The opinion
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4415
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RODNEY ANTAWAN BROWN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:11-cr-00218-H-2)
Submitted: March 25, 2013 Decided: May 7, 2013
Before NIEMEYER, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher B. Shella, SHELLA, HARRIS & AUS, PC, Durham, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Felice McConnell Corpening, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant
United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rodney Antawan Brown was found guilty, after a jury
trial, of one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); one count of armed bank
robbery and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2113(a), (d), and 2 (2006); and one count of use and carrying
of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence and
aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) and 2 (2006). The district court sentenced
Brown to 384 months’ imprisonment. Brown now appeals. In
accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
Brown’s attorney has filed a brief certifying that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning the substantive
reasonableness of Brown’s sentence. Brown filed a pro se brief
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, insufficient
evidence, and a Brady * violation. The Government has declined to
file a brief. Because we find no meritorious grounds for
appeal, we affirm.
Counsel for Brown questions whether Brown’s sentence
was reasonable. We review Brown’s sentence for reasonableness,
applying a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 52 (2007). We begin by reviewing
*
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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the sentence for significant procedural error, including
improper calculation of the Guidelines range, failure to
consider sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006),
sentencing based on clearly erroneous facts, or failure to
adequately explain the sentence imposed. Id. at 51. Only if we
find a sentence procedurally reasonable can we consider
substantive reasonableness. United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). Here, Brown’s within-Guidelines
sentence is presumed reasonable, United States v. Powell, 650
F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 350 (2011),
and we find no procedural or substantive error in its
imposition.
As to the challenges raised in Brown’s pro se
supplemental brief, we find no error. The evidence was
sufficient to support his convictions. The evidence purportedly
withheld by the Government—records of cell phone call times—is
not exculpatory, so there is no Brady violation. In addition,
we have held that “there is no Brady violation if the defense is
aware of the evidence in time to reasonably and effectively use
it at trial.” United States v. Jeffers, 570 F.3d 557, 573 (4th
Cir. 2009). Because Brown admits in his pro se brief that he
knew of the phone records prior to trial, he does not allege a
cognizable Brady claim. Finally, because the record does not
conclusively establish that counsel was ineffective, Brown’s
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claims to that effect may only be raised in a motion pursuant to
28 U.S.C.A. § 2255.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and conclude there are no meritorious issues for
appeal. Therefore, we affirm Brown’s conviction and sentence.
This court requires counsel to inform Brown, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Brown requests that a petition be filed but
counsel believes such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Brown. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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