e presumption of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i t y of s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1

and 23-4510.2 a p p l i e s ; and t h e r e f o r e t h e s e two s t a t u t e s a r e con-

s t i t u t i o n a l a s a p p l i e d t o a l l incumbent judges and j u s t i c e s

whether o r i g i n a l l y e l e c t e d o r a p p o i n t e d .

Amicus s u p p o r t s t h e d e f e n d a n t s ' p o s i t i o n and a d d i t i o n a l l y

p o i n t s o u t t h a t t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had no d i f f i c u l t y i n d e t e r m i n i n g

t h e meaning o f A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ,

a s i n d i c a t e d by enactment o f s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2;

and t h a t t h e r e i s no r a t i o n a l b a s i s f o r d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between

unopposed incumbent judges and j u s t i c e s i n i t i a l l y e l e c t e d and

those i n i t i a l l y appointed i n s o f a r a s subsequent e l e c t i o n s a r e

concerned.

The r e l e v a n t c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s a r e :

A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 81 which p r o v i d e s :

"Selection. (1) The Governor s h a l l nominate a

r e p l a c e m e n t from nominees s e l e c t e d i n t h e manner

provided by law f o r any vacancy i n t h e o f f i c e o f

supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e o r d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge.

I f t h e g o v e r n o r f a i l s t o nominate w i t h i n t h i r t y

d a y s a f t e r r e c e i p t o f nominees, t h e c h i e f j u s t i c e

o r a c t i n g c h i e f j u s t i c e s h a l l make t h e nomination.

Each nomination s h a l l be confirmed by t h e s e n a t e ,

b u t a nomination made w h i l e t h e s e n a t e i s n o t i n

s e s s i o n s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e a s a n a p p o i n t m e n t

u n t i l t h e end of t h e n e x t s e s s i o n . I f t h e nomi-

n a t i o n i s n o t c o n f i r m e d , t h e o f f i c e s h a l l be

v a c a n t and a n o t h e r s e l e c t i o n and nomination s h a l l

be made.

" ( 2 ) I f , a t t h e f i r s t e l e c t i o n a f t e r s e n a t e con-

f i r m a t i o n , and a t t h e e l e c t i o n b e f o r e e a c h suc-

c e e d i n g t e r m of o f f i c e , any c a n d i d a t e o t h e r t h a n

t h e incumbent j u s t i c e o r d i s t r i c t judge f i l e s

f o r e l e c t i o n t o t h a t o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e

incumbent s h a l l be p l a c e d on t h e b a l l o t . I f

t h e r e i s no e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t f o r t h e o f f i c e , t h e

name of t h e incumbent s h a l l n e v e r t h e l e s s be

p l a c e d on t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n b a l l o t t o a l l o w

v o t e r s o f t h e s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t t o approve o r

r e j e c t him. I f a n incumbent i s r e j e c t e d , a n o t h e r

s e l e c t i o n and nomination s h a l l be made.

" ( 3 ) I f a n incumbent d o e s n o t r u n , t h e r e s h a l l be

an e l e c t i o n f o r t h e o f f i c e . "

A r t i c l e I V , Section 5, provides:

"Result of e l e c t i o n s . I n a l l e l e c t i o n s h e l d by

t h e people, t h e person o r persons receiving t h e

l a r g e s t number o f v o t e s s h a l l be d e c l a r e d e l e c t e d . "

The s t a t u t e s a t t a c k e d i n t h i s c a s e were e n a c t e d by t h e

1973 L e g i s l a t u r e and p r o v i d e a s f o l l o w s :

"23-4510.1. Form o f b a l l o t on r e t e n t i o n of incumbent

supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e . I n t h e e v e n t t h e r e i s no

c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e o f f i c e o f supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e

o r c h i e f j u s t i c e o t h e r t h a n t h e incumbent, t h e name

of t h e incumbent s h a l l be p l a c e d on t h e o f f i c i a l

b a l l o t f o r t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n as f o l l o w s :

" S h a l l ( c h i e f ) j u s t i c e ( h e r e t h e name of t h e incum-

b e n t j u s t i c e i s i n s e r t e d ) o f t h e supreme c o u r t of

t h e s t a t e o f Montana be r e t a i n e d i n o f f i c e f o r

a n o t h e r term?

" / YES

I' (Mark a n "x" b e f o r e t h e word "YES" i f you wish t h e

j u s t i c e t o remain i n o f f i c e . Mark a n " x u b e f o r e

t h e word "NO" i f you d o n o t w i s h t h e j u s t i c e t o

remain i n o f f i c e . ) "

"23-4510.2. Form of b a l l o t on r e t e n t i o n of incum-

b e n t d i s t r i c t c o u r t judge. I n t h e event t h e r e i s

no c a n d i d a t e f o r t h e o f f i c e o f d i s t r i c t c o u r t

judge i n a j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t of t h e s t a t e o t h e r

t h a n t h e incumbent, t h e name o f t h e incumbent

s h a l l be p l a c e d on t h e o f f i c i a l b a l l o t f o r t h e

general e l e c t i o n a s follows:

" S h a l l judge ( h e r e t h e name o f t h e incumbent judge

of t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t i s i n s e r t e d ) of t h e d i s t r i c t

c o u r t of t h e j u d i c i a l d i s t r i c t of t h e

s t a t e of Montana be r e t a i n e d i n o f f i c e f o r a n o t h e r

t e r m i n off ice?

" /YES

"= NO

"(Mark a n "x" b e f o r e t h e word "YES" i f you w i s h

t h e judge t o remain i n o f f i c e . Mark a n " x u be-

f o r e t h e word "NO" i f you d o n o t w i s h t h e judge

t o remain i n o f f i c e . ) "

The c r u x o f t h e i s s u e b e f o r e u s i s t h e meaning o f t h e

second s e n t e n c e o f s u b d i v i s i o n ( 2 ) of A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 ,

1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n . S p e c i f i c a l l y , d o e s it mean t h a t a l l

-

incumbent d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s who a r e

unopposed must r u n on a n a p p r o v a l o r r e j e c t i o n b a l l o t i n t h e

general election? O r d o e s it mean t h a t t h o s e incumbents i n i -

t i a l l y a p p o i n t e d by t h e Governor and s u b s e q u e n t l y confirmed by

t h e s t a t e s e n a t e must r u n on t h i s b a s i s ?

The same r u l e s o f c o n s t r u c t i o n a p p l y i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e

meaning of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n s a s a p p l y t o s t a t u t o r y con-

struction. S t a t e ex r e l . Cashmore v . Anderson, 160 Mont. 1 7 5 ,

500 P.2d 921, c e r t . d e n . 410 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 1372, 35 L Ed 2d

593; Vaughn & Ragsdale Co. v . S t a t e Board of Equal., 109 Mont.

52, 96 P.2d 4 2 0 ; S t a t e ex r e l . Dufresne v . L e s l i e , 100 Mont. 449,

50 P.2d 959; S t a t e ex r e l . Gleason v . S t e w a r t , 57 Mont. 397, 188

P. 904. I n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e meaning o f a g i v e n p r o v i s i o n , t h e

i n t e n t of t h e f r a m e r s i s c o n t r o l l i n g . S e c t i o n 93-401-16, R.C.M.

1947; S t a t e e x r e l . Cashmore v . Anderson, s u p r a . Such i n t e n t

s h a l l f i r s t be d e t e r m i n e d from t h e p l a i n meaning o f t h e words

u s e d , i f p o s s i b l e , and i f t h e i n t e n t c a n be s o d e t e r m i n e d , t h e

c o u r t s may n o t go f u r t h e r and a p p l y any o t h e r means of i n t e r -

pretation. Dunphy v . Anaconda Co., 1 5 1 Mont. 76, 4 3 8 P.2d 660,

and c a s e s c i t e d t h e r e i n .

Can t h e i n t e n t of t h e p r o v i s i o n be d e t e r m i n e d by t h e

p l a i n meaning of t h e words u s e d ? The second s e n t e n c e o f sub-

division (2) reads:

" * * * I f t h e r e i s no e l e c t i o n c o n t e s t f o r

t h e o f f i c e , t h e name o f t h e incumbent s h a l l

n e v e r t h e l e s s be p l a c e d on t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n

b a l l o t t o a l l o w v o t e r s of t h e s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t

t o approve o r r e j e c t him. * * *"

The key word i s "incumbent". Is it u s e d i n t h e same

s e n s e t h a t i t i s used i n t h e p r e c e d i n g s e n t e n c e of t h e s u b d i v i s i o n

t o r e f e r t o a judge o r j u s t i c e a p p o i n t e d by t h e Governor t o f i l l

a vacancy and s u b s e q u e n t l y confirmed by t h e s t a t e s e n a t e --

-,

"If a t t h e f i r s t e l e c t i o n a f t e r s e n a t e c o n f i r m a t i o n , and a t t h e

e l e c t i o n b e f o r e e a c h s u c c e e d i n g t e r m o f o f f i c e , any c a n d i d a t e

o t h e r t h a n t h e incumbent j u s t i c e o r d i s t r i c t judge f i l e s f o r

e l e c t i o n t o t h a t o f f i c e , t h e name of t h e incumbent s h a l l be p l a c e d

on t h e b a l l o t* * *" and i n t h e f o l l o w i n g s e n t e n c e o f t h e sub-

division -- " * * * I f a n incumbent i s r e j e c t e d , a n o t h e r s e l e c t i o n

and nomination s h a l l be made." O r , on t h e o t h e r hand, i s it u s e d

t o r e f e r t o - incumbent i r r e s p e c t i v e of i n i t i a l e l e c t i o n o r

any

appointment? (Emphasis added.)

I n common u s a g e , t h e word "incumbent" means " a p e r s o n who i s

i n p r e s e n t p o s s e s s i o n of a n o f f i c e * * *." B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y 4 t h

Ed. Rev. I t i s n o t l i m i t e d , q u a l i f i e d o r r e s t r i c t e d by t h e method

by which o n e a t t a i n e d t h e o f f i c e . Thus, i f t h e second s e n t e n c e

o f t h e s u b d i v i s i o n i s i s o l a t e d from t h e f i r s t and t h i r d s e n t e n c e s

o f t h e s u b d i v i s i o n , t h e l a n g u a g e c o u l d mean t h a t a l l incumbent

d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s who a r e unopposed

must r u n on a n a p p r o v a l o r r e j e c t i o n b a l l o t i n t h e g e n e r a l

election.

On t h e o t h e r hand, i f we c o n s t r u e t h e language i n t h e

c o n t e x t o f t h e e n t i r e s u b d i v i s i o n a c o n t r a r y r e s u l t c a n be

reached. The word "incumbent" i n t h e f i r s t o r p r e c e d i n g s e n t e n c e

o f t h e s u b d i v i s i o n c l e a r l y r e f e r s t o a n incumbent a p p o i n t e d by

t h e Governor t o f i l l a vacancy a s p r o v i d e d i n s u b d i v i s i o n (1)

b e c a u s e s u c h incumbent i s t h e o n l y incumbent s u b j e c t t o con-

f i r m a t i o n by t h e s t a t e s e n a t e . L i k e w i s e t h e t h i r d and f i n a l

s e n t e n c e o f s u b d i v i s i o n ( 2 ) c a n o n l y r e f e r t o a n incumbent ap-

p o i n t e d by t h e Governor t o f i l l a vacancy a s p r o v i d e d i n sub-

d i v i s i o n (1) b e c a u s e s u c h incumbent i s t h e o n l y r e j e c t e d incum-

b e n t f o r which a n o t h e r s e l e c t i o n and nomination i s p o s s i b l e .

Thus t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e second s e n t e n c e o f s u b d i v i s i o n

( 2 ) h a s t h e same meaning a s t h e word "incumbent" i n t h e o t h e r two

s e n t e n c e s of t h e s u b d i v i s i o n , and t h e l a n g u a g e means t h a t un-

opposed incumbent d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s

o r i g i n a l l y a p p o i n t e d by t h e Governor t o f i l l a vacancy a s p r o v i d e d

i n s u b s e c t i o n (1) must r u n i n t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n on a n a p p r o v a l

or rejection ballot.

A c c o r d i n g l y , w e h o l d t h a t t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e second

s e n t e n c e o f s u b d i v i s i o n ( 2 ) , A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8 , 1972 Montana

C o n s t i t u t i o n , i s ambiguous. A s t h e language i t s e l f i s n o t clear,

we must r e s o r t t o e x t r i n s i c r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n .

P e r h a p s t h e b e s t i n d i c a t i o n of t h e i n t e n t of t h e f r a m e r s

i s found i n t h e e x p l a n a t o r y n o t e s a s p r e p a r e d by t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l

Convention. These p r o v i d e i n p e r t i n e n t p a r t , f o l l o w i n g A r t i c l e

VII, S e c t i o n 8 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n :

"Convention Notes

" R e v i s e s 1889 c o n s t i t u t i o n * * * Contested e l e c t i o n

of judges is not changed, however if a judge

in office does not have an opponent in an election

his name will be put on the ballot anyway and the

people asked to approve or reject him * * *."

This expresses the intent of the delegates to the Constitutional

Convention and the meaning they attached to the new constitution

they framed and adopted. It plainly shows that the approval or

rejection ballot was intended to apply to any unopposed judge

in office.

Legislative determination of constitutional intent leads

us to the same construction. While such determination is not

binding on this Court, it is entitled to consideration. Here

the legislature had no difficulty in determining that the intent

Montana

of the framers of the 1972/C3onstitution was that all unopposed

incumbent judges and justices were subject to approval or re-

jection by the voters. The legislature subsequently enacted imple-

menting legislation to that effect, sections 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2,

R.C.M. 1947. It is presumed that the legislature acted with

integrity and with an honest purpose to keep within constitutional

limits. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 2A,

Sec. 45.11, p. 33, and cases cited therein.

The principle of reasonableness in construction of an

ambiguous constitutional provision also aids us in determining

the intent of the framers here. This principle applies equally

to construing constitutional provisions or statutes and has been

defined and explained in these words:

"It has been called a golden rule of statutory

interpretation that unreasonableness of the

result produced by one among alternative possible

interpretations of a statute is reason for re-

jecting that interpretation in favor of another

which would produce a reasonable result. It is

said to be a 'well established principle of

statutory interpretation that the law favors

rational and sensible construction.'" Sutherland,

Statutory Construction, 4th Ed., Vol. 2A, Sec.

45.12, p. 37, and cases cited therein.

Montana has adopted this principle by statute, section 49-134,

R.C.M. 1947.

While w e d o n o t c o n s i d e r p e t i t i o n e r ' s contended con-

s t r u c t i o n w i l l l e a d t o " a b s u r d r e s u l t s " w i t h i n t h e meaning of

S t a t e ex r e l . Ronish v . Sch. ~ i s t No. 1, 136 Mont. 453, 348

.

P.2d 797, no r a t i o n a l b a s i s n o r r e a s o n h a s been s u g g e s t e d t o

u s and w e p e r c e i v e none f o r r e q u i r i n g unopposed incumbent

a p p o i n t e e s t o r u n on a n a p p r o v a l o r r e j e c t i o n b a s i s i n each

s u c c e e d i n g e l e c t i o n , w h i l e exempting o t h e r unopposed incumbent

judges o r j u s t i c e s from t h i s r e q u i r e m e n t . I n o u r view, s u c h a

construction leads t o an unreasonable r e s u l t , while t h e a l t e r n a -

t i v e c o n s t r u c t i o n simply promotes t h e d e s i r e o f t h e f r a m e r s t o

s u b j e c t a l l d i s t r i c t judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s t o a p p r o v a l

o r r e j e c t i o n by t h e v o t e r s whenever t h e y r u n unopposed.

Public Policy favors a l i k e construction. A recognized

a u t h o r i t y on s t a t u t o r y c o n s t r u c t i o n h a s used t h i s l a n g u a g e :

" S t a t u t e s r e g u l a t i n g t h e r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s t o

v o t e a r e of g r e a t p u b l i c i n t e r e s t and, t h e r e f o r e ,

a r e i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h a view t o s e c u r i n g f o r

c i t i z e n s t h e i r r i g h t t o v o t e and t o i n s u r e t h e

e l e c t i o n of t h o s e o f f i c e r s who a r e t h e p e o p l e ' s

choice." Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th

Ed., Vol. 3 , Sec. 71.15, p . 366, and c a s e s t h e r e i n

cited.

This Court has h e r e t o f o r e a p p l i e d t h i s p u b l i c p o l i c y i n favor

of t h e c i t i z e n ' s r i g h t t o v o t e i n c o n s t r u i n g a s t a t u t e p r o v i d -

ing f o r absentee b a l l o t s . Maddox v . Board o f S t a t e C a n v a s s e r s ,

116 Mont. 217, 149 P.2d 112. T h i s same p u b l i c p o l i c y a p p l i e s

with equal force i n construing subsection ( 2 ) , A r t i c l e V I I ,

S e c t i o n 8 , 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n .

For t h e f o r e g o i n g r e a s o n s , w e h o l d that t h e i n t e n t of

t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n a l d e l e g a t e s c o l l e c t i v e l y i n u s i n g t h e word

"incumbent" i n t h e second s e n t e n c e of s u b d i v i s i o n ( 2 ) , A r t i c l e

VII, S e c t i o n 8 , was t h a t i t a p p l y t o a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t

j u d g e s and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s i r r e s p e c t i v e of how t h e y

originally attained their judicial offices. W e therefore construe

t h e meaning of t h a t s u b d i v i s i o n t o r e q u i r e a l l unopposed d i s t r i c t

judges and supreme c o u r t j u s t i c e s r u n n i n g f o r e l e c t i o n o r r e -

e l e c t i o n t o be p l a c e d on t h e g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n b a l l o t t o a l l o w

v o t e r s o f t h e s t a t e o r d i s t r i c t , as t h e c a s e may b e , t o approve

o r r e j e c t him. A c c o r d i n g l y , w e h o l d s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and

23-4510.2, p r o v i d i n g f o r r e t e n t i o n o r r e j e c t i o n of s u c h j u s t i c e s

o r judges c o n s t i t u t i o n a l .

W e remark i n p a s s i n g t h a t w e have n o t r e l i e d on t h e

m i n u t e s o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Convention p r o c e e d i n g s a s i n d i c a -

t i v e of t h e i n t e n t of t h e d e l e g a t e s . W e have p u r p o s e l y r e f r a i n e d

from u s i n g t h i s b a s i s o f i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a s e x c e r p t s from v a r i o u s

p o r t i o n s o f t h e s e m i n u t e s , among o t h e r t h i n g s , c a n be used t o

s u p p o r t e i t h e r p o s i t i o n , o r even a t h i r d p o s i t i o n , i . e . t h a t t h e

d e l e g a t e s simply d i d n o t a d d r e s s t h e s p e c i f i c problem i n v o l v e d

i n t h i s case. I n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h e c o l l e c t i v e i n t e n t of

t h e d e l e g a t e s c a n b e s t be d e t e r m i n e d by a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e p r e -

c e d i n g r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n t o t h e ambiguous language used i n

s u b s e c t i o n ( 2 ) , A r t i c l e V I I , S e c t i o n 8, 1972 Montana C o n s t i t u t i o n ,

and approved by t h e d e l e g a t e s .

W e have c o n s i d e r e d t h e o t h e r arguments of r e l a t o r and

t h e o t h e r r u l e s of c o n s t r u c t i o n c i t e d . W e have d e t e r m i n e d t h a t

none would change o u r d e c i s i o n h e r e i n . To s e t e a c h f o r t h i n

d e t a i l h e r e i n would s e r v e no u s e f u l p u r p o s e . The a p p l i c a b l e

r u l e s and r e a s o n s f o r o u r d e c i s i o n a r e s e t f o r t h above.

T h i s o p i n i o n c o n s t i t u t e s a d e c l a r a t o r y judgment t h a t

s e c t i o n s 23-4510.1 and 23-4510.2, R.C.M. 1947, are c o n s t i t u t i o n a l

and a p p l y t o e v e r y unopposed incumbent d i s t r i c t judge o r supreme

c o u r t j u s t i c e running f o r e l e c t i o n o r r e - e l e c t i o n .

Justice

We concur:

Edward T. Dussault, District

, sitting in place of Mr.

Justice James T. Harrison.

Mr. Justice Wesley Castles:

I concur with the majority except that I do not view the

Legislative determination of constitutional intent as being

persuasive. Other than to indulge in the presumption of con-

stitutionality of legislation, I do not give great weight to

that principle.

Mr. Justice Gene B. Daly dissents and will file a written

dissent at a later date.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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