In re City of Detroit

Opinion Regarding Eligibilitg

STEVEN RHODES, Bankruptcy Judge.

The Congress shall have Power To ... establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States....

Article I, Section 8, United States Constitution

No ... law impairing the obligation of contract shall be enacted.

Article I, Section 10, Michigan Constitution

The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.

Article IX, Section 24, Michigan Constitution

*107

Table of Contents

I Summary of Opinion . 110

II. Introduction to the Eligibility Objections. 110

A. The Process. 110

B. Objections Filed by Individuals Without an Attorney. 111

C. Objections That Raise Only Legal Issues. 111

D. Objections That Require the Resolution of Genuine Issues of Material Fact. 112

III.Introduction to the Facts Leading up to the Bankruptcy Filing 112

A. The City’s Financial Distress. 113

1. The City’s Debt. 113

2. Pension Liabilities. 114

3. OPEB Liabilities. 115

4. Legacy Expenditures — Pensions and OPEB . 115

5. The Certificates of Participation. 115

a. The COPs and Swaps Transaction. 115

b. The Result. 116

c. The Collateral Agreement. 116

d. The City’s Defaults Under the Collateral Agreement 116

e. The Forbearance and Optional Termination Agreement 117

f. The Resulting Litigation Involving Syncora. 117

g. The COPs Debt. 118

6. Debt Service. 118

7. Revenues. 118

8. Operating Deficits. 118

9. Payment Deferrals . 119

B. The Causes and Consequences of the City’s Financial Distress 119

1. Population Losses. 119

2. Employment Losses. 119

3. Credit Rating. 119

4. The Water and Sewerage Department. 119

5. The Crime Rate. 120

6. Streetlights. 120

120

8. The Police Department. 120

9. The Fire Department. 120

10. Parks and Recreation. 120

11. Information Technology. 120

The City’s Efforts to Address Its Financial Distress. 121 p

A Brief History of Michigan’s Emergency Manager Laws 121 a

The Events Leading to the Appointment of the City’s Emergency 122 m

The State Treasurer’s Report of December 21, 2011. 122

The Financial Review Team’s Report of March 26, 2012 .. 123

The Consent Agreement. 123

The State Treasurer’s Report of December 14, 2012. 124

The Financial Review Team’s Report of February 19, 2013 124

The Appointment of an Emergency Manager for the City of 125

F. The Emergency Manager’s Activities. 126

1. The June 14, 2013 Meeting and Proposal to Creditors , 126

2. Subsequent Discussions with Creditor Representatives 127

G. The Prepetition Litigation. 128

H. The Bankruptcy Filing. 128

*108 IV. The City Bears the Burden of Proof 00

V. The Objections of the Individuals Who Filed Objections Without an Attorney. to CD

VI. The City of Detroit Is a “Municipality” Under 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(1) to CD

VII. The Bankruptcy Court Has the Authority to Determine the Constitutionality of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and Public Act 436. to CD

A. The Parties’ Objections to the Court’s Authority Under Stem v. Marshall. to CD

B. Stem, Waldman, and Global Technovations. CO O

C. Applying Stern, Waldman, and Global Technovations in This Case CO S — 1

D. Applying Stem in Similar Procedural Contexts. CO to

E. The Objectors Overstate the Scope of Stem. I — i CO CO

1. Stem Does Not Preclude This Court from Determining Constitutional Issues. CO co

2. Federalism Issues Are Not Relevant to a Stem Analysis. CO ^

F. Conclusion Regarding the Stern Issue. CO cn

VIII. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the United States Constitution. CD CO

A. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Uniformity Requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution. CD CO ¶-H

1. The Applicable Law . CD CO T — t

2. Discussion. l> CO T — 1

B. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution. CO

C. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. CO 00

1. The Tenth Amendment Challenges to Chapter 9 Are Ripe for Decision and the Objecting Parties Have Standing. 00 CO tH

a. Standing . c* CO t-H

b. Ripeness . o ^

2. The Supreme Court Has Already Determined That Chapter 9 Is Constitutional .

3. Changes to Municipal Bankruptcy Law Since 1937 Do Not Undermine the Continuing Validity of Bekins. CO

a. The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution Prohibits States from Enacting Municipal Bankruptcy Laws. 3

b. Asbury Park Is Limited to Its Own Facts. 3

4. Changes to the Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence Do Not Undermine the Continuing Validity of Bekins. kO ^ tH

a. New York v. United States. bO t — 1

b. Printz v. United States. CD ^ H

c. New York and Printz Do Not Undermine Bekins. t— ^ r-H

d. Explaining Some Puzzling Language in New York. GO H

5. Chapter 9 Is Constitutional As Applied in This Case. <75 'ñH H

a. When the State Consents to a Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, the Tent h Amendment Does Not Prohibit the Impairment of Contract Rights That Are Otherwise Protected by the State Constitution. cn o

b. Under the Michigan Constitution, Pension Rights Are Contractual Rights. cn o

IX. Public Act 436 Does Not Violate the Michigan Constitution. cn

*109 A. The Michigan Case Law on Evaluating the Constitutionality of a State Statute.155

B. The Voters’ Rejection of Public Act 4 Did Not Constitutionally Prohibit the Michigan Legislature from Enacting Public Act 436.156

C. Even If the Michigan Legislature Did Include Appropriations Provisions in Public Act 436 to Evade the Constitutional Right of Referendum, It Is Not Unconstitutional.157

D. Public Act 436 Does Not Violate the Home Rule Provisions of the Michigan Constitution.158

E. Public Act 436 Does Not Violate the Pension Clause of the Michigan Constitution.161

X. Detroit’s Emergency Manager Had Valid Authority to File This Bankruptcy Case Even Though He Is Not an Elected Official.161

XI. The Governor’s Authorization to File This Bankruptcy Case Was Valid Under the Michigan Constitution Even Though the Authorization Did Not Prohibit the City from Impairing Pension Rights.162

XII. The Judgment in Webster v. Michigan Does Not Preclude the City from Asserting That the Governor’s Authorization to File This Bankruptcy Case Was Valid. 1 — 1 to

A. The Circumstances Leading to the Judgment. I — i to

B. The Judgment Is Void Because It Was Entered After the City Filed Its Petition. lO ZO t-I

C. The Judgment Is Also Void Because It Violated the Automatic Stay CD SO rH

D. Other Issues . 1> ZO i-l

XIII.The City Was “Insolvent”.168

A. The Applicable Law.168

B. Discussion .168

1.The City Was “Generally Not Paying Its Debts As They Become Due”.169

2. The City Is Also “Unable to Pay Its Debts As They Become

The City’s “Lay” Witnesses.170 CO

The City’s Failure to Monetize Assets.170 ^

XIV. The City Desires to Effect a Plan to Adjust Its Debts.171

A. The Applicable Law.171

B. Discussion .172

XV. The City Did Not Negotiate with Its Creditors in Good Faith.172

A. The Applicable Law.172

B. Discussion .174

XVI.The City Was Unable to Negotiate with Creditors Because Such Negotiation Was Impracticable.176

A. The Applicable Law.176

B. Discussion .177

XVII. The City Filed Its Bankruptcy Petition in Good Faith Gi t— i — 1

A. The Applicable Law. O GO i — i

B. Discussion . O CO i — I

1. The Objectors’ Theory of Bad Faith. i — I GO i — 1

2. The Court’s Conclusions Regarding the Objectors’ Theory of Bad Faith. CO OO i — i

3. The City Filed This Bankruptcy Case in Good Faith CCO i — I

*110 187 a. The City’s Financial Problems Are of a Type Contemplated for Chapter 9 Relief.

187 b. The City’s Reasons for Filing Are Consistent with the Remedial Purpose of Chapter 9.

188 c. The City Made Efforts to Improve the State of Its Finances Prior to Filing, to No Avail.

188 d. The Residents of Detroit Will Be Severely Prejudiced If This Case Is Dismissed.

189 C. Conclusion Regarding the City’s Good Faith.

189 XVIII. Other Miscellaneous Arguments.

189 A. Midlantic Does Not Apply in This Case.

190 B. There Was No Gap in Mr. Orr’s Service as Emergency Manager

XIX. Conclusion: The City is Eligible and the Court Will Enter an Order for Relief. 190

I. Summary of Opinion

For the reason stated herein, the Court finds that the City of Detroit has established that it meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c). Accordingly, the Court finds that the City may be a debtor under chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code. The Court will enter an order for relief under chapter 9.

Specifically, the Court finds that:

• The City of Detroit is a “municipality” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (40).

• The City was specifically authorized to be a debtor under chapter 9 by a governmental officer empowered by State law to authorize the City to be a debtor under chapter 9.

• The City is “insolvent” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 10K32XQ.

• The City desires to effect a plan to adjust its debts.

• The City did not negotiate in good faith with creditors but was not required to because such negotiation was impracticable.

The Court further finds that the City filed the petition in good faith and that therefore the petition is not subject to dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 921 (c).

The Court concludes that it has jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (a), and that the matter is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2).

II. Introduction to the Eligibility Objections

The matter is before the Court on the parties’ objections to the eligibility of the City of Detroit to be a debtor in this chapter 9 case under 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c).

A. The Process

By order dated August 2, 2013, the Court set a deadline of August 19, 2013 for parties to file objections to eligibility. (Dkt. #280) That order also allowed the Official Committee of Retirees, then in formation, to file eligibility objections 14 days after it retained counsel.

One hundred nine parties filed timely objections to the City’s eligibility to file this bankruptcy case under § 109 of the bankruptcy code. In addition, two individuals, Hassan Aleem and Carl Williams, filed an untimely joint objection, but upon motion, the Court determined that these objections should be considered timely. (Dkt. #821, ¶ VIII, at 7) Accordingly, the total number of objections to be considered is 110.

In pursuing their eligibility objections, the parties represented by attorneys filed over 50 briefs through several rounds.

*111 Because the constitutionality of chapter 9 was drawn into question, the Court certified the matter to the Attorney General of the United States under 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (a), and permitted the United States to intervene. (Dkt. # 642 at 7) The United States then filed a brief in support of the constitutionality of chapter 9 (Dkt. # 1149) and a supplemental brief (Dkt. # 1560).

Also, because the constitutionality of a state statute was drawn into question, the Court certified the matter to the Michigan Attorney General under 28 U.S.C. § 2403 (b), and permitted the State of Michigan to intervene. The Michigan Attorney General filed a “Statement Regarding The Michigan Constitution And The Bankruptcy Of The City Of Detroit.” (Dkt. # 481) He also filed a brief regarding eligibility (Dkt. # 756) and a supplemental response (Dkt. # 1085).

In an effort to organize and expedite its consideration of these objections, the Court entered an “Order Regarding Eligibility Objections” on August 26, 2013 (Dkt. # 642) and a “First Amended Order Regarding Eligibility Objections” on September 12, 2013 (Dkt. # 821). Those orders divided the objections into two groups— those filed by parties with an attorney, which were, generally, organized groups (group A), and those filed by individuals, mostly without an attorney (group B). Individuals without an attorney (group B) filed 93 objections. The remaining 17 objections were filed by parties with an attorney. The objections filed by attorneys were then further divided between objections raising only legal issues and objections that require the resolution of genuine issues of material fact. 1

The Second Amended Final- Pre-Trial Order concisely identifies which parties assert which objections. (Dkt. # 1647 at 4-11) This opinion will not repeat that recitation.

B. Objections Filed by Individuals Without an Attorney

On September 19, 2013, the Court held a hearing at which the individuals who filed timely objections without an attorney had an opportunity to address the Court. At that hearing, 45 individuals addressed the Court. These objections are discussed in Part V, below.

C. Objections That Raise Only Legal Issues

On October 15 and 16, 2013, the Court heard arguments on the objections that raised only legal issues. These objections are addressed in Parts VII-XII, below. Summarily stated, these objections are:

1. Chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code violates the United States Constitution.

2. The bankruptcy court does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code.

3. Public Act 436 of 2012 violates the Michigan Constitution and therefore the City was not validly authorized to file this bankruptcy case as required for eligibility by 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(2).

4. The bankruptcy court does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of P.A. 436.

5. Detroit’s emergency manager is not an elected official and therefore did not *112 have valid authority to file this bankruptcy case, as required for eligibility by 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(2).

6. Because the governor’s authorization to file this bankruptcy case did not prohibit the City from impairing the pension rights of its employees and retirees, the authorization was not valid under the Michigan Constitution, as required for eligibility by 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(2).

7. Because of the proceedings and judgment in Webster v. The State of Michigan, Case No. 13-734-CZ (Ingham County Circuit Court), the City is precluded by law from claiming that the governor’s authorization to file this bankruptcy case was valid, as required for eligibility by 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(2).

D. Objections That Require the Resolution of Genuine Issues of Material Fact

Beginning on October 23, 2013, the Court conducted a trial on the objections filed by attorneys that require the resolution of genuine issues of material fact. These objections are addressed in Parts XIII-XVII, below. Summarily stated, these objections are:

8. The City was not “insolvent,” as required for eligibility by 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(3) and as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (32)(C).

9. The City does not desire “to effect a plan to adjust such debts,” as required for eligibility by 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(4).

10. The City did not negotiate in good faith with creditors, as required (in the alternative) for eligibility by 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(5)(B).

11. The City was not “unable to negotiate with creditors because such negotiation [was] impracticable,” as required (in the alternative) for eligibility by 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(5)(C).

12.The City’s bankruptcy petition should be dismissed under 11 U.S.C. § 921 (c) because it was filed in bad faith.

In addition, in the course of the briefing, parties asserted certain new and untimely objections. These are addressed in Part XVIII, below.

III. Introduction to the Facts Leading up to the Bankruptcy Filing

The City of Detroit was once a hardworking, diverse, vital city, the home of the automobile industry, proud of its nickname — the “Motor City.” It was rightfully known as the birthplace of the American automobile industry. In 1952, at the height of its prosperity and prestige, it had a population of approximately 1,850,000 residents. In 1950, Detroit was building half of the world’s cars.

The evidence before the Court establishes that for decades, however, the City of Detroit has experienced dwindling population, employment, and revenues. This has led to decaying infrastructure, excessive borrowing, mounting crime rates, spreading blight, and a deteriorating quality of life.

The City no longer has the resources to provide its residents with the basic police, fire and emergency medical services that its residents need for their basic health and safety.

Moreover, the City’s governmental operations are wasteful and inefficient. Its equipment, especially its streetlights and its technology, and much of its fire and police equipment, is obsolete.

To reverse this decline in basic services, to attract new residents and businesses, and to revitalize and reinvigorate itself, the City needs help.

The following sections of this Part of the opinion detail the basic facts regarding the City’s fiscal decline, and the causes and *113 consequences of it. Section A will address the City’s financial distress. Section B will address the causes and consequences of that distress. Section C will address the City’s efforts to address its financial distress. Part D will address the facts and events that resulted in the appointment of an emergency manager for the City. Finally, Parts E-G will address the facts and events that culminated in this bankruptcy filing.

The evidence supporting these factual findings consists largely of the following admitted exhibits:

Exhibit 6 — the City’s “Comprehensive Annual Financial Report” for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2012.

Exhibit 21 — “Preliminary Review of the City of Detroit,” from Andy Dillon, State Treasurer, to Rick Snyder, Governor, December 21, 2011;

Exhibit 22 — “Report of the Detroit Financial Review Team,” from the Detroit Financial Review Team to Governor Snyder, March 26, 2012;

Exhibit 24 — “Preliminary Review of the City of Detroit,” from Andy Dillon, State Treasurer, to Rick Snyder, Governor, December 14, 2012;

Exhibit 25 — “Report of the Detroit Financial Review Team,” from the Detroit Financial Review Team to Governor Snyder, February 19, 2013;

Exhibit 26 — Letter from Governor Rick Snyder to Mayor Dave Bing and Detroit City Council, March 1, 2013;

Exhibit 28 — Letter from Kevyn D. Orr, Emergency Manager, to Governor Richard Snyder and State Treasurer Andrew Dillon, July 16, 2013;

Exhibit 29 — “Authorization to Commence Chapter 9 Bankruptcy Proceeding,” from Governor Richard Snyder to Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr and State Treasurer Andrew Dillon.

' Exhibit 38 — Graph, “FY14 monthly cash forecast absent restructuring”

Exhibit 41 — “Financial and Operating Plan,” Kevyn D. Orr, Emergency Manager, June 10, 2013;

Exhibit 43 — “Proposal for Creditors,” City of Detroit, June 14, 2013;

Exhibit 44 — “Proposal for Creditors, Executive Summary,” City of Detroit, June 14, 2013;

Exhibit 75 — “Financial and Operating Plan,” Kevyn D. Orr, Emergency Manager, May 12, 2013;

Exhibit 414 — Declaration of Kevyn Orr in Support of Eligibility. (Dkt. #11)

The Court notes that the objecting creditors offered no substantial evidence contradicting the facts found in this Part of the opinion, except as noted below relating to the City’s unfunded pension liability.

A. The City’s Financial Distress

1. The City’s Debt

The City estimates its debt to be $18,000,000,000. This consists of $11,900,000,000 in unsecured debt and $6,400,000,000 in secured debt. It has more than 100,000 creditors.

According to the City, the unsecured debt includes:

$5,700,000,000 for “OPEB” through June 2011, which is the most recent actuarial data available. “OPEB” is “other post-employment benefits,” and refers to the Health and Life Insurance Benefit Plan and the Supplemental Death Benefit Plan for retirees;

$3,500,000,000 in unfunded pension obligations;

$651,000,000 in general obligation bonds;

*114 $1,430,000,000 for certificates of participation (“COPs”) related to pensions; $346,600,000 for swap contract liabilities related to the COPs; and

$300,000,000 of other liabilities, including $101,200,000 in accrued compensated absences, including unpaid, accumulated vacation and sick leave balances; $86,500,000 in accrued workers’ compensation for which the City is self-insured; $63,900,000 in claims and judgments, including lawsuits and claims other than workers’ compensation claims; and $13,000,000 in capital leases and accrued pollution remediation.

As noted, the objecting parties do not seriously challenge the City’s estimates of its debt, except for its estimates of its unfunded pension liability. The plans and others have suggested a much lower pension underfunding amount, perhaps even below $1,000,000,000. However, they submitted no proof of that. The Court concludes that it is unnecessary to resolve the issue at this time, because the City would be found eligible regardless of any specific finding on the pension liability that would be in the range between the parties’ estimates. Otherwise, the Court is satisfied that the City’s estimates of its other liabilities are accurate enough for purposes of determining eligibility, and so finds.

2. Pension Liabilities

The City’s General Retirement System (“GRS”) administers the pension plan for its nonuniformed personnel. The average annual benefit received by retired pensioners or their beneficiaries is about $18,000. AFSCME Br. at 3 (citing June 30, 2012 General Retirement System of City of Detroit pension valuation report). (Dkt. # 505) Generally these retirees are eligible for Social Security retirement or disability benefits.

The City’s Police and Fire Retirement System (“PFRS”) administers the pension plan for its uniformed personnel. The average annual benefit received by retired pensioners or their beneficiaries is about $30,000. Generally, these retirees are not eligible for Social Security retirement or disability benefits. Retirement Systems Br. at 5 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1206 (a)(8), 20 C.F.R. § 404.1212 ). (Dkt. # 519)

The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation does not insure pension benefits under either plan.

For the five years ending with FY 2012, pension payments exceeded contributions and investment income by approximately $1,700,000,000 for the GRS and $1,600,000,000 for the PFRS. This resulted in the liquidation of pension trust principal.

As noted, the two pension plans and the City disagree about the level of underfunding in the plans. Gabriel Roeder Smith & Company is the funds’ actuary. In its reports for the two pension plans as of June 30, 2012, it found an unfunded actuarial accrued liability (“UAAL”) of $829,760,482 for the GRS. Ex. 69 at 3. It found UAAL of $147,216,398 for the PFRS. Ex. 70 at 3.

The City asserts that the actuarial assumptions underlying these estimates are aggressive. Most significantly, the City believes that the two plans project unrealistic annual rates of return on investments net of expenses — 7.9% by GRS and 8.0% by PFRS, and that therefore their estimates are substantially understated. As stated above, the City estimates the underfunding to be $3,500,000,000.

Using current actuarial assumptions, the City’s required pension contributions, as a percentage of eligible payroll expenses, are projected to grow from 25% for GRS and 30% for PFRS in 2012 to 30% for GRS and 60% for PFRS by 2017. Changes in actuarial assumptions would result in further *115 increases to the City’s required pension contributions.

3.OPEB Liabilities

The OPEB plans consist of the Health and Life Insurance Benefit Plan and the Supplemental Death Benefit Plan. The City’s OPEB obligations arise under 22 different plans, including 15 different plans alone for medical and prescription drugs. These plans have varying structures and terms. The plan is a defined benefit plan providing hospitalization, dental care, vision care and life insurance to current employees and substantially all retirees. The City generally pays for 80% to 100% of health care coverage for eligible retirees. The Health and Life Insurance Plan is totally unfunded; it is financed entirely on a current basis.

As of June 30, 2011,19,389 retirees were eligible to receive benefits under the City’s OPEB plans. The number of retirees receiving benefits from the City is expected to increase over time.

The Supplemental Death Benefit Plan is a pre-funded single-employer defined benefit plan providing death benefits based upon years of creditable service. It has $34,564,960 in actuarially accrued liabilities as of June 30, 2011 and is 74.3% funded with UAAL of $8,900,000.

Of the City’s $5,700,000,000 OPEB liability, 99.6% is unfunded.

4.Legacy Expenditures— Pensions and OPEB

During 2012, 38.6% of the City’s revenue was consumed servicing legacy liabilities. The forecasts for subsequent years, assuming no restructuring, are 42.5% for 2013, 54.8% for 2014, 59.5% for 2015, 63% for 2016, and 64.5% for 2017.

5.The Certificates of Participation

The transactions described here are complex and confusing. The resulting litigation is as well. Nevertheless, a fairly complete explanation of them is necessary to an understanding of the City’s severe financial distress.

a. The COPs and Swaps Transaction

In 2005 and 2006, the City set out to raise $1.4 billion for its underfunded pension funds, the GRS and PFRS. The City created a non-profit Service Corporation for each of the two pension funds, to act as an intermediary in the financing. The City then entered into Service Contracts with each of the Service Corporations. The City would make payments to the Service Corporations, which had created Funding Trusts and assigned their rights to those Funding Trusts. The Funding Trusts issued debt obligations to investors called “Pension Obligation Certificates of Participation. (“COPs”). 2 Each COP represented an undivided proportionate interest in the payments that the City would make to the Service Corporations under the Service Contracts.

The City arranged for the purchase of insurance from two monoline insurers to protect against defaults by the funding trusts that would result if the City failed to make payments to the Service Corporations under the Service Contracts. This was intended to make the investments more attractive to potential investors. One insurer was XL Capital Assurance, Inc., now known as Syncora. The other was the Financial Guaranty Insurance Company.

Some of the COPs paid a floating interest rate. To protect the Service Corporations from the risk of increasing interest rates, they entered into hedge arrange *116 ments with UBS A.G. and SBS Financial (the “Swap Counterparties”). Under the hedges, also known as “swaps” (bets, really), the Service Corporations and the Swap Counterparties agreed to convert the floating interest rates into a fixed payment. Under the swaps, if the floating interest rates exceeded a certain rate, the Swap Counterparties would make payments to the Service Corporations. But if the floating interest rates sank below a certain rate, the Service Corporations would make payments to the Swap Counterparties. Specifically, there were eight pay-fixed, receive-variable interest rate swap contracts, effective as of June 12, 2006, with a total amount of $800,000,000.

Under the swaps, the City was also at risk if there was an “event of default” or a “termination event.” In such an event, the Swap Counterparties could terminate the swaps and demand a potentially enormous termination payment.

The Swap Counterparties also obtained protection against the risk that the Service Corporations would default on their quarterly swap payments. The parties purchased additional insurance against that risk from Syncora and the Financial Guaranty Insurance Company. Syncora’s liability for swap defaults is capped at $50,000,000, even though the Swap Coun-terparties’ claims may be significantly greater. This insurance is separate from the insurance purchased to protect against a default under the COPs.

b.The Result

In 2008, interest rates dropped dramatically. As a result, the City lost on the swaps bet. Actually, it lost catastrophically on the swaps bet. The bet could cost the City hundreds of millions of dollars. The City estimates that the damage will be approximately $45,000,000 per year for the next ten years.

c. The Collateral Agreement

As the City’s financial condition worsened, the City, the Service Corporations and the Swap Counterparties sought to restructure the swap contracts. In June 2009, they negotiated and entered into a Collateral Agreement that amended the swap agreements. The Collateral Agreement eliminated the “Additional Termination Event” and the potential for an immediate demand for a termination payment. The City agreed to make the swap payments through a “lockbox” arrangement and to pledge certain gaming tax revenues as collateral. The City also agreed to increase the interest rate of the swap agreements by 10 basis points effective July 1, 2010. It also agreed to new termination events, including any downgrading of the credit ratings for the COPs.

Two accounts were set up: 1) a “Hold-back Account” and 2) a “General Receipts Subaccount.” U.S. Bank was appointed custodian of the accounts. The casinos would pay developer payments and gaming tax payments to the General Receipts Sub-account daily. The City would make monthly deposits into the Holdback Account equal to one-third of the quarterly payment that the Service Corporations owed to the Swap Counterparties. When the City made that monthly payment, U.S. Bank would release to the City the accumulated funds in the General Receipts Subaccount. If the City defaulted, the Swap Counterparties could serve notice on U.S. Bank, which would then hold or “trap” the money in the General Receipts Subaccount and not disburse it to the City.

Syncora was not a party to the Collateral Agreement.

d. The City’s Defaults Under the Collateral Agreement

In March, 2012, the COPs were downgraded, which triggered a termination *117 event. The Swap Counterparties did not, however, declare a default.

In March, 2013, the appointment of the emergency manager for the City was another event of default. Again however, the Swap Counterparties did not declare a default.

As of June 28, 2013, the City estimated that if an event of default were declared and the Swap Counterparties chose to exercise their right to terminate, it faced a termination obligation to the Swap Coun-terparties of $296,500,000. This was the approximate negative fair value of the swaps at that time.

On June 14, 2013, the City failed to make a required payment of approximately $40,000,000 on the COPs. This default triggered Syncora’s liability as insurer on the COPs and it has apparently made the required payments. However, the City has made all of its required payments to the Swap Counterparties through the Hold-back Account. The City contends that as a result, Syncora has no liability to the Swap Counterparties on its guaranty to them.

e. The Forbearance and Optional Termination Agreement

Following the City’s defaults on the Collateral Agreement, the parties negotiated. On July 15, 2013 (three days before this bankruptcy filing), the City and the Swap Counterparties entered into a “Forbearance and Optional Termination Agreement.” Under this agreement, the Swap Counterparties would forebear from terminating the swaps and from instructing U.S. Bank to trap the funds in the General Receipts Subaccount. The City may buy out the swaps at an 18-25% discount, depending on when the payment is made. That buy-out would terminate the pledge of the gaming revenues. Syncora was not a party to this agreement.

When the City filed this bankruptcy case, it also filed a motion to assume the “Forbearance and Optional Termination Agreement.” (Dkt. # 17) Syncora and many other parties have filed objections to the City’s motion. However, because there are serious and substantial defenses to the claims made against the City under the COPs, these objections assert that the agreement should not be approved. After several adjournments, it is scheduled for hearing on December 17, 2013.

f. The Resulting Litigation Involving Syncora

Meanwhile, back on June 17, 2013, Syn-cora sent a letter to U.S. Bank declaring an event of default, triggering U.S. Bank’s obligation to trap all of the money in the General Receipts Subaccount. The City responded, taking the position that because it had not defaulted in its swap payments and because Syncora has no rights under the Collateral Agreement, Syncora had no right to instruct U.S. Bank to trap the funds.

U.S. Bank did trap approximately $15,000,000. This represented a significant percentage of the City’s monthly revenue.

As a result, on July 5, 2013, the City filed a lawsuit against Syncora in the Wayne County Circuit Court. It sought and obtained a temporary restraining order that resulted in U.S. Bank’s release of the trapped funds to the City. On July 11, 2013, Syncora removed the action to the district court in Detroit and filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order. On July 31, 2013, Syncora filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. On August 9, 2013, the district referred the matter to this Court. It is now Adversary Proceeding # 13-04942. On August 28, 2013, this Court ruled that the gaming revenues are property of the City and therefore protected by the automatic stay. *118 Tr. 9:17-21, August 28, 2013. (Dkt. # 692) As a result, on September 10, 2013, the temporary restraining order was dissolved with the City’s stipulation. Syncora’s motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding remains pending. It has been adjourned due to a tolling agreement between the parties.

Adding to this drama, on July 24, 2013, Syncora filed a lawsuit against the Swap Counterparties in a state court in New York, seeking an injunction to prevent the Swap Counterparties from performing their obligations under the Forbearance and Optional Termination Agreement. The Swap Counterparties then removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. That court, at the request of the Swap Counterparties, transferred the case to the federal district court in Detroit, which then referred it to this Court. It is Adversary Proceeding No. 13-05395.

g. The COPs Debt

Returning, finally, to the underlying obligations — the COPS, the City estimates that as of June 30, 2013, the following amounts were outstanding:

$480,300,000 in outstanding principal amount of $640,000,000 Certificates of Participation Series 2005 A maturing June 15, 2013 through 2025; and

$948,540,000 in outstanding principal amount of $948,540,000 Certificates of Participation Series 2006 A and B maturing June 15, 2019 through 2035.

6.Debt Service

Debt service from the City’s general fund related to limited tax and unlimited tax GO debt and the COPs was $225,300,000 for 2012, and is projected to exceed $247,000,000 in 2013. 3 The City estimates that 38% of its tax revenue goes to debt service rather than to city services. It further estimates that without changes, this will increase to 65% within 5 years.

7.Revenues

Income tax revenues have decreased by $91,000,000 since 2002(30%) and by $44,000,000 (15%) since 2008. Municipal income tax revenue was $276,500,000 in 2008 and $233,000,000 in 2012.

Property tax revenues for 2013 were $135,000,000. This is a reduction of $13,000,000 (10%) from 2012.

Revenues from the City’s utility users’ tax have declined from approximately $55,300,000 in 2003 to approximately $39,800,000 in 2012(28%).

Wagering taxes receipts are about $170-$180,000,000 annually.' However, the City projects that these receipts will decrease through 2015 due to the expected loss of gaming revenue to casinos opening in nearby Toledo, Ohio.

State revenue sharing has decreased by $161,000,000 since 2002(48%) and by $76,000,000 (30.6%) since 2008, due to the City’s declining population and significant reductions in statutory revenue sharing by the State.

8.Operating Deficits

The City has experienced operating deficits for each of the past seven years. Through 2013, it has had an accumulated general fund deficit of $237,000,000. However, this includes the effect of recent debt issuances — $75,000,000 in 2008; $250,000,000 in 2010; and $129,500,000 in 2013. If these debt issuances are excluded, the City’s accumulated general fund *119 deficit would have been $700,000,000 through 2013.

In 2012, the City had a negative cash flow of $115,500,000, excluding the impact of proceeds from short-term borrowings. In March 2012, to avoid running out of cash, the City borrowed $80,000,000 on a secured basis. The City spent $50,000,000 of that borrowing in 2012.

In 2013, the City deferred payments on certain of its obligations, totaling approximately $120,000,000. As set forth in the next section, these deferrals were for current and prior year pension contributions and other payments. With those deferrals, the City projects a positive cash flow of $4,000,000 for 2013.

If the City had not deferred these payments, it would have run out of cash by June 30, 2013.

Absent restructuring, the City projects that it will have negative cash flows of $190,500,000 for 2014; $260,400,000 for 2015; $314,100,000 for 2016; and $346,000,000 for 2017. The City further estimates that by 2017, its accumulated deficit could grow to approximately $1,350,000,000.

9. Payment Deferrals

The City is not making its pension contributions as they come due. It has deferred payment of its year-end Police and Fire Retirement System contributions. As of May 2013, the City had deferred approximately $54,000,000 in pension contributions related to current and prior periods and approximately $50,000,000 on June 30, 2013 for current year PFRS pension contributions. Therefore, the City will have deferred $104,000,000 of pension contributions.

Also, the City did not make the scheduled $39,700,000 payments on its COPs that were due on June 14, 2013.

B. The Causes and Consequences of the City’s Financial Distress

A full discussion of the causes and consequences of the City’s financial distress is well beyond the scope of this opinion. Still, the evidence presented at the eligibility trial did shed some important and relevant light on the issues that are before the Court. These “causes” and “consequences” are addressed together here because it is often difficult to distinguish one from the other.

1.Population Losses

Detroit’s population declined to just over 1,000,000 as of June 1990. In December 2012, the population was 684,799. This is a 63% decline in population from its peak in 1950.

2.Employment Losses

From 1972 to 2007, the City lost approximately 80% of its manufacturing establishments and 78% of its retail establishments. The number of jobs in Detroit declined from 735,104 in 1970 to 346,545 in 2012.

Detroit’s unemployment rate was 6.3% in June 2000; 23.4% in June 2010; and 18.3% in June 2012. The number of employed Detroit residents fell from approximately 353,000 in 2000 to 279,960 in 2012.

3.Credit Rating

The City’s credit ratings are below investment grade. As of June 17, 2013, S & P and Moody’s had lowered Detroit’s credit ratings to CC and Caa3, respectively. Ex. 75 at 3.

4.The Water and Sewerage Department

The Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (“DWSD”) provides water and wastewater services to the City and many suburban communities in an eight-county area, covering 1,079 square miles. DWSD’s cost of capital is inflated due to *120 its association with the City. This increased cost of capital, coupled with the inability to raise rates and other factors, has resulted in significant under-spending on capital expenditures.

5.The Crime Rate

During calendar year 2011, 136,000 crimes were reported in the City. Of these, 15,245 were violent crimes. In 2012, the City’s violent crime rate was five times the national average and the highest of any city with a population in excess of 200,000.

The City’s case clearance rate for violent crimes is 18.6%. The clearance rate for all crimes is 8.7%. These rates are substantially below those of comparable municipalities nationally and surrounding local municipalities.

6.Streetlights

As of April 2013, about 40% of the approximately 88,000 streetlights operated and maintained by the City’s Public Lighting Department were not working.

7.Blight

There are approximately 78,000 abandoned and blighted structures in the City. Of these, 38,000 are considered dangerous buildings. The City has experienced 11,-000 — 12,000 fires each year for the past decade. Approximately 60% of these occur in blighted or unoccupied buildings.

The average cost to demolish a residential structure is approximately $8,500.

The City also has 66,000 blighted vacant lots.

8.The Police Department

In 2012, the average priority one response time for the police department was 30 minutes. In 2013, it was 58 minutes. The national average is 11 minutes.

The department’s manpower has been reduced by approximately 40% over the last 10 years.

The department has not invested in or maintained its facility infrastructure for many years, and has closed or consolidated many precincts.

The department operates with a fleet of 1,291 vehicles, most of which have reached the replacement age of three years and lack modern information technology.

9.The Fire Department

The average age of the City’s 35 fire stations is 80 years, and maintenance costs often exceed $1,000,000 annually. The fire department’s fleet has many mechanical issues, contains no reserve vehicles and lacks equipment ordinarily considered standard. The department’s apparatus division now has 26 employees, resulting in a mechanic to vehicle ratio of 1 to 39 and an inability to complete preventative maintenance on schedule.

In February 2013, Detroit Fire Commissioner Donald Austin ordered firefighters not to use hydraulic ladders on ladder trucks except in eases involving an “immediate threat to life” because the ladders had not received safety inspections “for years.”

During the first quarter of 2013, frequently only 10 to 14 of the City’s 36 ambulances were in service. Some of the City’s EMS vehicles have been driven 250,-000 to 300,000 miles and break down frequently.

10.Parks and Recreation

The City closed 210 parks during fiscal year 2009, reducing its total from 317 to 107(66%). It has also announced that 50 of its remaining 107 parks would be closed and that another 38 would be provided with limited maintenance.

11.Information Technology

The City’s information technology infrastructure and software is obsolete and is not integrated between departments, or even within departments. Its information *121 technology needs to be upgraded or replaced in the following areas: payroll; financial; budget development; property information and assessment; income tax; and the police department operating system.

Payroll. The City currently uses multiple, non-integrated payroll systems. A majority of the City’s employees are on an archaic payroll system that has limited reporting capabilities and no way to clearly track, monitor or report expenditures by category. The current cost to process payroll is $62 per check ($19,200,000 per year). This is more than four times the general average of $15 per paycheck. The payroll process involves 149 full-time employees, 51 of which are uniformed officers. This means that high cost personnel are performing clerical duties.

Income Tax. The City’s highly manual income tax collection and data management systems were purchased in the mid-1990s and are outdated, with little to no automation capability. An IRS audit completed in July 2012, characterized these systems as “catastrophic.”

Financial Reporting. The City’s financial reporting system (“DRMS”) was implemented in 1999 and is no longer supported. Its budget development system is 10 years old and requires a manual interface with DRMS. 70% of journal entries are booked manually. The systems also lack reliable fail-over and back-up systems.

C. The City’s Efforts to Address Its Financial Distress

The City has reduced the number of its employees by about 2,700 since 2011. As of May 31, 2013, it had approximately 9,560 employees.

The City’s unionized employees are represented by 47 discrete bargaining units. 4 The collective bargaining agreements covering all of those bargaining units expired before this case was filed. 5

The City has implemented revised employment terms, called “City Employment Terms” (“CET”), for nonunionized employees and for unionized employees under expired collective bargaining agreements. It has also increased revenues and reduced expenses in other ways. It estimates that these measures have resulted in annual savings of $200,000,000.

The City cannot legally increase its tax revenues. Nor can it reduce its employee expenses without further endangering public health and safety.

D. A Brief History of Michigan’s Emergency Manager Laws

Before reviewing the events leading to the appointment of the City’s emergency manager, a brief review of the winding history of the Michigan statutes on point is necessary.

In 1990, the Michigan Legislature enacted Public Act 72 of 1990, the “Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act.” (“P.A. 72”) This Act empowered the State to intervene with respect to municipalities facing financial crisis through the appointment of an emergency financial manager who would assume many of the powers ordinarily held by local elected officials.

Effective March 16, 2011, P.A. 72 was repealed and replaced with Public Act 4 of *122 2011, the “Local Government and School District Fiscal Accountability Act.” (“P.A. 4”)

On November 5, 2012, Michigan voters rejected P.A. 4 by referendum. This rejection revived P.A. 72. See Order, Davis v. Roberts, No. 313297 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov. 16, 2012): 6

Petitioner’s reliance on the anti-revival statute, MCL 8.4, is unavailing. The plain language of MCL 8.4 includes no reference to statutes that have been rejected by referendum. The statutory language refers only to statutes subject to repeal. Judicial construction is not permitted when the language is unambiguous. Driver v. Naini, 490 Mich. 239, 247 , 802 N.W.2d 311 (2011). Accordingly, under the clear terms of the statute, MCL 8.4 does not apply to the voters’ rejection, by referendum, of P.A. 4.

See also Davis v. Weatherspoon, 2013 WL 2076478 , at *2 (E.D.Mich. May 15, 2013); Mich. Op. Att’y Gen No. 7267 (Aug. 6, 2012), 2012 WL 3544658 .

P.A. 72 remained in effect until March 28, 2013, when the “Local Financial Stability and Choice Act,” Public Act 436 of 2012, became effective. (“P.A. 436”) That Legislature enacted that law on December 13, 2012, and the governor signed it on December 26, 2012.

E. The Events Leading to the Appointment of the City’s Emergency Manager

The following subsections review the events leading to the appointment of the City’s emergency manager.

1. The State Treasurer’s Report of December 21, 2011

On December 6, 2011, the Michigan Department of the Treasury began a preliminary review of the City’s financial condition pursuant to P.A. 4.

On December 21, 2011, Andy Dillon, the state treasurer, reported to the governor that “probable financial stress” existed in Detroit and recommended the appointment of a “financial review team” pursuant to P.A. 4. Ex. 503 at 3. (Dkt. #11-3) In making this finding, Dillon’s report cited:

the inability of the City to avoid fund deficits, recurrent accumulated deficit spending, severe projected cash flow shortages resulting in an improper reliance on inter-fund and external borrowing, the lack of funding of the City’s other post-retirement benefits, and the increasing debt of the City[.]

More specifically, his report found:

(a) The City had violated § 17 of the Uniform Budget and Accounting Act (Public Act 2 of 1968) by failing to amend the City’s general appropriations act when it became apparent that various line items in the City’s budget for fiscal year 2010 exceeded appropriations by an aggregate of nearly $58,000,000, and that unaudited fiscal year 2011 figures indicated that expenditures would exceed appropriations by $97,000,000.

(b) The City did not file an adequate or approved “deficit elimination plan” with the Treasury for fiscal year 2010. The Treasury found that the City’s recent efforts at deficit reduction had been “unrealistic” and that “City officials either are incapable or unwilling to manage its own finances.”

(c) The City had a “mounting debt problem” with debt service requirements exceeding $597,000,000 in 2010 and long term debt exceeding $8,000,000,000 as of June 2011, excluding the City’s then-esti *123 mated $615,000,000 in unfunded actuarial pension liabilities and $4,900,000,000 in OPEB liability. The ratio of the City’s total long term debt to total net assets for 2010 was 32.64 to 1, which was far greater than other identified cites.

(d) The City was at risk of a termination payment, estimated at the time to be in the range of $280,000,000 to $400,000,000, under its swap contracts.

(e) The City’s long term bond rating had fallen below the BBB category and was considered “junk”- — -speculative or highly speculative.

(f) The City was experiencing significant cash flow shortages. The City projected a cash balance of $96,100,000 as of October 28, 2011. This was nearly $20,000,000 lower than the City’s previous estimates. It would be quickly eroded and the City would experience a cash shortage of $1,600,000 in April 2012 and would end 2012 with a cash shortfall of $44,100,000 absent remedial action.

(g) The City had difficulty making its required payments to its pension plans. In June of 2005, the City issued $1,440,000,000 of new debt in the form of Pension Obligation Certificates (“COPs”) to fund its two retirement systems with a renegotiated repayment schedule of 30 years.

2. The Financial Review Team’s Report of March 26, 2012

Under P.A. 4, upon a finding of “probable financial stress,” the governor was required to appoint a financial review team to undertake a more extensive financial management review of the City. On December 27, 2011, the governor announced the appointment of a ten member Financial Review Team. The Financial Review Team was then required to report its findings to the governor within 60-90 days.

On March 26, 2012, the Financial Review Team submitted its report to the governor. This report found that “the City of Detroit is in a condition of severe financial stress[J” Ex. 22. This finding of “severe financial stress” was based upon the following considerations:

(a) The City’s cumulative general fund deficit had increased from $91,000,000 for 2010 to $148,000,000 for 2011 and the City had not experienced a positive year-end fund balance since 2004.

(b) Audits for the City’s previous nine fiscal years reflected significant variances between budgeted and actual revenues and expenditures, primarily due to the City’s admitted practice of knowingly overestimating revenues and underestimating expenditures.

(c) The City was continuing to experience significant cash depletion. The City had proposed adjustments to collective bargaining agreements to save $102,000,000 in 2012 and $258,000,000 in 2013, but the tentative collective bargaining agreements negotiated as of the date of the report were projected to yield savings of only $219,000,000 for both years.

(d) The City’s existing debt had suffered significant downgrades. Among the reasons cited by Moody’s Investor Service for the downgrade were the City’s “weakened financial position, as evidenced by its narrow cash position, its reliance upon debt financing, and ongoing negotiations with its labor unions regarding contract concessions.” Ex. 22 at 10.

3. The Consent Agreement

In early 2012, the City and the State of Michigan negotiated a 47 page “Financial Stability Agreement,” more commonly called the “Consent Agreement.” Ex. 23. The Consent Agreement states that its purpose is to achieve financial stability for the City and a stable platform for the *124 City’s future growth. It was executed as of April 5, 2012. Under § 15 of P.A. 4, because a consent agreement within the meaning of P.A. 4 was negotiated and executed, no emergency manager was appointed for the City, despite the finding by the Financial Review Team that the City was in “severe financial stress.”

The Consent Agreement created a “Financial Advisory Board” (“FAB”) of nine members selected by the governor, the treasurer, the mayor and the city council. The Consent Agreement granted the FAB an oversight role and limited powers over certain City reform and budget activities. The FAB has held, and continues to hold, regular public meetings and to exercise its oversight functions set forth in the Consent Agreement.

4. The State Treasurer’s Report of December 14, 2012

On December 11, 2012, the Department of Treasury commenced a preliminary review of the City’s financial condition under P.A. 72. On December 14, 2012, Andy Dillon, State Treasurer sent to Rick Snyder, Governor a memorandum entitled “Preliminary Review of the City of Detroit.” Ex. 24. This was after the voters had rejected P.A. 4 and P.A. 72 was revived.

Treasurer Dillon reported to the governor that, based on his preliminary review, a “serious financial problem” existed within the City. Ex. 24 at 1. This conclusion was based on many of the same findings as his earlier report of December 21, 2011. Ex. 21. In addition he reported that:

(a)City officials had violated the proscriptions in sections 18 and 19 of P.A. 2 of 1968 in applying the City’s money for purposes inconsistent with the City’s appropriations.

(b) The City had projected possibly depleting its cash prior to June 30, 2013. However because of problems in the financial reporting functions of the City, the projections continued to change from month to month. This made it difficult to make informed decisions regarding the City’s fiscal health. The City would not be experiencing significant cash flow challenges if City officials had complied with statutory requirements to monitor and amend adopted budgets as needed. In sum, such compliance requires the ability to produce timely and accurate financial information, which City officials have not been able to produce.

(c) The City incurred overall deficits in various funds including the General Fund. The General Fund’s unrestricted deficit increased by almost $41,000,000 from $155,000,000 on June 30, 2010 to $196,000,000 on June 30, 2011, and is projected to increase even further for 2012. This would not have happened if the City had complied with its budgets.

5. The Financial Review Team’s Report of February 19, 2013

Upon receipt of Treasurer Dillon’s report, the governor appointed another Financial Review Team to review the City’s financial condition on December 18, 2012. This was also done under P.A. 72.

On February 19, 2013, the Financial Review Team submitted its report to the governor, concluding, “in accordance with [P.A. 72], that a local government financial emergency exists within the City of Detroit because no satisfactory plan exists to resolve a serious financial problem.” 7 Ex. 25.

*125 This finding by the Financial Review Team of a “local government financial emergency” was based primarily upon the following considerations:

(a) The City continued to experience a significant depletion of its cash, with a projected $100,000,000 cumulative cash deficit as of June 30, 2013. Cost-cutting measures undertaken by the mayor and city council were too heavily weighted to one-time savings and non-union personnel.

(b) The City’s cumulative general fund deficit had not experienced a positive year-end fund balance since 2004 and stood at $326,600,000 as of 2012. If the City had not issued substantial debt, the accumulated general fund deficit would have been $936,800,000 by 2012.

(c) The City’s long-term liabilities exceeded $14,000,000,000 as of June 30, 2013. Approximately $1,900,000,000 would come due over the next five years. The City had not devised a satisfactory plan to address these liabilities.

(d) The City Charter contains numerous restrictions and structural details that make it extremely difficult to restructure the City’s operations in a meaningful or timely manner.

(e) The management letter accompanying the City’s fiscal year 2012 financial audit report identified numerous material weaknesses and significant deficiencies in the City’s financial and accounting operations.

(f) Audits for the City’s last six fiscal years reflected significant variances between budgeted and actual revenues and expenditures, owing primarily to the City’s admitted practice of knowingly overestimating revenues and underestimating expenditures.

6. The Appointment of an Emergency Manager for the City of Detroit

On March 1, 2013, after receiving the Financial Review Team Report of February 19, 2013, the governor announced his determination under P.A. 72 that a “financial emergency” existed within the City. Ex. 26. By that point, P.A. 436 had been enacted but it was not yet effective.

On March 12, 2013, the governor conducted a public hearing to consider the city council’s appeal of his determination.

On March 14, 2013, the governor confirmed his determination of a “financial emergency” within the City and requested that the Local Emergency Financial Assistance Loan Board (“LEFALB”) appoint an emergency financial manager under P.A. 72.

On March 15, 2013, the LEFALB appointed Kevyn Orr as the emergency financial manager for the City of Detroit. Second Amended Final Pre-Trial Order, ¶ 42 at 11. (Dkt. #1647)

On March 25, 2013, Mr. Orr formally took office. Second Amended Final PreTrial Order, ¶ 43 at 11. (Dkt. # 1647)

On March 28, 2013, the effective date of P.A. 436, P.A. 72 was repealed, and Mr. Orr became the emergency manager of the City under §§ 2(e) and 31 of P.A. 436. M.C.L. §§ 141.1542(e) and 141.1571.

The emergency manager acts “for and in the place and stead of the governing body and the office of chief administrative officer of the local government.” M.C.L. § 141.1549(2). He has “broad powers in receivership to rectify the financial emergency and to assure the fiscal accountability of the local government and the local government’s capacity to provide or cause to be provided necessary governmental services essential to the public health, *126 safety, and welfare.” M.C.L. § 141.1549(2).

F. The Emergency Manager’s Activities

1. The June 14, 2013 Meeting and Proposal to Creditors

On June 14, 2013, Mr. Orr organized a meeting with approximately 150 representatives of the City’s creditors, including representatives of: (a) the City’s debt holders; (b) the insurers of this debt; (c) the City’s unions; (d) certain retiree associations; (e) the Pension Systems; and (f) many individual bondholders. At the meeting, Mr. Orr presented the June 14 Creditor Proposal, Ex. 43, and answered questions. At the conclusion of the meeting, Mr. Orr invited creditor representatives to meet and engage in a dialogue with City representatives regarding the proposal.

This proposal described the economic circumstances that resulted in Detroit’s financial condition. It also offered a thorough overhaul and restructuring of the City’s operations, finances and capital structure, as well as proposed recoveries for each creditor group. More specifically, the June 14, 2013 Creditor Proposal set forth:

(a)The City’s plans to achieve a sustainable restructuring by investing over $1,250,000,000 over ten years to improve basic and essential City services, including: (1) substantial investment in, and the restructuring of, various City departments, including the Police Department; the Fire Department; Emergency Medical Services; the Department of Transportation; the Assessor’s Office and property tax division; the Building, Safety, Engineering & Environment Department; and the 36th District Court; (2) substantial investment in the City’s blight removal efforts; (3) the transition of the City’s electricity transmission business to an alternative provider; (4) the implementation of a population-based streetlight footprint and the outsourcing of lighting operations to the newly-created Public Lighting Authority; (5) substantial investments in upgraded information technology for police, fire, EMS, transportation, payroll, grant management, tax collection, budgeting and accounting and the City’s court system; (6) a comprehensive review of the City’s leases and contracts; and (7) a proposed overhaul of the City’s labor costs and related work rules. Ex. 43 at 61-78.

(b) The City’s intention to expand its income and property tax bases, rationalize and adjust its nominal tax rates, and various initiatives to improve and enhance its tax and fee collection efforts. Ex. 43 at 79-82.

(c) The City’s intention to potentially realize value from the Detroit Water and Sewerage Department (“DWSD”) through the creation of a new metropolitan area water and sewer authority. This authority would conduct the operations under the City’s concession or lease of the DWSD’s assets in exchange for payments in lieu of taxes, lease payments, or some other form of payment. Ex. 43 at 83-86.

Regarding creditor recoveries, the City proposed:

(a) Treatment of secured debt commensurate with the value of the collateral securing such debt, including the repayment or refinancing of its revenue bonds, secured unlimited and limited tax general obligation bonds, secured installment notes and liabilities arising in connection with the swap obligations. Ex. 43 at 101-109.

(b) The pro rata distribution of $2,000,000,000 in principal amount of interest-only, limited recourse participation notes to holders of unsecured claims (i.e., holders of unsecured unlimited and limited *127 tax general obligation bonds); the Service Corporations (on account of the COPs); the pension systems (on account of pension underfunding); retirees (on account of OPEB benefits); and miscellaneous other unsecured claimants. The plan also disclosed the potential for amortization of the principal of such notes in the event that, for example, future City revenues exceeded certain thresholds, certain assets were monetized or certain grants were received. Ex. 43 at 101-109.

(c) A “Dutch Auction” process for the City to purchase the notes. Ex. 43 at 108.

At this meeting, Mr. Orr also announced his decision not to make the scheduled $39,700,000 payments due on the COPs and swaps transactions and to impose a moratorium on principal and interest payments related to unsecured debt.

2. Subsequent Discussions with Creditor Representatives

Following the June 14, 2013 meeting at which the proposal to creditors was presented. Mr. Orr and his staff had several other meetings. 8

On June 20, 2013, Mr. Orr’s advisors met with representatives of the City’s unions and four retiree associations. In the morning they met with representatives of “non-uniformed” employees and retirees. In the afternoon they met with “uniformed” employees and retirees. In these meetings, his advisors discussed retiree health and pension obligations. Approximately 100 union and retiree representatives attended the two-hour morning session. It included time for questions and answers. Approximately 35 union and retiree representatives attended the afternoon session, which lasted approximately 90 minutes.

On June 25, 2013, Mr. Orr’s advisors and his senior advisor staff members held meetings in New York for representatives and advisors with all six of the insurers of the City’s funded bond debt; the pension systems; and U.S. Bank, the trustee or paying agent on all of the City’s bond issuances. Approximately 70 individuals attended this meeting. At this five-hour meeting, the City’s advisors discussed the 10-year financial projections and cash flows presented in the June 14 Creditor Proposal, together with the assumptions and detail underlying those projections and cash flows; the City’s contemplated reinvestment initiatives and related costs; and the retiree benefit and pension information and proposals that had been presented to the City’s unions and pension representatives on June 20, 2013.

Also on June 25, 2013, the City’s advis-ors held a separate meeting with U.S. Bank and its advisors to discuss the City’s intentions with respect to the DWSD, and the special revenue bond debt related thereto; the City’s proposed treatment of its general obligation debt, including the COPs; and various other issues raised by U.S. Bank.

On June 26 and 27, 2013, Mr. Orr’s advisors held individual follow-up meetings with each of several bond insurers. On June 26, 2013, the City team met with business people, lawyers and financial ad-visors from NPFGC in a two-hour meeting and Ambac Assurance Corporation in a 90-minute meeting. Financial Guaranty Insurance Corporation had originally requested a meeting for June 26, 2013 but *128 subsequently cancelled. On June 27, 2013, the City team met with business people, lawyers and financial advisors from Syn-cora in a 90-minute meeting and Assured Guaranty Municipal Corporation in a 90-minute meeting.

On July 10, 2013, the City and certain of its advisors held meetings with representatives and advisors of the GRS, as well as representatives and counsel for certain non-uniformed unions and retiree associations and representatives and advisors of the PFRS, as well as representatives and counsel for certain uniformed unions and retiree associations. Each meeting lasted approximately two hours. The purposes of each meeting were to provide additional information on the City’s pension restructuring proposal and to discuss a process for reaching a consensual agreement on pension underfunding issues and the treatment of any related claims.

On July 11, 2013, the City and its advis-ors held separate follow-up meetings with representatives and advisors for select non-uniform unions and retiree associations, the GRS, certain uniformed unions and retiree associations, and the PFRS to discuss retiree health issues.

G. The Prepetition Litigation

On July 3, 2013, two lawsuits were filed against the governor and the treasurer in the Ingham County Circuit Court. These suits sought a declaratory judgment that P.A. 436 violated the Michigan Constitution to the extent that it purported to authorize chapter 9 proceedings in which vested pension benefits might be impaired. They also sought an injunction preventing the defendants from authorizing any chapter 9 proceeding for the City in which vested pension benefits might be impaired. Flowers v. Snyder, No. 13-729-CZ July 3, 2013; Webster v. Snyder, No. 13-734-CZ July 3, 2013.

On July 17, 2013, the Pension Systems commenced a similar lawsuit. General Retirement System of the City of Detroit v. Orr, No. 13-768-CZ July 17, 2013.

H. The Bankruptcy Filing

On July 16, 2013, Mr. Orr recommended to the governor and the treasurer in writing that the City file for chapter 9 relief. Ex. 28. (Dkt. # 11-10) An emergency manager may recommend a chapter 9 filing if, in his judgment, “no reasonable alternative to rectifying the financial emergency of the local government which is in receivership exists.” M.C.L. § 141.1566(1).

On July 18, 2013, Governor Snyder authorized the City of Detroit to file a chapter 9 bankruptcy case. Ex. 29. (Dkt. # 11-11) M.C.L. § 141.1558(1) permits the governor to “place contingencies on a local government in order to proceed under chapter 9.” However, the governor’s authorization letter stated, “I am choosing not to impose any such contingencies today. Federal law already contains the most important contingency — a requirement that the plan be legally executable, 11 USC 943(b)(4).” Ex. 29. at 4. Accordingly, his authorization did not include a condition prohibiting the City from seeking to impair pensions in a plan.

At 4:06 p.m. on July 18, 2013, the City filed this chapter 9 bankruptcy case. 9 (Voluntary Petition, Dkt. # 1)

IV. The City Bears the Burden of Proof.

Before turning to the filed objections, it is necessary to point out that the City bears the burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence each of the elements of eligibility under 11 U.S.C. *129 § 109 (c). Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo (In re City of Vallejo), 408 B.R. 280, 289 (9th Cir. BAP 2009); In re City of Stockton, Cal., 493 B.R. 772, 794 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2013).

V.The Objections of the Individuals Who Filed Objections Without an Attorney

As the Court commented at the conclusion of the hearing on September 19, 2013, the individuals’ presentations were moving, passionate, thoughtful, compelling and well-articulated. These presentations demonstrated an extraordinary depth of concern for the City of Detroit, for the inadequate level of services that their city government provides and the personal hardships that creates, and, most clearly, for the pensions of City retirees and employees. These individuals expressed another deeply held concern, and even anger, that became a major theme of the hearing — the concern and anger that the State’s appointment of an emergency manager over the City of Detroit violated their fundamental democratic right to self-governance.

The Court’s role here is to evaluate how these concerns might impact the City’s eligibility for bankruptcy. In making that evaluation, the Court can only consider the specific requirements of applicable law — 11 U.S.C. §§ 109 (e) and 921(c). It is not the Court’s role to examine this bankruptcy or these objections to this bankruptcy from any other perspective or on any other basis. For example, neither the popularity of the decision to appoint an emergency manager nor the popularity of the decision to file this bankruptcy case are matters of eligibility under the federal bankruptcy laws.

To the extent that individual objections raised arguments that do raise eligibility concerns, they are addressed through this opinion. It appears to the Court that these individuals’ concerns should mostly be addressed in the context of whether the case was filed in good faith, as 11 U.S.C. § 921 (c) requires. To a lesser extent, they should also be considered in the context of the specific requirement that the City was “insolvent.” 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(3). Accordingly, the Court will address these concerns in those Parts of this opinion. See Part XIII (insolvency) and Part XVII (good faith), below.

VI.The City of Detroit Is a “Municipality” Under 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(1).

With its petition, the City filed a “Memorandum in Support of Statement of Qualifications Pursuant to Section 109(c) of the Bankruptcy Code,” asserting that the City is a “municipality” as defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101 (40) and as required by 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(1). (Dkt. #14 at 8-9) In the “Second Amended Final Pre-Trial Order,” the parties so stipulated. (Dkt. # 1647 at 11) Accordingly, the Court finds that the City has established this element of eligibility and will not discuss it further.

VII.The Bankruptcy Court Has the Authority to Determine the Constitutionality of Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code and Public Act 436.

A. The Parties’ Objections to the Court’s Authority Under Stern v. Marshall

Several objecting parties challenge the constitutionality of chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code under the United States Constitution. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern v. Marshall, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2594 , 180 L.Ed.2d 475 (2011), these parties also assert that this Court does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of chapter 9.

*130 Several objecting parties also challenge the constitutionality of P.A. 436 under the Michigan Constitution. Some of these parties also assert that this Court does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of P.A. 436.

The Official Committee of Retirees filed a motion to withdraw the reference on the grounds that this Court does not have the authority to determine the constitutionality of chapter 9 or P.A. 436. It also filed a motion for stay of the eligibility proceedings pending the district court’s resolution of that motion. In this Court’s denial of the stay motion, it concluded that the Committee was unlikely to succeed on its arguments regarding this Court’s lack of authority under Stern. In re City of Detroit, Mich., 498 B.R. 776, 781-87 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.2013). The following discussion is taken from that decision.

B. Stern, Waldman, and Global Technovations

In Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court held that the “judicial power of the United States” can only be exercised by an Article III court and “that in general, Congress may not withdraw from judicial cognizance any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.” 131 S.Ct. at 2608-12 . The Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court therefore lacks the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a debtor’s counterclaim that is based on a private right when resolution of the counterclaim is not necessary to fix the creditor’s claim. 131 S.Ct. at 2611-19 . The Court described the issue before it as “narrow.” 10 131 S.Ct. at 2620 .

The Sixth Circuit has adhered to a narrow reading of Stem in the two cases that have addressed the issue: Onkyo Europe Elect. GMBH v. Global Technovations Inc. (In re Global Technovations Inc.), 694 F.3d 705 (6th Cir.2012), and Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910 (6th Cir.2012).

In Global Technovations, the Sixth Circuit summarized Stem as follows:

Stem’s limited holding stated the following: When a claim is “a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditor’s proof of claim in bankruptcy,” the bankruptcy court cannot enter final judgment. Id. at 2611. In those cases, the bankruptcy court may only enter proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ibid.

694 F.3d at 722 . Based on this view of Stem, the Global Technovations court held that the bankruptcy court did have the authority to rule on the debtor’s fraudulent transfer counterclaim against a creditor that had filed a proof of claim. Id.

In Waldman , the Sixth Circuit summarized the holding of Stem as follows:

When a debtor pleads an action under federal bankruptcy law and seeks disal-lowance of a creditor’s proof of claim against the estate—as in Katchen [v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 , 86 S.Ct. 467 , 15 L.Ed.2d 391 (1966) ] — the bankruptcy court’s authority is at its constitutional maximum. 131 S.Ct. at 2617-18 . But *131 when a debtor pleads an action arising only under state-law, as in Northern Pipeline [v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 458 U.S. 50 , 102 S.Ct. 2858 , 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982) ]; or when the debtor pleads an action that would augment the bankrupt estate, but not “necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance pro-eess[,]” 131 S.Ct. at 2618 ; then the bankruptcy court is constitutionally prohibited from entering final judgment. Id. at 2614 .

698 F.3d at 919 . Based on this view of Stem, the Waldman court held that the bankruptcy court lacked authority to enter a final judgment on the debtor’s prepetition fraud claim against a creditor that was not necessary to resolve in adjudicating the creditor’s claim against the debtor.

These cases recognize the crucial difference to which Stem adhered. A bankruptcy court may determine matters that arise directly under the bankruptcy code, such as fixing a creditor’s claim in the claims allowance process. However, a bankruptcy court may not determine more tangential matters, such as a state law claim for relief asserted by a debtor or the estate that arises outside of the bankruptcy process, unless it is necessary to resolve that claim as part of the claims allowance process. See City of Cent. Falls, R.I. v. Central Falls Teachers’ Union (In re City of Cent. Falls), R.I., 468 B.R. 36, 52 (Bankr.D.R.I.2012) (“[Ajlthough the coun terclaim at issue in Stem arose under state law, the determinative feature of that counterclaim was that it did not arise under the Bankruptcy Code.”).

C. Applying Stern, Waldman, and Global Technovations in This Case

The issue presently before the Court is the debtor’s eligibility to file this chapter 9 case. A debtor’s eligibility to file bankruptcy stems directly from rights established by the bankruptcy code. As quoted above, Waldman expressly held, “When a debtor pleads an action under federal bankruptcy law,” the bankruptcy court’s authority is constitutional. 698 F.3d at 919 . In this case, the debtor has done precisely that. In seeking relief under chapter 9, it has pled “an action under federal bankruptcy law.”

The parties’ federal and state constitutional challenges are simply legal arguments in support of their objection to the City’s request for bankruptcy relief. Nothing in Stern, Waldman, or Global Technovations suggests any limitation on the authority of a bankruptcy court to consider and decide any and all of the legal arguments that the parties present concerning an issue that is otherwise properly before it.

More specifically, those cases explicitly state that a bankruptcy court can constitutionally determine all of the issues that are raised in the context of resolving an objection to a proof of claim, even those involving state law. 11 For the same rea *132 sons, a bankruptcy court can also constitutionally determine all issues that are raised in the context of resolving an objection to eligibility.

D. Applying Stern in Similar Procedural Contexts

No cases address Stem in the context of eligibility for bankruptcy. Nevertheless, several cases do address Stem in the context of similar contested matters — conversion and dismissal of a case. Each case readily concludes that Stem’s limitation on the authority of a bankruptcy court is inapplicable. For example, in In re USA Baby, Inc., 674 F.3d 882, 884 (7th Cir.2012), the Seventh Circuit held that nothing in Stem precludes a bankruptcy court from converting a chapter 11 case to chapter 7, stating, “we cannot fathom what bearing that principle might have on the present case.” 12 In Mahanna v. Bynum, 465 B.R. 436 (W.D.Tex.2011), the court held that Stem does not prohibit the bankruptcy court from dismissing the debtors’ chapter 11 case. The court concluded, “[T]his appeal is entirely frivolous, and constitutes an unjustifiable waste of judicial resources!.]” Id. at 442 . In In re *133 Thalmann, 469 B.R. 677, 680 (Bankr.S.D.Tex.2012), the court held that Stem does not prohibit a bankruptcy court from determining a motion to dismiss a case on the grounds of bad faith. 13 This line of cases strongly suggests that Stem likewise does not preclude a bankruptcy court from determining eligibility.

E. The Objectors Overstate the Scope of Stern .

Implicitly recognizing how far its objection to this Court’s authority stretches Stem, the objectors argue that two aspects of their objection alter the analysis of Stem and its application here. The first is that their objections raise important issues under both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution. The second is that strong federalism considerations warrant resolution of its objection by an Article III court. Neither consideration, however, is sufficient to justify the expansion of Stem that the objectors argue.

1. Stern Does Not Preclude This Court from Determining Constitutional Issues.

First, since Stem was decided, non-Article III courts have considered constitutional issues, always without objection.

Both bankruptcy courts and bankruptcy appellate panels have done so. 14 More specifically, and perhaps more on point, in two recent chapter 9 cases, bankruptcy courts addressed constitutional issues without objection. Association of Retired Employees v. City of Stockton, Cal. (In re City of Stockton, Cal.), 478 B.R. 8 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.2012) (holding that retirees’ contracts could be impaired in the chapter 9 case without offending the constitution); In re City of Harrisburg, PA, 465 B.R. 744 (Bankr.M.D.Pa.2011) (upholding the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute barring financially distressed third class cities from filing bankruptcy).

In addition, the Tax Court, a non-Article III court, has also examined constitutional issues, without objection. 15 Likewise, the *134 Court of Federal Claims, also a non-Article III court, has considered constitutional claims, without objection. This was done perhaps most famously in Beer v. United States, 111 Fed.Cl. 592 (Fed.Cl.2013), which is a suit by Article III judges under the Compensation Clause of the United States Constitution.

Stem does not change this status quo, and nothing about the constitutional dimension of the objectors’ eligibility objections warrants the expansion of Stem that they assert. As Stem itself reaffirmed, “We do not think the removal of counterclaims such as [the debtor’s] from core bankruptcy jurisdiction meaningfully changes the division of labor in the current statute[.]” 131 S.Ct. at 2620 . Expanding Stern to the point where it would prohibit bankruptcy courts from considering issues of state or federal constitutional law would certainly significantly change the division of labor between the bankruptcy courts and the district courts. 16

2. Federalism Issues Are Not Relevant to a Stern Analysis.

The objectors’ federalism argument is even more perplexing and troubling. Certainly the objectors are correct that a ruling on whether the City was properly authorized to file this bankruptcy case, as required for eligibility under 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(2), will require the interpretation of state law, including the Michigan Constitution.

However, ruling on state law issues is required in addressing many issues in bankruptcy cases. As the Supreme Court has observed, “[B]ankruptcy courts [ ] consult state law in determining the validity of most claims.” Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 444 , 127 S.Ct. 1199, 1201 , 167 L.Ed.2d *135 178 (2007). Concisely summarizing the reality of the bankruptcy process and the impact of Stem on it, the court in In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692, 698 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.2011), concluded:

[Stem] certainly did not hold that a Bankruptcy Judge cannot ever decide a state law issue. Indeed, a large portion of the work of a Bankruptcy Judge involves actions in which non-bankruptcy issues must be decided and that ‘stem from the bankruptcy itself or would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process,’ [131 S.Ct.] at 2618, for example, claims disputes, actions to bar dischargeability, motions for stay relief, and others. Those issues are likely within the ‘public rights’ exception as defined in Stem.

Other cases also illustrate the point. 17

The distinction is clear. While in some narrow circumstances Stem prohibits a non-Article III court from adjudicating a state law claim for relief, a non-Article III court may consider and apply state law as necessary to resolve claims over which it does have authority under Stem. The mere fact that state law must be applied does not by itself mean that Stem prohibits a non-Article III court from determining the matter.

Moreover, nothing about a chapter 9 case suggests a different result. In City of Cent. Falls, R.I., 468 B.R. at 52 , the court stated, “Nor did [Stern] address concerns of federalism; although the eoun-terclaim at issue in Stem arose under state law, the determinative feature of that counterclaim was that it did not arise under the Bankruptcy Code. The operative dichotomy was not federal versus state, but bankruptcy versus nonbankruptcy.”

The troubling aspect of the objectors’ federalism argument is that it does not attempt to define, even vaguely, what interest of federalism is at stake here.

In Arizona v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2500 , 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012), the Supreme Court stated, “Federalism, central to the constitutional design, adopts the principle that both the National and State Governments have elements of sovereignty the other is bound to respect.” Accordingly, federalism is about the federal and state governments respecting each other’s sovereignty. It has nothing to do with the requirements of Article III or, to use the phraseology of Stem with the “division of labor” between the district courts and the bankruptcy courts. 18 131 S.Ct. at 2620 . See also City of Cent. Falls, R.I., 468 B.R. at 52 , quoted above.

F. Conclusion Regarding the Stern Issue

For these reasons, the Court concludes that it does have the authority to determine the constitutionality of chapter 9 under the United States Constitution and the constitutionality of P.A. 436 under the Michigan Constitution.

*136 VIII. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the United States Constitution.

The objecting parties argue that chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code violates several provisions of the United States Constitution, both on its face and as applied in this case. The Court will first address the arguments that chapter 9 is facially unconstitutional under the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I, Section 8, and the Contracts Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. The Court will then address the argument that chapter 9, on its face and as applied, violates the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the principles of federalism embodied therein.

A. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Uniformity Requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution.

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution provides: “The Congress shall have Power To ... establish ... uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”

The objecting parties, principally AFSCME, assert chapter 9 violates the uniformity requirement of the United States Constitution because chapter 9 “ced[es] to each state the ability to define its own qualifications for a municipality to declare bankruptcy, chapter 9 permits the promulgation of non-uniform bankruptcies within states.” AFSCME’s Corrected Objection to Eligibility, ¶ 58 at 25 (citing M.C.L. § 141.1558). (Dkt. #505) AFSCME argues that this is particularly so in Michigan, where P.A. 436 allows the governor to exercise discretion when determining whether to authorize a municipality to seek chapter 9 relief, and also allows the governor to “attach whichever contingencies he wishes.” Id.

1. The Applicable Law

The Supreme Court has addressed the uniformity requirement in several cases. In Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 , 22 S.Ct. 857 , 46 L.Ed. 1113 (1902), the Court held that the incorporation into the bankruptcy law of state laws relating to exemptions did not violate the uniformity requirement of the United States Constitution. The Court stated, “The general operation of the law is uniform although it may result in certain particulars differently in different states.” Id. at 190 , 22 S.Ct. 857 .

In Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 , 38 S.Ct. 215 , 62 L.Ed. 507 (1918), the Court upheld the Bankruptcy Act’s incorporation of varying state fraudulent conveyance statutes, despite the fact that the laws “may lead to different results in different states.” Id. at 613 , 38 S.Ct. 215 .

In Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corps., 419 U.S. 102, 159 , 95 S.Ct. 335 , 42 L.Ed.2d 320 (1974), the Court held, “The uniformity provision does not deny Congress power to take into account differences that exist between different parts of the country, and to fashion legislation to resolve geographically isolated problems.”

The Supreme Court has struck down a bankruptcy statute as non-uniform only once. In Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 , 102 S.Ct. 1169 , 71 L.Ed.2d 335 (1982), the Court struck down a private bankruptcy law that affected only the employees of a single company. The Court concluded, “The uniformity requirement, however, prohibits Congress from enacting a bankruptcy law that, by definition, applies only to one regional debtor. To survive scrutiny under the Bankruptcy Clause, a law must at least apply uniformly to a defined class of debtors.” Id. at 473 , 102 S.Ct. 1169 .

*137 More recently, the Sixth Circuit has addressed the uniformity requirement in two cases. In Schultz v. United States, 529 F.3d 343, 351 (6th Cir.2008), the court concluded, “Over the last century, the Supreme Court has wrestled with the notion of geographic uniformity, ultimately concluding that it allows different effects in various states due to dissimilarities in state law, so long as the federal law applies uniformly among classes of debtors.” Summarizing the Supreme Court’s decisions in Moyses, Stellwagen, and Blan-chette, the court stated, “Congress does not exceed its constitutional powers in enacting a bankruptcy law that permits variations based on state law or to solve geographically isolated problems.” Id. at 353 .

In Richardson v. Schafer (In re Schafer), 689 F.3d 601 (6th Cir.2012), the court stated, “the Bankruptcy Clause shall act as ‘no limitation upon congress as to the classification of persons who are to be affected by such laws, provided only the laws shall have uniform operation throughout the United States.’” Id. at 611 (quoting Leidigh Carnage Co. v. Stengel, 95 F. 637, 646 (6th Cir.1899)). It added, “Schultz clarified that it is not the outcome that determines the uniformity, but the uniform process by which creditors and debtors in a certain place are treated.” Id.

2. Discussion

Chapter 9 does exactly what these cases require to meet the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution. The “defined class of debtors” to which chapter 9 applies is the class of entities that meet the eligibility requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c). One such qualification is that the entity is “specifically authorized ... to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter[.]” § 109(c)(2). As Moyses and Stellwagen specifically held, it is of no consequence in the uniformity analysis that this requirement of state authorization to file a chapter 9 case may lead to different results in different states.

It appears that AFSCME objects to the lack of uniformity that may arise from the differing circumstances of municipalities that the governor might authorize to file a chapter 9 petition. That it not the test. Rather, the test is whether chapter 9 applies uniformly to all chapter 9 debtors. It does.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that chapter 9 satisfies the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution.

B. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution.

The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, which is Article I, Section 10, provides, “No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, ...” AFSCME argues that chapter 9 violates the Contracts Clause. This argument is frivolous. Chapter 9 is a federal law. Article I, Section 10 does not prohibit Congress from enacting a “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Id.

As the court stated in In re Sanitary & Imp. Dist., No. 7, 98 B.R. 970 (Bankr.D.Neb.1989):

The Court further concludes that the Bankruptcy Code adopted pursuant to the United States Constitution Article 1, Section 8 permits the federal courts through confirmation of a Chapter 9 plan to impair contract rights of bondholders and that such impairment is not a violation by the state or the municipality of Article 1, Section 10 of the United States Constitution which prohibits a *138 state from impairing such contract rights.

Id. at 973 .

Or, more succinctly stated, “The Bankruptcy Clause necessarily authorizes Congress to make laws that would impair contracts. It long has been understood that bankruptcy law entails impairment of contracts.” Stockton, 478 B.R. at 15 (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 191 , 4 Wheat. 122 , 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819)).

C. Chapter 9 Does Not Violate the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Tenth Amendment provides, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”

This Amendment reflects the concept that the United States Constitution “created a Federal Government of limited powers.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 , 111 S.Ct. 2395 , 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 , 61 S.Ct. 451 , 85 L.Ed. 609 (1941) (The Tenth Amendment “states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”).

The Supreme Court’s “consistent understanding” of the Tenth Amendment has been that “[t]he States unquestionably do retain a significant measure of sovereign authority ... to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 , 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 549 , 105 S.Ct. 1005 , 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985)) (quotation marks omitted); see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 , 511 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 1355 , 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (“We use ‘the Tenth Amendment’ to encompass any implied constitutional limitation on Congress’ authority to regulate state activities, whether grounded in the Tenth Amendment itself or in principles of federalism derived generally from the Constitution.”); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 733 , 51 S.Ct. 220 , 75 L.Ed. 640 (1931) (“The Tenth Amendment was intended to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to the states or to the people.”).

The objecting parties argue that chapter 9 violates these principles of federalism because, in the words of AFSCME, it “allows Congress to set the rules controlling State fiscal self-management — an area of exclusive state sovereignty.” AFSCME’s Corrected Objection to Eligibility, ¶ 40 at 15-16. (Dkt. # 505) The Court interprets this argument as a facial challenge to the constitutionality of chapter 9. The as-applied challenge, as stated by the Retiree Committee and other objecting parties, is that if the State of Michigan can properly authorize the City of Detroit to file for chapter 9 relief without the explicit protection of accrued pension rights for individual retired city employees, then chapter 9 “must be found to be unconstitutional as permitting acts in derogation of Michigan’s sovereignty.” Retiree Committee Objection to Eligibility, ¶ 3 at 1-2. (Dkt. # 805)

Before addressing the merits of these arguments, however, the Court must first address two preliminary issues that the United States raised in its “Memorandum in Support of Constitutionality of Chapter 9 of Title 11 of the United States Code”— standing and ripeness. (Dkt. # 1149)

1. The Tenth Amendment Challenges to Chapter 9 Are Ripe for Decision and the Objecting Parties Have Standing.

The United States argues that the creditors who assert that chapter 9 violates the *139 Tenth Amendment as applied in this case lack standing and that this challenge is not ripe for adjudication at this stage in the case. 19 The Court concludes that the objecting parties do have standing and that then1 challenge is now ripe for determination.

a. Standing

“As a rule, a party must have a ‘personal stake in the outcome of the controversy to satisfy Article III.” Stevenson v. J.C. Bradford & Co. (In re Cannon), 277 F.3d 838, 852 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 , 82 S.Ct. 691, 703 , 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962)).

In a bankruptcy case, the standing of a party requesting to be heard turns on whether the party is a “party in interest.” See In re Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201 , 210 (3rd Cir.2011). A party in interest is one who “has a sufficient stake in the proceeding so as to require representation.” In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042 (3d Cir.1985).

11 U.S.C. § 1109 (b), provides, “A party in interest, including ... a creditor ... may raise and may appear and be heard on any issue in a case under this chapter.” 11 U.S.C. § 901 (a) makes this provision applicable in a chapter 9 case.

In the chapter 9 case of In re Barnwell County Hosp., 459 B.R. 903, 906 (Bankr.D.S.C.2011), the court stated, “ ‘Party in interest’ is a term of art in bankruptcy. Although not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, it reflects the unique nature of a bankruptcy case, where the global financial circumstances of a debtor are resolved with respect to all of debtor’s creditors and other affected parties.”

In a chapter 9 case on point, In re Suffolk Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 462 B.R. 397, 403 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.2011), the court held that a party to an executory contract with a municipal debtor has standing to object to the debtor’s eligibility-

Similarly, in In re Wolf Creek Valley Metro. Dist. No. TV, 138 B.R. 610 (D.Colo.1992), also a chapter 9 case, the court stated, “[M]any courts have concluded that the party requesting standing must either be a creditor of a debtor ... or be able to assert an equitable claim against the estate.” Id. at 616 (citation and quotation marks omitted). See also In re Addison Community Hospital Authority, 175 B.R. 646 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1994) (holding that creditors are parties in interest and have standing to be heard).

Under 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (b) and these cases, it is abundantly clear that the objecting parties, who are creditors with pension claims against the City, have standing to assert their constitutional claim as part of their challenge to this bankruptcy case.

Nevertheless, the United States asserts that Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992), precludes standing here. In that case, the Supreme Court adopted this test to determine whether a party has standing under Article III of the constitution:

Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion *140 of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’ Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — ’the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”

Id. at 560-61 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal citations omitted). The United States asserts that the objecting parties do not meet this standard because their injury is not “imminent” at this stage of the proceedings.

The Court concludes that the contours of standing under 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (b) are entirely consistent with the constitutional test for standing that the Supreme Court adopted in Lujan . A creditor has a direct, personal stake in the outcome of a bankruptcy case and thus has standing to challenge the bankruptcy filing. Accordingly, the Court concludes that every creditor of the City of Detroit has standing to object to its eligibility to be a debtor under chapter 9.

b. Ripeness

The United States argues that the issue of whether chapter 9 is constitutional as applied in this case is not ripe for determination at this time. The City joins in this argument. City’s Reply to Retiree Committee’s Objection to Eligibility at 3-5. (Dkt. # 918)

The premise of the argument is that the filing of the case did not result in the impairment of any pension claims. Thus the United States argues that this issue will be ripe only when the City proposes a plan that would impair pensions if confirmed. Until then, it argues, their injury is speculative. 20

In Miles Christi Religious Order v. Township of Northville, 629 F.3d 533 (6th Cir.2010), the Sixth Circuit summarized the case law on the ripeness doctrine:

The ripeness doctrine encompasses “Article III limitations on judicial power” and “prudential reasons” that lead federal courts to “refus[e] to exercise jurisdiction” in certain cases. Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 , 123 S.Ct. 2026 , 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003). The “judicial Power” extends only to “Cases” and “Controversies,” U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, not to “any legal question, wherever and however presented,” without regard to its present amenability to judicial resolution. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir.2008) (en banc). And the federal courts will not “entangle]” themselves “in abstract disagreements” ungrounded in the here and now. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148 , 87 S.Ct. 1507 , 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967); see Warshak, 532 F.3d at 525 . Haste makes waste, and the “premature adjudication” of legal questions compels courts to resolve matters, even constitutional matters, that may with time be satisfactorily resolved at the local level, Nat’l Park Hospitality Ass’n, 538 U.S. at 807 , 123 S.Ct. 2026 ; Grace Cmty. Church v. Lenox Twp., 544 F.3d 609, 617 (6th Cir.2008), and that “may turn out differently in different settings,” Warshak, 532 F.3d at 525 .

*141 To decide whether a dispute has ripened into an action amenable to and appropriate for judicial resolution, we ask two questions: (1) is the dispute “fit” for a court decision in the sense that it arises in “a concrete factual context” and involves “a dispute that is likely to come to pass”? and (2) what are the risks to the claimant if the federal courts stay their hand? Warshak, 532 F.3d at 525 ; see Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 149 , 87 S.Ct. 1507 .

Id. at 537.

Although the argument of the United States has some appeal, 21 the Court must reject it, largely for the same reasons that it found that the objecting parties have standing. The ultimate issue before the Court at this time is whether the City is eligible to be a debtor in chapter 9. This dispute arises in the concrete factual context of the City of Detroit filing this bankruptcy case under chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code and the objecting parties challenging the constitutionality of that very law. This dispute is not an “abstract disagreement ungrounded in the here and now.” It is here and it is now.

The Court further concludes that as a matter of judicial prudence, resolving this issue now will likely expedite the resolution of this bankruptcy case. The Court notes that the parties have fully briefed and argued the merits. Further, if the Tenth Amendment challenge to chapter 9 is resolved now, the parties and the Court can then focus on whether the City’s plan (to be filed shortly, it states) meets the confirmation requirements of the bankruptcy code.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the objecting parties’ challenge to chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code as applied in this case is ripe for determination at this time.

2. The Supreme Court Has Already Determined That Chapter 9 Is Constitutional.

The question of whether a federal municipal bankruptcy act can be administered consistent with the principles of federalism reflected in the Tenth Amendment has already been decided. In United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 , 58 S.Ct. 811 , 82 L.Ed. 1137 (1938), the United States Supreme Court specifically upheld the Municipal Corporation Bankruptcy Act, 50 Stat. 653 (1937), over objections that the statute violated the Tenth Amendment. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 53-54 , 58 S.Ct. 811 .

In upholding the 1937 Act, the Bekins court found:

The statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its fiscal affairs. The bankruptcy power is exercised in relation to a matter normally within its province and only in a case where the action of the taxing agency in carrying out a plan of composition approved by the bankruptcy court is authorized by state law. It is of the essence of sovereignty to be able to make contracts and give consents bearing upon the exertion of governmental power.... The reservation to the States by the Tenth Amendment protected, and did not destroy, their right to make contracts and give consents where that *142 action would not contravene the provisions of the Federal Constitution.

Bekins, 304 U.S. at 51-2 , 58 S.Ct. 811 .

The Court further noted that two years earlier, it had struck down a previous version of the federal municipal bankruptcy law for violating the Tenth Amendment. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298 U.S. 513 , 56 S.Ct. 892 , 80 L.Ed. 1309 (1936). 22 The Court found, however, that in the 1937 Act, Congress had “carefully” amended the law “to afford no ground for [the Tenth Amendment] objection.” Bekins, 304 U.S. at 50 , 58 S.Ct. 811 . The Court quoted approvingly, and at length, from a House of Representatives Committee report on the 1937 Act:

There is no hope for relief through statutes enacted by the States, because the Constitution forbids the passing of State laws impairing the obligations of existing contracts. Therefore, relief must come from Congress, if at all. The committee are not prepared to admit that the situation presents a legislative no-man’s land. It is the opinion of the committee that the present bill removes the objections to the unconstitutional statute, and gives a forum to enable those distressed taxing agencies which desire to adjust their obligations and which are capable of reorganization, to meet their creditors under necessary judicial control and guidance and free from coercion, and to affect such adjustment on a plan determined to be mutually advantageous.

Id. at 51 , 58 S.Ct. 811 (quotation marks omitted).

Bekins thus squarely rejects the challenges that the objecting parties assert to chapter 9 in this case and it has not been overruled.

*143 It is well-settled that this Court is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. In Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 , 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997), the Court stated, “[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Id. at 237 , 117 S.Ct. 1997 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 , 109 S.Ct. 1917 , 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989) (quotation marks omitted)). See also Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 744 (6th Cir.2002).

Nevertheless, the objecting parties assert that subsequent amendments to the municipal bankruptcy statute and subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding the Tenth Amendment compel the conclusion that Bekins is no longer good law, or at least that it is inapplicable in this case. Specifically, in its objection, AFSCME argues that since Bekins was decided, “intervening Supreme Court precedent holds that states can fashion their own municipal reorganization statutes, but cannot consent to any derogation of their sovereign powers.” AFSCME’s Corrected Objection to Eligibility, ¶ 44 at 17. (Dkt. #505) Although the Court concludes that Bekins remains good law and is controlling here, the Court will address these arguments.

3. Changes to Municipal Bankruptcy Law Since 1937 Do Not Undermine the Continuing Validity of Bekins .

The only relevant change to municipal bankruptcy law that AFSCME identifies is the addition of § 903 to the bankruptcy code, the substance of which was added in 1946 as § 83(i) of the 1937 Act. That section provided, “[N]o State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such agencies shall be binding upon any creditor who does not consent to such composition, and no judgment shall be entered under such State law which would bind a creditor to such composition without his consent.”

In slightly different form, § 903 of the bankruptcy code now provides:

This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control, by legislation or otherwise, a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality, including expenditures for such exercise, but—

(1) a State law prescribing a method of composition of indebtedness of such municipality may not bind any creditor that does not consent to such composition; and

(2) a judgment entered under such a law may not bind a creditor that does not consent to such composition.

11 U.S.C. § 903 .

AFSCME argues that this provision created a new exclusivity in chapter 9 that forces the states to adopt the federal scheme for adjusting municipal debts. This exclusivity, the argument goes, deprives the states of the ability to enact state legislation providing for municipal debt adjustment, which is inconsistent with the principles of federalism set forth in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 , 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 , 117 S.Ct. 2365 , 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997).

This argument fails on two levels. First, other than in one limited instance, Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, N.J., 316 U.S. 502 , 62 S.Ct. 1129 , 86 L.Ed. 1629 (1942), courts have always interpreted the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution to prohibit the states from enacting legislation providing for municipal bankruptcies. The 1946 *144 amendment that added the provision that is now § 903 did not change this law.

Second, neither New York nor Printz undermine Bekins . As developed above, at its core, Bekins rests on state consent. As will be developed below, like Bekins , both New York and Printz are also built on the concept of state consent. Indeed, it was the lack of state consent to the federal programs in those cases that caused the Supreme Court to find them unconstitutional.

a. The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution Prohibits States from Enacting Municipal Bankruptcy Laws.

The Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, states, “No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Con-tractsf.]”

Applying this clause, the Supreme Court has stated, “When a State itself enters into a contract, it cannot simply walk away from its financial obligations.” Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 , 412 n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 697 , 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983). “It long has been established that the Contracts Clause limits the power of the States to modify their own contracts as well as to regulate those between private parties.” U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 17 , 97 S.Ct. 1505 , 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977) (citing Dartmough College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 , 4 Wheat. 518 , 4 L.Ed. 629 (1819); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87 , 6 Cranch 87 , 3 L.Ed. 162 (1810)). Section 903 simply restates this principle.

Moreover, contrary to AFSCME’s assertion, it is clear that Bekins fully considered this issue. It found, “The natural and reasonable remedy through [bankruptcy] was not available under state law by reason of the restriction imposed'by the Federal Constitution upon the impairment of contracts by state legislation.” Bekins, 304 U.S. at 54 , 58 S.Ct. 811 .

b. Asbury Park Is Limited to Its Own Facts.

As noted above, only one case, Asbury Park, is to the contrary. The Court concludes, however, that this case represents a very narrow departure from these principles and its holding is limited to the unique facts of that case. Indeed, the Court itself stated, “We do not go beyond the case before us.” 316 U.S. at 516 , 62 S.Ct. 1129 .

The adjustment plan at issue in Asbury Park was “authorized” by the New Jersey state court on July 21, 1937. This was after the federal municipal bankruptcy law was struck down in Ashton and before the enactment of the municipal bankruptcy act that Bekins approved. Moreover, in As- bury Park, the bonds affected by the plan of adjustment, which the Court found were worthless prior to the adjustment, were reissued without a reduction in the principal obligation and became significantly more valuable as a result of the adjustment. Asbury Park, 316 U.S. at 507-08, 512-13 , 62 S.Ct. 1129 .

The limited application of Asbury Park to its own facts has been repeatedly recognized. The cases now firmly establish that the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution bars a state from enacting municipal bankruptcy legislation. In U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27 , 97 S.Ct. 1505 , 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977), the Supreme Court observed, “The only time in this century that alteration of a municipal bond contract has been sustained by this Court was in [As- bury Park ].” 23

*145 In In re Jefferson Cnty., Ala., 474 B.R. 228, 279 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.2012), aff'd sub nom. Mosley v. Jefferson Cnty. (In re Jefferson Cnty.), 2012 WL 3775758 (N.D.Ala. Aug. 28, 2012), the court stated, “A financially prostrate municipal government has one viable option to resolve debts in a non-consensual manner. It is a bankruptcy case. Outside of bankruptcy, non-consensual alteration of contracted debt is, at the very least, severely restricted, if not impossible.” The court added, “There has been only one instance in this and the last century when the Supreme Court of the United States has sustained the alteration of a municipal bond contract outside a bankruptcy case.” Id. at 279 n. 21. It further observed that Asbury Park has since been “distinguished and its precedent status, if any, is dubious.” Id.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the addition of § 903 to our municipal bankruptcy law does not undermine the continuing validity of Bekins .

4. Changes to the Supreme Court’s Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence Do Not Undermine the Continuing Validity of Bekins .

a. New York v. United States

In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 , 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), the Supreme Court considered a Tenth Amendment objection to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, 42 U.S.C. § 2021b, et seq. Congress enacted that law to address the problem of identifying storage sites for low-level radioactive waste. 505 U.S. at 152-54 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . The Act provided three different incentives for each state to take responsibility over the nuclear waste generated within its borders. Id.

The first was a monetary incentive to share in the proceeds of a surcharge on radioactive waste received from other states, based on a series of milestones. 505 U.S. at 171 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . The Court found this program constitutional because it was, in fact, nothing more than an incentive to the state to regulate. Congress had “placed conditions — the achievement of the milestones — on the receipt of federal funds.” Id. at 171 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . The states could choose to achieve these milestones, and receive the federal funds, or not. Id. at 173 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . “[T]he location of such choice in the States is an inherent element in any conditional exercise of Congress’ spending power.” Id.

The Court then stated, “In the second set of incentives, Congress has authorized States and regional compacts with disposal sites gradually to increase the cost of access to the sites, and then to deny access altogether, to radioactive waste generated in States that do not meet federal deadlines.” Id. The Court held that this provision was also constitutional, again because the states retained the choice to participate in the federal program or not.

The Court explained, “Where federal regulation of private activity is within the scope of the Commerce Clause, we have recognized the ability of Congress to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.” Id. at 173-74 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 (emphasis added). “[T]he choice remains at all times with the residents of the State, *146 not with Congress. The State need not expend any funds, or participate in any federal program, if local residents do not view such expenditures or participation as worthwhile.” Id. at 174 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 .

These two provisions of the Act passed constitutional muster precisely because states could consent to participation in the federal program or withhold their consent as they saw fit. The Court held that these two programs:

represent permissible conditional exercises of Congress’ authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses respectively, in forms that have now grown commonplace. Under each, Congress offers the States a legitimate choice rather than issuing an unavoidable command. The States thereby retain the ability to set their legislative agendas; state government officials remain accountable to the local electorate.

Id. at 185 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 .

In contrast, the third of these provisions — the “take title” provision” — forced the states to choose between either regulating the disposal of radioactive waste according to Congress’s standards or “taking title” to that waste, thereby assuming all the liabilities of its producers. Id. at 174-75 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . The Court held that this provision violated the Tenth Amendment, because it offered the states no choice but to do the bidding of the federal government. This provision, the Court determined, did not ask for state “consent” but instead “commandeered” the states.

The Court’s precedent is clear that the federal government may not require the states to regulate according to federal terms. “[T]he Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.” Id. at 162 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . “Congress may not simply £commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’ ” Id. at 161 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 , 101 S.Ct. 2352 , 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981)).

The “take title” provision did just that. Although guised as a “so-called incentive” scheme, the Court found that the “take title” provisions offered the states no real choice at all.

Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing alone, would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate, standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the two.

Id. at 176, 112 S.Ct. 2408 . The “take title” provisions did not give the states what the Court deemed the constitutionally “critical alternative[.]” Id. at 176 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . “A State may not decline to administer the federal program. No matter which path the State chooses, it must follow the direction of Congress.” Id. at 177 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 .

The cornerstone of New York v. United States, then, is state consent. The federal government may constitutionally encourage, incentivize, or even entice, states to do the federal government’s bidding. It may not command them to do so.

b. Printz v. United States

The Supreme Court reiterated these principles in Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 , 117 S.Ct. 2365 , 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997), and extended them to Congressional efforts to compel state officers to act. *147 At issue in Printz were provisions of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 , that required state and local law enforcement officers to carry out background checks for firearms dealers in connection with proposed sales of firearms. It also required that the background checks be performed in accordance with the federal law. Printz, 521 U.S. at 903-04 , 117 S.Ct. 2365 .

The Court concluded that while state and local governments remained free to voluntarily participate in the background check program, the “mandatory obligation imposed on [law enforcement officers] to perform background checks on prospective handgun purchasers plainly runs afoul [of the Constitution].” Id. at 933 , 117 S.Ct. 2365 . Again, the stumbling block was a lack of state consent:

We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly. The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.

521 U.S. at 935, 117 S.Ct. 2365 .

c. New York and Printz Do Not Undermine Bekins .

Printz acknowledged that states could volunteer to carry out federal law. Id. at 910-11, 916-17 , 117 S.Ct. 2365 (describing the history of state officers carrying out federal law as involving “voluntary” action on the part of the states). Concurring, Justice O’Connor added, “Our holding, of course, does not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act. States and chief law enforcement officers may voluntarily continue to participate in the federal program.” Id. at 936 , 117 S.Ct. 2365 .

By the same token, New York acknowledged that states can and do enter into voluntary contracts with the federal government whereby states agree to legislate according to federal terms in exchange for some federal benefit or forbearance. New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 .

What makes those federal programs constitutionally permissible, and the commandeering at issue in New York and Printz impermissible, is consent, and nothing more. If the state is acting voluntarily, it is free to engage with the federal government across a broad range of subject areas. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is violated only when the state does not consent.

Chapter 9 simply does not implicate the concerns of New York and Printz . As Bekins emphasized, chapter 9 “is limited to voluntary proceedings for the composition of debts.” Bekins, 304 U.S. at 47 , 58 S.Ct. 811 (emphasis added). The Be-kins Court explained:

The bankruptcy power is competent to give relief to debtors in such a plight and, if there is any obstacle to its exercise in the case of the districts organized under state law it lies in the right of the State to oppose federal interference. The State steps in to remove that obstacle. The State acts in aid, and not in derogation, of its sovereign powers. It invites the intervention of the bankruptcy power to save its agency which the State itself is powerless to rescue. Through its cooperation with the national government the needed relief is given. We see no ground for the conclusion that the Federal Constitution, in the interest of state sovereignty, has reduced *148 both sovereigns to helplessness in such a case.

Id., 304 U.S. at 54 , 58 S.Ct. 811 .

The federal government cannot and does not compel states to authorize municipalities to file for chapter 9 relief, and municipalities are not permitted to seek chapter 9 relief without specific state authorization. 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(2). There is simply no “commandeering” involved. New York, 505 U.S. at 161 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . Chapter 9 does not compel a state to enact a specific regulatory program, as in New York . Nor does chapter 9 press state officers into federal service, as in Printz . Instead, as Bekins held, valid state authorization is required for a municipality to proceed in chapter 9.

Moreover, during the pendency of the chapter 9 case, § 904 of the bankruptcy code mandates that the bankruptcy court “may not ... interfere with (1) any of the political or governmental powers of the debtor; (2) any of the property or revenues of the debtor; or (3) the debtor’s use or employment of any income-producing property.” 11 U.S.C. § 904 . At the same time, bankruptcy code § 903 mandates, “This chapter does not limit or impair the power of a State to control ... a municipality of or in such State in the exercise of the political or governmental powers of such municipality!.]”

Because the state and local officials must authorize the filing of a chapter 9 petition, 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(2), and because they retain control over “the political or governmental powers” of the municipality, these state officials remain fully politically accountable to the citizens of the state and municipality. See New York, 505 U.S. at 186 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 (“The States thereby retain the ability to set their legislative agendas; state government officials remain accountable to the local electorate.”).

d. Explaining Some Puzzling Language in New York

To be sure, some language in New York (not repeated in Printz) lends support to the argument that state consent cannot cure a federal law that would otherwise violate the Tenth Amendment. In New York , Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court explained that federalism does not exist for the benefit of states, as such, but rather is a part of the constitutional structure whose purpose is to benefit individuals. 505 U.S. at 182 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . Justice O’Connor continued:

Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States, ... the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the “consent” of state officials .... The constitutional authority of Congress cannot be expanded by the “consent” of the governmental unit whose domain is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the States.”

Id.

Some of the parties in this case have seized upon this language to argue that “the Supreme Court has weakened if not rejected Bekins’ foundation — that a State’s consent can remedy any violation of the Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism as they affect individual citizens.” Retiree Committee Objection to Eligibility, ¶ 37 at 19. (Dkt. #805)

The difficulty with this argument is that it proves too much. If this language from New York has the sweeping force that the objecting parties ascribe to it, then a state’s consent could never “cure” what would otherwise be a Tenth Amendment violation. The two incentives in New York that were constitutionally sustained would instead have been struck down like the “take title” provision. As the Court emphasized in New York , “even where Congress has the authority under the Consti *149 tution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.” New York, 505 U.S. at 166 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 .

Yet, despite Congress’ inability to compel states to regulate according to federal standards, it may unquestionably invite, encourage, or entice the states to do so. New York specifically held that Congress may “encourage a State to regulate in a particular way,” or “hold out incentives to the States as a method of influencing a State’s policy choices.” Id. The key is consent. New York further held, “Our cases have identified a variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests.” Id. Consent to what would otherwise be an unlawful commandeering of state governments was the very basis for upholding two of the regulatory programs at issue in New York. Id. at 173-74 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 .

It is not entirely clear, therefore, what Justice O’Connor meant when she wrote that states “cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution.” Id. at 182 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . In a very real sense, the holding of New York rests on the premise that states can do just that. Congress cannot require the states to legislate with respect to the problem of radioactive waste, but it can unquestionably hold out incentives that induce the states to consent to do so. More broadly put, states can “consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution.” Id.

The Court can only conclude that Justice O’Connor meant something else — that a state cannot consent to be compelled. As the Court saw the “choice” in New York , it was a choice between two unconstitutional alternatives — regulating according to federal standards or taking title to all of the low level radioactive waste produced by private parties in the state. Justice O’Connor likely concluded that the latter alternative was so unpalatable that it was really no choice at all. After all, here is where the Court found that “Congress had crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion.” Id. at 175 , 112 S.Ct. 2408 . Understood this way, Justice O’Connor may have been saying nothing more than that one cannot consent to have a gun held to one’s head. The idea of “consent” in such a scenario is meaningless.

If this understanding is correct, it would be incumbent upon the objecting parties to identify some way in which federal authority has compelled state action here. They have not.

Whatever the intended meaning of this language, it cannot be that state consent can never “cure” what would otherwise violate the Tenth Amendment. That meaning would sweep aside the holding of New York itself. Nor does this language undo the holding in Bekins , which, as stated before, this Court must apply until the Supreme Court overrules it.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that chapter 9 is not facially unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment.

5. Chapter 9 Is Constitutional As Applied in This Case.

Several of the objecting parties also raise “as-applied” challenges to the constitutionality of chapter 9 under the Tenth Amendment to United States Constitution. Although variously cast, the primary thrust of these arguments is that if chapter 9 permits the State of Michigan to authorize a city to file a petition for chapter 9 relief without explicitly providing for *150 the protection of accrued pension benefits, the Tenth Amendment is violated.

The Court concludes that these arguments must be rejected.

a. When the State Consents to a Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, the Tenth Amendment Does Not Prohibit the Impairment of Contract Rights That Are Otherwise Protected by the State Constitution.

The basis for this result begins with the recognition that the State of Michigan cannot legally provide for the adjustment of the pension debts of the City of Detroit. This is a direct result of the prohibition against the State of Michigan impairing contracts in both the United States Constitution and Michigan Constitution, as well as the prohibition against impairing the contractual obligations relating to accrued pension benefits in the Michigan Constitution.

The federal bankruptcy court, however, is not so constrained. As noted in Part VIII B, above, “The Bankruptcy Clause necessarily authorizes Congress to make laws that would impair contracts. It long has been understood that bankruptcy law entails impairment of contracts.” Stockton, 478 B.R. at 15 (citing Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. 122, 191 , 4 Wheat. 122 , 4 L.Ed. 529 (1819)).

The state constitutional provisions prohibiting the impairment of contracts and pensions impose no constraint on the bankruptcy process. The Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution, and the bankruptcy code enacted pursuant thereto, explicitly empower the bankruptcy court to impair contracts and to impair contractual rights relating to accrued vested pension benefits. Impairing contracts is what the bankruptcy process does.

The constitutional foundation for municipal bankruptcy was well-articulated in Stockton:

In other words, while a state cannot make a law impairing the obligation of contract, Congress can do so. The goal of the Bankruptcy Code is adjusting the debtor-creditor relationship. Every discharge impairs contracts. While bankruptcy law endeavors to provide a system of orderly, predictable rules for treatment of parties whose contracts are impaired, that does not change the starring role of contract impairment in bankruptcy.

It follows, then, that contracts may be impaired in this chapter 9 case without offending the Constitution. The Bankruptcy Clause gives Congress express power to legislate uniform laws of bankruptcy that result in impairment of contract; and Congress is not subject to the restriction that the Contracts Clause places on states. Compare U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 4, with § 10, cl. 1.

478 B.R. at 16 .

For Tenth Amendment and state sovereignty purposes, nothing distinguishes pension debt in a municipal bankruptcy case from any other debt. If the Tenth Amendment prohibits the impairment of pension benefits in this case, then it would also prohibit the adjustment any other debt in this case. Bekins makes it clear, however, that with state consent, the adjustment of municipal debts does not im-permissibly intrude on state sovereignty. Bekins, 304 U.S. at 52 , 58 S.Ct. 811 . This Court is bound to follow that holding,

b. Under the Michigan Constitution, Pension Rights Are Contractual Rights.

The Plans seek escape from this result by asserting that under the Michigan Constitution, pension debt has greater protection than ordinary contract debt. *151 The argument is premised on the slim reed that in the Michigan Constitution, pension rights may not be “impaired or diminished,” whereas only laws “impairing” contract rights are prohibited.

There are several reasons why the slight difference between the language that protects contracts (no “impairment”) and the language that protects pensions (no “impairment” or “diminishment”) does not demonstrate that pensions were given any extraordinary protection.

Before reviewing those reasons, however, a brief review of the history of the legal status of pension benefits in Michigan is necessary.

At common law, before the adoption of the Michigan Constitution in 1963, public pensions in Michigan were viewed as gratuitous allowances that could be revoked at will, because a retiree lacked any vested right in their continuation. In Brown v. Highland Park, 320 Mich. 108, 114 , 30 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Mich.1948), the Michigan Supreme Court stated:

We are convinced that the majority of cases in other jurisdictions establishes the rule that a pension granted by public authorities is not a contractual obligation, that the pensioner has no vested right, and that a pension is terminable at the will of a municipality, at least while acting within reasonable limits. At best plaintiffs in this case have an expectancy based upon continuance of existing charter provisions.

Similarly, in Kosa v. Treasurer of State of Mich., 408 Mich. 356, 368-69 , 292 N.W.2d 452, 459 (1980), the court observed this about the status of pension benefits before the 1963 Constitution was adopted:

Until the adoption of Const.1963, art. 9, s 24, legislative appropriation for retirement fund reserves was considered to be an ex gratia action. Consequently, the most that could be said about “pre-con” legislative appropriations for retirees was that there was some kind of implied commitment to fund pension reserves.

Id. (footnote omitted).

In the 1963 Constitution, this provision enhancing the protection for pensions was included: “The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.” Mich. Const, art. IX, § 24.

In Kosa, 408 Mich, at 370 n. 21, 292 N.W.2d at 459 , the Michigan Supreme Court quoted the following history from the constitutional convention regarding article 9, section 24:

“MR. VAN DUSEN: Mr. Chairman, if I may elaborate briefly on Mr. Brake’s answer to Mr. Downs’ question, I would like to indicate that the words ‘accrued financial benefits’ were used designedly, so that the contractual right of the employee would be limited to the deferred compensation embodied in any pension plan, and that we hope to avoid thereby a proliferation of litigation by individual participants in retirement systems talking about the general benefits structure, or something other than his specific right to receive benefits. It is not intended that an individual employee should, as a result of this language, be given the right to sue the employing unit to require the actuarial funding of past service benefits, or anything of that nature. What it is designed to do is to say that when his benefits come due, he’s got a contractual right to receive them. “And, in answer to your second question, he has the contractual right to sue for them. So that he has no particular interest in the funding of somebody else’s *152 benefits as long as he has the contractual right to sue for his.

“MR. DOWNS: I appreciate Mr. Van Dusen’s comments. Again, I want to see if I understand this. Then he would not have a remedy of legally forcing the legislative body each year to set aside the appropriate amount, but when the money did come due this would be a contractual right for which he could sue a ministerial officer that could be man-damused or enjoined; is that correct?

“MR. VAN DUSEN: Thats my understanding, Mr. Downs.”

1 Official Record, Constitutional Convention 1961, pp. 773-774.

Id. (emphasis added).

Kosa also offered an explanation for the origin of the provision. “To gain protection of their pension rights, Michigan teachers effectively lobbied for a constitutional amendment granting contractual status to retirement benefits.” 408 Mich, at 360 , 292 N.W.2d at 455 (emphasis added).

The Kosa court summarized the provision, again using contract language, as follows:

To sum up, while the Legislature’s constitutional contractual obligation is not to impair “accrued financial benefits”, even if that obligation also related to the funding system, there would be no impairment of the contractual obligation because the substituted “entry age normal” system supports the benefit structure as strongly as the replaced “attained age” system.

Id., 408 Mich, at 373 , 292 N.W.2d at 461 (emphasis added).

While counting such blessings as have come to them, public school employees are understandably still concerned about their pension security. In that regard, this opinion reminds the Legislature that the constitutional provision adopted by the people of this state is indeed a solemn contractual obligation between public employees and the Legislature guaranteeing that pension benefit payments cannot be constitutionally impaired.

Id., 408 Mich, at 382 , 292 N.W.2d at 465 (emphasis added).

More recently, in In re Constitutionality of 2011 Pa. 38 , 490 Mich. 295 , 806 N.W.2d 683 (2011), the Michigan Supreme Court unequivocally stated, “The obvious intent of § 24, however, was to ensure that public pensions be treated as contractual obligations that, once earned, could not be diminished.” Id. at 311, 806 N.W.2d at 693 (emphasis added).

That historical review begins to demonstrate the several reasons why the slight difference in the language that protects contracts and the language that protects pensions does not suggest that pensions were given any extraordinary protection:

First, the language of article IX, section 24, gives pension benefits the status of a “contractual obligation.” The natural meaning of the words “contractual obligation” is certainly inconsistent with the greater protection for which the Plans now argue.

Second, if the Michigan Constitution were meant to give the kind of absolute protection for which the Plans argue, the language in the article IX, section 24 simply would not have referred to pension benefits as a “contractual obligation.” It also would not have been constructed by simply copying the verb from the contracts clause — “impair”—and then adding a lesser verb — “diminish” in the disjunctive.

Third, linguistically, there is no functional difference in meaning between “impair” and “impair or diminish.” There certainly is a preference, if not a mandate, *153 to give meaning to every word in written law. In Koontz v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 312 , 645 N.W.2d 34, 39 (2002), the Michigan Supreme Court summarized the familiar command, “Courts must give effect to every word, phrase, and clause in a statute, and must avoid an interpretation that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.” The court went on to state, however, “we give undefined statutory terms their plain and ordinary meanings.” Id.

Under Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir.1999), discussed in more detail in Part IX A, below, this Court is bound by these commands of statutory interpretation that the Michigan Supreme Court embraced in Koontz . But if this Court gives these terms — “diminish” and “impair” — their plain and ordinary meanings, as Koontz requires, those meanings would not be substantively different from each other. The terms are not synonyms, but they cannot honestly be given meanings so different as to compel the result that the Plans now seek. “Diminish” adds nothing material to “impair.” All “diminishment” is “impairment.” And, “impair” includes “diminish.”

Fourth, the Plans’ argument for a greater protection is inconsistent with the Michigan Supreme Court’s interpretation of the constitutional language in Kosa and in In re Constitutionality of 2011 PA 38 . Those cases also used contract language to describe the status of pensions. This is important because the Sixth Circuit has held that on questions of state law, this Court is bound to apply the holdings of the Michigan Supreme Court. See Kirk v. Hanes Corp. of North Carolina, 16 F.3d 705, 706 (6th Cir.1994).

Fifth, an even greater narrative must be considered here, focusing on 1963. Be-kins had long since determined that municipal bankruptcy was constitutional. That of course meant that even though states could not impair municipal contracts, federal courts could do that in a bankruptcy case. Indeed, Michigan law then allowed municipalities to file bankruptcy. 24

It was within that framework of rights, expectations, scenarios and possibilities that the newly negotiated, proposed and ratified Michigan Constitution of 1963 explicitly gave accrued pension benefits the status of contractual obligations. That new constitution could have given pensions protection from impairment in bankruptcy in several ways. It could have simply prohibited Michigan municipalities from filing bankruptcy. It could have somehow created a property interest that bankruptcy would be required to respect under Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 , 99 S.Ct. 914 , 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979) (holding that property issues in bankruptcy are determined according to state law). Or, it could have established some sort of a secured interest in the municipality’s property. It could even have explicitly required the State to guaranty pension benefits. But it did none of those.

Instead, both the history from the constitutional convention, quoted above, and the language of the pension provision itself, make it clear that the only remedy for *154 impairment of pensions is a claim for breach of contract.

Because under the Michigan Constitution, pension rights are contractual rights, they are subject to impairment in a federal bankruptcy proceeding. Moreover, when, as here, the state consents, that impairment does not violate the Tenth Amendment. Therefore, as applied in this case, chapter 9 is not unconstitutional.

Nevertheless, the Court is compelled to comment. No one should interpret this holding that pension rights are subject to impairment in this bankruptcy case to mean that the Court will necessarily confirm any plan of adjustment that impairs pensions. The Court emphasizes that it will not lightly or casually exercise the power under federal bankruptcy law to impair pensions. Before the Court confirms any plan that the City submits, the Court must find that the plan fully meets the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 943 (b) and the other applicable provisions of the bankruptcy code. Together, these provisions of law demand this Court’s judicious legal and equitable consideration of the interests of the City and all of its creditors, as well as the laws of the State of Michigan.

IX. Public Act 436 Does Not Violate the Michigan Constitution.

Section 109(c)(2) of the bankruptcy code requires that a municipality be “specifically authorized, in its capacity as a municipality or by name, to be a debtor under such chapter by State law, or by a governmental officer or organization empowered by State law to authorize such entity to be a debtor under such chapter.” 11 U.S.C. § 109 (c)(2). The evidence establishes that the City was authorized to file this ease. The issue is whether that authorization was proper under the Michigan Constitution.

Section 18 of P.A. 436, M.C.L. § 141.1558, establishes the process for authorizing a municipality to file a case under chapter 9 of the bankruptcy code:

(1) If, in the judgment of the emergency manager, no reasonable alternative to rectifying the financial emergency of the local government which is in receivership exists, then the emergency manager may recommend to the governor and the state treasurer that the local government be authorized to proceed under chapter 9. If the governor approves of the recommendation, the governor shall inform the state treasurer and the emergency manager in writing of the decision.... The governor may place contingencies on a local government in order to proceed under chapter 9. Upon receipt of written approval, the emergency manager is authorized to proceed under chapter 9. This section empowers the local government for which an emergency manager has been appointed to become a debtor under title 11 of the United States Code, 11 USC 101 to 1532, as required by section 109 of title 11 of the United States Code, 11 USC 109, and empowers the emergency manager to act exclusively on the local government’s behalf in any such case under chapter 9.

M.C.L. § 141.1558(1).

On July 16, 2013, Mr. Orr gave the governor and the treasurer his written recommendation that the City be authorized to file for chapter 9 relief. Ex. 28. On July 18, 2013, the governor approved this recommendation in writing. Ex. 29. Later that day, Mr. Orr issued a written order directing the City to file this chapter 9 case. Ex. 30. Thus the City of Detroit’s bankruptcy filing was authorized under state law.

*155 Nevertheless, several objectors assert various arguments that the City of Detroit is not authorized to file this case.

First, several objectors argue that the authorization is not valid because P.A. 436, the statute establishing the underlying procedure for a municipality to obtain authority for filing, is unconstitutional. Broadly stated, these are the challenges to P.A. 436:

The Retired Detroit Police Members Association (“RDPMA”) challenges the constitutionality of P.A. 436 on the grounds that it was enacted immediately after the referendum rejection of a similar statute, P.A. 4.

The RDPMA also asserts that P.A. 436 is unconstitutional on the grounds that the Michigan Legislature added an appropriation provision for the purpose of evading the peoples’ constitutional right to referendum.

Several objectors argue that P.A. 436 is unconstitutional because it fails to protect pensions from impairment in bankruptcy.

AFSCME asserts that P.A. 436 is unconstitutional because it violates the “Strong Home Rule” provisions in the Michigan Constitution.

A. The Michigan Case Law on Evaluating the Constitutionality of a State Statute.

The validity of P.A. 436 under the Michigan Constitution is a question of state law. Determining the several constitutional challenges to P.A. 436 requires this Court to apply state law. In Meridian Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kellman, 197 F.3d 1178, 1181 (6th Cir.1999), the Sixth Circuit provided this guidance on determining state law:

In construing questions of state law, the federal court must apply state law in accordance with the controlling decisions of the highest court of the state. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). If the state’s highest court has not addressed the issue, the federal court must attempt to ascertain how that court would rule if it were faced with the issue. The Court may use the decisional law of the state’s lower courts, other federal courts construing state law, restatements of law, law review commentaries, and other jurisdictions on the “majority” rule in making this determination. Grantham & Mann v. American Safety Prods., 831 F.2d 596, 608 (6th Cir.1987). A federal court should not disregard the decisions of intermediate appellate state courts unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 , 87 S.Ct. 1776, 1782 , 18 L.Ed.2d 886 (1967).

Similarly, in Demczyk v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. (In re Graham Square, Inc.), 126 F.3d 823, 827 (6th Cir.1997), the court stated, “Where the relevant state law is unsettled, we determine how we think the highest state court would rule if faced with the same case.”

The Michigan Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the validity P.A. 436. As a result, this Court must attempt to ascertain how that court would rule if it were faced with the issue.

In In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2011 Pa. 38 , 490 Mich. 295, 307-8 , 806 N.W.2d 683, 692 (2011), the Michigan Supreme Court summarized its decisions on evaluating a constitutional challenge to a state law:

“Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and courts have a duty to construe a statute as constitutional unless its unconstitutionality is clearly apparent.” Taylor v. Gate Pharm., 468 Mich. *156 1, 6 , 658 N.W.2d 127 (2003). “We exercise the power to declare a law unconstitutional with extreme caution, and we never exercise it where serious doubt exists with regard to the conflict.” Phillips v. Mirac, Inc., 470 Mich. 415, 422 , 685 N.W.2d 174 (2004). “‘Every reasonable presumption or intendment must be indulged in favor of the validity of an act, and it is only when invalidity appears so clearly as to leave no room for reasonable doubt that it violates some provision of the Constitution that a court will refuse to sustain its validity.’ ” Id. at 423 , 685 N.W.2d 174 , quoting Cady v. Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 505 , 286 N.W. 805 (1939). Therefore, “the burden of proving that a statute is unconstitutional rests with the party challenging it[.]” In re Request for Advisory Opinion Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 Pa. 71 , 479 Mich. 1, 11 , 740 N.W.2d 444 (2007)[.]

This guidance, as well as the decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court on issues relating to the right to referendum, home rule, and the pension clause, will inform this Court’s determinations on the objectors’ challenges to P.A. 436.

B. The Voters’ Rejection of Public Act 4 Did Not Constitutionally Prohibit the Michigan Legislature from Enacting Public Act 436.

On March 16, 2011, the governor signed P.A. 4 into law. P.A. 4 repealed P.A. 72. However, the voters rejected P.A. 4 by referendum in the November 6, 2012 election. Shortly after that election, on December 26, 2012, the governor signed P.A. 436 into law. It took effect on March 28, 2013.

The RDPMA argues that P.A. 436 is unconstitutional because it is essentially a reenactment of P.A. 4. The City and the State of Michigan assert that there are several differences between P.A. 436 and P.A. 4, such that they are not the same law.

The right of referendum is established in article 2, section 9 of the Michigan Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 9. The people reserve to themselves the power to propose laws and to enact and reject laws, called the initiative, and the power to approve or reject laws enacted by the legislature, called the referendum. The power of initiative extends only to laws which the legislature may enact under this constitution. The power of referendum does not extend to acts making appropriations for state institutions or to meet deficiencies in state funds and must be invoked in the manner prescribed by law within 90 days following the final adjournment of the legislative session at which the law was enacted. To invoke the initiative or referendum, petitions signed by a number of registered electors, not less than eight percent for initiative and five percent for referendum of the total vote cast for all candidates for governor at the last preceding general election at which a governor was elected shall be required.

Referendum, approval

No law as to which the power of referendum properly has been invoked shall be effective thereafter unless approved by a majority of the electors voting thereon at the next general election.

Mich. Const, art. II, § 9.

In Reynolds v. Bureau of State Lottery, 240 Mich.App. 84 , 610 N.W.2d 597 (2000), the Michigan Court of Appeals considered the power of the legislature to reenact a law while a referendum process regarding that law was pending. The court explained:

[N]othing in the Michigan Constitution suggests that the referendum had a *157 broader effect than nullification of [the 1994 act]. We cannot read into our constitution a general “preemption of the field” that would prevent further legislative action on the issues raised by the referendum. The Legislature remained in full possession of all its other ordinary constitutional powers, including legislative power over the subject matter addressed in [the 1994 act].

Reynolds, 240 Mich.App. at 97 , 610 N.W.2d at 604-05 .

This Michigan Court of Appeals decision strongly suggests that the referendum rejection of P.A. 4 did not prohibit the Michigan legislature from enacting P.A. 436, even though P.A. 436 addressed the same subject matter as P.A. 4 and contained very few changes.

As noted above, the Sixth Circuit has instructed, “A federal court should not disregard the decisions of intermediate appellate state courts unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d at 1181 . No data, let alone any persuasive data, suggests that the Michigan Supreme Court would decide this issue otherwise. Accordingly, the RDPMA’s challenge on this ground must be rejected.

C. Even If the Michigan Legislature Did Include Appropriations Provisions in Public Act 436 to Evade the Constitutional Right of Referendum, It Is Not Unconstitutional.

The RDPMA also contends that P.A. 436 is unconstitutional because the Michigan legislature included appropriations provisions in P.A. 436 for the sole purpose of shielding the Act from referendum. Section 34 of P.A. 436 appropriates $780,000 for 2013 to pay the salaries of emergency managers. Section 35 of P.A. 436 appropriates $5,000,000 for 2013 to pay professionals hired to assist emergency managers.

There certainly was some credible evidence in support of the RDPMA’s assertion that the appropriations provisions in P.A. 436 were motivated by a desire to immunize it from referendum. For example, Howard Ryan testified in his deposi-. tion on October 14, 2013:

Q. I’d just like to ask a follow-up to a question counsel asked you. You said that the appropriation language was put in the — early on in the process; is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Based on your conversations with the people at the time, was it your understanding that one or more of the reasons to put the appropriation language in there was to make sure that it could not — the new act could not be defeated by a referendum?

A. Yes.

Q. And where did you get that knowledge from?

A. Well, having watched the entire process unfold over the past two years.

Q. The Governor’s office knew that that was the point of it?

A. Yes.

Q. That your department knew that that was the point of it?

A. Yes.

Q. The legislators you were dealing with knew that that was the point of it?

A. Yes.

Howard Dep. Tr. 46:1-23, Oct. 14, 2013. 25

Other evidence in support includes: a January 31, 2013 e-mail addressed from *158 Mr. Orr to partners at Jones Day, in which he observed that P.A. 436 “is a clear end-around the prior initiative” to repeal the previous Emergency Manager statute, Public Act 4, “that was rejected by the voters in November.” Ex. 403 (Dkt. # 509-3) According to Mr. Orr “although the new law provides the thin veneer of a revsion (sic) it is essentially a redo of the prior rejected law and appears to merely adopt the conditions necessary for a chapter 9 filing.” Ex. 403. (Dkt. #509-3)

There are, however, several difficulties with the RDPMA’s argument.

The Court must conclude that the Michigan Supreme Court would not, if faced with this issue, hold that P.A. 436 is unconstitutional. In Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Secretary of State, 464 Mich. 359, 367 , 630 N.W.2d 297, 298 (2001), that court concisely held that a public act with an appropriations provision is not subject to referendum, regardless of motive. Concurring, Chief Justice Corrigan added that even if the motive of a legislative body could be discerned as opposed to the motives of individual legislators, “This Court has repeatedly held that courts must not be concerned with the alleged motives of a legislative body in enacting a law, but only with the end result — the actual language of the legislation.” Id. at 367 , 630 N.W.2d 297 .

Similarly, in Houston v. Governor, 491 Mich. 876 , 877, 810 N.W.2d 255 , 256 (2012), the Michigan Supreme Court stated, “[T]his Court possesses no special capacity, and there are no legal standards, by which to assess the political propriety of actions undertaken by the legislative branch. Instead, it is the responsibility of the democratic, and representative, processes of government to check what the people may view as political or partisan excess by their Legislature.”

In People v. Gibbs, 186 Mich. 127, 134-35 , 152 N.W. 1053, 1055 (1915), the Michigan Supreme Court stated, “Courts are not concerned with the motives which actuate the members of the legislative body in enacting a law, but in the results of their action. Bad motives might inspire a law which appeared on its face and proved valid and beneficial, while a bad and invalid law might be, and sometimes is, passed with good intent and the best of motives.” See also Kuhn v. Dep’t of Treasury, 384 Mich. 378, 383-84 , 183 N.W.2d 796, 799 (1971).

Finally, it must also be noted that on November 8, 2013, the Sixth Circuit vacated pending rehearing en banc the decision on which the RDPMA heavily relies. City of Pontiac Retired Employees Assoc. v. Schimmel, 726 F.3d 767 (6th Cir.2013).

Accordingly, the Court concludes that P.A. 436 is not unconstitutional as a violation of the right to referendum in article II, section 9 of the Michigan Constitution.

D. Public Act 436 Does Not Violate the Home Rule Provisions of the Michigan Constitution.

Certain objectors argue that P.A. 436 violates Article VII, Section 22 of the Michigan Constitution, which states:

Under general laws the electors of each city and village shall have the power and authority to frame, adopt and amend its charter, and to amend an existing charter of the city or village heretofore granted or enacted by the legislature for the government of the city or village. Each such city and village shall have power to adopt reso *159 lutions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the constitution and law. No enumeration of powers granted to cities and villages in this constitution shall limit or restrict the general grant of authority conferred by this section.

The argument is that the appointment of an emergency manager for a municipality under P.A. 436 is inconsistent with the right of the electors to adopt and amend the City charter and the city’s right to adopt ordinances. AFSCME asserts that “Michigan is strongly committed to the concept of home rule[.]” AFSCME Amended Objection at 75-91. (Dkt. # 1156) “This ‘strong home rule’ regime reflects a bedrock principle of state law, ... all officers of cities are to ‘be elected by the electors thereof, or ap

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