J. Schott v. UCBR

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jeffry Schott, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 778 C.D. 2021

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent : Submitted: August 19, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE CEISLER FILED: November 17, 2022

Jeffry Schott (Claimant) petitions for review of the March 12, 2021 Order of

the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) affirming the decision

of a Referee to deny Claimant unemployment compensation (UC) benefits. The

Board concluded that Claimant was ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e)

of the Unemployment Compensation Law (Law)1 because he was discharged from

work for willful misconduct. We affirm the Board’s Order.

Background

Claimant was employed full time as Budget Director for the County of

Delaware (Employer) from April 13, 2020, through May 26, 2020. Bd.’s Finding of

1

Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §

802(e). Section 402(e) of the Law provides that an employee shall be ineligible for UC benefits

for any week in which his unemployment is due to his discharge from work for willful misconduct.

43 P.S. § 802(e).

Fact (F.F.) No. 1. When he applied for the position, Claimant stated that he resided

in Boothwyn, Pennsylvania, a municipality in Delaware County. Id. No. 2.

After hiring Claimant, Employer conducted an investigation into Claimant’s

place of residence and determined that Claimant resided in Wilmington, Delaware.

Id. No. 3. At that time, however, Claimant resided in neither Boothwyn nor

Wilmington; he resided in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Id. No. 4.

Employer has a policy stating that its employees must reside in Delaware

County, but Employer allows an employee to relocate to Delaware County within

six months after beginning a position with Employer. Id. No. 5.2 Following its

investigation, Employer determined that Claimant had lied about his place of

residence in his application materials; as a result, Employer discharged Claimant for

making false statements in his application. Id. No. 6.

Claimant filed a claim for UC benefits, which the local UC Service Center

denied. Based on its review of the initial claim record, the Service Center found:

[C]laimant stated he thought he had six . . . months to move into

[Delaware C]ounty. [Employer’s] staff informed him that the six[-

]month period was not factual and no one would have cause to offer

him the [six-]month extension since he said he lived in Delaware

2

Employer’s residency policy states in pertinent part:

No [p]erson shall be eligible for employment with the County of Delaware unless

he or she is a resident of, and lives within the geographical boundaries of[,] the

County of Delaware.

An employee who lives in Delaware County at the time of employment and then

decides to move out of Delaware County will lose his/her right to continued

employment with the County of Delaware.

Record (R.) Item No. 4 (emphasis added).

2

[C]ounty. [C]laimant’s actions[] showed a deliberate violation of

[E]mployer’s rule/requirements and willful misconduct.

R. Item No. 6. Therefore, the Service Center determined that Claimant was

ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law.

Claimant appealed to the Referee, who held a telephone hearing on October

16, 2020. Employer presented the testimony of its Leave Program Coordinator,

Christine Cuthbert, and Claimant testified on his own behalf.

Ms. Cuthbert testified that Employer discharged Claimant for “[f]alsification

of the application process.” Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 10/16/20, at 11. She

explained that Claimant identified his place of residence as Boothwyn,

Pennsylvania, on his job application and “on all his . . . paperwork for his

application,” but the driver’s license he subsequently provided to Employer had a

Wilmington, Delaware, address, “and that’s when we first started questioning where

he lived.” Id. at 11-12. Ms. Cuthbert explained:

I do the paperwork for new hires. When they fill out the paperwork for

new hires, with the I-9 [tax] form, we need [a] driver’s license, proof of

residency. So[] . . . we could take a passport, we take a driver’s license,

social security, and . . . we check to make sure that . . . the driver’s

license matches the items that they have given us . . . on record.

Id. at 20 (emphasis added).

Ms. Cuthbert testified that Employer then “took measures to see where

[Claimant] lived, and . . . found . . . that he was actually coming and going in the

mornings and evenings from the Wilmington, Delaware address.” Id. at 12. She

testified that Employer had “surveillance pictures . . . of [Claimant’s] car parked at

[his] Wilmington address . . . [o]n multiple days.” Id. at 15-16.

Ms. Cuthbert testified that, after the investigation, a meeting took place

between Claimant, Barbara Hatton, and Kate Bryan on May 27, 2020. Id. at 12-13.

3

Ms. Cuthbert was not present at the meeting, but she “sit[s] right outside [Ms.]

Hatton’s office” and “saw the meeting happen.” Id. at 13. She testified:

I did see them enter . . . the office. The meeting did happen, and

[Claimant] was terminated. . . . [T]he only thing I want to add is the

six-month policy, . . . since he stated he lived in the county, the six-

month policy[] . . . does not apply, because it’s more of a falsification

that . . . he was term[inated] for, and not that he lived out of the county.

It’s that he falsified where he lived.

Id. at 14 (emphasis added).

On cross-examination, Ms. Cuthbert testified that Marianne Grace was

Employer’s Executive Director at the time of Claimant’s hiring and was one of the

people responsible for hiring Claimant. Id. at 18. Ms. Cuthbert testified that

Employer discharged Ms. Grace a few weeks after Claimant’s discharge. Id. at 17-

18. Ms. Cuthbert also testified that she was not involved in Claimant’s interview

process, but she knew that he was interviewed by “many people.” Id. at 14-15.

Ms. Cuthbert further testified:

The six[-]month issue would’ve come into play if [Claimant had] said

I’m moving into Delaware County, but I live in Delaware. We would’ve

had him sign an affidavit stating he would move within six months. He

didn’t sign the affidavit because he never revealed [that] he lived in

Delaware. . . . Our entire statement is the falsification of the application

and where [Claimant] stated [he] lived. . . .

Id. at 31 (emphasis added).

Claimant testified that before working for Employer, he worked for the City

of Philadelphia for two years. Id. at 10. With regard to his residency, Claimant

testified:

I lived in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for about the last two years prior

to taking the job in Delaware County, and I was in the process, literally

4

in the process, like, I had stuff all over the globe. . . . I was moving out

of my condo in Philadelphia, and I was moving back to Delaware

County. Now, my grandmother had died. I was in the process of

purchasing that house[] . . . I explained that to at least six people that .

. . interviewed me. . . .

Id. at 24 (emphasis added).

Claimant testified that the Boothwyn address on his application was his

deceased grandmother’s address and reiterated that he was “in the process” of

purchasing her home. Id. at 25. Claimant testified that when he applied for the

position, his thought process was: “[T]hey’re not going to harass me if I’m not all

the way in Delaware County right now, because I’ve got a lot of things in flux,” so

“I’ll apply for this job.” Id. Claimant further testified:

[Employer] bring[s] me in for eight interviews. . . . They all ask me so,

what’s your situation? How come you don’t work for Philadelphia

anymore? Don’t you have to live there to work there? I said yeah, . . .

I live there, I have a condo there, but . . . I’m moving back to Delaware

County, Pennsylvania. My grandmother just died a year and a half ago.

I’m in the process of buying her house. You know, my kids live in

Delaware. I got all kinds of issues but, you know, I’m going to end up

being in Delaware County at my grandmother’s house, okay? That was

the game plan for me[] . . . .

....

. . . I spoke to . . . eight people. I told them all my situation, and in

each of those interviews, they said don’t worry about it, you’re fine,

you [have] six months . . . to get all your stuff together . . . and switch

your driver’s license and do this and do that.

Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added). According to Claimant, the job description for the

Budget Director position “d[id]n’t say that [he] had to give a full disclosure of

anything before [he] got there.” Id. at 26.

5

Claimant testified that when he applied for the position, he “was living on a

consistent and regular basis at 1850 Larkin Road [in Boothwyn] at . . . [his] deceased

grandmother’s house.” Id. at 27. He also testified that he owns a property in

Chichester, Delaware County. Id. With regard to his grandmother’s home, Claimant

testified that “it’s still in [her] estate currently” and that, for the past year and a half,

his father and uncle have been “arguing about the price of the house so that

[Claimant] can buy it.” Id. at 29-30.

When asked about the Wilmington address on his driver’s license, Claimant

testified:

[P]rior to getting the job in Delaware County, I was offered a position

with the State of Delaware that I turned down to take the job at

Delaware County. So, I went to Delaware and got a Delaware driver’s

license, because that’s where I thought I was going to be, and then

Delaware County offered me the job, and I went to get a Pennsylvania

driver’s license, where I was actually living, and they said oh, we’re

closed [due to the COVID-19 pandemic].

Id. at 28. Claimant also testified:

[T]he reason that I don’t live in Delaware is because my wife and I are

having issues. That’s the bottom line. It’s none of Ms. Cuthbert’s

business, it’s none of [Employer’s] business at all, and I don’t feel that

I have to explain that, but that’s fine. If that’s . . . the issue that they

have, they should have asked me[] . . . , and I did, in full disclosure,

explain my situation to at least six people during the interview process.

Id. at 25.

Finally, Claimant testified:

If I was trying to be deceptive, I would’ve just put the address of the

property that I own [in Chichester] on the application, but that was not

my intent, and that was not the facts of the matter. . . . [Boothwyn was]

where I was living. That’s where I slept on a regular basis. Aside from

6

the times where I had to watch my kids [in Wilmington] because my

wife had to go to work.

Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added).

Following the hearing, the Referee concluded that Claimant was discharged

for falsifying his place of residence on his employment application, which amounted

to willful misconduct. Ref.’s Order, 10/26/20, at 2. The Referee discredited

Claimant’s testimony that he did not deliberately falsify his application because he

was in the process of moving to Delaware County. Id. The Referee explained his

ruling as follows:

[E]mployer[’s] witness argued that [C]laimant was discharged for

providing false information about his residency when he applied for the

position of Budget Director with the County of Delaware. [C]laimant

argued that he did not make a misrepresentation because he was in the

process of moving. For the following reasons, the [R]eferee does not

find [C]laimant’s statements regarding his residency credible and finds

that [E]mployer has met its burden of proving willful misconduct in

connection with [C]laimant’s work.

. . . [E]mployer determined that [C]laimant was living in Wilmington,

Delaware[,] despite stating that he lived in Delaware County,

Pennsylvania[,] when he applied for his position. According to

[E]mployer[’s] witness, had [C]laimant disclosed his residence, he

would have been afforded six months to relocate to Delaware County.

[C]laimant argued that he was never given the chance to move; the

[R]eferee finds [C]laimant’s argument immaterial because [E]mployer

discharged [him] for providing false information when applying for his

position. [E]mployer did not discharge [C]laimant for his place of

residence.

In response to [E]mployer’s basic allegation, [C]laimant stated that he

was going to move to Delaware County, and he actually lived in

Philadelphia County at the time of his application and employment with

Delaware County. In other words, even if [E]mployer was incorrect in

its conclusion that [C]laimant was living in Wilmington, Delaware,

[E]mployer’s material conclusions, i.e.[,] that [C]laimant

7

misrepresented his place of residence in his application, holds true;

[C]laimant did not reside in Delaware County when he asserted that

he did. Since [E]mployer discharged [C]laimant for providing false

information in his application for employment, [he] is still liable for

providing false information even if his actual residence [was] in

Philadelphia rather tha[n] Wilmington. In either case, he

misrepresented his residency when he applied [for] the . . . Budget

Director position. . . .

Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Referee concluded that Claimant was

ineligible for UC benefits under Section 402(e) of the Law. Id. at 3.3

Claimant appealed to the Board, which adopted the Referee’s findings of fact

and conclusions of law on the issue of willful misconduct and affirmed the Referee’s

decision. Bd.’s Order, 3/12/21, at 1. Claimant now appeals to this Court.4

Analysis

Our courts have defined “willful misconduct” as: (a) a wanton or willful

disregard of the employer’s interests; (b) a deliberate violation of the employer’s

rules; (c) a disregard for the standards of behavior that the employer rightfully can

expect of its employees; or (d) negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the

3

The Referee also determined that Claimant was liable for a fault overpayment in the

amount of $2,232. Ref.’s Order, 10/26/20, at 3. However, the Board subsequently reversed that

portion of the Referee’s Order, finding:

[C]laimant did not provide false information to the UC Service Center about the

reason for his discharge. [He] reported that he was discharged because [E]mployer

accused him of violating a residency rule, and that is accurate. Because there is

insufficient evidence that the overpayment was due to [C]laimant’s fault, a non-

fault overpayment is assessed under Section 804(b) of the . . . Law[, 43 P.S. §

874(b)].

Bd.’s Order, 3/12/21, at 1.

4

Our scope of review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated,

whether an error of law was committed, and whether the necessary findings of fact are supported

by substantial evidence. Section 704 of the Administrative Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 704.

8

employer’s interests or of the employee’s duties or obligations. Grieb v.

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 827 A.2d 422, 425 (Pa. 2003). The employer

bears the burden of proving that the claimant was discharged for willful misconduct.

Walsh v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 943 A.2d 363, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

This Court has held that “supplying false information on an employment

application constitutes willful misconduct justifying the denial of [UC] benefits.”

Huyett v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 477 A.2d 900, 901-02 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1984); see Sill-Hopkins v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 563 A.2d 1288, 1290

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1989). To satisfy its burden of proof, the employer must show that

“the [employee’s] falsification or concealment [was] deliberate, and that the

information [was] material to the qualifications of the employee for the job.”

Johnson v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 427 A.2d 724, 725 (Pa. Cmwlth.

1981).

First, Claimant challenges the Board’s findings that he lied about his place of

residence in his employment application and that Employer discharged him for

making false assertions in his application. Claimant’s Br. at 19. According to

Claimant, these findings imply that during the interview process, Claimant

deliberately concealed his living arrangements and, as to that issue, the Board’s

findings are “based entirely on [Ms.] Cuthbert’s [inadmissible] hearsay testimony.”

Id. at 20. We conclude that Claimant has mischaracterized the Board’s findings.

During her testimony, Ms. Cuthbert offered testimony regarding purported

verbal exchanges between other Employer representatives and Claimant about his

residency, and Claimant objected to some of that testimony on hearsay grounds. See

N.T., 10/16/20, at 14, 21, 30. Importantly, however, the Board did not rely on that

testimony in making its findings of fact or conclusions of law. Rather, the Board

9

based its willful misconduct determination on Claimant’s written representations in

his application paperwork, about which Ms. Cuthbert had personal knowledge as the

individual who “do[es] the paperwork for new hires.” Id. at 20; see Bd.’s F.F. No.

6 (“[E]mployer determined that [C]laimant had lied in his application materials

regarding his residence and discharged [him] for making false assertions in his

application.”) (emphasis added).

Next, Claimant asserts that the Board erred in concluding that he committed

willful misconduct because Employer failed to establish, and the Board did not

specifically find, that he deliberately misrepresented his place of residence on his

employment application. He claims that he did not intentionally misrepresent where

he lived, because the unrebutted evidence showed that he was regularly living in

Boothwyn at the time and he believed he had six months to move after he was hired.

Claimant’s Br. at 19, 28-29. We disagree.

It is undisputed that Claimant stated in his employment application that he

resided in Boothwyn, which is located in Delaware County. Bd.’s F.F. No. 2. At

the hearing, Claimant testified that he lived in Philadelphia for the prior two years

while working for the City of Philadelphia, but he was “in the process” of moving

into his deceased grandmother’s home in Boothwyn and was sleeping there “on a

regular basis.” N.T., 10/16/20, at 24-25, 32. The Board, however, rejected

Claimant’s testimony that he was regularly living in Boothwyn as not credible.

Ref.’s Order, 10/26/20, at 2; Bd.’s Order, 3/12/21, at 1; see Russo v. Unemployment

Comp. Bd. of Rev., 13 A.3d 1000, 1003 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (stating that the Board

is the ultimate factfinder and is empowered to make credibility determinations and

reject the testimony of any witness); Korpics v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev.,

833 A.2d 1217, 1219 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (“In making [credibility]

10

determinations, the Board may accept or reject the testimony of any witness in whole

or in part.”). While the Board did not use the term “deliberate” in describing

Claimant’s conduct, it found that “Claimant had lied in his application materials

regarding his residence,” Bd.’s F.F. No. 6 (emphasis added), which implies that his

representation was intentional and not unintentional or negligent.

Claimant also asserts that Employer failed to establish that his place of

residence was material to the Budget Director position, because Employer’s job

posting stated that an applicant must be willing to move to Delaware County within

six months after accepting the position. Claimant’s Br. at 29-30. In support of this

claim, Claimant offered into evidence one of Employer’s recent job postings for a

different position, which stated: “Residency Requirement: [Employer] has a

residency requirement for employees. Anyone applying for this job must reside in

Delaware County or be willing to move to Delaware County within six months of

starting employment.” N.T., 10/16/20, Claimant’s Ex. 2 (bold in original) (italics

added). Claimant also testified that during the interview process, Employer’s

representatives told him he did not need to worry about his residency because he

would have six months to move to Delaware County if he got the job. N.T.,

10/16/20, at 26.

“[W]here an employee is fired for supplying false information on his

employment application, an employer must show that the omitted information is

material to the employee’s qualifications for the job in order to establish willful

misconduct.” Bruce v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 450 A.2d 1083, 1085 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 1982) (emphasis added). Whether a given misrepresentation is material

depends on the facts of each case. Sill-Hopkins, 563 A.2d at 1290. The requirement

of materiality, however, is not limited “to formal job prerequisites only.” Scott v.

11

Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 474 A.2d 426, 427 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1984). In other

words, “it has never been the law that an employee must be truthful only as to matters

concerning specific job prerequisites and may freely provide false or misleading

information as to any other factor which could encourage an employer to select him

or her.” Sill-Hopkins, 563 A.2d at 1290.

In this case, the Board found that Employer has a policy requiring that its

employees reside in Delaware County. Bd.’s F.F. No. 5; R. Item No. 4. Claimant

was aware of Employer’s residency requirement when he applied for the Budget

Director position, as he admitted that the requirement was included in all of

Employer’s job postings. See N.T., 10/16/20, at 22; id., Claimant’s Ex. 2; R. Item

No. 7. Because county residency was a prerequisite to employment with Employer,

any false information about an applicant’s place of residence was necessarily

material to the qualifications for the position. See Scott, 474 A.2d at 427 (holding

that the claimant’s misrepresentation that he had a college degree in business

administration, when he did not, was willful misconduct where the educational

qualification was listed as one of the hiring criteria).

Claimant testified that when he applied for the job, he believed that he had six

months to move to Delaware County and that Employer was “not going to harass

[him] if [he was] not all the way in Delaware County . . . because [he had] a lot of

things in flux” and the job description “d[id]n’t say that [he] had to give a full

disclosure of anything before [he] got there.” N.T., 10/16/20, at 25-26. However,

Ms. Cuthbert, who handled the paperwork for new hires, credibly testified that if

Claimant had disclosed that he lived outside of Delaware County when he applied

for the position, Employer “would’ve had [Claimant] sign an affidavit stating he

would move [to Delaware County] within six months,” but Employer did not offer

12

him that opportunity because he identified his place of residence as Boothwyn. Id.

at 11, 20, 31; see also id. at 5 (Ms. Cuthbert testified that Claimant “filled all his

paperwork out with the address on record of 1850 Larkin Road, Boothwyn, PA”);

id. at 11-12 (Ms. Cuthbert testified that Claimant identified his place of residence as

Boothwyn on his job application and “on all his . . . paperwork for his application”).

We conclude that Employer established that county residency was material to

the qualifications for the Budget Director position. The fact that Employer would

offer a non-county resident an opportunity to move to Delaware County if he or she

were hired is irrelevant, because Claimant stated in his application that he lived in

Boothwyn and, as such, was already a Delaware County resident. Moreover,

Claimant’s representation in his application that he resided in Boothwyn might have

encouraged Employer to hire Claimant over other qualified candidates for the

position. See, e.g., Sill-Hopkins, 563 A.2d at 1290-91 (finding that the claimant’s

failure to disclose that she was denied registration to sell securities in Michigan was

material, even though the job requirements did not include selling securities in

Michigan, in part because her omission may have encouraged the employer to hire

her over other applicants and such an omission was “clearly inconsistent with her

position of trust”).

Finally, Claimant asserts that the Board’s decision is unsupported by

substantial, competent evidence. Claimant contends that Employer’s basis for

discharging him was factually inaccurate, because Employer determined that he

lived in Wilmington when he applied for the job, but the Board found that he lived

in Philadelphia. Claimant’s Br. at 30. According to Claimant, the Board exceeded

the scope of its authority when it found an alternate basis to support Employer’s

discharge of Claimant. Id. We disagree.

13

Our Court has stated that “[i]t is irrelevant whether the record contains

evidence to support findings other than those made by the fact[]finder; the critical

inquiry is whether there is evidence to support the findings actually made.”

Ductmate Indus., Inc. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 949 A.2d 338, 342 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2008) (emphasis added). “Where substantial evidence supports the Board’s

findings, they are conclusive on appeal.” Id.

Although Employer determined that Claimant lived in Wilmington, the record

contains sufficient evidence, in the form of Claimant’s own testimony, to support

the Board’s finding that Claimant lived in Philadelphia. Claimant testified that when

he applied for the position, he was living in Philadelphia and was “moving out of

[his] condo in Philadelphia and . . . was moving back to Delaware County.” N.T.,

10/16/20, at 24; see also id. at 25 (Claimant testified that when he was asked during

his interviews if he was living in Philadelphia, he “said yeah, . . . I live there, I have

a condo there, but . . . I’m moving back to Delaware County”); id. at 29 (Claimant

testified that he stated to each of his interviewers: “I have a condo in Philadelphia,

and that’s where I live”). Regardless of whether Claimant lived in Wilmington or

Philadelphia, neither of those cities is located in Delaware County. As the Board

properly determined: “[E]ven if [E]mployer was incorrect in its conclusion that

[C]laimant was living in Wilmington, Delaware, [E]mployer’s material conclusions,

i.e.[,] that [C]laimant misrepresented his place of residence in his application, holds

true; [C]laimant did not reside in Delaware County when he asserted that he did.”

Ref.’s Order, 10/26/20, at 3 (emphasis added); Bd.’s Order, 3/12/21, at 1. While

Claimant testified that he was “in the process” of moving into his grandmother’s

home in Boothwyn and slept there “on a regular basis,” N.T., 10/16/20, at 24-25, 32,

the Board discredited that testimony. Ref.’s Order, 10/26/20, at 2; Bd.’s Order,

14

3/12/21, at 1. Therefore, we agree with the Board that “[s]ince [E]mployer

discharged [C]laimant for providing false information in his application for

employment, [he] is still liable for providing false information even if his actual

residence [was] in Philadelphia rather tha[n] Wilmington.” Ref.’s Order, 10/26/20,

at 3 (emphasis added); Bd.’s Order, 3/12/21, at 1.

Conclusion

We conclude that the record contains substantial evidence to support the

Board’s determination that Claimant committed disqualifying willful misconduct

under Section 402(e) of the Law by falsifying his place of residence in his

application materials. Accordingly, we affirm the Board’s Order.

____________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

Judges Fizzano Cannon and Dumas did not participate in the decision of this case.

15

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Jeffry Schott, :

Petitioner :

:

v. : No. 778 C.D. 2021

:

Unemployment Compensation :

Board of Review, :

Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 17th day of November, 2022, the Order of the Unemployment

Compensation Board of Review, dated March 12, 2021, is hereby AFFIRMED.

____________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge