Topalian v. Hartford Life Insurance

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

MATSUMOTO, District Judge.

On April 30, 2010, plaintiff Stephen J. Topalian (“plaintiff’ or “Topalian”), a former employee of Alstate Insurance Com *299 pany (“Allstate”), commenced this action against Hartford Life Insurance Company (“defendant” or “Hartford”), pursuant to § 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B), challenging Hartford’s termination of his long term disability (“LTD”) benefits under the Group Long Term Disability Income Plan for Allstate Employees (the “Plan”). (See ECF No. 1, Complaint dated 4/27/10 (“Compl.”).) Plaintiff seeks reversal of Hartford’s decision to terminate his LTD benefits, unpaid LTD benefits retroactive to July 30, 2008, interest on those unpaid benefits, attorneys’ fees, costs, a declaration that he is totally disabled within the meaning of the Plan, and future payment of LTD benefits under the Plan. (See Compl. at 6.)

Presently before the court are the parties’ fully-briefed cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (ECF No. 55, Hartford’s Motion for Summary Judgment dated 4/20/12 (“Hart. Mot.”); ECF No. 56, Hartford’s Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion (“Hart. Mem.”); ECF No. 66, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Hart. Mot. (“Pl. Opp.”); ECF No., 63, Hartford’s Reply Memorandum (“Hart. Reply”); ECF No. 60, Hartford’s Rule 56.1 Statement (“Hart. 56.1 Stmt.”); ECF No. 66, Exh. 1, Plaintiffs 56.1 Counter-Statement (“Pl. 56.1 Resp.”); ECF No. 64, 1 Exh. 1, Plaintiffs Redacted Motion for Summary Judgment dated 2/29/12 (“Pl. Mot.”); ECF No. 64, Exh. 2, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment Motion (“Pl. Mem.”); ECF No. 61, Hartford’s Memorandum in Opposition to Pl. Mot. (“Hart. Opp.”); ECF No. 65, Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum (“Pl. Reply”); ECF No. 64, Exh. 17, Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 Statement (“Pl. 56.1 Stmt.”); ECF No. 62, Hartford’s 56.1 Counter-Statement (“Hart. 56.1 Resp.”).)

For the reasons set forth below, Hartford’s motion for summary judgment is granted, and plaintiffs cross-motion for summary judgment is denied.

BACKGROUND

The following facts, taken from the parties’ Rule 56.1 statements 2 and relevant portions of the expansive Administrative Record, 3 are undisputed unless otherwise *300 noted. The court has considered whether the parties have proffered admissible evi *301 dence in support of their positions and, in evaluating each party’s respective summary judgment motion, has viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 77, 81 (2d Cir.2010).

Plaintiff, a morbidly obese man in his fifties during the period relevant to this action, is a former Allstate employee who began receiving LTD benefits through the Plan in 2004. In 2008, Hartford terminated those LTD benefits, upon a finding that plaintiff was no longer disabled under the meaning of the Plan. After filing an unsuccessful administrative appeal of Hartford’s termination decision, plaintiff now argues that Hartford’s termination of his LTD benefits was improper, unfair, and unsupported by substantial evidence.

Set forth below is a detailed summary of the Plan documents, plaintiffs personal background and employment history, and the extensive medical evidence and proceedings relevant to Hartford’s termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits.

I. The Plan Documents

Beginning in January 1, 2000, Hartford, a claims administrator, insured and administered the Plan through an insurance policy designated “GLT-673454.” 4 (Hart. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 3; PI. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 3; AR 1, 15-16.) The parties do not dispute that plaintiff enrolled and participated in the Plan and received disability benefits under that Plan. (Hart 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 3; PI. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 3.) The parties disagree, however, regarding whether the documents included in the Administrative Record constitute “the Plan” that lies at the heart of this action. (Compare PI. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 117-20, Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶¶ 3-6, and Pl. Mem. at 28, with Hart. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 3-8, Hart. Resp. ¶¶ 117-20, and Hart. Opp. at 8-9.) These documents include: (A) the “Group Benefit Plan: Allstate Insurance Company” (the “Group Benefit Plan Document”), (AR 12-39), and (B) the “Amendment to Group Policy 673454 on July 30, 2004” (the “2004 Policy Amendment” or the “Amendment”), (AR 1-11).

A. The Group Benefit Plan Document/Booklet-Certificate

The Group Benefit Plan Document contains a Certificate of Insurance, which explains that

[t]he terms of the Group Insurance Policy which affect an employee’s insurance are contained in the following pages [of the Group Benefit Plan]. This Certificate of Insurance and the following pages will become your Booklet-certificate. The Booklet-certificate is part of the Group Insurance Policy.

This Booklet-certificate replaces any other which Hartford Life may have issued to the Policyholder to give you under the Group Insurance Policy specified herein.

(AR 15.) Additionally, the Group Benefit Plan Document includes a “Schedule of Insurance” document, which provides a “Plan Effective Date” of January 1, 2000, identifies the Group Insurance Policy as “GLT-673454,” and clarifies that the benefits described within the Group Benefit Plan are “those in effect as of January 1, 2003.” (AR 16.) The Schedule of Insurance also specifies that “[t]his plan of Disability Insurance provides you with loss of income protection if you become disabled *302 from a covered accidental bodily injury, sickness or pregnancy.” (Id.)

Moreover, in response to the question “Who interprets policy terms and conditions?”, the Group Benefit Plan Document clarifies that Hartford retains “full discretion and authority to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret all terms and provisions of the Group Insurance Policy.” (AR 27.)

The Group Benefit Plan Document then provides the following definitions of relevant terms:

Any Occupation means an occupation for which you are qualified by education, training or experience, and that has an earnings potential greater than an amount equal to the lesser of the product of your Indexed Pre-disability Earnings and the Benefits Percentage and the Maximum Monthly Benefit shown in the Schedule of Insurance.

Disability or Disabled means that during the Elimination Period and for the next 24 months you are prevented by: 1. accidental bodily injury; 2. sickness; 3. Mental Illness; 4. Substance Abuse; or 5. pregnancy, from performing one or more of the Essential Duties of Your Occupation, and as a result your Current Monthly Earnings are no more than 80% of your Indexed Pre-disability Earnings. After that, you must be so prevented from performing one or more of the Essential Duties of Any Occupation.

Monthly Benefit means a monthly sum payable to you while you are Disabled, subject to the terms of the Group Insurance Policy.

Physician means a person who is: 1. a doctor of medicine, osteopathy, psychology or other healing art recognized by us; 2. licensed to practice in the state or

jurisdiction where care is being given; and 3. practicing within the scope of that license.

Regular Care of a Physician means you are attended by a Physician, who is not related to you: 1. with medical training and clinical experience suitable to treat your disabling condition; and 2. whose treatment is: a) consistent with the diagnosis of the disabling condition; b) according to guidelines established by medical, research and rehabilitative organizations; and c) administrated as often as needed, to achieve the maximum medical improvement.

(AR 28-31.)

The Group Benefit Plan Document further provides that Hartford may terminate a claimant’s LTD benefits on any the following dates, among others:

1. the date you are no longer Disabled as defined;

2. the date you fail to furnish Proof of Loss, when requested by [Hartford];

3. the date you are no longer under the Regular Care of a Physician, or refuse [Hartford’s] request that you submit to an examination by a Physician;

7. the date no further benefits are payable under any provision in this plan that limits benefit duration.

(AR 20.)

Further, the Group Benefit Plan Document contains an “ERISA Information” section, which states as follows:

This employee welfare benefit (Plan) is subject to certain requirements of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as amended. ERISA requires that you receive a Statement of ERISA Rights, a description of Claim Procedures, and other spe *303 cific information about the Plan. This document ... provides important information about the Plan.

The benefits described in your booklet-certificate (Booklet) are provided under a group insurance policy (Policy) issued by ... Hartford ... and are subject to the Policy’s terms and conditions. The Policy is incorporated into, and forms a part of, the Plan. The Plan has designated and named the Insurance Company as the claims fiduciary for benefits provided under the Policy. The Plan has granted the Insurance Company full discretion and authority .to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret all terms and provisions of the Policy.

A copy of the Plan is available for your review during normal working hours in the office of the Plan Administrator.

(AR 33.) The Group Benefit Plan Document thereafter describes the procedures for filing claims for benefits and appealing denials of such claims. (AR 36-38.)

B. The 2004 Policy Amendment

Like the Group Benefit Plan Document, the 2004 Policy Amendment sets forth an effective date of January 1, 2003, identifies the Group Insurance Policy as “GLT-673454,” and clarifies that the Group Insurance Policy has an effective date of January 1, 2000. (AR 1.)

The Amendment contains an “Incorporation Provision” which states that “[t]he Booklet-certificate(s), and the endorsement form(s) enclosed therein, attached to this Policy are hereby incorporated in, and made a part of, this policy” and thereafter references Booklet Form 673454(GLT)1 Rev. 6. (AR 3.) In addition, the Incorporation Provision notes that “[t]he terms found in ... Booklet-certificate [673454] will control: the benefit plan provisions; the eligibility and effective date of insurance rules; the termination of insurance rules; exclusions; and other general policy provisions pertaining to state insurance law requirements.” (AR 3.)

Furthermore, the Amendment incorporates by reference the “Schedule of Insurance” set forth in Booklet-certificate 673454(GLT)1 Rev. 6, which is included in the Group Benefit Plan explained above. (AR 4.) According to the Amendment, this Schedule of Insurance “will control the: benefit amounts and maximum limits; eligibility and effective date rules; and other schedule amounts and limits,” all of “which apply to the employees of the Policyholder.” (AR 4.)

Finally, the Amendment sets forth certain “Policy Provisions” that control the Plan. (AR 8-9.) Among those Policy Provisions is the statement that “the [entire] contract between the parties consists of: the policy; the application of the Policyholder, a copy of which is attached to and made a part of the policy when issued; and the applications, if any, of each insured person.” (AR 8.) The Amendment then explains that “Hartford ... will give the Policyholder an individual Booklet-certificate for each insured employee. The Booklet-certificate is part of the policy, and will explain the important features of the policy.” (AR 9.)

II. Plaintiff’s Personal Background and Employment History

Plaintiff was born on December 22, 1957, graduated from high school in 1975, and earned his Associates Degree from SUNY Farmingdale in 1977. (AR 154.) After his graduation from SUNY Farming-dale, plaintiff attended Vale Technical Institute for two years. (AR 936.)

Thereafter, plaintiff worked as an insurance appraiser for various companies and as an account representative for a stock brokerage between 1979 and 1989. (AR *304 936.) On September 25, 1989, plaintiff began working as a Senior Auto Appraiser for CNA Personal Insurance, which was later acquired by Allstate. (Hart. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 1; PL 56.1 Resp. ¶ 1.) As a Senior Auto Appraiser, plaintiff negotiated and estimated vehicle insurance claims and “[s]et appointments, document[ed] files, [wrote] drafts, [and] arrive[d] at [an] agreed price [with a repair] shop when possible.” (AR 163.)

In 2000, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Reinspector for Encompass Insurance Company (“Encompass”), a division of Allstate. (Hart. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 2; AR 163.) In his capacity as Reinspector, plaintiff reviewed the work of staff appraisers and independent appraisers. (AR 163.) Two years later in 2002, plaintiff was promoted to Front Line Performance Leader Auto Field Manager (“Auto Field Manager”). (Hart. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 2; Pl. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 2; AR 163.) As Auto Field Manager, plaintiff supervised eight employees, oversaw “all claims referred to independent appraisers,” conducted performance reviews, tracked statistics, and developed goals for his staff members. (AR 163.) Plaintiff regularly worked between ten to twelve hours each day during his tenure as Auto Field Manager and drove an average of five hundred miles per week. (AR 1802-03.)

III. Plaintiff’s 2004 Claim for STD Benefits

Plaintiff stopped working as an Auto Field Manager on January 30, 2004. (See AR 1965-66.) On February 9, 2004, Allstate employee Rebecca Abel and Hartford employee Sharon Ryan conducted an intake interview regarding plaintiffs claim for STD benefits. (See AR 1965.) Ms. Abel advised Hartford that plaintiffs date of disability was February 4, 2004. (AR 1966.)

On February 13, 2004, Dr. Jeanne Green, plaintiffs family physician, sent Hartford an Attending Physician’s Statement (“APS”), along with plaintiffs medical records. (See AR 838-57.) The APS indicated that plaintiffs “primary diagnosis” was hypoxia, congestive heart failure, hypertension, and obstructive sleep apnea. (AR 839.) The APS further identified plaintiffs “secondary diagnosis” as “super morbid obesity” and noted subjective symptoms of shortness of breath and dyspnea on exertion. (Id.) Moreover, according to the APS, plaintiff was hospitalized for these conditions between February 5, 2004 and February 9, 2004. (Id.) During his hospitalization, he was diagnosed with congestive heart failure. (AR 923.)

Among the additional medical records sent to Hartford by Dr. Green were a dual isotope adenosine study dated June 9, 2003 and an echocardiogram report dated February 5, 2004. (AR 844, 852-55.) The June 9, 2003 dual isotope adenosine study stated that “[t]here is no evidence of ischemia nor infarct but the patient appears to have a dilated left ventricle with a reduced ejection fraction of 43% but there are technical limitations due to his body size.” (AR 855.) Moreover, the February 5, 2004 echocardiogram report returned negative, with no thrombi or pericardial effusions noted or ventricular irregularities noted. (See AR 844.)

Dr. Green contacted Hartford on numerous occasions throughout March and April 2004 to provide additional information regarding plaintiffs medical conditions. For example, on March 17, 2004, Dr. Green informed a Hartford claims examiner that plaintiffs “blood sugar, weight, [and] hypertension” were disabling and prevented plaintiff from working. (AR 1962.) On April 5, 2004, Dr. Green sent Hartford a fax explaining that plaintiff “should remain *305 out of work ... at least another month.” (AR 831,1962.)

On May 6, 2004, Ms. Abel provided Hartford with a description of the physical requirements of plaintiffs Auto Field Manager position. (AR 156-57.) In particular, Ms. Abel described the Auto Field Manager position as requiring eight hours of sitting and/or two hours of standing, one hour of walking, five hours of driving, frequent bending, and occasional lifting of up to ten pounds. (AR 156.)

On or around June 29, 2004, Dr. Green faxed Hartford additional medical records dated March 29, 2004 through June 25, 2004. (Hart. 56.1 Stmt. ¶30; PI. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 30; AR 816-27.) One of those records, a sleep study dated March 29, 2004, confirmed plaintiffs diagnosis with obstructive sleep apnea “associated with a moderate degree of oxygen desaturation during sleep,” which improved with use of a continuous positive airway pressure (“CPAP”) machine. (AR 826.) Based on the foregoing medical conditions, Hartford extended plaintiffs STD benefits until August 3, 2004. (AR 1951.)

IV. Plaintiff’s 2004 Claim for LTD Benefits

A. Initial Submission of LTD Benefits Claim

On May 11, 2004, Hartford provided plaintiff with the necessary forms to submit a claim for LTD benefits. (Hart. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 33; PI. 56.1 Resp. ¶ 33.) On July 9, 2004, plaintiff faxed Hartford his LTD benefits application, which included an Employee’s Statement, a Claimant Questionnaire, a list of treating physicians, and an APS. (AR 782-97.) In his Employee’s Statement, plaintiff confirmed that he completed two years of college at Vale Technical Institute, where he studied auto damage estimating. (AR 783.) Moreover, in his Claimant Questionnaire, plaintiff described his medical conditions as “[sjpiking blood pressure, dizzy, lightheaded, problemas] w[ith] ... shortness of breath simply from walking,” retaining fluids in his lower extremities, and waking up in the middle of the night to catch his breath. (AR 787.) Despite these conditions, plaintiff indicated in his Claimant Questionnaire that he was able to continue some of his physical activities, such as fishing on one occasion as well as supervising his sons’ yard work. (AR 787.)

In his list of treating physicians, plaintiff named the following medical doctors: Dr. Green, Dr. Rocca D. Grella, Dr. Yanpino Yu, Dr. Richard S. Litman, Dr. Scott R. Capustin, Dr. Gerald J. Furst, Dr. Lisa Schirripa, Dr. Vithiananthan, Dr. Chawla, and Dr. Gary Zito. {See AR 788-89.)

Finally, in her APS, Dr. Green reported primary diagnoses of congestive heart failure, hypertension, and obstructive sleep apnea and secondary diagnoses of morbid obesity. (AR 796.) Dr. Green then reviewed plaintiffs functional capabilities and indicated that, despite his medical conditions, plaintiffs ability to stand was minimally affected; his walking abilities progressed to approximately one hundred yards without stopping; he could sit for approximately thirty minutes “without changing positions or getting up”; he could lift up to ten pounds “occasionally”; but was unable to push, pull, reach[]/ work[] overhead.” (AR 797.) Dr. Green additionally stated that plaintiff could drive for approximately ten miles without stopping and taking a break and that his ability to use his keyboard was “minimally affected.” (AR 797.) In light of these findings, Dr. Green concluded that “at the current rate of improvement,” she “antieipate[d] an additional [three] months of incapacity.” (AR 797.)

*306 On July 28, 2004, Dr. Green sent a letter to Hartford in further support of plaintiffs LTD benefits claim. (AR 779-80.) In that letter, Dr. Green explained that “[a]t this time [plaintiff] remains unable to return to work due to dizziness and overwhelming fatigue secondary to which he falls asleep constantly.” (AR 779.) Dr. Green informed Hartford that plaintiff was considering bariatric surgery, was being treated by a pulmonologist for his sleep apnea, consulted a nephrologist regarding his labile hypertension, and pursued treatment from a neurologist for episodic vertigo. (AR 779-80.) Dr. Green advised that, based on her diagnoses, plaintiff “remains fully disabled and unable to return to work in any capacity at this time” and stated that she “anticipated at least another two months before [plaintiff] could consider returning” to work. (AR 780.)

B. Hartford’s Initial Approval of LTD Benefits Claim

On September 10, 2004, Hartford informed plaintiff by telephone that his LTD benefits claim was approved. (AR 1940.) During that telephone call, plaintiff informed Hartford that he would promptly contact the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) to file an application for benefits. (Id.) By letter dated September 14, 2004, Hartford informed plaintiff that his LTD benefits were approved effective June 24, 2004 and that he was awarded a “net monthly benefit” of $2,850. (AR 767.)

Two weeks later, on September 24, 2004, Allstate notified Hartford that plaintiff was entitled to a higher net monthly benefit based on an annual salary of $69,312. (AR 765.) In response, Hartford adjusted plaintiffs net monthly benefit to $2,900. (AR 1937.)

Y. Hartford’s Extension of Plaintiff’s LTD Benefits

On April 21, 2005, Noelle C. Anderson, a Hartford claims examiner, contacted plaintiff by phone for a “milestone call.” (AR 1936.) During that call, plaintiff reported kidney stones, swelling in his legs, memory problems, depression, and periodic dizziness. (Id.) That same day, Hartford advised plaintiff that it required updated information regarding his LTD benefits claim and requested a Claimant Questionnaire and APS by May 31, 2005. (AR 759.)

Approximately one month later, on May 24, 2005, Dr. Green submitted an updated APS, in which she reported a primary diagnosis of “super morbid obesity” and secondary diagnoses of hypertension, diabetes, high cholesterol, obstructive sleep apnea, a history of congestive heart failure, and transient ischemic attacks. (AR 714.) Dr. Green enclosed imaging studies and lab reports in support of these diagnoses. (Id.) Dr. Green also listed plaintiffs subjective symptoms of “dyspnea, fatigue, minimal] endurance, episodic vertigo, and amnesia.” (Id.) Moreover, Dr. Green advised that plaintiff recovered from his congestive heart failure (with “no recurrent episodes”), noted slight improvement in his hypertension, diabetes, and high cholesterol, and stated that plaintiffs ischemic attacks occurred more frequently. (Id.) As to plaintiffs functional limitations, Dr. Green indicated that plaintiff suffered pain in his hips, knees, and ankles after standing for more than fifteen minutes. (AR 715.) Dr. Green further observed that plaintiffs walking ability was limited by dyspnea and pain and that plaintiff “must change position” every thirty minutes. (Id.) Dr. Green’s APS further stated that plaintiff had a limited ability to work or reach overhead, to drive for longer than ten minutes, and to lift, carry, push, or pull objects. (Id.) Dr. Green observed that plaintiffs typing ability was limited only by his ability to sit. (Id.) Finally, Dr. Green expressed her opinion that she ex *307 pected plaintiffs “period of incapacity to be indefinite,” but that plaintiff was pursuing “bariatric surgery options.” (Id.)

On or around May 25, 2005, plaintiff submitted his updated Claimant Questionnaire describing his disabling medical conditions. (AR 719-25.) Specifically, plaintiff listed the following medical conditions:

When blood pressure spikes, I get dizzy/lightheaded. Occasionally, my blood pressure gets so high that I can hear it usually in my right ear. When this occurs, I have a problem with my equilibrium. Shortness of breath from walking or climbing stairs. Still waking up at night needing to sit up to catchy my breath. Moderate to severe swelling below knees.

(AR 719.) Plaintiff additionally listed his height, 6 feet, and weight, 395 pounds. (AR 719.) Plaintiff further reported that he frequently “visits [the] bathroom due to [his] medications” and must lie down two to five times a day to reduce swelling in his legs. (Id.) Plaintiff explained that he was able to bathe, dress himself, go to the toilet, transfer from his bed to ■ a chair, control his bladder, feed himself, and maintain his personal hygiene independently. (Id.) Plaintiff noted, however, that he takes “much longer to bathe, use [the] toilet and dress ... than [he] did in the past” and that bending and transferring from his bed to a chair makes him “dizzy.” (Id.) Plaintiff again listed Dr. Green as his primary care physician, and also named his two neurologists, Dr. Michael O. Sauter and Dr. Yu, his urologist, Dr. Zito, and his podiatrist, Dr. Schirripa. (AR 720.) Plaintiff also stated that, within eighteen months of completing his Claimant Questionnaire, he visited Dr. Grella, Dr. Lit-man, Dr. Capustin, ophthalmologist Dr. Vincent Basilice, and bariatric specialist Dr. Arif Ahmad. (AR 721.)

Upon evaluation of his medical records, Hartford approved plaintiffs continuing claim for LTD benefits on June 10, 2005. (AR 1933-34.)

VI. Hartford’s 2006 Approval of Plaintiff’s LTD Claim under “Any Occupation” Standard

By letter dated January 20, 2006, Hartford notified plaintiff that it had commenced an investigation to determine whether he was eligible under the Plan’s new “Any Occupation” standard, which was scheduled to take effect on June 24, 2006. (AR 711-12.) Hartford therefore requested a “Work and Education History Form,” an updated APS, and a Physical Capacities Evaluation Form (“PCE”). (AR 712.) On March 9, 2006, Hartford received the requested forms from plaintiff.

A. Dr. Kevin Schiller’s 2006 APS and PCE

In the updated APS, Dr. Kevin Schiller, plaintiffs new primary care physician, reported primary diagnoses of coronary artery disease and hypertension and secondary diagnoses of congestive heart failure and sleep apnea. (AR 702.) Next to the line for plaintiffs “Subjective symptoms,” Dr. Schiller wrote “[shortness of breath] and chronic pain.” (Id.) Dr. Schiller recorded plaintiffs weight, 395 pounds, and height, 6 feet. (Id.) Dr. Schiller further noted that plaintiff experienced difficulty standing, walking, reaching/working overhead, pushing, and pulling. (AR 703.) Dr. Schiller described plaintiffs ability to sit, drive, and use the keyboard as “fair.” (Id.) Finally, the APS states that plaintiff received treatment from neurologist Dr. Sauter, nephrologist Dr. Boglia, and urologist Dr. Zito. (AR 702.)

In the PCE, Dr. Schiller set forth plaintiffs general workplace capabilities as fol *308 lows: (1) plaintiff could sit for one hour at a time for a total of two hours per day; (2) plaintiff could stand for half an hour at a time for a total of one hour per day; and (3) plaintiff could walk for fifteen minutes at a time for a total of one hour per day. (AR 704.) Dr. Schiller advised that plaintiff could occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, and crouch, as well as lift, carry, push, or pull up to ten pounds. (Id.) Dr. Schiller further indicated that plaintiff could frequently drive, reach at or below waist level, and handle/finger/feel objects with both hands. (AR 704-05.) Finally, Dr. Schiller observed that plaintiff could never balance. (AR 704.)

B. Hartford’s March 2006 Request for Additional Medical Records

Upon receipt of Dr. Schiller’s APS and PCE, Hartford continued its investigation of plaintiffs LTD benefits claim. To that end, on March 9, 2006, Hartford requested, and ultimately received, 5 updated medical records from plaintiffs treating physicians: Dr. Zito, Dr. Sauter, Dr. Ahmad, Dr. Yu, Dr. Schirripa, Dr. Grella, and Dr. Schiller. (AR 520-46, 563-67, 614-15, 637-48, 657-65, 1913, 1917, 1922, 1926, 1928.)

In response to Hartford’s March 2006 request for medical records, Dr. Zito, plaintiffs urologist, submitted July 2004 CT scan reports of plaintiffs abdomen and pelvis. (AR 659-60.) The CT scan report of plaintiffs abdomen stated that plaintiff had “very minimal right hydronephrosis,” “minimal right mid peri-uteral stranding,” and a “questionable tiny right mid ureteral calculi.” (AR 659.) The CT scan report of plaintiffs pelvis indicated “minimal right mid peri-ureteral stranding with associated tiny calculi with tiny right mid ureteral calculi” with no evidence of hydroureter, definite bladder calculus, bowel obstruction, free fluid, or adenopathy. (AR 660.)

On March 10, 2006, Dr. Sauter, plaintiffs neurologist, promptly responded to Hartford’s request for medical records. (AR 599-613.) Dr. Sauter submitted office notes dated August 10, 2005 through March 2, 2006. (AR 600-02.) In those office notes, Dr. Sauter explained that plaintiff had a history of epilepsy as a child. (AR 601.) Dr. Sauter also provided the results of plaintiffs Doppler neck carotid procedure on March 21, 2006. (AR 603.) The procedure revealed “no evidence of hemodynamically significant stenosis,” particularly “in the proximal left internal carotid artery.” (Id.) Furthermore, Dr. Sauter submitted an August 11, 2005 MRI report of plaintiffs brain. (AR 604.) The 2005 MRI report indicated plaintiffs history of right-sided weakness and memory loss but noted that plaintiff was “stable.” (Id.) Finally, Dr. Sauter submitted an August 11, 2005 EEG report, which reported an abnormal EEG “due to occasional sharp wave activity” and explained that “[hjyperventilation and photostimulation are unremarkable.” (AR 606.)

Dr. Ahmad, a physician at the Long Island Bariatric Center, similarly responded to Hartford’s records request. (AR 637-648, 1925.) In a September 21, 2005 office note, Dr. Ahmad stated that plaintiff steadily gained weight since 1992, when he was diagnosed with Lyme disease and was unable to exercise as a result. (AR 639.) Dr. Ahmad’s office note specified that plaintiff suffered from hypertension, dia *309 betes, sleep apnea, depression, joint problems, and osteoarthritis, among other medical infirmities. (Id.) In addition, Dr. Ahmad also submitted an “Initial Nutrition Consultation,” dated October 5, 2004, indicating that plaintiff sought weight reduction surgery. (AR 638.) Dr. Ahmad’s Initial Nutrition Consultation further noted that plaintiffs exercise regime consisted of walking five times a week for approximately twenty minutes. (Id.)

In response to Hartford’s request, Dr. Yu, plaintiffs nephrologist, mailed the handwritten progress of another treating nephrologist, Dr. Boglia. (AR 623-626, 1923.) Dr. Boglia’s progress notes, dated August 2005 through March 2006, discuss certain urinary and bladder issues which plaintiff did not claim were disabling conditions at that time. (Id.) Dr. Schirripa, plaintiffs podiatrist, also answered Hartford’s request for records and submitted office visit notes dated January 12, 2005 through April 3, 2006. (AR 1922; see also AR 563-67.) In those office visit notes, Dr. Schirripa described the painful nails and calluses on plaintiffs feet. (AR 563-67,1922.)

On June 1, 2006, Hartford also received medical records from the offices of Dr. Grella, plaintiffs cardiologist. (AR 520-46, 1916.) Among those records is a June 9, 2003 letter from Dr. Mitchell Saunders, Dr. Grella’s medical partner, to Dr. Green. (AR 527.) In that letter, Dr. Saunders described the results of plaintiffs echocardiogram and stated that “[he] advised [plaintiff] that most likely his chest and arm pains are related to cervical disk disease and not ischemia [because] he does not get them with exertion.” (Id.) Additionally, Dr. Grella’s office submitted a June 22, 2004 adenosine study which found “[n]o clear evidence of ischemia or infarction,” anterior thinning, “[mjildly delayed inferoapical systolic motion,” increased “left ventricular end diastolic and end systolic volumes,” and a “[l]eft ventricular ejection fraction of 46%.” (AR 534.) Notably, the June 2004 adenosine study reported that plaintiff experienced “no significant change in left ventricular function, left ventricular volumes, or myocardial perfusion” since his last test in June 2003. (Id.)

Dr. Grella’s office submitted two letters from Dr. Grella to plaintiffs primary care physicians. In his May 25, 2005 letter to Dr. Green, Dr. Grella opined that “[s]ince his hospitalization in February, the patient has been out of work just due to ‘not feeling well’ but overall a fairly nondescript situation.” (AR 525.) Dr. Grella noted, however, that

[r]eview of [plaintiffs] systems is notable for sweats, fatigue, nosebleed on higher dose aspirin ..., shortness of breath, snoring, ... abdominal pains, history of urinary tract infections and kidney stones with blood in his urine, headaches, loss of balance, history of diabetes, depression and easy bruising.

(Id.) Dr. Grella noted that plaintiffs “[p]hysical examination reveals a well-developed, morbidly obese man in no acute distress.” (AR 526.)

The second letter, dated December 2, 2005, from Dr. Grella to Dr. Schiller, sets forth Dr. Grella’s “[f]inal impression” of plaintiff as a “hypertensive, diabetic with multiple medical problems, who has continued complaints of ... atypical chest pain, exertional dyspnea which were of unclear origin.” (AR 524.) In the December 2, 2005 letter, Dr. Grella expressed his impression that much of plaintiffs “exertional dyspnea including the pulmonary hypertension ... [is] likely related, to his ... morbid obesity.” (Id.) "Dr. Grella therefore recommended additional cardiac testing. (Id.) Dr. Grella reported that plaintiffs “blood pressure appears to be *310 adequately controlled at the current time” and recommended “no change of [plaintiffs] medications.” (Id.)

Finally, Hartford received documents from Dr. Schiller on June 23, 2006. (AR 614-15, 618, 1913.) Dr. Schiller submitted a March 7, 2006 letter addressed to him from nephrologist Dr. Boglia. (AR 614-15.) In that March 7th letter, Dr. Boglia informed Dr. Schiller that plaintiff complained of “occasional urinary frequency and incomplete bladder emptying.” (AR 614.) With respect to plaintiffs hypertension, Dr. Boglia reported that plaintiffs

blood pressure was significantly improved from our last visit. He will also undergo a 24-hour blood pressure monitor. The patient’s blood pressure will not become normalized at his current weight. If he is able to lose significant amount of weight, his blood pressure will dramatically improve.

(Id.) With respect to plaintiffs diabetes, Dr. Boglia reported that plaintiffs “Hemoglobin A1C was well controlled back in December of 2005.” (AR 615.) Finally, regarding plaintiffs obesity, Dr. Boglia indicated that plaintiff “states [ ]he is attempting diet and exercise” and “is still considering going for bariatric surgery.” (Id.)

C. 2006 Social Security Administration (“SSA”) Disability Finding

On March 28, 2006, Ted S. Shapiro, Esq., plaintiffs counsel during his SSA proceedings, transmitted to Hartford SSA’s fully favorable Notice of Decision dated March 22, 2006. (See AR 627-35.) In his proceedings before the SSA, the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that plaintiff lacked the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform sedentary work and that plaintiff was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity. (Id.) Specifically, the ALJ held that

[t]he medical evidence reveals [that plaintiff] ... is severely impaired by morbid obesity, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, nephrolithiasis, obstructive sleep apnea, and congestive heart failure associated with left ventricular dysfunction.

At my request Dr. Osvaldo Fulco ... reviewed the medical evidence and answered interrogatories I posed. Writing on February 28, 2006, Dr. Fulco estimated the claimant — an individual with severe shortness of breath and edema and brawny discoloration of both lower extremities with evidence, by a nuclear scan performed on June 9, 2003, of a reduced left ventricular ejection fraction of forty-three percent — could sit only two hours, stand/walk less than two hours, and lifi/carry no more than ten pounds during an eight-hour workday. Unable to climb, push and pull, the [plaintiff], in the opinion of the medical expert, must avoid hazardous situations such as unprotected heights and dangerous moving machinery.

(AR 631-32.) The ALJ therefore concluded that plaintiff lacked the RFC “to perform even sedentary work because of persistent and severe shortness of breath compounded by swelling of both lower extremities.” (AR 632.) According to the ALJ, these conditions resulted in “an ability to lifi/carry no more than ten pounds, to sit only two hours, and to stand/walk less than two hours during an eight-hour workday.” (Id.) Finally, the ALJ explained that plaintiffs “exertional and nonexertional limitations preclude him from performing his past relevant work and significantly erode his remaining occupational base for sedentary work to the extent that he is unable to engage in any alternative substantial gainful activity existing in significant numbers in the national economy.” (AR 633.)

*311 By fax dated April 20, 2006, plaintiff transmitted a copy of the SSA’s Notice of Award to Hartford. (AR 585.) The SSA’s Notice of Award stated that the SSA found plaintiff “disabled under [SSA] rules on February 5, 2004.” (AR 586.)

Upon notification of plaintiffs SSA Award, Hartford calculated past due benefits, subtracted the amount owed to plaintiffs Social Security attorney, and offset the amount of LTD benefits owed by the amount awarded by the SSA. (See AR 943.)

D. Plaintiffs July 2006 Claimant Questionnaire

By letter dated June 29, 2006, Hartford informed plaintiff that it was continuing its investigation to determine whether plaintiff was disabled under the “Any Occupation” standard set forth in the Plan. (AR 446-47.) Hartford further clarified that “[a]dditional benefits paid beyond June 24, 2006 should not be construed as an admission of continued liability.” (AR 447.)

Accordingly, on July 19, 2006, Hartford requested an updated Claimant Questionnaire from plaintiff. (AR 445.) Hartford received plaintiffs updated Claimant Questionnaire on August 10, 2006. (AR 440-43, 1912.) In that July 2006 Claimant Questionnaire, plaintiff described his medical conditions as follows: “Blood pressure has been more stable overall, but is still spiking daily. When [blood pressure] spikes, I get light headed/dizzy. Sometimes my [blood pressure] gets so high that I can hear it in my right ear which in turn gives me problems [with] equilibrium. Shortness of breath from walking or using stairs.” (AR 440.) Plaintiff further reported moderate to severe swelling of his lower extremities and shortness of breath when laying down. (Id.) Nevertheless, the July 2006 Claimant Questionnaire indicates that plaintiffs daily activities included going for a walk, using the treadmill, and spending time with his family in the evenings. (Id.) Plaintiff further noted that he does light chores around the house, brings in empty trash pails, and went fishing once a year between 2004 and 2006. (Id.)

E. Hartford’s Approval of Plaintiffs Continuing LTD Benefits Claim

Upon review of plaintiffs July 2006 Claimant Questionnaire, Hartford Nurse Amanda P. Ferrill concluded that plaintiff was still disabled based on his pulmonary hypertension, left ventricular hypertrophy, and bilateral venous insufficiency/edema. (AR 1910-12.) Nurse Ferrill further opined that “without significant weight loss [plaintiffs] health will not improve” and therefore recommended a “follow up with medical on a yearly basis [to] note any significant weight changes.” (AR 1912.)

Thereafter, on September 8, 2006, Hartford analyst Jamie L. Lindvall recommended that plaintiffs claim for continued LTD benefits be approved based on his medical conditions. (AR 1909.) In particular, Ms. Lindvall took note of plaintiffs left ventricular hypertrophy, bouts with chronic leg edema, and hypertension. (Id.) Although Ms. Lindvall acknowledged that plaintiff could occasionally climb, stoop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and reach above and lift, carry, push, and pull up to tend pounds, she concluded that plaintiffs “[c]ondition [was] unlikely to improve” absent “significant weight loss.” (AR 1909.)

By letter dated September 11, 2006, Hartford advised plaintiff that his claim for continuing LTD was approved under the “Any Occupation” standard. (AR 438, 1909-10.) Hartford’s September 11, 2006 letter clarified that payment of LTD benefits would continue “subject to terms and limitations of the Policy, as long as [plaintiff] meet[s] the policy definition and requirements.” (AR 438.)

*312 VII. Hartford’s 2007 Reevaluation of Plaintiff’s Disability

On February 14, 2007, Hartford again requested plaintiff to complete an updated Claimant Questionnaire and APS in support of his continuing LTD benefits claim. (AR 425, 1908.) On March 27, 2007, Hartford’s Special Investigations Unit reviewed plaintiffs continuing LTD benefits claims but determined not to accept the claim for investigation. (AR 1907.) Hartford subsequently received plaintiffs 2007 Claimant Questionnaire on April 11, 2007. (AR 426-30.) In his 2007 Claimant Questionnaire, plaintiff described his medical conditions as tingling and numbness in his lower extremities and fingers; moderate to severe swelling of lower extremities; shortness of breath; back and neck pain; spiking blood pressure; and unstable equilibrium. (AR 426.) Plaintiff advised that he could do the following activities independently: bathe, dress, use the toilet, transfer from bed to chair, maintain his personal hygiene, and feed himself. (Id.) Plaintiff further advised that he occasionally performed light chores around the house and yard such as watering the plants and garden and bringing in empty garbage pails. (Id.) Finally, plaintiff stated that he was 425 pounds in October 2006 but had lost 29 pounds as of April 2007. (Id.)

In April 2007, Hartford also received a portion of plaintiffs updated APS and Dr. Schiller’s office visit note, both of which were dated March 10, 2007. (AR 431-34.) The first page of the 2007 APS reported primary diagnoses of right leg pain, chest pain, and shortness of breath, and subjective symptoms of shortness of breath. (AR 431.)

On April 11, 2007, Hartford analyst Molly Grossman approved plaintiffs continuing claim for LTD benefits, stating that “[ujnless [plaintiff] loses weight he will not be able to [return to work] at any occupation].” (AR 1906-07.) Ms. Grossman further noted plaintiffs tingling and numbness, shortness of breath, swelling, spiking in blood pressure, and back and neck pain. (AR 1906.) Ms. Grossman acknowledged that plaintiff reported a loss of 29 pounds since October 2006. (AR 1907.) Finally, Ms. Grossman summarized plaintiffs history of medical conditions, including but not limited to hypertension, diabetes, obesity, and high cholesterol. (Id.)

On August 13, 2007, plaintiffs file was assigned to Hartford Claim Specialist Debbie Staz. (AR 959.) On September 13, 2007, Ms. Staz and plaintiff spoke on the phone, during which plaintiff indicated that his “last hope” was gastric banding, or “stomach band,” surgery. (AR 961.) On October 17, 2007, Ms. Staz noted that plaintiff was scheduled to undergo gastric banding surgery on November 13, 2007. (AR 964.) On November 13, 2007, plaintiff underwent gastric banding surgery. (AR 1490.)

VIII. Hartford’s 2008 Reevaluation of Plaintiff’s Disability

A. January 2008 Work and Education History Form, Claimant Questionnaire, and APS

On January 2008, Ms. Staz requested plaintiff to complete an updated Work Education History Form, Claimant Questionnaire, and APS in support of his continuing LTD benefits claim. (AR 407,1899.)

Plaintiffs Work and Education History Form set forth plaintiffs employment history, educational background, work skills, and noted that he resigned from Allstate in “2005 after STD [and] LTD were exhausted.” (AR 155.) Moreover, in his 2008 Claimant Questionnaire, plaintiff explained his disabling conditions as follows:

*313 Moderate to severe swelling of lower extremities, as well as tingling [and] numbness. Tingling [and] numbness also affects my fingers but less often than my legs. Shortness of breath can occur when walking, laying down, going up or down stairs, etc. Blood pressure is normal more of the time, but still spikes (from once every couple of days to multiple times daily) [.] Sometimes I can hear a pulsing/beating in my right each which throws off my equilibrium. ... Back [and] neck pain due to all of the falling due to dizziness over the past several years.

(AR 378.) Plaintiff indicated that his daily activities included “[s]ome household chores at a slow pace,” walking as tolerated, going to doctor’s appointments, using the bathroom, measuring blood pressure and blood sugar’, sorting through mail, and paying bills. (Id.) Moreover, plaintiff indicated that he could do the following activities independently: bathe, dress, use the toilet, transfer from his bed to a chair, control his bladder, maintain his personal hygiene, and feed himself; however, plaintiff noted that activities such as bathing, dressing, and using the toilet take much longer and that actions that require bending can make him dizzy. (Id.) Plaintiff indicated that, despite his medical conditions, he could carry out “[v]ery light yard maintenance [and] household chores intermittently.” (Id.) Plaintiff recorded his height as 6 feet and weight as 388 pounds. (Id.)

In addition, Dr. Schiller’s 2008 APS reported plaintiffs primary diagnoses as morbid obesity, back pain, and status post-gastric band surgery, along with a secondary diagnosis of hypertension. (AR 389.) With respect to plaintiffs work environment capabilities, Dr. Schiller advised that plaintiff could sit for two hours at a time for a total of ten hours per day, stand for half an hour at a time for a total of one hour per day, and walk for one hour at a time for a total of one hour per day. (AR 390.) Dr. Schiller indicated that plaintiff could “occasionally” kneel, crouch, drive, reach overhead, and lift/carry up to 20 pounds with both hands. (Id.) In his APS, Dr. Schiller further opined that the expected duration of plaintiffs restrictions was “6 months.” (Id.) Dr. Schiller indicated that plaintiff could “participate in vocational rehabilitation services,” which included “worksite accommodations, identifying alternative work, and/or retaining assistance.” (Id.)

Appended to Dr. Schiller’s 2008 APS was a January 10, 2008 office visit note. (AR 391-92.) In his January 2008 office visit note, Dr. Schiller observed that plaintiffs knee pain was “moderate” with “an aching quality” but noted plaintiffs comment that his “[r]ight knee pain [was] improving.” (AR 391.) Dr. Schiller further clarified that plaintiff was treated with “physical therapy and NSAIDS” and has responded well to that treatment. (Id.)

B. Hartford’s February 2008 Request for Additional Medical Records

In February 2008, Hartford requested updated medical records from plaintiffs treating physicians, including Dr. Schiller, Dr. Collin Brathwaite, and Dr. Grella. 6

In response to this request, Dr. Schiller submitted numerous medical records including letters, radiology reports, and office visit notes. (See AR 261-365, 970, 1902.) For example, Dr. Schiller included a letter from Dr. Balchandani describing *314 plaintiffs December 7, 2006 nuclear stress test, “which revealed normal perfusion with no fixed reversible defects identified.” (AR 348.) Additionally, Dr. Schiller provided a cardiac catherization report regarding a June 5, 2007 procedure to evaluate plaintiffs heart pressure, arteries, and ventricular function. (AR 343-45.) The cardiac catherization report demonstrated non-obstructive coronary artery disease with normal left ventricular function, moderate left ventricular diastolic dysfunction, mild to moderate pulmonary hypertension, normal renal arteries, and successful placement of vascular closure device. (AR 435.)

Dr. Schiller also included a January 21, 2007 letter to him from Dr. Thomas P. Ribaudo, in which Dr. Ribaudo noted that plaintiff expressed no complaints of chest discomfort and an improvement in shortness of breath. (AR 340.) In his January 21st letter, Dr. Ribaudo noted plaintiffs admission to “some episodes of anxiety” and opined that such anxiety “could definitely be one of the contributing factors” to his shortness of breath. (AR 341.)

In a January 24, 2007 office note, Dr. Schiller reported that plaintiff fell through basement stairs and cut his right lower leg but suffered no fracture. (AR 313.) According to a follow-up X-ray, plaintiff showed “no evidence of fracture, dislocation or destructive bone lesion” with no abnormalities in his joint spaces and soft tissue. (AR 322.) On February 10, 2007, plaintiff again visited Dr. Schiller for a follow-up examination of plaintiffs leg ulcer related to the basement fall, and Dr. Schiller noted that plaintiffs cellulitis was improving. (AR 307.) Moreover, an X-ray and MRI conducted on March 13, 2007 indicated “[n]o obvious fracture-dislocation” with “[i]njury to the posterior medial meniscal root ligament with partial tear and reactive bone marrow edema of the tibia.” (AR 320-21.) A March 19, 2007 office visit note indicates that plaintiff presentéd with complaints of knee pain, again related to plaintiffs basement fall. (AR 302.) On May 2, 2007, plaintiff again visited Dr. Schiller, seeking treatment for neck and lower back pain. (AR 297.) During that office visit, plaintiff noted that he had been receiving physical therapy for three weeks. (Id.)

Dr. Schiller also provided Hartford with a May 23, 2007 letter from Dr. Grella, in which Dr. Grella advised that plaintiff denied chest pain and was “clinically stable” and “asymptomatic from a cardiac perspective,” despite plaintiffs chronic dyspnea on exertion, some diastolic dysfunction, and non-obstructive coronary artery disease. (AR 338-39.) •

Finally, Dr. Schiller submitted various notes recording plaintiffs office visits between June 2007 and November 2007, during which plaintiff presented with leg, knee, and back pain. (See AR 264-66, 287-91.) Dr. Schiller’s November 28, 2007 office visit note indicates that plaintiff stated that his “[r]ight knee was improving,” despite moderate pain and “an aching quality.” (AR 264.)

In addition, Dr. Brathwaite, plaintiffs gastric banding surgeon, provided Hartford with medical records related to plaintiffs November 13, 2007 gastric banding surgery and his post-surgical follow-up examinations. (AR 239-56, 1453-55.) During his December 2007 follow-up visit, plaintiff did not complain about his surgery, denied any signs or symptoms of infection in his surgical wounds, and reported walking thirty minutes a day. (AR 244.) In his medical progress notes, Dr. Brathwaite noted that plaintiff had a decrease in his appetite due to his divorce and death of his father. (AR 239, 971.) Dr. Brathwaite’s medical records also demonstrated a pre-surgery weight of 404 *315 pounds and a post-surgery weight of 378 pounds as of February 2008. (AR 971.)

Finally, Dr. Grella provided Hartford with updated medical records regarding plaintiffs cardiac health. (AR 180-95, 1890.) Included in those records is the first page of a November 7, 2007 letter from Dr. Grella to Dr. Brathwaite, wherein Dr. Grella explained his pre-surgery evaluation of plaintiff on November 5, 2007. (AR 181.) Dr. Grella found that plaintiff

was found to have nonobstructive coronary artery disease with only luminal irregularities and a preserved ejection fraction of 55%. The patient additionally does not have any significant valvular heart disease by echocardiography. The only finding was diastolic dysfunction secondary to hypertension, for which he is on medical therapy. He continues to be asymptomatic in terms of any cardiac issues in terms of chest discomfort. He does have dyspnea on exertion likely secondary to his morbid obesity, but otherwise has had no lightheadedness, dizziness, palpitations, or syncopal events. He does have chronic leg edema, which is known to be related to chronic venous insufficiency.

(Id.) Dr. Grella also provided a letter dated May 23, 2007, in which he approved plaintiff for surgery and expressed his opinion that “from a cardiac perspective [plaintiff] is clinically stable, and overall, would pose an acceptable and low cardiac risk for surgery.” (AR 184-85.)

C. Ms. Staz’s March 2008 Telephone Conversation with Plaintiff

On March 24, 2008, Ms. Staz called plaintiff to discuss his medical condition. (AR 973.) During that phone conversation, plaintiff expressed that his “back and knee pain [was] really causing him a lot of pain.” (AR 972-73.) Plaintiff reported that he was prescribed Percocet and was taking Vicodin. (AR 972.) Plaintiff further indicated that his orthopedist, Dr. Muhlrad, diagnosed him with torn cartilage in his right knee but postponed surgery pending plaintiffs gastric banding surgery. (AR 973.) Plaintiff also confirmed that “since he has been losing ... weight his back has been hurting a lot more” but that “his diabetes is under control.” (Id.)

IX. 2008 Termination of Plaintiff’s LTD Benefits

A. Ms. Staz’s Preliminary Recommendation to Terminate Benefits

On April 28, 2008, Ms. Staz wrote letters to Dr. Schiller and Dr. Brathwaite inquiring whether plaintiff was capable of performing full-time sedentary or light-duty work, as defined by the United States Department of Labor (“DOL”). 7 (AR 147-50, 1889.) In both letters, Hartford provided the following definition of “light work”:

The U.S. Department of Labor defines light work as exerting up to 20 pounds of force occasionally, and/or up to 10 pounds of force frequently, and/or a negligible amount of force constantly (constantly: activity or condition exists 2/3 or more of the time) to move objects. Physical demand requirements are in excess of those for Sedentary Work. Even though the weight lifted may be only a negligible amount, a job should be rated Light Work: (1) when it requires walking or standing to a significant degree; or (2) when it requires sitting most of the time but entails pushing and/or pulling of arm or leg controls; and/or (3) when the job requires work *316 ing at a production rate pace entailing the constant pushing and/or pulling of materials even though the weight of those materials is negligible.

(AR 147, 149.) Additionally, both letters provided the definition of “sedentary work” as follows:

The U.S. Department of Labor defines sedentary work as follows: exerting up to 10 pounds of force occasionally (occasionally: activity or condition exists up to 1/3 of the time) and/or a negligible amount of force frequently (frequently: activity or condition exists from 1/3 to 2/3 of the time) to lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise move objects, including the human body. Sedentary work involves sitting most of the time, but may involve walking or standing for brief periods of time. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required only occasionally and all other sedentary criteria are met.

(AR 148,150.)

Hartford then posed the following question to Dr. Schiller: “In your opinion, is Stephen Topalian capable of full-time (8 hours a day, 5 days a week) light work due to his knee pain?” (AR 147.) In response, Dr. Schiller placed a checkmark next to “No.” (Id.) Hartford also asked Dr. Schiller: “In your opinion, is Mr. Topalian capable of full-time (8 hours a day, 5 days a week) sedentary work due to his knee pain and low back pain?” (AR 148.) Dr. Schiller placed a checkmark next to “Yes.” (Id.) Hartford then instructed Dr. Schiller to “provide [his] rationale” and supporting medical evidence should he determine that plaintiff “is unable to return to” either light or sedentary work as a result of his knee and back pain. (Id.) Despite this invitation, Dr. Schiller provided no such rationale. (Id.)

Hartford posed similar questions to Dr. Brathwaite. (AR 149.) Specifically, Hartford asked Dr. Brathwaite whether plaintiff was capable of full time light work and whether plaintiff was capable of full time sedentary work due to his lap band surgery. (AR 149-50.) In response to both questions, Dr. Brathwaite placed a check-mark next to “Yes.” (Id.)

On May 13, 2008, plaintiff contacted Ms. Staz and informed her that he lost 39 pounds since his gastric banding surgery and that “[t]he only complications he is having is [that] he hit his knee ... and hopes to see the Orthopaedist soon. He also continues to have back pain. Other than that he has no other issues.” (AR 1887-88.)

On May 27, 2008, Hartford completed an Employability Analysis Report. (AR 122-23, 144-45.) Hartford explained that its Employability Analysis Report was conducted based on plaintiffs education, training, work history, and functional capacity. (AR 122.) With respect to plaintiffs functional capacity, Hartford noted that it relied on the answers provided by Dr. Schiller and Dr. Brathwaite in response to Hartford’s questions regarding plaintiffs ability to perform light and sedentary work. (Id.) Upon review of plaintiffs functional capacity, education, skills, and employment history, Hartford determined that plaintiff had the requisite skill, knowledge, and functional capacity to perform at least three sedentary occupations prevalent in the national economy: (1) “Supervisor, Claims”; (2) “Supervisor, Correspondence Section”; and (3) “Automobile Club Safety Program Coordinator.” (AR 123.)

On May 29, 2008, Ms. Staz reviewed plaintiffs extensive medical history. and supporting medical documentation, determined that plaintiff “has the ability to perform a sedentary occupation,” and recommended termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits. (AR 1881-85.)

*317 B. Hartford’s Confirmation of Ms. Staz’s Recommendation

Hartford did not terminate plaintiffs benefits immediately after Ms. Staz’s recommendation. Rather, Hartford conducted further investigation “to ascertain if there has been recent [medical treatment] for other conditions which might impact the claimant’s functionality.” (AR 1885.) To that end, Ms. Staz contacted the offices of Dr. Sauter, Dr. Boglia, Dr. Zito, Dr. Capustin, and therapist Kathleen Van Essendelft on June 6, 2008, seeking information regarding plaintiffs recent treatment and updated medical records. (AR 1880-81.)

Dr. Sauter’s office informed Hartford that plaintiffs last office visit was on March 2, 2006, (AR 112, 1880), and Dr. Boglia’s office advised Hartford that plaintiffs last office visit was on March 5, 2008, (AR 1881.)

Dr. Zito’s office notified Hartford that plaintiffs next scheduled appointment was for June 17, 2008 and provided treatment records for plaintiffs most recent office visit on June 1, 2007. (AR 1880-81.) Those treatment records related to plaintiffs annual urological examination. (AR 1880.)

On June 16, 2008, Dr. Capustin promptly replied to Ms. Staz’s inquiry and provided updated medical records dating back to May 2007. (AR 108-11, 1879.) In particular, Dr. Capustin produced a letter dated May 30, 2007 to Dr. Brathwaite, in which Dr. Capustin advised that plaintiff was on a CPAP machine for obstructive sleep apnea and that “[r]epeat CPAP titration is not required.” (AR 109.) In that May 30th letter, Dr. Capustin noted that “as weight loss progresses, CPAP pressures will be titrated down.” (Id.)

On July 8, 2008, Hartford received a letter from Dr. Van Essendelft, who advised that plaintiff was receiving psycho-therapeutic treatment on a weekly to biweekly basis beginning in June 4, 2007 related to his obesity. (AR 105.) In that letter, Dr. Van Essendelft provided a diagnosis of adjustment disorder with mixed disturbance of emotions, listing the psychological stressors of disability and relationship issues at home. (Id.)

Ten days later, on July 18, 2008, Hartford received Dr. Boglia’s medical records dated January 2, 2007 through June 19, 2008. (AR 59-66, 69-74, 1879.) In a June 19, 2008 office visit note, Dr. Boglia noted that plaintiff “may need a [left] knee replacement” and observed that plaintiff appeared stressed because of a divorce. (AR 59.) Dr. Boglia noted, however, that plaintiff was “feeling better” and trying to lose weight and “take control of [his] health.” (Id.) Similarly, in a March 17, 2008 office visit note, Dr. Boglia discussed plaintiffs November 2007 gastric banding surgery and plaintiffs subsequent weight loss, noting that plaintiff weighed 378 pounds despite his lack of exercise. (AR 63.) Dr. Boglia further observed that, at the time of his March 2008 office visit, plaintiffs father had died, plaintiff was going through a divorce, and that plaintiff discovered gravel in his urine. (Id.) Finally, in a July 2, 2007 letter addressed to Dr. Schiller, Dr. Boglia informed Dr. Schiller that plaintiff suffered from pain in his right leg, was “following with orthopedics[,] and was diagnosed with a torn meniscus in the right knee and possible sciatica.” (AR 67.) Dr. Boglia noted that, although plaintiff experienced gravel in his urine in April 2007, that condition had not since recurred: (Id.) Dr. Boglia also noted the presence of plaintiffs “Grade 1 edema,” large head and neck, obesity, and limp. (Id.) In addition to the aforementioned office notes, Dr. Boglia also provided Hartford with plaintiffs May 2008 lab results, *318 confirming plaintiffs diagnosis of kidney stones. (See AR 75-98.)

By letter dated July 23, 2008, Hartford informed Dr. Boglia of its finding that “[a]fter a thorough review of the medical records, it appears [plaintiff] has the functional capacity to perform at a light to sedentary occupation.” (AR 53-56, 2018-19.) In that letter, Hartford provided the same definitions of “light work” and “sedentary work” included in Hartford’s April 28, 2008 letters to Drs. Brathwaite and Schiller. (AR 55-56.) Hartford then asked Dr. Boglia whether plaintiff was “capable of full-time (8 hours a day, 5 days a week)” light work and sedentary work “due to his hypertension and trace edema.” (Id.) On July 28, 2008, Dr. Boglia responded to Hartford’s form letter and checked “Yes” next to the question regarding plaintiffs capacity to perform light work despite his hypertension and trace edema, and did not answer the question regarding plaintiffs ability to perform sedentary work. (AR 48-49.) As with Hartford’s letters to Dr. Brathwaite and Dr. Schiller, Dr. Boglia was invited to provide his rationale and supporting medical results to support any finding that plaintiff was unable to perform either light or sedentary work. (AR 49.) Dr. Boglia, however, provided no such rationale or supporting medical records. (See id.)

C. Hartford’s July 2008 Termination Decision

On July 28, 2008, Ms. Staz reassessed the updated medical evidence and again recommended termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits on the ground that plaintiff “no longer meets the definition of total disability from performing any occupation.” (AR 987-91.) Ms. Staz specifically found that plaintiff “has the ability to perform a sedentary and/or light occupation.” (AR 991.)

Two days later, on July 30, 2008, Hartford Team-Leader G. Sharmaine McNeil approved Ms. Staz’s recommendation with the following entry on Hartford’s system:

It is important to note that the claimant’s [last office visit] with Cardiologist AP Grella was 11/7/07 per the med recs from AP Grella. As of 11/7/07 the claimant continued to be asymptomatic in terms of any cardiac issues in terms of chest discomfort. A 1/07 [ejection fraction] indicated the claimant did have coronary artery disease and a preserved ejection fraction of 55% (which is within normal limits). The [plaintiff] has diastolic dysfunction 2nd to [hypertension] for which he is treated. 11/7/07 EKG indicated a normal sinus rhythm with poor R-wave progression in V1-V3; otherwise no [acute] ST-T wave changes were noted. AP Grella further noted that from a cardiac perspective the claimant was [clinically] stable (for the gastric banding surgery). As of 11/7/07 the claimant’s BP was , 120/60 and AP Grella noted that his BP, was well controlled (on medications). In light of the review of all clinical data and multiple physician releases (AP Schiller, AP Brathwaite, and AP Boglia) to perform either a sedentary or light duty [occupation], the weight of the clinic evidence does not support the claimant remains [totally disabled from] any [occupation].

(AR 991-92.)

By letter dated July 30, 2008, Hartford advised plaintiff of its determination to terminate his LTD benefits. (See AR 42-46.) In the determination letter, Hartford specifically informed plaintiff that he did “not meet the policy definition of Disability beyond 7/30/2008.” (AR 42.) Hartford noted that “[a]ll of the papers contained in [plaintiffs] file were reviewed as a whole,” which included the following:

*319 • The Employee section of the Application for Long Term Disability Income Benefits received on 7/09/2004;

• The Attending Physician’s Statement of Continued Disability signed by Dr. Kevin Schiller on 1/10/2008;

• Office notes and medical records from Dr. Kevin Schiller from 12/28/2006 through 1/10/2008;

• Office notes and medical records from Dr. Collin E. Brathwaite from 2/24/2007 through 2/19/2008;

• Office notes and medical records from Dr. Rocco D. Grella from 1/05/2007 through 11/07/2007;

• Your Claimant Questionnaire you completed 1/30/2008;

• Letter to Dr. Collin Brathwaite dated 4/28/2008 and his reply dated 5/02/2008;

• Letter to Dr. Kevin Schiller dated 4/28/2008 and his reply dated 5/02/200 [8];

• Medical record from Dr. Gary J. Zito dated 6/11/2007;

• Reply to our request for medical records from Dr. Sauter on 6/06/2008;

• Medical record dated 5/30/2007 from Dr. Scott Capustin;

• Letter received from Dr. Van Essen-delft dated 7/08/2008;

• Medical records from Long Island Nephrology Consultants from 1/05/2007 through 6/19/2008;

• Letter to Dr. Joseph Boglia dated 7/23/2008 and his reply dated 7/28/2008;

• Employability Analysis information completed by a Vocational Rehabilitation Clinical Case Manager on 5/27/2007.

(AR 44.) Hartford further indicated that it considered “all of the medical information in [plaintiffs] file to decide if [he] eontinue[d] to meet the definition of Disability.” (Id.) Thereafter, Hartford provided a detailed review of the medical records compiled by Hartford. (See AR 44-46.)

After summarizing Dr. Schiller’s 2008 APS, Hartford explained that plaintiffs right knee and lumbar pain were treated with physical therapy and medication and that plaintiff underwent gastric banding surgery in November 2007. (AR 44.) Hartford credited Dr. Brathwaite’s post-surgery report that plaintiff reported walking thirty minutes a day and lost twelve pounds. (Id.) Hartford also acknowledged Dr. Brathwaite’s finding that, in February 2008, plaintiff had no complaints and had lost approximately 26 pounds. (Id.)

With respect to plaintiffs cardiac health, Hartford cited to Dr. Grella’s November 2007 letter, which reported a “normal sinus rhythm with poor R-wave progression in V1-V3.” (AR 45.) According to Hartford, medical records established that plaintiff did not have obstructive coronary disease or significant valvular heart disease and had an ejection fraction of 55%. (Id.) Hartford specifically noted that “Dr. Grella felt from a cardiac perspective [that plaintiff was] clinically stable and overall acceptable and a low cardiac risk for surgery.” (Id.)

Hartford then proceeded to cite to Dr. Schiller, Dr. Brathwaite, and Dr. Boglia’s response letters in which: (1) Dr. Schiller indicated that plaintiff could perform sedentary work but not light work, despite plaintiffs knee and back pain; (2) Dr. Brathwaite stated that plaintiff could perform both sedentary and light work in light of plaintiffs lap band surgery; and (3) Dr. Boglia stated that plaintiff had the functional capacity to perform light work, despite his hypertension and trace edema. *320 (Id.) After reviewing the remainder of the medical findings, Hartford concluded that plaintiff had the functional capacity for full-time sedentary work. (Id.) Hartford also reviewed the Employability Analysis Report and listed three occupations within plaintiffs qualifications and physical capabilities. (Id.)

Finally, Hartford reminded plaintiff that it considered his “claim file as a whole for the purposes of determining [his] entitlement to Long Term Disability benefits.” (Id.) Hartford then advised plaintiff of his right to an administrative appeal of Hartford’s termination decision. (AR 46.)

X. Plaintiff’s Administrative Appeal

A. Plaintiffs Appeal

On August 18, 2008, plaintiff requested Hartford to forward “any/all information that was used in [the] decision making process to cancel[ ] [plaintiffs] disability as of [July 31, 2008].” (AR 2017.) In response, Hartford transmitted to plaintiff a complete copy of his claims file. (AR 1031,1871.) By correspondence dated November 7, 2008, Michael E. Quiat, Esq., plaintiffs counsel of record in the instant action, informed Hartford that he was retained to represent plaintiff to pursue an administrative appeal of Hartford’s decision to terminate his LTD benefits. (AR 1868-70.) In that November 7th letter, Mr. Quiat requested several documents from Hartford, including a copy of the plan document, the “summary plan description,” the Third-Party Administrator Agreement, and a copy of the Administrative Record. (AR 1868-69.)

On November 17, 2008, Hartford’s Appeal Unit acknowledged receipt of plaintiffs administrative appeal, notified Mr. Quiat that Hartford would “make an appeal decision as soon as possible and should make the decision within 45 days of the receipt of the request,” and further noted that “[i]f there are special circumstances that prevent us from making the decision in that time, the evaluation period can be extended to 90 days.” (AR 1030.) On December 3, 2008, Hartford produced a copy of plaintiffs claim file and advised Mr. Quiat of the 180 day deadline to submit information and documents in support of plaintiffs appeal. (AR 1029.)

On March 2, 2009, Mr. Quiat submitted the following documents in support of plaintiffs administrative appeal, each of which will be discussed in further detail below:

• Exhibit A: Dr. Kevin Schiller[’s] Multiple Diagnoses Full Assessment Letter dated February 17, 2009;

• Exhibit B: Dr. Collin E.M. Brathwaite[’s] Multiple Diagnoses Full Assessment Letter dated February 17, 2009;

• Exhibit C: Dr. Joseph Boglia[’s] Multiple Diagnoses Full Assessment Letter dated February 17, 2009;

• Exhibit D: Schedule of Medication Side Effects for Stephen Topalian;

• Exhibit E: Individual Medication Side Effects/Faet Sheets, provided by Physician Desk Reference (PDR) online service;

• Exhibit F: Certification of Stephen Topalian executed March 1, 2009; and

• Exhibit G: Medical Appointment Monthly Calendars, January 2007 through February 2009.

(AR 1688-89.)

Exhibits A through C consist of letters from Mr. Quiat to Drs. Schiller, Brathwaite, and Boglia. Each of those letters included the following language:

[R]ather than provide you with a complete picture of Mr. Topalian’s entire medical condition, treatment and medi *321 cations, Hartford ... elicited from you a narrow response to a question relating only to your area of treatment, then used that answer to justify a termination of benefits.

In order to correct the record in regard to Mr. Topalian’s claim, we have set forth below a complete list of all of Mr. Toplian’s current diagnoses as well as the attached chart of medications which Mr. Topalian must take daily in order to function in the most minimal capacity.

Mr. Topalian has current diagnoses for the following diseases and/or conditions: (1) Morbid obesity ...; (2) Diabetes Mellitus (Type-2); (3) Lumbago ...; (4) Hypertension; (5) Sleep Apnea, Obstructive; (6) Venous Insufficiency; (7) Hypothyroidism, Acquired; (8) Edema; (9) Gout.

(AR 1703-04, 1707-08, 1711-12.) In each letter, Mr. Quiat then solicited “Yes/No” responses to the following statements: (1) “The materials set forth in this letter and the accompanying schedule would materially affect my opinion as to Mr. Toplian’s disability status.”; and (2) “In view of the information provided as to Mr. Topalian’s multiple medical conditions and medication, I wish to retract my opinion as expressed in my ... 2008 correspondence to Hartford.” (AR 1705, 1709, 1713.) In response to these letters, Dr. Schiller checked “Yes” next to statements (1) and (2), (AR 1705), Dr. Brathwaite checked ‘Yes” next to statements (1) and (2), (AR 1709), and Dr. Boglia did not respond to Mr. Quiat’s letter, (AR 1713).

Exhibit D lists plaintiffs medications, which included prescription drugs to treat his hypertension, kidney stones, diabetes, depression, cholesterol, pain, and to supplement key nutrients like potassium. (AR 1715-16.) In addition Exhibit E provides information regarding many of the prescription drugs listed in Exhibit F. (See AR 1717-1800.)

Exhibit F, plaintiffs Certification, sets forth plaintiffs records of plaintiffs personal, employment, ánd medical history, dating back to 2003. (AR 1801-07.) Plaintiff further sets forth his allegations regarding his medical condition, particularly his belief that “Medically, [he] continuéis] to deteriorate” in light of his kidney stones. (AR 1805.) In his Certification, plaintiff also references his “numerous medical conditions,” which require him to “be examined and evaluated frequently by [his] treating physicians.” (Id.) Plaintiff then chronicles his medical conditions and daily activities including his fatigue, leg swelling, his inability to perform household chores such as vacuuming or dusting because of dizzy spells, and use of an adjustable bed, diabetic shoes, and a CPAP machine. (AR 1804-06.)

Finally, Exhibit G consists of plaintiffs appointment calendar between January 2007 through February 2009, during which period he visited numerous treating physicians and gastric band support groups. (See 1808-34.)

In further support of his administrative appeal, plaintiff also submitted a letter addressed to Dr. Boglia, in which Dr. Boglia responds to Mr. Quiat’s inquiries about plaintiffs functional capacity. (See AR 1679-81.) In that letter, Mr. Quiat states:

As we discussed in our recent telephone call, it is generally not your practice to sign correspondence such as the one signed in this case because it is generally not in the medical purview of nephrologists to address the overall impact- of other medical conditions on the workability of a patient.

(AR 1680.) Mr. Quiat then posed the following two questions to Dr. Boglia, to which Dr. Boglia responded “No”:

*322 (1) Given all of the medical conditions from which Mr. Topalian currently suffers, are you able to give a professional opinion, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, as to Mr. Topalian’s ability to work on a fulltime basis in a light and/or sedentary position?

(2) Do you believe to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the position which you took in the July 23, 2008 correspondence with respect only to Hypertension and Trace Edema, can fairly be relied upon by Hartford to determine whether Mr. Topalian is disabled from working on a fulltime basis in a light and/or sedentary position, given the other conditions from which he suffers and for which he is currently being treated?

(AR 1681.)

By letter dated March 27, 2009, Hartford advised Mr. Quiat that it received the letter including Dr. Boglia’s responses to his questions and thereafter advised plaintiff that Hartford would make a benefit determination in forty-five days. (AR 1028.)

B. Hartford’s Request for Updated Medical Evidence

On April 22, 2009, Hartford reviewed the documentation submitted in support of plaintiffs administrative appeal and noted that plaintiffs appointment calendar included office visits with several physicians not accounted for in Hartford’s claim file. (AR 995-96.) Consequently, on April 27, 2009, Hartford informed Mr. Quiat that Hartford had requested updated medical records from the physicians named in plaintiffs appointment calendar and encouraged Mr. Quiat to contact the doctors’ offices to ensure prompt transmittal of the requested information. (AR 1025, 1027.)

By letter dated May 4, 2009, Hartford informed plaintiff that it would be taking a forty-five day extension to decide the administrative appeal because Hartford had not yet received the updated medical records from his treating physicians. (AR 1026.)

On May 14, 2009, Mr. Quiat notified Hartford that he contacted the additional physicians and claimed that only podiatrist Dr. Schirripa acknowledged receipt of Hartford’s record request. (AR 1553-54.) On May 14, 2009, Hartford responded to Mr. Quiat’s letter by enclosing copies of fax confirmations for each of the physicians and by informing Mr. Quiat that second requests would be sent that day. (AR 1024,1573,1575-88.)

1. Updated Medical Records of Dr. David Franko, Dr. Capustin, Dr. Zito, and Dr. Boglia

On May 14, 2009, Hartford also received updated medical records from Dr. Franko, Dr. Schirripa, Dr. Capustin, and Dr. Zito. (AR 996.) Dr. Franko’s updated medical records include a July 22, 2008 letter, in which Dr. Franko observed that plaintiff complained of lower back pain and numbness in his extremities but “deniefd] any chest pain, palpitations, or dizziness.” (AR 1612.) In that July 22nd letter, Dr. Franko expressed his opinion that plaintiffs “lap band procedure took well, and there were no complications.” (AR 1613.) Additionally, in an April 14, 2009 letter, Dr. Franko explained that plaintiff lost approximately eighty pounds since his November 2007 gastric banding surgery and denied “dizziness, lightheadedness, naseousness [sic], vomiting, or chest pain” during an office visit. (AR 1609.) In his April 14th letter, Dr. Franko reported plaintiffs weight as 347 pounds and further noted that plaintiff “ha[d] some mild lower extremity edema” and “mildly ele *323 vated” blood pressure. 8 (AR 1609-10.)

Dr. Capustin’s updated medical records consist of office visit notes dated May 16, 2008 through January 29, 2009, in which Dr. Capustin indicates that, as of January 29, 2009, plaintiffs weight was 347 pounds. (AR 1631-33.) Furthermore, Dr. Zito’s updated medical records include a June 17, 2008 office visit note describing plaintiffs complaints of frequent urination. (AR 1636.)

On May 15, 2009, Hartford also received Dr. Boglia’s updated medical records regarding plaintiffs urological conditions. {See AR 1560-72.) One of those updated records, a March 30, 2009 office visit note, indicates that plaintiff is “still lightheaded at times,” walks with a limp, and has occasional high blood pressure. (AR 1563.) In this March 30th note, Dr. Boglia further stated that plaintiffs “gastric band [had] not recently [been] tightened.” {Id.) Moreover, in an April 10, 2009 office visit note, Dr. Boglia recorded plaintiffs weight as 341 pounds. (AR 1562.)

By letter dated June 1, 2009, Hartford informed Mr. Quiat’s office that Hartford had still not received any additional records from Dr. Muhlrad. (AR 1023.) Hartford advised that under ERISA, Hartford was obligated to provide plaintiff with forty-five days to respond, and further noted that “[i]f the information is received, prior to the final appeal decision, we will consider it, whether or not we proceed with our appeal review on 6/10/09 using the information contained in the claim file.” {Id.)

2. Updated Medical Records of Dr. Brathwaite and Dr. Schiller

On June 3, 2009, Hartford received Dr. Brathwaite’s updated medical records regarding plaintiffs bariatric health, which included follow-up forms that plaintiff completed. (AR 1422-37.) In an August 22, 2008 gastric banding follow-up form, plaintiff wrote that he suffered from occasional nausea and indicated that he did not exercise often due to pain in his knees. (AR 1431.) Dr. Brathwaite’s notes from this follow-up visit indicate that plaintiffs “Chief Complaint” was “not losing weight.” (AR 1432.) In a September 30, 2008 gastric banding follow-up form, plaintiff indicated that he walked two to three times a week for as much as fifteen minutes. (AR 1429.)

Two weeks later, on June 17, 2009, Hartford received Dr. Schiller’s updated medical records, which included medical reports and office notes dated February 14, 2008 through April 24, 2009. (AR 1000, 1285-1401.) Among those records were echocardiogram and sonography reports, both dated February 24, 2009. (AR 1379-80.) The echocardiogram report indicated a “dilated left ventricle with no wall motion abnormalities noted,” an “enlarged left atrium,” and “a trace mitral regurgitation.” (AR 1379.) The sonography report found “[n]o hemodynamically significant stenosis in the Bilateral Carotid arteries studied at this time.” (AR 1380.) Moreover, three of Dr. Schiller’s updated records concerned plaintiffs lower extremities. {See AR 1381-84.) For example, a February 5, 2009 report diagnosed plaintiff with mild or moderate peripheral vascular disease in both of his calves. (AR 1381.)

3. Updated Medical Records of Dr. Muhlrad

On June 24, 2009, Hartford received Dr. Muhlrad’s 2008-2009 medical records, *324 comprised of office visit notes and medical records related to four hyalgan injection shots to treat plaintiffs knee arthritis. (AR 1228-51.) In one of Dr. Muhlrad’s office visit notes, Dr. Muhlrad recommended physical therapy for plaintiff, who had suffered a whiplash injury to his neck during an automobile accident on May 18, 2009. (AR 1265.)

On June 26, 2009, Kathleen Meneses, Mr. Quiat’s paralegal, acknowledged that Hartford had not yet received Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 medical records but informed Hartford that “[t]he records from 2007 contain the diagnosis of spinal [s]tenosis and that [plaintiffs] left knee is significantly impaired.” (AR 1257.) In response, Hartford informed Ms. Meneses that it would not commence its review of plaintiffs claim until it received Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 medical records. (AR 1021.) Hartford further advised Ms. Meneses that “[i]f you want us to evaluate [plaintiffs] appeal without [Dr. Muhlrad’s] information, please notify us and we will begin the evaluation.” (Id.) Neither plaintiff nor his attorney requested that Hartford evaluate the appeal without Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 records.

On that same day, Hartford faxed Dr. Muhlrad a request for plaintiffs 2007 medical records. • (AR 1001-02.) On August 3, 2009, Hartford received the requested medical records from Dr. Muhlrad. (See AR 1002.) . Among such records were two MRI reports: a June 30, 2007 MRI report of plaintiffs lower spine and a March 21, 2007 MRI report of plaintiffs right knee. (AR 1199-1200.) The June 30, 2007 MRI report noted “Multilevel lumbar degenerative disc and facet disease with significant central stenosis at L3-L4 and mild steno-sis at L4-L5.” (AR 1199.) The March 21, 2007 report of plaintiffs right knee documented an “[i]njury to the posterior medial meniscal root ligament with partial tear and reactive bone marrow edema of the tibia. Probable small peripheral tear, posteromedial aspect of the medial meniscus. Soft tissue swelling, greater at the lateral aspect.” (AR 1200.) Dr. Muhlrad’s updated records also include a September 14, 2007 physical therapy progress report, which noted plaintiffs normal strength and decreased complaints of knee pain. (AR 1201.) .

4. Dr. Schiller’s July 2009 Letter

On July 20, 2009, Dr. Schiller informed Hartford of his opinion that plaintiff “is unable to work because of his chronic medical conditions, and, for this reason, his disability benefits should be reinstated immediately.” (AR 1176.) In support of this opinion, Dr. Schiller cited to plaintiffs long history of “cardiomegaly and' diastolic heart failure,” “morbid obesity causing obstructive sleep apnea,” “severe left knee pain and low back pain.” (Id.) Dr. Schiller acknowledged that plaintiffs “morbid obesity has been partially treated by gastric banding performed in November 2007” but notes that plaintiff has also suffered from a meniscus tear and “severe chronic bilateral lower extremity venous insufficiency, which makes it difficult for him to ambulate.” (Id.) In Dr. Schiller’s view, plaintiffs venous insufficiency “prevents him from working at a sedentary job.” (Id.) Dr. Schiller concluded that he has observed “no substantive improvement in [plaintiffs] condition since [Dr. Schiller] first saw him as a patient in 2006.” (Id.)

By letter dated August 24, 2009, Hartford assured Dr. Schiller that his letter would be considered as part' of its review of plaintiffs administrative appeal. (AR 1017.)

C. Hartford’s Extended Decision Making Timeframe

On August 5, 2009, Hartford advised Mr. Quiat that it received Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 *325 medical records and that such records “complete[ ] the appeal to [plaintiffs] claim for Long Term Disability benefits.” (AR 1020.) Hartford therefore noted that it would render a decision within forty-five days of August 3, 2009, unless an extension was necessary. (Id.)

On August 13, 2009, Mr. Quiat responded to Hartford, expressing his disagreement with Hartford’s “interpretation of the time requirements established under ERISA.” '(AR 1133-34.) Instead, Mr. Quiat argued that Hartford was required to render its decision within forty-five days of plaintiffs submission of the appeal, with only one forty-five day extension for cause. (Id.) Mr. Quiat noted his position that the forty-five day period within which Hartford was required to make a decision on the appeal began to run no later than March 27, 2009. (AR 1134.)

In a response, dated August 24, 2009, Hartford explained that the delay resulted from the need for additional documents from plaintiffs physicians. (AR 1018-19.) Hartford maintained that “after reviewing the claim file and the documents submitted with the March 2, 2009 and March 27, 2009 appeal letters, ... Hartford determined that updated medical records for 2008 were necessary in order to provide a full and fair review.” (AR 1018.) Hartford thereafter reminded Mr. Quiat that it already “advised [him] that [it] would not begin the evaluation of [plaintiffs] appeal until the additional information [from Dr. Muhlrad] was received” and further noted that it “gave [plaintiff] the option of notifying [Hartford] if [he] wanted [Hartford] to evaluate his appeal without the information.” (AR 1019.)

Hartford then noted that on July 31, 2009, Hartford received a letter from Dr. Schiller in support of plaintiffs appeal and subsequently received Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 medical records on August 3, 2009. (Id.) Hartford then provided its understanding of the appropriate decision making time period for plaintiffs administrative appeal as follows:

Hartford considers the August 3, 2009 receipt of [plaintiffs] 2007 medical records with Dr. Muhlrad to constitute receipt of new information submitted to complete [plaintiffs] appeal submission. Accordingly, ... Hartford reserves the right to a 45 days appeal review period under ERISA, commencing on August 3, 2009, with allowance of a second 45 days decision period if there are special circumstances that prevent us from making the decision within that time. At this time, we have requested a medical review by an independent physician consultant and anticipate making a final claim determination on or before September 17, 2009.

(Id.)

D. Medical Peer Reviews of Dr. Gary Nudell and Dr. Russell Green

On August 6, 2009, Hartford referred plaintiffs LTD benefits claim to Reliable Review Services (“RRS”) for two co-morbid medical peer reviews: one to be conducted by an internist and another by a specialist in occupational medicine. (AR 1165-66.) Hartford thereafter notified RRS that it “would really like to have separate reviews to ensure that all conditions in combination are fully considered” in light of “the multiple conditions and specialties involved.” (AR 1003.) Plaintiffs LTD benefits claim was reviewed by Dr. Nudell and Dr. Green, both of whom determined that plaintiff was capable of performing full-time sedentary work and attested that “completion of [plaintiffs] review [did] not constitute a conflict of interest.” (See AR 1122,1128.)

*326 1. Dr. Nudell’s Peer Review

On August 24, 2009, Dr. Nudell, a board certified physician in internal medicine, submitted his peer review to Hartford. (AR 1113-22.) After describing the numerous documents reviewed in conjunction with his peer review, Dr. Nudell provided his professional opinion regarding claimant’s capacity for work as of July 31, 2008 and beyond. (AR 1121-22.)

In particular, Dr. Nudell considered plaintiffs numerous medical conditions, including his diabetes, hypertension, sleep apnea, coronary artery disease, venous stasis, lumbar degenerative disease, and left knee derangement. (Id.) Dr. Nudell provided a brief description of the treatment of each medical condition and his opinion of its effects on plaintiffs work capacity. (Id.)

With respect to diabetes, Dr. Nudell noted that “there is no documented evidence in the records that the claimant’s diabetes is causing any restrictions.” (AR 1121.) Dr. Nudell then noted that plaintiffs hypertension was being treated medically and noted that given the absence of any “end organ damage,” plaintiffs hypertension “should not pose any work restrictions.” (Id.) With respect to plaintiffs sleep apnea, Dr. Nudell noted that plaintiff was being treated with CPAP and that his sleep apnea would not pose any work restrictions, especially because the medical records provide no evidence that plaintiff experiences severe daytime fatigue or issues with CPAP. (AR 1122.) Dr. Nudell advised that plaintiff has nonobstructive coronary artery disease and noted the absence of any mention of congestive heart failure or any specific limitations from a cardiac standpoint. (Id.) Regarding plaintiffs venous stasis, Dr. Nudell acknowledged plaintiffs history of cellulitis and leg edema as well as plaintiffs risk for recurrent skin breakdown. (Id.) Although Dr. Nudell recognized that it would be “clinically helpful for the [plaintiff] to keep his lower extremities elevated when able,” Dr. Nudell saw no “recent evidence that this condition would prevent the claimant from functioning in a sedentary position.” (Id.) Dr. Nudell stated that plaintiffs MRI shows evidence of lumbar degenerative disc disease and spinal-stenosis; however, Dr. Nudell indicated that he observed no compelling medical evidence that plaintiffs degenerative disc disease would preclude plaintiff from functioning in a full time sedentary position, “as long, as [plaintiff] was given the opportunity to shift positions as needed for pain control.” (Id.) Finally, with respect to plaintiffs left knee derangement, Dr. Nudell observed that plaintiff suffered from a “meniscal tear and OA,” which would “limit the claimant’s ability to ambulate for prolonged periods, but should not affect his ability to perform in a sedentary position.” (Id.)

In light of the foregoing, Dr. Nudell concluded that

[plaintiff] should be capable of functioning in a full time sedentary position ... [and] should be afforded the opportunity to shift positions as needed for pain control; when able he should try to raise his lower extremities to avoid further swelling; should limit ambulation to less than 10 minutes at a time. I see no specific indication to restrict the claimant’s fine motor activity with the upper extremities. I would recommend limiting his lifting to less than 10 pounds secondary to his chronic degenerative disc disease.

(Id.)

2. Dr. Green’s Peer Review

On August 24, 2009, Dr. Green also submitted his medical record peer review report. (AR 1123-28.) Like Dr. Nudell, Dr. Green reviewed plaintiffs medical records *327 and treatment history, described plaintiffs medical conditions, and summarized his opinion regarding the effect of each condition on plaintiffs functional capacity. (AR 1123-27.)

Dr. Green first noted that “[t]here is no anticipated functional impact of hypertension on [plaintiff]” and that “[n]one of the blood pressures recorded in the documents would be impairing or disqualifying.” (AR 1126.) Second, Dr. Green noted that plaintiffs sleep apnea would have no functional impact on plaintiffs ability to be well and do normal tasks in light of plaintiffs CPAP treatment. (Id.) With respect to plaintiff’s multiple medications, Dr. Green concluded based on Dr. Schiller’s observation, that plaintiff had no problems with his medications. (Id.) Dr. Green thereafter noted that plaintiffs diabetes medicine should not functionally impact the plaintiff. (Id.) Regarding plaintiffs knee pain, Dr. Green advised that plaintiffs knee injury “could result in difficulty performing activities of daily living and make it somewhat difficult for the claimant to get around if there were no other medical issues.” (Id.) Dr. Green concluded, however, that the MRI findings on plaintiffs knee “are not so severe that one would expect [plaintiff] to have to significantly change his activities of daily living or contemplate a different type of work than he had been working in.” (Id.) Dr. Green then advised that plaintiffs back pain was “not peculiar to" an individual of [plaintiffs] age irrespective of occupational demands or the impact of morbid obesity on the axial spine.” (Id.) With respect to plaintiffs morbid obesity, Dr. Green indicated that morbid obesity “is associated with an obesity related to cardiomyopathy which the heart catheterization in 01/2007 demonstrated.” (Id.) Dr. Green further acknowledged that plaintiffs pulmonary hypertension, peripheral swelling, and venous stasis were consistent with plaintiffs morbid obesity. (Id.)

After describing plaintiffs medical conditions, Dr. Green stated that “[t]aken individually, no one of [plaintiffs] diagnoses should have a significant functional impact on day to day activities experienced by [plaintiff] apart from the morbid obesity and its associated conditions.” (AR 1127.) Dr. Green, however, noted that “[t]aken as a collection of conditions, it is my opinion that his functional capacity is impaired.” (Id.)

Dr. Green thereafter offered his opinion with a reasonable degree of medical certainty “that given the information from [plaintiff] questionnaires and the information from Dr. Schiller’s medical records, the [plaintiff] is probably more functional than he claims” and that “[plaintiff] is capable of performing a sedentary position.” (Id.) Although Dr. Green stated that plaintiff “should be allowed to be up and about to reduce the risks of lower extremity swelling,” Dr. Green advised that “most sedentary positions would allow for this.” (Id.) Dr. Green further observed that plaintiff “must be very strong in order to raise himself up and move himself about” and provided the following detailed work limitations and restrictions:

It is therefore my recommendation that he is able to lift, carry, push, or pull 10 lbs. on an occasional (activity or condition exists up to 1/3 of the time) basis. There would be no restriction on bending. The claimant would be restricted from squatting or kneeling. The claimant should walk no further than 100 feet without being allowed to rest and catch his breath. Overhead lifting should be no greater than 10 pounds. There would be no limitations on activities involving a minimal weight at waist level or while sitting. This would allow working on a computer, performing paperwork tasks, using the telephone, and *328 interacting with others in an office .setting. Hand activities such as writing or using a phone would not be limited. It would be my opinion that the claimant would be able to work eight hours per day, 40 hours per week.

(Id.) Dr. Green concluded by offering the logic of his recommendation: namely, “that the duties involved with sedentary work and those that the claimant is currently performing at home are very similar. A sedentary position does not require significant ambulation or mobility. A sedentary position does not require a great deal of lifting or exertion.” (AR 1128.) Dr. Green therefore opined that “[t]here would be significant benefit to the claimant medically to return to the workplace.” (Id.)

3. Consensus Opinion

Dr. Nudell and Dr. Green conferred and co-wrote the following consensus opinion: “The case was discussed with Dr. Green on 08/17/2009 for approximately 15 minutes. After this discussion, we both agreed that while the claimant has multiple medical issues, that he should be capable of functioning in a full time sedentary position with the restrictions discussed above.” (Id.)

E. Hartford’s Decision to Uphold Initial Termination on Appeal

On September 1, 2009, after review of the two medical peer review reports and plaintiffs entire LTD benefits claim file, Hartford Examiner Genie Guthrie recommended upholding Hartford’s initial termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits claim. (AR 1003-06.) Ms. Guthrie concluded that “[t]he preponderance of the evidence available to [Hartford] establishes that [plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary level work with flexibility of position changes.” (AR 1006.) Ms. Guthrie further noted that Hartford’s Employability Analysis Report identified three sedentary occupations within plaintiffs functional capacity, qualifications, and skills. (Id.)

By letter dated September 1, 2009, Ms. Guthrie informed plaintiff of Hartford’s decision to uphold its prior determination to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits. (See AR 1009-16.) Ms. Guthrie set forth a list of over thirty documents reviewed by Hartford during the course of plaintiffs administrative appeal. (AR 1009-11.) Ms. Guthrie then advised that Hartford “also considered the fact that [plaintiff] was approved for Social Security Disability (SSD) benefits.” (AR 1011.) Ms. Guthrie noted, however, that the “SSD decision is based on specific established rulings” and that Hartford “must administer claims based on the medical documentation available to [Hartford], and is required to make its determination based on applicable Policy language and provisions, independent of all other Agencies.” (Id.) Ms. Guthrie thereafter provided an analysis of plaintiffs medical records and the documented improvement in plaintiffs condition subsequent to the gastric banding surgery in November 2007. (AR 1011-13.)

Ms. Guthrie proceeded to provide the following critical clarification:

We would like to point out that ... Hartford did not rely solely upon the opinion expressed by Dr. Boglia on 7/23/08 with respect to [plaintiffs] conditions of Hypertension and Trace Edema in making a disability determination. The Hartford considered all of the documentation in Mr. [plaintiffs] claim file, viewed as a whole, including [his] written and oral statements; the medical records available from all of his known treating physicians; the APS completed by Dr. Schiller on 1/30/08; the opinions expressed by Dr. Schiller with respect to *329 [plaintiffs] knee and low back pain, and by Dr. Brathwaite with respect to his lapband postoperative status; and the 11/7/07 report by Dr. Grella indicating that [plaintiff] was clinically stable from a cardiac perspective.

(AR 1013.) Ms. Guthrie further assured plaintiff that Hartford “specifically requested the opinions of [plaintiffs] most current treating physicians, and relied upon those opinions in conjunction with the totality of the claim documentation.” (Id.) Indeed, Ms. Guthrie noted that despite the retracted opinions of Dr. Boglia, Dr. Schiller, and Dr. Brathwaite, “none of [plaintiffs] physicians has provided any new statement regarding his functionality or specifying any medically indicated limitations or restrictions.” (Id.)

Thereafter, Ms. Guthrie acknowledged but ultimately rejected Dr. Schiller’s July 20, 2009 letter in support of plaintiffs administrative appeal on the grounds that Dr. Schiller provided no “clinical documentation in support of his opinion, and did -not specify any functional impairments except difficulty with ambulation.” (AR 1014.) Ms. Guthrie reminded plaintiff that “to provide a full and fair review, [Hartford] sent copies of all of the medical documentation in [plaintiffs] claim file to [RRS] for an independent review by physician consultants ... to assist [Hartford] in evaluating the functional impact of [plaintiffs] various medical conditions in aggregate.” (Id.) After summarizing the peer review reports of Dr. Nudell and Dr. Green, Ms. Guthrie again noted that Hartford’s Employability Analysis Report specified at least three occupations available to plaintiff. (See AR 1014-16.)

F. Plaintiffs Request for Administrative Record

On January 4, 2010, Mr. Quiat again requested various documents from Hartford, including the Administrative Record, the Summary Plan Description, and Hartford’s Third Party Agreement with Allstate. (AR 1074-76.) On January 27, 2010, Hartford responded that “[t]o the extent [plaintiff] requested information which dpes not exist, or which is not relevant to [plaintiffs] claim according to the pertinent regulations, it is not enclosed.” (AR 1073.) Hartford then reminded plaintiff that “to protect material such as private third-party information or privileged communications, certain documents may have been withheld or appropriately redacted.” (Id.)

XI. Hartford’s Claims Administration Procedures and Policies

In support of its summary judgment motion, Hartford has provided the affidavit of Ms. Guthrie and the declaration of Hartford Director of Litigation and Appeals Bruce Luddy. (See EOF No. 57, Declaration of Bruce Luddy (“Luddy Decl.”); Guthrie Aff.) Their relevant testimony is set forth below:

• Hartford reviews benefits claims fairly without regard to the manner in which the plan is funded. (Luddy Decl. ¶ 6.; Guthrie Aff. ¶ 8.)

• Hartford consistently awards benefits on claims that are entitled to payment pursuant to the provisions of the applicable benefits plan while consistently denying claims that are not entitled to such payments. (Luddy Decl. ¶ 6.)

• Hartford recognizes that awarding benefits on claims that are not entitled to such payments pursuant to the terms of the applicable plan does not benefit all of the persons insured under that plan as a group. (Luddy Decl. ¶ 7.) Instead, such payments could result in increased premiums and/or a reduction or elimination of *330 benefits by the employer, which will ultimately work to the detriment of all participants and beneficiaries of a given plan. (Id.)

• Hartford does not provide its Claims Specialists, Team Leaders or Appeals Specialists with any incentives, remuneration, bonuses, awards, achievements, or other recognition based in whole or in part upon the denial or termination of claims. (Luddy Decl. ¶ 8; Guthrie Aff. ¶ 9.)

• Hartford’s claims decision-makers are paid fixed salaries and performance bonuses that are wholly unrelated to the number of claims paid or claims denied. (Luddy Deck ¶ 8; Guthrie Aff. ¶ 9.)

• Hartford’s Claim Specialists, Team Leaders and Appeals Specialists are evaluated on the quality and accuracy of their claims decisions in accordance with the applicable plan documents. (Luddy Deck ¶ 9; Guthrie Aff. ¶ 9.)

• Hartford does not discourage its claim decision-makers from paying legitimate claims. (Luddy Deck ¶ 10.)

• Hartford maintains a separate Appeals Unit for the consideration of claims that have been denied by the claims department on its initial review. (Luddy Deck ¶ 3.)

• During the Appeals Specialist’s review of a denied claim on administrative appeal, the individual responsible for the appeal does not discuss the merits of the claim with the Claim Specialist who made the initial benefits determination, or her supervisors. (Luddy Deck ¶ 5; Guthrie Aff. ¶ 7.)

• Hartford’s claims department and Appeals Unit are completely separate business units from the financial and underwriting departments. (Luddy Deck ¶¶ 12,14.) Neither the claims department nor the Appeals Unit seeks approval from Hartford’s financial underwriters in connection with their decision-making on claims for disability benefits. (Luddy Dec. ¶ 13.) Hartford’s financial and underwriting departments do not advise or influence the claims department or Appeals Unit with respect to whether or not to pay a claim. (Luddy Deck ¶ 14.)

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

A. Summary Judgment Standard

“Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” Rodal v. Anesthesia Grp. of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the district court must resolve all ambiguities, and credit all factual inferences that could rationally be drawn, in favor of the party opposing summary judgment and determine whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact, raising an issue for trial.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 202 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A fact is material when it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, an issue of fact is genuine only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

*331 “In order to defeat a motion for summary judgment supported by proof of facts that would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law, the nonmoving party is required under Rule 56[ ] to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact to be tried.” Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d 522, 532 (2d Cir.1993). The nonmoving party may not, however, “rely simply on conclusory statements or on contentions that the affidavits supporting the motion are not credible, or upon the mere allegations or denials of the nonmoving party’s pleading.” Id. at 532-33 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

“Courts reviewing a challenge of denial of benefits under ERISA may do so on a motion for summary judgment, which ‘provides an appropriate vehicle whereby the Court can apply substantive ERISA law to the administrative record.’ ” Zarringhalam v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int’l Union Local 1500 Welfare Fund, 906 F.Supp.2d 140, 154 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (quoting Gannon v. Aetna Life Ins., Co., No. 05-CV-2160, 2007 WL 2844869 , at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007)); see also Fortune v. Grp. Long Term Disability Plan for Emps. of Keyspan Corp., 637 F.Supp.2d 132, 141 (E.D.N.Y.2009), aff'd, 391 Fed.Appx. 74 (2d Cir.2010). “In such an action the contours guiding the court’s disposition of the summary judgment motion are necessarily shaped through the application of the substantive law of ERISA.” Alfano v. CIGNA Life Ins. Co., No. 07-CV-9661, 2009 WL 222351 , at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B. ERISA Standard of Review

As a threshold matter, the court must determine the standard of review applicable to Hartford’s termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits. The Supreme Court has long held that “a denial of benefits challenged under [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de novo standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 , 109 S.Ct. 948 , 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 , 128 S.Ct. 2343 , 171 L.Ed.2d 299 (2008); Hobson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir.2009). “When the claims administrator is granted express authority to determine eligibility issues, however, the [c]ourt ‘will not disturb the administrator’s ultimate conclusion unless it is arbitrary and capricious.’ ” Salute v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 04-CV-2035, 2005 WL 1962254 , at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005) (quoting Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir.1995)). “The plan administrator bears the burden of proving that the deferential standard of review applies.” Fay v. Oxford Health Plan, 287 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir.2002) (citing Kinstler v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins., Co., 181 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir.1999)).

Here, the parties dispute whether Hartford’s termination decision should be reviewed de novo or under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Plaintiff urges the court to apply a de novo standard of review on two independent grounds. First, plaintiff argues that Hartford has failed to establish that Allstate conveyed or intended to convey discretion to Hartford. (Pl. Mem. at 25; Pl. Opp. at 11.) Second, plaintiff contends that Hartford failed to comply with the regulatory time requirements in deciding plaintiffs administrative appeal, thereby forfeiting any discretion. (Pl. Mem. at 22; Pl. Opp. at 9-11.) As set forth below, both of plaintiffs arguments are meritless.

*332 1. Relevant Plan Documents and Hartford’s Discretion under the Plan

Plaintiff first contends that the Administrative Record lacks evidence that Allstate conveyed or intended to convey discretion to Hartford. (Pl. Mem. at 25.) Although plaintiff concedes that Hartford has identified “adequate plan language describing discretion,” plaintiff maintains that Hartford must also present “evidence that said discretionary authority was actually transmitted. ” (Pl. Opp. at 12 (emphasis in original); see also Pl. Mem. at 25.) To that end, plaintiff argues that the Administrative Record does not contain the Plan itself but instead contains only “plan documents” and a “Summary Plan Description,” both of which were drafted and issued by Hartford and thus fail to prove that discretion was explicitly conferred to Hartford. (Pl. Mem. at 26; Pl. Opp. at 12-13.) Plaintiffs contention misconstrues the evidence in the Administrative Record and ignores controlling Plan Documents, which establish that Hartford retains discretionary authority. 9

As previously noted, the Administrative Record before the court contains a Group Benefit Plan Document and a 2004 Policy Amendment, both of which include provisions that set forth the controlling terms and provisions of the Plan. (AR 1-39.) The Group Benefit Plan Document contains a Certificate of Insurance, which explains that the pages within the . Group Benefit Plan Document, including the Certificate of Insurance, become .an employee’s “Booklet-certificate.” (AR 15.) The Certificate of Insurance further states that the “Booklet-certificate is part of the Group Insurance Policy.” (Id.) The Booklet-certificate thereafter explains that Harford retains “full discretion and authority to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret all terms and provisions of the Group Insurance Policy.” (AR 27.) Moreover, the Booklet-certificate further explains that “[t]he benefits described in [the Booklet-certificate] ... are provided under a group insurance policy (Policy) issued by ... Hartford ... and are subject to the Policy’s terms and conditions.” (AR 33.) Notably, the Booklet-certificate further indicates that the Policy “is incorporated into, and forms a part of, the Plan” and that “[t]he Plan has granted [Hartford] full discretion and authority to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe and interpret all terms and provisions of the Policy.” (AR 33; see also AR 36.) As such, plaintiffs Booklet-certificate — a part of the Policy, which in turn forms a part of the Plan — features explicit and uncontroverted evidence that Hartford possesses discretion to determine a claimant’s eligibility for LTD benefits under the Plan and to interpret the provisions of plaintiffs insurance policy. No further evidence of Allstate’s “transmittal” of such discretion is needed to demonstrate what the plain language of the Plan Documents unequivocally establish.

In addition, the 2004 Policy Amendment includes an Incorporation.Provision which indicates that the Booklet-certificate and the forms enclosed therein “are ... incorporated in, and made a part of, this policy.” (AR 3.) The 2004 Amendment’s Incorporation Provision thereafter states that the terms of the Booklet-certificate, comprised of the Certificate of Insurance and all pages in the Group Benefit Plan Document, “will control: the benefit plan provisions; the eligibility and effective date of insurance rules; the termination of *333 insurance rules; exclusions; and other general policy provisions pertaining to state insurance law requirements.” (Id.) The Amendment further states that “the [entire] contract between [Hartford and Allstate] consists of: the policy; the application of the Policyholder, a copy of which is attached to and made a part of the policy when issued; and the applications, if any, of each insured person.” (AR 8.) As such, the 2004 Policy Amendment clarifies that the Booklet-certificate is a controlling Plan Document, the terms of which “control ... the benefit plan provisions.” (AR 3.) Taken together, the Booklet-certificate and 2004 Policy Amendment establish that the Plan unambiguously confers on Hartford the discretionary authority to determine disability eligibility and to enforce and interpret the terms of the Plan.

The district court’s analysis in Joyner v. Continental Cas. Co., 837 F.Supp.2d 233 (S.D.N.Y.2011) proves instructive in this case. In Joyner , the district court held that a Group Long Term Disability Certificate, which was not designated a Summary Plan Description, established that the Plan vested discretionary authority in the Claims Administrator. Id. at 237 . Specifically, the district court reasoned that the “integration clause in the Group Policy states ‘The policy, the Employer’s application, Your certificate- of coverage, and Your application, if any, and any other attached papers, form the entire contract between the parties.’” Id. The court in Joyner therefore concluded that the Certificate, “according to the plain language of the Policy, is part of the plan’s terms and is ‘legally binding,’ and thus gives [the Claims Administrator] discretionary authority to interpret the plan.” Id. at 237-38 .

Similar to the legally binding Certificate in Joyner , the Booklet-certificate here is incorporated into and is a part of the plan and controls the benefit plan provisions. As such, the discretionary authority set forth in the Booklet-certificate provides ample proof that Hartford enjoys discretionary authority under the Plan. See Thurber v. Aetna Life Co., 712 F.3d 654, 658-59 (2d Cir.2013) (acknowledging that the plaintiffs “Booklet” constituted a plan document that could have, but did not, reserve discretion to plan administrator); Palmiotti v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 423 F.Supp.2d 288, 297-98 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (finding a “LTD Booklet” containing reservation of discretionary authority to be a controlling Plan Document where, as here, the LTD Booklet was incorporated into the insurance policy).

In arguing to the contrary, plaintiff cursorily asserts that the Administrative Record includes only a “plan amendment,” a “Summary Plan Description,” and/or “Policy documents,” but not the Plan. 10 (PI. Mem. at 26; PI. Opp. at 12-13.) In support of this claim, plaintiff cites to the following language in the Booklet-certificate: “[t]he Policy is incorporated into, and forms a part of, the Plan.... A copy *334 of the Plan is available for your review during normal working hours in the office of the Plan Administrator.” (AR 33; Pl. Mem. at 27.) Plaintiff asserts that this language “states that additional Plan documents exist” that are not included in the Administrative Record. (Pl. Mem. at 29.) Plaintiffs speculative assertion, however, mischaracterizes the evidence in the Administrative Record and presumes, without any evidentiary basis, that the Booklet-certificate constitutes a “Summary Plan Description.” As explained above, Hartford has produced controlling Plan documents establishing that Hartford retains discretionary authority under the Plan. Plaintiffs insistence that additional Plan Documents may exist and his concomitant speculation that such additional Plan Documents may controvert the discretion unequivocally set forth in the submitted Plan Documents — specifically, the Booklet-certificate — are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

Moreover, plaintiffs reliance on CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 1866 , 179 L.Ed.2d 843 (2011) is unavailing. (Pl. Mem. at 29.) In Amara , the Supreme Court held that terms set forth in summary plan descriptions could not be enforced as terms of the plan itself. 131 S.Ct. at 1877-78 . The Court reasoned that “[t]o make the language of a plan summary legally binding could well lead plan administrators to sacrifice simplicity and comprehensibility in order to describe plan terms in the language of lawyers” and thus concluded that “the summary documents .... do not themselves constitute the terms of the plan.” Id. at 1877-78 .

Amara is inapposite for two reasons. First, as previously noted, there is no evidentiary basis to conclude that the documents in the Administrative Record constitute summary plan descriptions rather than controlling Plan Documents. 11 To the contrary, as discussed above, the 2004 Policy Amendment clarifies that the Booklet-certificate, which establishes Hartford’s discretion under the Plan, controls the terms of the benefits plan. (See AR 3.) Moreover, the Administrative Record establishes that the Booklet-certificate is a part of the Group Insurance Policy and that the Group Insurance Policy is part of the Plan. 12 (See AR 15, 33.)

*335 Second, unlike in Amara , there is no admissible proof demonstrating that “the Plan” conflicts with any of the documents in the Administrative Record received by plaintiff regarding Hartford’s discretionary authority. Schussheim v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 09-CV-4858, 2012 WL 3113311 , at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 31, 2012) (“After Amara, to the extent that the language of a ‘plan summary’ conflicts with the actual terms of the plan, the terms of the plan control.”). Plaintiff concedes that “the specific language relied upon by ... Hartford is adequate to describe discretionary authority,” and merely asserts that additional Plan documents may exist. ' (PI. Mem. at 25.) Nowhere in plaintiff’s submissions does he assert that those additional Plan documents divest Hartford of discretionary authority. 13 As such, the Supreme Court’s holding in Amara is not controlling and does not compel application of de novo review in this case.

Equally unavailing is plaintiffs reliance on Sheehan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 368 F.Supp.2d 228 (S.D.N.Y.2005). (Pl. Mem. at 29.) In Sheehan , the district court found that MetLife, the plan administrator, failed to establish that the arbitrary and capricious standard of review applied. Id. at 231 . The district court reasoned that MetLife conceded during the initial round of discovery that it could not uncover complete copies of the relevant plan documents. Id. After permitting plaintiff to conduct additional “documentary and deposition discovery on the issues of plan interpretation,” the district court in Sheehan rejected MetLife’s request for deferential review on the ground that MetLife again failed to produce the relevant plan documents demonstrating MetLife’s discretionary authority. See id.

Unlike in Sheehan , where the district court rejected MetLife’s request for arbitrary and capricious review based on its complete failure to locate and present plan documents establishing conferral of discretionary authority, Hartford has produced the relevant Plan Documents — the Booklet-certificate and the 2004 Policy Amendment — which when read together, establish Hartford’s explicit discretionary authority to enforce and interpret the terms of the Plan. 14

*336 Accordingly, Hartford has adduced sufficient evidence to establish that the Plan confers explicit discretionary authority on Hartford.

2. Hartford’s Purported Failure to Comply with Regulatory Time Requirements

Plaintiff next maintains that the court should apply a de novo standard of review because Hartford failed to comply with the DOL’s time requirements for deciding plaintiffs administrative appeal. (PI. Mem. at 22-24.) Specifically, plaintiff contends that his administrative appeal, which was submitted on March 2, 2009, was not decided by Hartford until September 1, 2009, long after the regulatory time period set forth under 29 C.F.R. §§ 2560.503 — 1(i)(1)(i), 2560.503 — 1(i)(3)(i). (PI. Mem. at 22-23.) Plaintiff argues that Hartford’s failure to issue a timely decision by June 25, 2009 deprives Hartford of its discretion, thereby requiring de novo review of its termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits. Plaintiffs argument fails.

Even assuming that Hartford’s decision on plaintiffs appeal was untimely, a close review of the Administrative Record establishes that Hartford is entitled to deferential review. 15 Far from forfeiting its discretionary authority, Hartford requested updated medical records from plaintiffs treating physicians to ensure a complete and accurate claim file and thereafter rendered its written decision less than one month after obtaining all of the relevant medical evidence. In doing so, Hartford properly exercised its discretion and substantially complied with the DOL’s regulatory deadlines, and its decision remains entitled to a deferential standard of review.

*337 Indeed, the weight of authority in the Second Circuit supports the application of arbitrary and capricious review where, as here, the plan administrator remains in regular contact with the benefits claimant and issues a decision prior to the commencement of federal litigation. E.g., Duncan v. CIGNA Life Ins. Co., No. 10-CV-1164, 2011 WL 6960621 , at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2011) (“CLICNY has provided a decision to which the Court can defer, and did so before it was served with the complaint in this action. ... Moreover, CLICNY regularly communicated with plaintiff regarding the status of his appeal and informed the plaintiff of the reasons for delays.” (citations omitted)), aff'd, Duncan v. CIGNA Life Ins. Co., 507 Fed.Appx. 61 (2d Cir.2013); Robinson v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 06-CV-7604, 2007 WL 3254397 , at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2007) (“[Although MetLife did not issue a decision within the time prescribed by ERISA, its tardiness was not in bad faith. MetLife remained in contact with [plaintiffs] attorney, informed him of the reasons for its delays, and took steps to ensure a full and fair review of Robinson’s claim. Therefore, the Court will apply the arbitrary and capricious standard.”); Daniel v. UnumProvident Corp., No. 04-CV-1073, 2006 WL 5692739 , at *14 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 2006) (“UNUM Life’s delay in providing plaintiff with timely notice of the denial of her appeal was occasioned, at least in part, by additional medical and vocational reviews of her claim, following additional submissions by plaintiff. Thus, the delay cannot be characterized as dilatory or as evidencing bad faith.”); Pava v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., No. 03-CV-2609, 2005 WL 2039192 , at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2005) (holding that where the administrator communicates with the claimant regarding the status, of the appeal, acts in good faith, and does not delay its decision unreasonably, its failure to comply with the regulation deadlines may be excused); Hammer v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., No. 01-CV-9307, 2005 WL 525445 , at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2005) (holding that the Second Circuit has not carved out an exception to the arbitrary and capricious standard to revert to a de novo standard of review for untimely rendered decisions of administrative appeals), affd on other grounds, 160 Fed.Appx. 103 (2d Cir.2005); cf. Demirovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 B-J Pension Fund, 467 F.3d 208, 212 (2d Cir.2006) (“[R]ather than go directly to court when the Fund failed to issue a timely initial determination, [plaintiff] chose to appeal. She then waited for and received a timely decision on her appeal. This eventual decision constitutes a final decision and exercise of the Fund’s discretion, to which we must defer.” (footnote omitted)).

The district court’s reasoning in Duncan provides strong support for the application of arbitrary and capricious review in this case. In Duncan, the district court held that the plan administrator’s untimely determination of plaintiffs appeal did not require de novo review. 2011 WL 6960621 , at *4-5. Specifically, the district court reasoned that “[e]ven assuming that defendant’s determination was late, this is not a case in which the administrator fails to respond at all, nor is it a case in which the administrator has failed to comply in any reasonable respect with the regulatory deadlines.” Id. at *5 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The district court further explained that the plan administrator rendered a decision before the commencement of the plaintiffs federal ERISA action and regularly communicated with the plaintiff regarding the status of his appeal. Id. In light of the plan administrator’s good faith conduct, the Duncan court held that arbitrary and ca *338 pricious, rather than de novo, review was warranted. Id.

As in Duncan, Hartford’s delay in this case did not arise out of dilatory gamesmanship or bad faith. Hartford regularly communicated with plaintiff regarding the status of his appeal, informed plaintiff of the additional time needed to acquire relevant medical records from his treating physicians, and thereafter rendered a decision on plaintiffs appeal months before the commencement of" the instant action. Having done so, Hartford substantially complied with the DOL’s regulatory deadlines and rendered a decision that is entitled to deferential review, notwithstanding any purported delay in its final benefits determination. See Pava, 2005 WL 2039192 , at *9 (“[T]he case law in this Circuit indicates that where the administrator communicates with the claimant regarding the status of her appeal, acts in good faith, and does not delay its decision unreasonably, its failure to comply with the regulation deadlines may be excused.”).

Indeed, the timeline of events surrounding plaintiffs administrative appeal confirms Hartford’s proactive and comprehensive approach to plaintiffs LTD benefits claim and demonstrates that Hartford substantially complied with the DOL’s regulatory deadlines. 16 Specifically, on March 2, 2009, plaintiff submitted his administrative appeal, and supplemented that appeal on March 27, 2009 with an additional letter from Dr. Boglia. (AR 1028, 1690.) By letter dated March 27, 2009, Hartford informed plaintiff that it would issue a decision on his administrative appeal by May 11, 2009. (AR 1028, 1091.) On April 22, 2009, after reviewing the treatment calendar submitted by plaintiff in support of his appeal, Hartford discerned that it lacked updated medical records from plaintiffs treating physicians and sought to obtain those updated records. (AR 995-96.) Accordingly, by letter dated April 27, 2009, Hartford informed plaintiff of its request for additional medical records from plaintiffs treating physicians and encouraged plaintiffs counsel to assist Hartford in obtaining those updated records. (See AR 1027.)

On May 4, 2009, Hartford informed plaintiff that it was taking a forty-five day extension to decide plaintiffs administrative appeal because it was awaiting updated medical records from plaintiffs treating physicians. (See AR 1026.) Between May 2009 and June 2009, Hartford received numerous updated medical records from Dr. Franko, Dr. Schirripa, Dr. Capustin, Dr. Brathwaite, Dr. Schiller, and Dr. Muhlrad. (See AR 996, 1422-37, 1228-51.) Although Hartford received Dr. Muhlrad’s 2008-2009 medical records on June 24, 2009, Hartford did not receive Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 medical records. (AR 1228-51, 1257.) Accordingly, by letter dated June 26, 2009, Hartford notified plaintiff that it would not commence its review of plaintiffs appeal until it received Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 medical records. (AR 1021.) Significantly, in its June 26th letter, Hartford also advised plaintiff to inform Hartford if he wanted it to evaluate the administrative appeal without Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 records. (AR 1021.) Plaintiff, however, did not request Hartford to commence its appeal before Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 records were received.

*339 On August 3, 2009, Hartford received Dr." Muhlrad’s 2007 medical records. (AR 1002.) On August 5th, Hartford explained that the receipt of Dr. Muhlrad’s 2007 records completed plaintiffs appeal and required a determination within forty-five days with the option for another forty-five day extension. (AR 1020.) Less than one month later, on September 1, 2009, Hartford rendered its decision on plaintiffs appeal and upheld Hartford’s initial termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits. (AR 1009-16.)

Throughout this extended process, Hartford consistently communicated with plaintiff regarding its need for updated records from plaintiffs numerous treating physicians to ensure a full and fair review of plaintiffs LTD benefits claim. Hartford informed plaintiff of the additional time needed to obtain those updated records and requested the assistance of plaintiffs counsel to ensure timely receipt of those records. Furthermore, Hartford afforded plaintiff the option of proceeding with consideration of his appeal without the medical records of his orthopedist. Having failed to avail himself of that option, plaintiff now seeks to shift the blame onto Hartford and to punish Hartford for attempting to base its decision on updated and complete medical records. The court rejects plaintiffs meritless attempts to subject Hartford’s claims determination to de novo review and finds that Hartford was in substantial compliance with the DOL’s regulatory deadlines.

The case law cited by plaintiff does not command a different result. In Nichols v. Prudential Ins. Co., the plan administrator failed to decide plaintiffs appeal before the expiration of the regulatory deadlines. 406 F.3d 98, 104-08 (2d Cir.2005). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a lawsuit in federal court, and the plan administrator moved to dismiss plaintiffs complaint for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. Id. at 102 . The Second Circuit held that because the plan administrator failed to render a timely decision before the plaintiff commenced her federal action, the plaintiffs administrative appeal was “deemed denied,” thereby permitting her to go directly to federal court rather than await the plan administrator’s belated decision. Id. at 105-109 . The Second Circuit further clarified that the plaintiffs “ ‘deemed denied’ claim [was] not denied by any exercise discretion, but by operation of law” and therefore held “that a ‘deemed denied’ claim is entitled to de novo review.” Id. at 109 . In so holding, the- Second Circuit declined to apply the “substantial compliance” approach to the plan administrator’s failure to comply with the regulatory deadlines because doing so could effectively block the plaintiffs access to the federal courts. See id. at 107 .

The district court in Fershtadt v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. reached a similar result. No. 07-CV-6963, 2010 WL 571818 , at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010). In Fershtadt , the plan administrator failed to communicate at all with the plaintiff and issued a decision on the plaintiffs appeal five days after he filed his federal complaint. Id. at *11 . Relying on Nichols, the Fershtadt court refused to apply deferential review to the plan administrator’s untimely decision because “the defendant had failed to acknowledge the appeal by the administrative deadline and failed to render a decision by the time the suit was brought.” Id. (citing Nichols, 406 F.3d at 109 ). As in Nichols, the district court in Fershtadt declined to apply the substantial compliance doctrine and did not excuse the plan administrator’s failure to comply with the regulatory deadlines. Id.

This case is not analogous to Nichols or Fershtadt . In Nichols and Fershtadt, de novo review was appropriate because the *340 plan administrators failed to issue their final determination prior to the commencement of the claimants’ federal lawsuits. Additionally, in each case, the plaintiff did not await the plan administrator’s decision before proceeding to federal court, and application of the substantial compliance doctrine thus risked prejudicing the plaintiffs access to federal court. By contrast, Hartford rendered its decision on plaintiffs administrative appeal on September 1, 2009, several months before plaintiff commenced this action on April 30, 2010. 0Compare AR 1009-16, with Compl.) Rather than proceeding directly to federal court after Hartford’s purported failure to comply with the DOL’s deadlines, plaintiff awaited Hartford’s decision on his administrative appeal and relied upon that decision in his Complaint. In denying plaintiffs claim, Hartford did not forfeit, but rather exercised, its discretion. As such, neither Nichols nor Fershtadt supports plaintiffs argument that de novo review is warranted. See Daniel, 2006 WL 5692739 , at *13 (holding that because the plan administrator “provided plaintiff with a written denial of her claim'which detailed its reasons for the denial, albeit in an untimely manner,” the “case [did] not involve a decision that was ‘deemed denied’’ under the regulations and, thus, [was] distinguishable from those cases which held that a ‘deemed denial’ does not warrant any deference”); Pava, 2005 WL 2039192 , at *9-10 (distinguishing Nichols and holding that “[t]he pattern of interaction between the parties demonstrates that Plaintiff sought and waited for Hartford to exercise its discretion, and that she relied on this exercise before coming to this Court”).

Consequently, the court finds that Hartford’s decision on plaintiffs appeal, even if untimely, is subject to arbitrary and capricious review. This approach is consistent with the policy underlying the DOL’s regulations, particularly in light of Hartford’s proactive attempts to render a decision based on complete and updated medical records. See Pava, 2005 WL 2039192 , at *9-10; Gilbertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 328 F.3d 625, 635 (10th Cir.2003) (“ERISA’s procedural regulations are meant to promote accurate, cooperative, and reasonably speedy decision-making.”).

II. Application of Arbitrary and Capricious Review

As explained above, Hartford’s decision to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits must be reviewed under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review. “[T]he scope of judicial review when applying the arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow.” Zarringhalam, 906 F.Supp.2d at 156 (citing Celardo v. GNY Auto. Dealers Health & Welfare Trust, 318 F.3d 142, 146 (2d Cir.2003)). Under this standard, the court “may overturn a denial of benefits ‘only if it was without reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a matter of law.’ ” Demirovic, 467 F.3d at 212 (quoting Pulvers v. First UNUM Life Ins. Co., 210 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir.2000)). “Substantial evidence is ‘such evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the conclusion reached by the [administrator and] ... requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.’ ” Celardo, 318 F.3d at 146 (alterations in original) (quoting Miller v. United Welfare Fund, 72 F.3d 1066, 1072 (2d Cir.1995)).

“In the context of a summary judgment motion, the arbitrary and capricious standard requires that [the court] ask whether the aggregate evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, could support a rational determination that the plan administrator acted arbitrarily in denying the claim for benefits.” Zarringhalam, 906 F.Supp.2d *341 at 156 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Critically, courts “reviewing plan administrators’ benefit denials for arbitrariness and capriciousness are not free to substitute [their] own judgment for that of the insurer as if [they] were considering the issue of eligibility anew.” Duncan, 2011 WL 6960621 , at *6 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The mere existence of conflicting evidence does not' render the [plan administrator’s] decision arbitrary or capricious.” Daniel, 2006 WL 5692739 , at *15 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Despite the “deferential nature of the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard,” the court is mindful that the “plan’s administrator ... must provide a full and fair review of the decision to deny the claim.” Neely v. Pension Trust Fund of the Pension Hospitalization & Benefit Plan of the Elec. Indus., No. 00-CV-2013, 2004 WL 2851792 , at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 8, 2004). “[S]uch a review must include a searching and careful determination as to whether the conclusion reached by the administrator in view of the facts before it was indeed rational and not arbitrary.” Rappa v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., No. 06-CV-2285, 2007 WL 4373949 , at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For the reasons discussed below, the court finds that Hartford afforded plaintiff a full and fair review and terminated plaintiffs LTD benefits based on substantial evidence in the Administrative Record. Consequently, Hartford’s decision was neither arbitrary nor capricious. 17

A. Hartford Denied Plaintiffs LTD Benefits Claim Based on Substantial Evidence After a Full and Fair Review

Hartford initially terminated plaintiffs LTD benefits in July 2008, upon a determination that plaintiff was no longer disabled from performing any occupation, as defined by the Plan. {See AR 987-92.) In September 2009, Hartford upheld this initial determination on administrative appeal. (AR 1003-15.) Both Hartford’s initial decision and its decision on appeal were supported by substantial evidence in the Administrative Record.

1. Hartford’s Initial Determination to Terminate Plaintiffs LTD Benefits

Hartford’s initial determination to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits in July 2008 was based on a comprehensive and detailed review of plaintiffs claim file, the relevant clinical data, and all of the medical evidence in the Administrative Record. {See AR 44.) In particular, Hartford relied upon: (1) the medical records of plaintiffs treating physicians; (2) the functional capacity opinions of Drs. Boglia, Brathwaite, and Schiller; (3) plaintiffs own statements regarding his improved- functional capacity; and (4) Hartford’s -Employability Analysis Report. Accordingly, Hartford’s initial termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits was supported by substantial evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

First, Hartford based its denial of plaintiffs LTD benefits on the updated records of his treating physicians, all of whom documented improvement in plaintiffs *342 medical conditions and functional capacity-in the months leading up to July 2008.

For example, in his January 2008 APS, Dr. Schiller acknowledged plaintiffs improved functional capacity. (See AR 389-92.) Specifically, Dr. Schiller reported that plaintiff was capable of sitting for two hours at a time for a total of ten hours per day, standing for half an hour at a time for a total of one hour per day, and walking for one hour at a time for a total of one hour per day. 18 (AR 390.) Dr. Schiller further indicated that plaintiff could occasionally kneel, drive, reach overhead, and lift/carry up to 20 pounds .with both hands. (Id.) Notably, Dr. Schiller expected plaintiffs functional restrictions to last approximately six months and explainéd that plaintiff could “participate in vocational rehabilitation services,” including worksite accommodations — a medical finding consistent with Hartford’s determination to terminate plaintiffs benefits in July 2008. (Id.) Although Dr. Schiller observed that plaintiff suffered from moderate knee pain radiating into the right leg, Dr. Schiller also recorded plaintiffs comment that his knee pain was improving. 19 (AR 391.) Dr. Schiller further noted that plaintiff was responding well to his physical therapy and pain medications. (Id.) In addition, Dr. Schiller indicated that plaintiff “has been tolerating his medications well.” (Id.)

Dr. Brathwaite, plaintiffs bariatric surgeon, similarly reported improvement in plaintiffs medical condition and functional capacity after his November 2007 gastric banding surgery. (See AR 239-56, 1453-55.) According to Dr. Brathwaite’s December 2007 post-surgical examination notes, plaintiff expressed no complaints regarding the gastric banding procedure and, in fact, reported walking thirty minutes a day. (AR 244.) Moreover, Dr. Brathwaite recorded plaintiffs pre-surgery weight as 404 pounds and noted that by February 2008, plaintiff weighed 378 pounds. (AR 971.) Notably, by June 27, 2008, shortly before Hartford’s initial termination of plaintiffs LTD benefits, plaintiff had lost even more weight, reporting a weight of 367 pounds. (AR 1445.)

Dr. Boglia, plaintiffs nephrologist, similarly provided updated treatment records documenting plaintiffs improved medical condition. In a June 2008 office visit note, Dr. Boglia acknowledged that plaintiff possibly required a knee replacement and appeared stressed because of his divorce but ultimately observed that plaintiff was “feeling better” and trying to lose weight and “take control of [his] health.” (AR 59.) Likewise, in a March 2008 office visit note, Dr. Boglia noted plaintiffs weight loss due to his gastric banding surgery despite the lack of any exercise. (AR 63.)

In addition, Dr. Capustin, plaintiffs pulmonologist, provided updated medical records indicating that plaintiff utilized a CPAP machine to treat his sleep apnea and that “as weight loss progresses, CPAP pressures will be titrated down.” (AR 109.) Moreover, Hartford also considered *343 medical records from plaintiffs psychotherapist, who reported that plaintiff was receiving psychotherapeutic treatment on a weekly to biweekly basis. (AR 105.)

Furthermore, even before plaintiffs gastric banding surgery, Dr. Grella, plaintiffs cardiologist, noted improvement in plaintiffs cardiac health. (See 180-195, 1890.) Specifically, in a May 23, 2007 letter, Dr. Grella cleared plaintiff for surgery and opined that “from a cardiac perspective [plaintiff] is clinically stable, and overall, would pose an acceptable and low cardiac risk for surgery.” (AR 184-85.) Likewise, in a pre-surgery evaluation dated November 5, 2007, Dr. Grella explained that despite plaintiffs nonobstructive coronary artery disease, diastolic dysfunction, leg edema, and dyspnea, plaintiff was “asymptomatic in terms of any cardiac issues in terms of chest discomfort” and reported no “lightheadedness, dizziness, palpitations, or syncopal events.” (AR 181.)

Taken together, the contemporaneous treatment records of plaintiffs physicians support Hartford’s initial determination to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits based on his improved functional capacity. (See AR 44-46.)

Second, Hartford also relied upon medical opinions solicited from Drs. Boglia, Brathwaite, and Schiller regarding plaintiffs improved functional capacity. Specifically, in response to Hartford’s inquiries regarding plaintiffs functional capacity, Dr. Schiller indicated that, as of April 2008, plaintiff was capable of performing full-time sedentary work despite his knee pain and low back pain but opined that plaintiff was unable of performing full-time light work. 20 (AR 148.) Dr. Schiller provided no explanation or supporting medical evidence for his determination that plaintiff was unable to perform full-time light work, despite the opportunity to provide such an explanation. (See id.) In addition, Dr. Brathwaite stated that, as of April 2008, plaintiff was capable of both light and sedentary work due to his November 2007 gastric banding surgery. (AR 149-50.) Finally, Dr. Boglia responded that, as of July 2008, plaintiff was able to perform light work despite his hypertension and trace edema. 21 (AR 48-49.)

*344 In an attempt to discredit these three opinions, plaintiff maintains that Hartford inappropriately asked Drs. Schiller, Brathwaite, and Boglia only about the isolated conditions that each respective physician was treating. (PI. Mem. at 35.) Plaintiffs contention does not alter the court’s conclusion that Hartford appropriately relied upon the solicited opinions of plaintiffs treating physicians. As correctly noted by Hartford, the solicited opinions of the three treating physicians were consistent with their contemporaneous treatment records, which documented improvement -in plaintiffs medical conditions and functional capacity subsequent to his November 2007 gastric banding procedure. Moreover, Drs. Schiller, Brathwaite, and Boglia were asked about plaintiffs functional capacity with respect to their respective knowledge and specialties. In limiting the scope of its inquiry as to each physician, Hartford ensured that the doctors based their opinions on objective medical evidence and personal knowledge. Hartford therefore appropriately credited the opinions of Drs. Boglia, Brathwaite, and Schiller in its initial determination to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits. (See AR 991-92.)

Third, Hartford also, reasonably relied upon plaintiffs own statements regarding his improved functional capacity. For example, in his 2008 Claimant Questionnaire, plaintiff explained that despite his various medical conditions, he was able to perform “[s]ome household chores at a slow pace,” to walk, to use the bathroom, to sort through mail, to pay bills, and to carry out “very light yard maintenance.” (AR 378.) Plaintiff also reported his ability to independently perform various daily tasks such as bathing, feeding himself, dressing, and using the toilet, albeit at a slow pace. (See id.) Additionally, during a telephone discussion on March 24, 2008, plaintiff advised Hartford of his back and knee pain but noted that he was prescribed pain medication. (Id.) Plaintiff confirmed that he continued to lose weight and that “his diabetes is under control.” (Id.) Finally, on May 13, 2008, plaintiff notified Hartford that he lost 39 pounds since his gastric banding surgery, that his “only complications” related to his knee injury, that he intended to seek treatment from an orthopedist for that knee injury, and that he continued to have back pain. (See AR 1887-88.) Notably, plaintiffs statements regarding his improved functional capacity and medical conditions were consistent with the contemporaneous clinical data provided by his treating physicians. Accordingly, plaintiffs description of his improved medical conditions and functional capacity further buttressed Hartford’s reasoned determination that he was able to perform sedentary work.

Fourth, and finally, Hartford predicated its July 2008 initial benefits determination in part on a May 2008 Employability Analysis Report. (See AR 122-23, 144-45.) Hartford’s Employability Analysis Report considered plaintiffs education, work history, and functional capacities and determined that plaintiff had the requisite skill and knowledge to perform at least three sedentary occupations prevalent in the national economy. (AR 122-23.)

*345 In light of the evidence described above, and upon an independent review of the Administrative Record, the court finds that Hartford’s initial determination to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits was reasonable and based on substantial evidence. Notwithstanding plaintiffs exaggerated assertions to the contrary, Hartford carefully reviewed all of the relevant medical evidence and clinical data and rationally determined that plaintiff was no longer disabled under the Plan. Moreover, the Administrative Record lacks, and plaintiff has failed to identify, sufficient evidence to establish that Hartford acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Indeed, even crediting plaintiffs contention that the Administrative Record contains some evidence in conflict with Hartford’s findings, it is well established that the “mere existence of conflicting evidence does not render the [plan administrator’s] decision arbitrary or capricious.” See Daniel, 2006 WL 5692739 , at *15 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Plaintiffs Administrative Appeal

Hartford’s September 2009 decision on plaintiffs administrative appeal was equally supported by substantial evidence in the Administrative Record. After receiving plaintiffs administrative appeal, Hartford promptly requested updated medical records from plaintiffs treating physicians and initiated ongoing efforts to supplement plaintiffs claims file with clinical data from his recent medical appointments. (See AR 995-96, 1025, 1027.) Based upon a comprehensive review of the updated medical records from plaintiffs physicians, the preexisting medical evidence in plaintiffs claims file, and the medical peer review reports of two independent physician consultants, Hartford reaffirmed its initial determination that plaintiff was no longer disabled under the Plan and upheld the July 2008 termination decision. (See AR 1003-06, 1009-13.) In reaching this determination, Hartford did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and afforded plaintiff a full and fair review.

First, the updated medical records obtained from plaintiffs treating physicians during the administrative appeal did not alter Hartford’s conclusion that plaintiff could perform sedentary work in light of his weight loss and improved functional capacity. 22 According to Dr. Brathwaite’s updated medical records, plaintiff reported walking two to three times a week for as much as fifteen minutes at a time. (AR 1429.) In addition, Dr. Franko’s updated medical records documented plaintiffs significant weight loss, noting that plaintiff lost approximately eighty pounds as of February 2009 due to his gastric banding surgery. (AR 1609.) Dr. Capustin’s updated office visit, notes reported plaintiffs weight at 347 pounds as of January 2009. (AR 1631-33.) Dr. Boglia’s April 10, 2009 office visit note recorded plaintiffs weight at 341 pounds. (AR 1562.)

Second, Hartford secured two independent co-morbid medical peer review re *346 ports completed by board-certified physicians, both of whom further reinforced Hartford’s determination to deny plaintiffs LTD benefits. (AR 1165-66.) In the first peer review report, Dr. Nudell, a board-certified internist, provided a detailed discussion of . plaintiffs numerous medical conditions and concluded that, despite his various medical conditions, plaintiff was capable of functioning in a full time sedentary position. (See AR 1113— 23.) In arriving at this conclusion, Dr. Nudell specifically considered plaintiffs diabetes, hypertension, sleep apnea, coronary artery disease, venous stasis, history of leg edema, lumbar degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, and knee injury and ultimately determined that plaintiffs medical conditions did not restrict his ability to perform sedentary work. ■ (See AR 1121-22.) Dr. Nudell recognized that plaintiff “should be afforded the opportunity to shift positions as needed for pain control” and to “raise his lower extremities to avoid ... swelling,” but found “no specific indication to restrict [plaintiffs] fine motor activity with the upper extremities.” (AR 1122.)

In the second peer review report, Dr. Green, a specialist in occupational medicine, likewise concluded that plaintiff was capable of performing sedentary work. (AR 1123-28.) Dr. Green considered plaintiffs hypertension, sleep apnea, multiple medications, knee pain, back pain, and morbid obesity and noted that individually, plaintiffs conditions did not “have a significant functional impact on day to day activities ... apart from the morbid obesity.” (AR 1127.) Dr. Green acknowledged that “[t]aken as a collection of conditions, ... [plaintiffs] functional capacity is impaired.” (Id.) Dr. Green’s acknowledgment of plaintiffs functional impairment, however, did not amount to a finding that plaintiff was unable to perform sedentary work. Rather, Dr. Green expressly opined that in light of plaintiffs own statements in his Claimant Questionnaires and the information in Dr. Schiller’s medical records, plaintiff was “probably, more functional than he claims” and determined that “the claimant is capable of performing a sedentary position.” (Id.) Notably, Dr. Green commented that plaintiff “must be very strong in order to raise himself up and move himself about” and recommended that plaintiff “would be able to work eight hours per day, 40 hours per week.” (Id.) Dr. Green further explained that plaintiff could perform sedentary work because he was already performing similar tasks at home. (AR 1128.)

In addition to their individual peer review reports, Drs. Nudell and. Green also provided a consensus opinion in which they expressed their agreement that notwithstanding plaintiffs medical conditions, he was capable of performing sedentary work. (Id.) Taken together with all of the medical evidence in the Administrative Record, the individual and consensus opinions of Dr. Nudell and Dr. Green provided Hartford with a strong evidentiary basis to reject plaintiffs administrative appeal.

Furthermore, Hartford considered and reasonably rejected or afforded minimal weight to additional evidence offered in support of plaintiffs administrative appeal. For example, Hartford did not credit Dr. Schiller’s July 20, 2009 letter, in which Dr. Schiller expressed his opinion that plaintiff is unable to work due to his chronic medical conditions, including plaintiffs obesity, cardiac problems, sleep apnea, knee pain, and low back pain. (AR 1176.) In rejecting Dr. Schiller’s opinion letter, Hartford rationally explained that Dr. Schiller provided no “clinical documentation in support of his opinion, and did not specify any functional impairments except difficulty with ambulation.” (AR 1014.) In addition, Hartford found unpersuasive the so *347 licited retractions of Dr. Boglia, Dr. Brathwaite, and Dr. Schiller. (AR 1013.) Hartford reasoned that none of the doctors “provided any new statement regarding his functionality or specifying any medically indicated limitations or restrictions.” (Id.) In affording little weight to Dr. Schiller’s July 2009 opinion letter as well as the new opinions of Dr. Boglia, Dr. Brathwaite, and Dr. Schiller, Hartford did not “arbitrarily refuse to credit the reliable evidence put forth by [plaintiff].” Demirovic, 467 F.3d at 212 (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, Hartford determined that such evidence was neither reliable nor relevant in light of the lack of supporting clinical documentation and the absence of new statements specifying plaintiffs medically indicated functional limitations. (AR 1013.) Moreover, after considering the totality of the medical evidence, Hartford concluded that Dr. Schiller’s July 20, 2009 letter and the three retractions did not offset the substantial objective medical evidence demonstrating plaintiffs improved functional capacity and the findings of Dr. Nudell and Dr. Green. The court finds no basis to disturb Hartford’s reasonable determination. Hobson, 574 F.3d at 89 (“[T]he question for this court is not whether [the plan administrator] made the correct decision [but] whether [the plan administrator] had a reasonable basis for the decision that it made.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

After a full and fair review of all of the relevant and reliable medical evidence and clinical data in the Administrative Record, Hartford determined that plaintiff was not disabled under the Plan in light of his improved functional capacity and ability to perform sedentary work. In making this determination, Hartford rendered a decision based on substantial evidence and properly denied plaintiffs administrative appeal. According due deference to Hartford, the court finds that Hartford’s decision on plaintiffs administrative appeal was neither arbitrary nor capricious.

B. Plaintiffs Arguments

Plaintiff advances several meritless arguments in an attempt to discredit Hartford’s decision to terminate his LTD benefits. Specifically, plaintiff maintains that Hartford denied plaintiff a full and fair review and acted arbitrarily or capriciously by: (1) failing to consider all of the relevant medical evidence; (2) failing to afford adequate weight to plaintiffs favorable 2006 SSA Disability Finding; (3) improperly relying on the peer review reports of Dr. Green and Dr. Nudell; (4) failing to conduct an independent medical examination (“IME”), functional capacity examination (“FCE”), or surveillance; and (5) terminating plaintiffs LTD benefits based on a conflict of interest. As explained below, plaintiffs arguments lack any persuasive force and rest on a misguided view of the law and facts.

1. Hartford’s Failure to Consider All Relevant Medical Evidence

Plaintiff argues that Hartford’s decision to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits was not based on substantial evidence. Specifically, plaintiff contends that Hartford (a) ignored evidence of plaintiffs orthopedic impairments, including sustained knee, joint, and back pain, (PI. Opp. at 1-7; PL Reply at 9-11); (b) failed to consider his subjective statements regarding his disabling medical conditions, (Pl. Mem. at 39-41); and (c) disregarded the side effects of plaintiffs medications, (PL Opp. at 22-23). 23 Plaintiffs contentions are unavailing.

*348 a. Plaintiffs Orthopedic Impairments and Complaints of Pain

First, based on the record before the court, plaintiffs unfounded assertion that Hartford ignored plaintiffs orthopedic impairments during its initial determination to deny plaintiffs benefits in July 2008 must be rejected. (See Pl. Opp. at 2.) As explained above, Hartford considered all of the medical evidence in plaintiffs claim file and based its initial decision to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits on substantial evidence in the Administrative Record. Indeed, Hartford terminated plaintiffs LTD benefits based on. Dr. Schiller’s opinion that plaintiff was capable of full-time sedentary work, despite his knee pain. (AR 147-48.) Hartford further relied upon objective medical evidence demonstrating plaintiffs improved functional capacity and plaintiffs own statements regarding his physical abilities. (See, e.g., AR 59, 63, 239-56, 378, 389-93, 971, 973.)

To discredit Hartford’s initial determination, plaintiff cites to medical records in the Administrative Record documenting plaintiffs purportedly disabling orthopedic impairments and asserts that Hartford failed to consider such medical evidence before terminating plaintiffs benefits in July 2008. (Pl. Opp. at 1-3; Pl. Reply at 10.) Plaintiff, however, disregards the fact that a majority, if not all, of the cited medical records regarding his orthopedic impairments were not produced to Hartford until plaintiffs administrative appeal in 2009. (See, e.g., AR 1228-35, 1265-66, 1285, 1300, 1307, 1350, 1355, 1362, 1367, 1383.) Hartford could not have ignored, in 2008, medical records that it did not receive from plaintiffs physicians until his administrative appeal in 2009. 24 In any event, the Administrative Record lacks sufficient medical evidence establishing that plaintiffs purported orthopedic impairments were disabling as defined by the Plan, or precluded him from engaging in sedentary work. As such, the court finds no reason to substitute its judgment for the reasoned and comprehensive judgment of Hartford in deciding to terminate plaintiffs LTD benefits in July 2008. See Duncan, 2011 WL 6960621 , at *6.

Nor did Hartford ignore plaintiffs orthopedic impairments, or complaints of knee, back, or joint pain in deciding his appeal in September 2009. (See PI. Opp. at 4-5.) To the contrary, Hartford engaged in a comprehensive review of all of the relevant medical evidence, fully considered plaintiffs medical conditions, and determined that plaintiff could engage in sedentary work based on the totality of the evidence in plaintiffs claims file. Additionally, Hartford retained two independent medical peer review physicians, both of whom considered but discounted plaintiffs purportedly disabling orthopedic impairments. For example, Dr. Nudell

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