Opinion

Joseph Torda v. Fairfax County School Board

  • 517 F. App'x 162
Court
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Filed
Apr 4, 2013
Status
Unpublished
On the bench
Niemeyer, Gregory, Thacker
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.3%

The opinion

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-1883

JOSEPH MICHAEL TORDA, by and through his guardians, Susan

Capuano Torda and Thomas Torda; SUSAN CAPUANO TORDA, mother

of Joseph Michael Torda,

Plaintiffs – Appellants,

v.

FAIRFAX COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District

Judge. (1:11-cv-00193-GBL-TRJ)

Submitted: March 18, 2013 Decided: April 4, 2013

Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Joseph Michael Torda, Susan Capuano Torda, Appellants Pro Se.

Patricia A. Minson, John Francis Cafferky, BLANKINGSHIP & KEITH,

PC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Susan Capuano Torda and her son, Joseph Michael Torda,

appeal the district court’s order denying their motion for

judgment on the record and entering judgment in favor of the

Fairfax County School Board on the Tordas’ civil action, which

challenged the decision of a due process hearing officer on

claims arising under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

Act of 2004 (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006).

We have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error. See M.S. ex rel. Simchick v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 553

F.3d 315, 323 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating standard of review). In

particular, we agree with the district court that the Tordas are

barred from challenging the Board’s eligibility determinations

by virtue of the pertinent statute of limitations as well as by

their own conduct, see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B) (2006);

Patricia P. v. Bd. of Educ. of Oak Park, 203 F.3d 462, 469 (7th

Cir. 2000), and we conclude, in light of the conflicting

evidence, that the district court did not clearly err in finding

that Joseph does not possess a specific auditory processing

disorder that is not secondary to his cognitive challenges. See

MM ex rel. D.M. v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523,

538 (4th Cir. 2002). Likewise, we see no reason to disturb the

district court’s conclusion that Joseph received a free

appropriate public education during the pertinent time period.

2

See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982); Sumter

Cnty. Sch. Dist. 17 v. Heffernan ex rel. TH, 642 F.3d 478, 483

(4th Cir. 2011); Hall v. Vance Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629,

636 (4th Cir. 1985). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

district court.

Finally, we grant each of the Board’s pending motions

except for its motion to strike the Tordas’ informal reply

brief, which we deny. We deny each of the Tordas’ pending

motions except for their motion for leave to file an informal

reply brief exceeding the length limitations, which we grant.

See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a); United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d

318, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that Fed. R. App. P.

10(e)(2) allows for modification of record, but not introduction

of new evidence in appellate court). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before this court and argument would

not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

3

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