Martin v. State

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

JOHN PINNOW STEVE CARTER

Special Assistant to the Attorney General of Indiana

Public Defender

Greenwood, Indiana NANDITA G. SHEPHERD

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA

JAMI MARTIN, )

)

Appellant (Defendant), ) Supreme Court Cause Number

) 03S01-0108-PC-363

v. )

) Court of Appeals Cause Number

STATE OF INDIANA, ) 03A01-0012-PC-412

)

Appellee (Plaintiff). )

APPEAL FROM THE BARTHOLOMEW CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable Stephen R. Heimann, Sr., Judge

Cause No. 03C01-8802-CF-175

CRIMINAL TRANSFER

August 28, 2002

RUCKER, Justice

We grant transfer and hold that the 2001 amendments to the Indiana

Code providing credit for time served on home detention as a condition of

probation should be applied retroactively to the defendant in this case.

Facts and Procedural History

After pleading guilty to two counts of dealing in cocaine, Jami

Martin was sentenced by the trial court to twenty years for each count, to

be served concurrently. The trial court later modified the sentence and

placed Martin on electronically monitored home detention as a condition of

probation. When Martin violated the conditions of his probation, the trial

court revoked it and ordered him to serve the balance of his sentence.

Martin subsequently filed various motions with the trial court to receive

credit for the time he had served on home detention, all of which the trial

court denied. Martin then initiated an appeal.

On May 22, 2001, while Martin’s appeal was pending before the Court of

Appeals, the General Assembly amended Indiana Code sections 35-38-2-3 and

35-38-2.5-5. Pub.L. No. 166-2001, §§ 1, 2, 2001 Ind. Acts 1075-76, 1077.

Effective July 1, 2001, the amendments provide that a person earns credit

for time served on home detention as a condition of probation. Ind. Code

§§ 35-38-2-3(h)(2), (j)(2), -2.5-5(e). Previously, the statutes were

silent on this point. See I.C. §§ 35-38-2-3, -2.5-5 (1998). Noting in

passing that the amendments did not apply to Martin, the Court of Appeals

affirmed the trial court. Martin v. State, 748 N.E.2d 428, 430 n.4 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2001). Martin seeks transfer contending that the amendments

should be applied retroactively to him. We previously granted transfer and

now reverse the trial court.

Discussion

The general rule is that unless there are strong and compelling

reasons, statutes will normally be applied prospectively. Metro Holding

Co. v. Mitchell, 589 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ind. 1992). An exception to this

general rule exists for remedial statutes, which are statutes intended to

cure a defect or mischief that existed in a prior statute. Bryarly v.

State, 232 Ind. 47, 111 N.E.2d 277, 278-79 (1953); Ind. Dep’t of State

Revenue v. Estate of Riggs, 735 N.E.2d 340, 344 (Ind. Tax Ct. 2000). When

a remedial statute is involved, a court must construe it to “effect the

evident purpose for which it was enacted[.]” Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.

Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 14 N.E. 586, 589 (1887). Accordingly, remedial

statutes will be applied retroactively to carry out their legislative

purpose unless to do so violates a vested right or constitutional

guaranty.[1] Id.

Prior to the amendments at issue here, there was a conflict of

authority in the Court of Appeals regarding the availability of credit for

time served on home detention as a condition of probation. One line of

authority held that a person was entitled to such credit. See Dishroon v.

State, 722 N.E.2d 385, 389 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); cf. Purcell v. State, 721

N.E.2d 220, 222 n.4, 223 (Ind. 1999) (holding that a person is entitled to

credit for time served on home detention pursuant to a community

corrections program but expressing no opinion as to credit for time served

on home detention as a condition of probation). The other line of

authority held that a person was not entitled to such credit. See Palmer

v. State, 744 N.E.2d 525, 530 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to follow

Dishroon).[2]

To highlight this conflict of authority, the Court of Appeals in

Palmer implored the General Assembly to address the issue of credit for

time served on home detention as a condition of probation because, as it

stood, it was a “patchwork quilt of contradiction and confusion.” Id.; see

also id. at 531 (requesting “the General Assembly to offer some much-needed

clarification, consistency, and guidance . . . .”) (Brook, J., concurring).

The General Assembly apparently responded by amending Indiana Code

sections 35-38-2-3 and 35-38-2.5-5 during the 2001 session to provide

credit for time served on home detention as a condition of probation. In

light of the General Assembly’s response, we conclude that the amendments

are remedial in nature as they were intended to cure a defect that existed

in prior statutes, namely: silence concerning whether a defendant was

entitled to credit for time served on home detention as a condition of

probation. Therefore, because the amendments do not violate a vested right

or constitutional guaranty, we apply them retroactively to Martin in order

to carry out their legislative purpose of providing credit for time served

on home detention as a condition of probation.[3]

Conclusion

We reverse the trial court.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, SULLIVAN and BOEHM, JJ., concur.

-----------------------

[1] We acknowledge that a number of decisions have stated that if a

remedial statute violates vested rights or creates new rights, then it

cannot be applied retroactively. See, e.g., Samm v. Great Dane Trailers,

715 N.E.2d 420, 423 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied; Deasy-Leas v.

Leas, 693 N.E.2d 90, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied; Estate of

Robinson v. C & I Leasing, Inc., 691 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998),

trans. denied; R.L.G. v. T.L.E., 454 N.E.2d 1268, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App.

1983); McGill v. Muddy Fork of Silver Creek Watershed Conservancy Dist.,

175 Ind. App. 48, 370 N.E.2d 365, 370 (1977); Malone v. Conner, 135 Ind.

App. 167, 189 N.E.2d 590, 591 (1963), trans. denied. However, this

formulation is inconsistent with this Court’s precedent.

[2] We grant transfer today in Palmer and hold that the amendments at

issue here should also be applied retroactively to the defendant in that

case.

[3] We observe that since the amendments went into effect on July 1,

2001, the Court of Appeals has twice reached the same outcome as reached

here, albeit on different grounds. In Senn v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1190 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2002), the defendant, who had been sentenced before the effective

date of the amendments, filed a motion in the trial court seeking credit

for time served on home detention as a condition of probation. The trial

court denied the motion. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the

General Assembly’s amendments to Indiana Code sections 35-38-2-3 and 35-38-

2.5-5 represented an “effort to clarify the law,” not to change it. Id. at

1199. As such, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. Similarly,

in Stith v. State, 766 N.E.2d 1266 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), the Court of

Appeals held:

We believe the 2001 amendment to the statute reflects the

legislature’s clarification of its preexisting intent that

probationers on home detention be entitled to credit time. We

accordingly choose to follow Dishroon as more accurately reflecting

the legislative intent to be gleaned from the “patchwork quilt of

contradiction and confusion” that existed prior to the July 2001

amendment to the statute.

Stith was entitled to credit time for the period when he was on

home detention as a condition of probation, and we therefore reverse.

Id. at 1268 (citation and footnote omitted), trans. not sought.