Opinion

P. v. Brown CA5

Court
California Court of Appeal
Filed
Mar 15, 2013
Status
Unpublished
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 26.2%

The opinion

Filed 3/14/13 P. v. Brown CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,

F064316

Plaintiff and Respondent,

(Super. Ct. No. DF10417A)

v.

HERBERT BROWN, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John W. Lua,

Judge.

Rex Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and

Raymond L. Brosterhous II, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

*Before Wiseman, Acting P.J., Kane, J. and Peña, J.

INTRODUCTION

Appellant Herbert Brown contends the parole revocation fine imposed pursuant to

Penal Code1 section 1202.45 at the time of his original sentence should be stricken.

Respondent maintains that because the original sentence was recalled, the fine is no

longer an issue. Respondent does acknowledge, however, that if the court were to find

imposition of the fine remained in effect, the fine should be stricken. The court finds that

when the trial court recalled its original sentence, imposition of the fine was effectively

vacated. Therefore, the court will affirm the sentence imposed April 17, 2012.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a felony complaint filed June 15, 2011, the Kern County District Attorney

alleged appellant committed two violations of indecent exposure pursuant to section 314,

subdivision 1. It was further alleged, as to both counts, that appellant had seven prior

strikes within the meaning of section 667, subdivisions (c) through (j), and section

1170.12, subdivisions (a) through (e).

On June 20, 2011, appellant was arraigned; the court entered not guilty pleas, and

all allegations were denied. The public defender was appointed.

Assisted by counsel, on December 19, 2011, appellant pled no contest to one count

of indecent exposure pursuant to a plea bargain. The second count alleged was dismissed

by the People in the furtherance of justice.

Thereafter, appellant moved to withdraw his plea, alleging it was entered by

mistake, ignorance, or incomplete legal advice. The People opposed the motion, and

appellant replied thereto.

On January 25, 2012, the court denied appellant’s motion and proceeded to

sentencing. In accordance with the plea bargain, the court denied probation and

sentenced appellant to a total state prison term of six years. It also assessed a number of

1All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

2.

fines and fees, including a restitution fine pursuant to section 1202.4 and a parole

revocation fine pursuant to section 1202.45.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on January 25, 2012. On February 29, 2012,

appellant filed an amended notice of appeal.

On April 17, 2012, the trial court recalled its earlier sentence. After amending

count 1 of the complaint to allege a misdemeanor violation of section 314, the trial court

denied probation and sentenced appellant to 447 days in custody. He was also required to

register as a sex offender pursuant to section 290. Appellant then received credit for a

total of 447 days.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND2

On June 3, 2011, while in the custody of California Department of Corrections and

Rehabilitation, appellant was observed by a female correctional officer to be engaging in

lewd conduct. Specifically, his pants were down around his ankles and he was

masturbating in his cell. Despite being asked to stop, appellant continued through to

sexual release. Thereafter, he was extracted from his cell and housed in the

administrative segregation unit.

The Fine Imposed Pursuant to Section 1202.45, a Parole Revocation

Fine, Was Vacated When the Court Recalled Its Original Sentence and

Subsequently Resentenced Appellant to a Misdemeanor Term and

Credit for Time Served

Appellant maintains that a parole revocation fine imposed when he was originally

sentenced to a term of six years in state prison should be stricken as a result of

resentencing where he was sentenced as a misdemeanant. Respondent contends that

when the trial court recalled its original sentence, that sentence was vacated and, hence,

no parole revocation fine remains outstanding. The court agrees.

At the time of appellant’s sentencing, section 1202.45 provided that

2The statement of facts is taken from the probation officer’s report.

3.

“[i]n every case where a person is convicted of a crime and whose sentence

includes a period of parole, the court shall at the time of imposing the

restitution fine pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4, assess an

additional parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount as that

imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1202.4. This additional

parole revocation restitution fine shall not be subject to penalty assessments

…, and shall be suspended unless the person’s parole is revoked.” (Former

§ 1202.45.)

“A sentence resulting in imprisonment in the state prison pursuant to Section 1168 or

1170 shall include a period of parole supervision or postrelease community supervision,

unless waived, or as otherwise provided in this article.” (§ 3000, subd. (a)(1).)

Because appellant originally received a commitment to state prison, imposition of

the parole revocation fine was required on January 25, 2012. Nonetheless, the trial court

later granted a defense motion to recall the sentence imposed on that date.

Section 1170, subdivision (d) provides that a trial court can recall a sentence on its

own motion within 120 days after committing a defendant to prison. (Dix v. Superior

Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 455.) It may do so for any lawful reason rationally related;

it is not limited to correcting a disparate sentence. (People v. Nelms (2008) 165

Cal.App.4th 1465, 1473; People v. Alanis (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1467, 1475.) Here, the

trial court recalled its sentence within the required time frame, or approximately 83 days

after appellant was originally sentenced. Additionally, it appears the trial court did so for

a reason rationally related to lawful sentencing. At resentencing, reference was made to a

1987 abstract of judgment, and it can be reasonably inferred the document affected

subsequent treatment of the crime.

Further, the statute specifies how the offender is to be resentenced: “as if he or

she had not previously been sentenced.” (§ 1170, subd. (d).) Thus, the trial court’s recall

of the original sentence placed appellant in a position similar to that as if he had not been

sentenced at all. In effect, then vacating all fines imposed on January 25, 2012.

4.

Because appellant was resentenced to a term of 447 days in custody, and was

given credit for time served,3 the sentence imposed on April 17, 2012, did not include a

period of parole. In the absence of a sentence including a period of parole, that sentence

would not include a parole revocation fine.4 In fact, when the trial court resentenced

appellant, it made no mention of any fine, nor did it impose any fine.

Therefore, the court finds that the trial court’s recall of the original sentence that

provided for a period of parole, in favor of a later sentence that did not, effectively

vacated any fine previously imposed pursuant to section 1202.45.

DISPOSITION

The judgment imposed April 17, 2012, is affirmed.

3Appellant served 299 actual days and received 148 days of good and work time credits,

for a total of 447 days.

4See, e.g., People v. Cruz (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 664, 671-672 (defendant who is not

subject to state parole period after sentence completed is not subject to parole revocation

restitution fine). See also People v. Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 63 (indeterminate

sentence of life without possibility of parole precluded imposition of parole revocation fine);

People v. DeFrance (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 486, 505 (same); People v. Jenkins (2006) 140

Cal.App.4th 805, 819 (same).

5.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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