In the Int. of: M.E.B.-H., Appeal of: M.H.

J-A20010-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.E.B.-H., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA

:

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APPEAL OF: M.H., FATHER :

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:

:

: No. 976 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 11, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s):

CP-51-AP-0000714-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.Q.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.H., FATHER :

:

:

:

:

: No. 977 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 11, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s):

CP-51-AP-0000715-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.M.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

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APPEAL OF: M.H., FATHER :

:

:

:

:

: No. 978 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 11, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s):

CP-51-AP-0000716-2021

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.B., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.H., FATHER :

:

J-A20010-22

:

:

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: No. 988 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 11, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s):

CP-51-DP-0001008-2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.Q.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.H., FATHER :

:

:

:

:

: No. 989 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 11, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s):

CP-51-DP-0001009-2020

IN THE INTEREST OF: M.H., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: M.H., FATHER :

:

:

:

:

: No. 990 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 12, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at No(s):

CP-51-DP-0000520-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 16, 2022

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

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M.H. (“Father”) appeals from the decrees entered on March 11, 2022,

which granted the petitions filed by the Philadelphia Department of Human

Services (“DHS”) for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights

to his minor children, M.E.B.-H. (born in December of 2016), M.Q.H. (born in

May of 2018), and M.M.H. (born in April of 2020) (collectively “the

Children”), pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938.1 Father also appeals from the

orders entered on April 11 and April 12, 2022, which changed the

permanency goals for the Children from reunification with Mother and Father

to adoption.2, 3 After careful review, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and

remand with instructions.

We reproduce the following factual background and procedural history

of this matter, as summarized by DHS:

[DHS] first learned of the family in 2016[,] after [it] received a

General Protective Services (GPS) report that Mother had tested

positive for Percocet at the time of M.[E.B.-]H.’s birth[, i]n

December [of] 2016. DHS continued to monitor and stay

involved with the family over the next few years.

____________________________________________

1Decrees involuntarily terminating the parental rights of T.B. (“Mother”)

were entered on the same date; however, Mother has not filed an appeal.

2 Mother has not filed an appeal from the April 11 and April 12, 2022

permanency review orders.

3 By per curiam order entered May 9, 2022, this Court sua sponte

consolidated the appeals at Nos. 976, 977, 978, 988, 989, and 990 EDA

2022, as these matters involve related parties and issues.

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M.M.H.[, born in April of 2020,] suffered withdrawal symptoms

from Mother’s use of 20 drugs including amphetamines and

spent a month in the hospital NICU. Father never once visited

M.M.H. in the hospital. On May 8, 2020, M.M.H. was ready for

discharge; DHS obtained an Order of Protective Custody (OPC)

for M.M.H. and placed him in the care of his paternal aunt.[4]

The trial court adjudicated M.M.H. dependent on June 10, 2020,

with Father present.[5]

In August 2020, DHS learned that M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H. lacked

routine medical and dental care. On September 14, 2020, DHS

filed urgent petitions for M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H. On November

20, 2020, the court adjudicated M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H. as

dependent and committed them to DHS custody.[6] Father failed

to attend the hearing.

DHS’s Brief at 9-10 (citations to record omitted).

____________________________________________

4 On May 18, 2020, the Community Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) held an initial

single case plan (“SCP”) meeting, at which the following objectives were

determined for Father: 1) comply with CUA services; 2) attend court

hearings; 3) seek and attend anger management therapy; and 4) attend

weekly, supervised visits with M.M.H. Father’s Brief at 9. Father did not

attend the SCP meeting. Id.

5 At the June 10, 2020 hearing, Mother and Father were referred to the

Achieving Reunification Center (“ARC”) for parenting classes and

employment assistance. The court further referred Mother and Father for

domestic violence counseling, and Father was referred for anger

management counseling. Father’s Brief at 10.

6 At the November 20, 2020 adjudicatory hearing, Father was “referred to

ARC for parenting education, housing assistance, and employment services;

ordered to sign releases and consents; and ordered to comply with the

[Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) order that Mother obtained against him].”

Father’s Brief at 14. Additionally, “Father was referred to [a Continuing

Education Unit (“CEU”)] for a dual diagnosis assessment and three random

drug screens prior to the next court date[,] and ordered to engage in

Menergy for domestic violence counseling.” Id.

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On November 29, 2021, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate

Father’s parental rights to Children, along with petitions for a goal change to

adoption. A combined hearing was held on these matters on March 11,

2022, at which DHS called multiple witnesses and Father testified on his own

behalf. Following is a summary of the evidence produced at the hearing:

1. Incarceration

Father was incarcerated on firearms offenses in approximately

September [of] 2021. Since being incarcerated, Father has not

reached out to [the CUA] to have any telephone contact with

M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H. Nor has Father taken advantage of any

programming offered at the prison to complete his case plan

objectives.

2. Allegations of Domestic Violence

Father received domestic violence and anger management

objectives because Mother made allegations of abuse against

Father[,] and M.E.B.-H. stated she was scared of Father. Mother

and Father continued to be in a relationship despite the ongoing

domestic violence. Mother had a PFA [order] against Father at

one point.

Father had multiple criminal charges for domestic violence, with

Mother as the complainant. All charges were later withdrawn.

3. Father’s Drug Use and Unemployment

[Father] has a history of drug use for which he has never

received treatment. The trial court referred [F]ather for

employment services but he never attended.

4. Lack of Reunification Efforts

At M.M.H.’s adjudication hearing, Father received his single case

plan objectives for reunification. His case plan objectives

included compliance with CUA case management and court

orders, biweekly visits with M.M.H., weekly supervised visits with

M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H., compliance with [ARC] services,

parenting, housing, employment, attendance at … Menergy,

anger management, a [CEU] assessment for dual diagnosis,

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three random drug screens prior to next court hearing, as well

as a requirement to make his whereabouts known to CUA case

management. Before his incarceration, CEU attempted to

contact Father multiple times to assist him[,] but their efforts

were unsuccessful.

To help him meet his objectives, Father also received a referral

to ARC services in September 2020 for employment, parenting[,]

and housing assistance. Father failed to respond to phone calls

and text messages from the reunification intake specialist and as

a result he was closed out for services the following month on

October 30, 2020. [Natalie] Turner[, the case manager

supervisor,] stated … that there had been no contact from Father

regarding these objectives throughout the life of the case.

Father never attended ARC, never attended any other courses

for parenting, housing[,] or employment and has not made any

outreach to CUA to try to communicate any efforts towards these

objectives. Father failed to receive any treatment for anger

management and domestic violence. Father had 14 months

prior to his incarceration to make progress toward his case plan

objectives but he failed to do so.

At the termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing on March 22,

2022[, from] which the instant appeal arises, Father testified

that he knew the objectives he needed to complete to begin the

process of reunification. When asked why those objectives were

incomplete, he said that he did not have time because he was

“going through a lot.” When asked why he never visited M.M.H.,

he responded “no comment.” … Finally, when asked why he did

not visit with M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H., he stated that he was going

through a lot[,] and he assumed they were taken care of.

Father has failed to make any substantial reunification efforts.

5. Minimal Parenting

At the TPR hearing, the court heard detailed testimony regarding

Father’s lack of involvement in the Children’s lives over the

years. … Ms. Turner[] testified as the case manager supervisor

for the life of the case. Ms. Turner stated that Father never took

M.M.H. to any medical appointments and does not provide for

him in any way. When M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H. came into DHS[’s]

care, they were behind on medical and dental[ care,] and they

did not become up to date with care until they were removed

and placed with [their] maternal great grandmother.

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Further, Father never had any visits with M.M.H.[,] nor has he

had any telephone contact with him. As for M.E.B.-H. and

M.Q.H., Father was supposed to have supervised visits with

them[,] but his last visit was in 2020 at M.M.H.’s birth. Father

has never provided financially for M.M.H., M.E.B.-H, and M.Q.H.

Father has never sent cards, letters, or gifts to the three

[C]hildren[,] and the [C]hildren do not ask to see him.

When Father had the opportunity to express any desire for

reunification at the TPR hearing, he instead stated that he did

not want to push the kids onto others….

6. Children’s Bond with Current Caregivers

All three [C]hildren were in the care of trusted, DHS-approved

relatives at the time of the TPR hearing. All of the Children are

in pre-adoptive homes. M.M.H. had been living with [his]

paternal aunt since his shelter care order on May 11, 2020.

M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H. were placed with [their] maternal great-

grandmother since CUA received the case.

Ms. Turner testified at the TPR hearing that M.M.H. only

recognizes [his] paternal aunt as his parent. Ms. Turner

described their relationship as “loving, caring; he looks to her as

a mother. He calls her mommy.” When asked to explain who

M.M.H. looks to when he’s sick, hungry[,] and hurt, Ms. Turner

testified that M.M.H. looks to [his] paternal aunt.

Paternal aunt takes M.M.H. to his medical appointments and

provides financially for M.M.H. In later testimony, Ms. Turner

testified that the only mother M.M.H. recognizes is [his] paternal

aunt and that’s who he calls [“]mom[”]. As of March 10, 2020,

M.M.H. was deemed by DHS to be in a safe home with his needs

being met.

M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H. have been with [their] maternal great

grandmother for the life of the case. Ms. Turner was asked to

testify to [the] maternal great grandmother’s relationship with

M.E.B.-H. and M.Q.H. When asked to describe the relationship,

she described it as “loving and caring as well.” When asked who

they look to when they’re sick, hungry[,] or hurt, Ms. Turner said

[their] maternal great grandmother. Finally, when asked who

takes the Children to their medical appointments, Ms. Turner

said [the Children’s] maternal great grandmother. On March 10,

2022, the trial court found that M.E.B.-H and M.Q.H. were in a

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safe home with [their] maternal great grandmother, with their

needs being met.

DHS’s Brief at 10-15 (citations to record omitted).

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found clear and

convincing evidence to warrant the involuntary termination of Father’s

parental rights to the Children under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8),

and (b), and it entered decrees accordingly. The court further determined

that a goal change to adoption was in the best interest of the Children;

however, it appears that the trial court inadvertently entered orders on

March 11, 2022, reflecting a continued goal of reunification. On April 11 and

12, 2022, the trial court entered amended permanency review orders to

reflect its intended goal change to adoption.

On April 11, 2022, Father filed timely notices of appeal, along with

concise statements of matters complained of on appeal, pursuant to 23

PA.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)(i). The trial court subsequently filed a notice of

compliance with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), indicating that the reasons for its

involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights and changing the

permanency goals to adoption were stated on the record at the March 11,

2022 hearing, and it attached a copy of the transcript accordingly. Father

now presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.[]§[]2511(a)(1)?

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.[]§[]2511(a)(2)?

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3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.[]§[]2511(a)(5)?

4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.[]§[]2511(a)(8)?

5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental

rights of [Father] under 23 Pa.C.S.[]§[]2511(b)?

6. Whether the trial court erred by determining it to be in the

[C]hildren’s best interest to change the goal from

reunification to adoption?

Father’s Brief at 5-6 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answers

omitted).

Father’s first five issues relate to the trial court’s termination of his

parental rights. We review such a decree in accordance with the following

standard:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental

rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the

trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse

of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support

for the trial court’s decision, the decree must stand. Where a

trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate

parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge’s

decision the same deference that we would give to a jury

verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s decision is

supported by competent evidence.

In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting In re S.H., 879

A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005)). Moreover, we have explained that:

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as

testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to

enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without

hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”

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Id. (quoting In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).

The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented

and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve

conflicts in the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super.

2004). If competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will

affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result. In re

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa. Super. 2003).

We are guided further by the following: Termination of parental rights

is governed by section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated

analysis.

Our case law has made clear that under [s]ection 2511, the

court must engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating

parental rights. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the

parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the

statutory grounds for termination delineated in [s]ection

2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct

warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to [s]ection

2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child

under the standard of best interests of the child. One major

aspect of the needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature

and status of the emotional bond between parent and child, with

close attention paid to the effect on the child of permanently

severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citing 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511,

other citations omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear

and convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the

termination of parental rights are valid. R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276.

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With regard to section 2511(b), we direct our analysis to the facts

relating to that section. This Court has explained that:

Subsection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental

rights would best serve the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of the child. In In re C.M.S., 884

A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court stated,

“Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are

involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.”

In addition, we instructed that the trial court must also discern

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost

attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing that

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of a

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no

bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 (Pa. Super.

2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis

necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.

Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Instantly, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights pursuant

to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with the

trial court as to any one subsection of section 2511(a), as well as section

2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super.

2004) (en banc). Herein, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under

section 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following

grounds:

…

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child

to be without essential parental care, control or

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental

well-being and the conditions and causes of the

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incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will

not be remedied by the parent.

…

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing,

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(2).

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. [] §

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence

necessary for his physical and mental well-being; and (3) the

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to

perform parental duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super.

2002) (citations omitted).

In the case of an incarcerated parent, this Court has stated:

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[T]he fact of incarceration does not, in itself, provide grounds for

the termination of parental rights. However, a parent’s

responsibilities are not tolled during incarceration. The focus is

on whether the parent utilized resources available while in prison

to maintain a relationship with his or her child. An incarcerated

parent is expected to utilize all available resources to foster a

continuing close relationship with his or her children…. Although

a parent is not required to perform the impossible, he must act

affirmatively to maintain his relationship with his child, even in

difficult circumstances. A parent has the duty to exert himself,

to take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.

Thus, a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and

rearing of his child is converted, upon the failure to fulfill his …

parental duties, to the child’s right to have proper parenting and

fulfillment of his … potential in a permanent, healthy, safe

environment. A parent cannot protect his parental rights by

merely stating that he does not wish to have his rights

terminated.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855-56 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations

and quotation marks omitted). “Thus, the fact of incarceration alone neither

compels nor precludes termination of parental rights. Parents must still

provide for the emotional and physical well-being of their children.” In re

Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1120 (Pa. Super. 2010). Moreover, we note that

“[t]he cause of incarceration may be particularly relevant to the [s]ection

2511(a) analysis, where imprisonment arises as a direct result of the

parent’s actions which were ‘part of the original reasons for the removal’ of

the child.” Id. (quoting In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1006 (Pa. Super.

2008)).

Instantly, Father claims that DHS failed to meet its burden to establish

grounds for termination under section 2511(a)(2). Father’s Brief at 25. In

support of his argument, however, Father merely states that he “has

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contacted the [C]hildren through their caregivers, has housing[,] and is

willing to remedy the issues that brought the [C]hildren into care.” Id. He

does not provide any explanation for his lack of parental involvement with

his Children prior to his incarceration or his failure to maintain a bond with

the Children while incarcerated, nor does he explain how he plans to remedy

any of the causes or conditions of his incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal,

which caused the Children to be without essential parental care. We remain

unconvinced that Father is due any relief on this claim.

As DHS argues, Father has never acted as a father to the Children.

DHS’s Brief at 19. Although the Children originally entered care due to

Mother’s drug addiction, DHS notes that Father was unable to provide them

with a safe home or parental care. Id. at 19-20. M.Q.H. and M.E.B.-H had

not received routine medical care or immunizations since 2018, and both

Mother and Father failed to address the behavioral health needs of M.Q.H.

Id. at 20. Additionally, DHS indicates that Father did not respond to

telephone calls from an intake specialist at ARC to set up services for

housing and employment, nor has he attended any other courses for

parenting, housing, or employment. Id. Prior to his incarceration, Father

was unemployed and living with his uncle and his uncle’s brother. Id. (citing

N.T. Hearing, 3/11/22, at 85-86 (Father’s testifying that if he were to be

reunified with his Children, all the Children would stay in a bedroom with

him in his uncle’s apartment)). Father also failed to address domestic

violence or substance abuse issues, despite Mother’s PFA against him,

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M.Q.H.’s fear of him, and referrals to Menergy and domestic violence

courses. Id. In sum, DHS concludes that Father refused or was incapable

of prioritizing reunification with his Children and that it would not be

appropriate “to continue holding these [C]hildren’s lives in abeyance waiting

for Father to get his act together.” Id. at 21. “Not only did Father refuse to

obtain appropriate housing, … but he failed to attend parenting classes,

failed to access employment assistance, failed to visit any of his [C]hildren,

failed to talk with them on the phone, failed to attend drug treatment, and

generally failed to comply with anything the trial court ordered.” Id.

Moreover, it is clear that the trial court took into consideration Father’s

period of incarceration when considering termination under section

2511(a)(2); however, it emphasized that “for the first 14 months of this

case, [F]ather was not incarcerated and there were no attempts by [F]ather

to remedy any of the situations which led to the [C]hildren[’s] being

rendered dependent.” N.T. Hearing at 95-96. Based on all the evidence

presented, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s findings of

clear and convincing evidence establishing that “the repeated and continued

incapacity[, ab]use, neglect or refusal to parent has caused the [C]hild[ren]

to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for

[their] physical or mental well-being and [that] the conditions and causes of

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by

[Father].” Id. at 95. As such, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of

law in the court’s termination of Father’s parental rights under this section.

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As for the trial court’s analysis under section 2511(b), Father argues

that the evidence presented by DHS “did not rise to the level of clear and

convincing evidence” to prove that termination of his parental rights is in the

best interests of the Children. Father’s Brief at 27. However, in support of

his claim, he merely states: “Father had telephone contact with the

[C]hildren through telephone calls. When [F]ather is released he could

continue to make the bond between the [C]hildren and [F]ather stronger.”

Id.

DHS counters that no bond exists between Father and the Children

and that substitute caregivers currently perform all the parenting tasks for

Children and provide them with love and affection. DHS’s Brief at 26. As for

Father’s assertion that he could continue to strengthen his bond with the

Children after his release from prison, DHS maintains that such a claim is

“inappropriate and incredible. What matters is the bond Father has

established during the Children’s lives thus far,” which is nonexistent. Id.

DHS further explains:

[T]he evidence established that there was no bond between

Father and the Children. He has not visited with any of the

Children during their time in care. He has spoken to the

caregivers of the older children, but there is no evidence of any

regularity and no testimony or other evidence of any other

contact with the [C]hildren. The caseworker testified that there

is no parent/child relationship between Father and the Children.

Father has never provided financially for the Children and has

never sent cards, letters, or gifts to the Children. The Children

do not ask to see Father. Father failed to establish a bond with

the Children prior to his incarceration, and the caseworker

testified that even if he were to attempt to complete his

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objectives after his release, they could not be completed within

… any reasonable period of time given how long the Children

have already been in care. The caseworker did not believe that

terminating Father’s rights would cause any irreparable harm to

the Children.

Instead, the Children are bonded with their relatives who have

been caring for them for their entire time in care. M.M.H. is with

his paternal aunt (and has been there since his discharge from

the hospital[] after being born exposed to drugs)[,] and the

older two children are with [their] maternal great grandmother.

Id. at 25-26 (citations to record omitted).

DHS further suggests:

In addition to examining the existence of a parent-child bond,

the trial court should also consider the “love, comfort, security,

and stability” the [C]hildren might have with their resource

parents. In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010). Here,

the Children are all in pre-adoptive homes, and it is the resource

parents who have been providing for the day-to-day needs of

the Children. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in In re[]

T.S.M. that “[c]ommon sense dictates that courts considering

termination must also consider whether the children are in a pre-

adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster

parents.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d [251,] 268 [(Pa. 2013)]. The

caseworker testified that M.M.H. only recognizes [his] paternal

aunt as his parent. Paternal aunt meets all of his needs[,] and

he calls her “Mommy.” M.E.B.-H and M.Q.H. have been with

[their] maternal great grandmother for the life of the case.

Their relationship is “loving and caring,” per the caseworker.

Maternal great-grandmother meets their daily needs[,] and they

look to her for car[e] and support.

Terminating Father’s parental rights would best serve the

Children’s needs and welfare by helping them achieve safety,

stability, and permanency.

Id. at 26-27 (citations to record omitted).

After considering all the evidence presented, the trial court concluded

“there’s clearly no bond between the parents [and Children]. While they

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may know who they are[, the court] question[s] whether they do. And they

certainly do not know them in the traditional sense of a mother and father

because they’ve not been a mother and father to the [C]hildren since they

were placed into the system and rendered dependent.” N.T. Hearing at 98-

99. Based on the foregoing, we deem the trial court’s decision to terminate

Father’s parental rights under section 2511(b) to be supported by the

record, and we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law.

Having determined that the trial court did not err in terminating

Father’s parental rights, we proceed with addressing the merits of Father’s

final issue pertaining to the permanency goal changes. In doing so, we are

guided by the following:

In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement goal …

to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. In re

N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 822 (Pa. Super. 2006). To hold that the

trial court abused its discretion, we must determine its judgment

was “manifestly unreasonable,” that the court disregarded the

law, or that its action was “a result of partiality, prejudice, bias

or ill will.” Id. (quoting In re G.P.-R., 851 A.2d 967, 973 (Pa.

Super. 2004)). While this Court is bound by the facts

determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the court’s

inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a “responsibility

to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry

and that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal

principles to that record.” In re A.K., 906 A.2d 596, 599 (Pa.

Super. 2006). Therefore, our scope of review is broad. Id.

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Furthermore, this Court has stated:

Placement of and custody issues pertaining to dependent

children are controlled by the Juvenile Act[, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-

65], which was amended in 1998 to conform to the federal

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Adoption and Safe Families Act (“ASFA”). The policy underlying

these statutes is to prevent children from languishing indefinitely

in foster care, with its inherent lack of permanency, normalcy,

and long-term parental commitment. Consistent with this

underlying policy, the 1998 amendments to the Juvenile Act, as

required by the ASFA, place the focus of dependency

proceedings, including change of goal proceedings, on the child.

Safety, permanency, and well-being of the child must take

precedence over all other considerations, including the rights of

the parents.

In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citations and footnotes

omitted; emphasis in original). Additionally, we recognize that “the agency

has the burden to show a goal change would serve the child’s best

interests….” In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d 339, 347 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Specifically, section 6351 of the Juvenile Act provides direction to the

court for the disposition of dependent children, stating in pertinent part:

(f) Matters to be determined at permanency hearing.—At

each permanency hearing, a court shall determine all of the

following:

(1) The continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the

placement.

(2) The appropriateness, feasibility and extent of

compliance with the permanency plan developed for the

child.

(3) The extent of progress made toward alleviating the

circumstances which necessitated the original placement.

(4) The appropriateness and feasibility of the current

placement goal for the child.

(5) The likely date by which the placement goal for the

child might be achieved.

(5.1) Whether reasonable efforts were made to finalize the

permanency plan in effect.

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(6) Whether the child is safe.

…

(9) If a child has been in placement for at least 15 of the

last 22 months or the court has determined that

aggravated circumstances exist and that reasonable efforts

to prevent or eliminate the need to remove the child from

the child’s parent, guardian or custodian or to preserve

and reunify the family need not be made or continue to be

made, whether the county agency has filed or sought to

join a petition to terminate parental rights and to identify,

recruit, process and approve a qualified family to adopt the

child unless:

(i) The child is being cared for by a relative best

suited to the physical, mental and moral welfare of

the child;

(ii) The county agency has documented a compelling

reason for determining that filing a petition to

terminate parental rights would not serve the needs

and welfare of the child; or

(iii) The child’s family has not been provided with

necessary services to achieve the safe return to the

child’s parent, guardian or custodian within the time

frames set forth in the permanency plan.

(10) If a sibling of a child has been removed from his

home and is in a different placement setting than the child,

whether reasonable efforts have been made to place the

child and the sibling of the child together or whether such

joint placement is contrary to the safety or well-being of

the child or sibling.

(11) If the child has a sibling, whether visitation of the

child with that sibling is occurring no less than twice a

month, unless a finding is made that visitation is contrary

to the safety or well-being of the child or sibling.

(12) If the child has been placed with a caregiver, whether

the child is being provided with regular, ongoing

opportunities to participate in age-appropriate or

developmentally appropriate activities. In order to make

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the determination under this paragraph, the county agency

shall document the steps it has taken to ensure that:

(i) The caregiver is following the reasonable and

prudent parent standard; and

(ii) The child has regular, ongoing opportunities to

engage in age-appropriate or developmentally

appropriate activities. The county agency shall

consult with the child regarding opportunities to

engage in such activities.

…

(f.1) Additional determination.—Based upon the

determinations made under subsection (f) and all relevant

evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall determine one

of the following:

(1) If and when the child will be retuned to the child’s

parent, guardian or custodian in cases where the return is

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental

and moral welfare of the child.

(2) If and when the child will be placed for adoption, and

the county agency will file for termination of parental

rights in cases where return to the child’s parent, guardian

or custodian is not best suited to the safety, protection and

physical, mental and moral welfare of the child.

(3) If and when the child will be placed with a legal

custodian in cases where the return to the child’s parent,

guardian or custodian or being placed for adoption is not

best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental

and moral welfare of the child.

(4) If and when the child will be placed with a fit and

willing relative in cases where return to the child’s parent,

guardian or custodian, being placed for adoption or being

placed with a legal custodian is not best suited to the

safety, protection and physical, mental and moral welfare

of the child.

…

(f.2) Evidence.—Evidence of conduct by the parent that places

the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, including

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evidence of the use of alcohol or a controlled substance that

places the health, safety or welfare of the child at risk, shall be

presented to the court by the county agency or any other party

at any disposition or permanency hearing whether or not the

conduct was the basis for the determination of dependency.

(g) Court order.—On the basis of the determination made

under subsection (f.1), the court shall order the continuation,

modification or termination of placement or other disposition

which is best suited to the safety, protection and physical,

mental and moral welfare of the child.

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f), (f.1), (f.2), (g).

Additionally, this Court has provided further considerations that apply

in goal change situations, stating:

Because the focus is on the child’s best interests, a goal change

to adoption might be appropriate, even when a parent

substantially complies with a reunification plan. In re N.C.,

supra [at] 826-27. Where a parent’s “skills, including [his or]

her judgment with regard to the emotional well-being of her

children, remain problematic[,]” a goal change to adoption might

be appropriate, regardless of the parent’s compliance with a

permanency plan. Id. at 825. The agency is not required to

offer services indefinitely, where a parent is unable to properly

apply the instruction provided. In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 340

(Pa. Super. 2002). See also In re S.B., supra at 981 (giving

priority to child’s safety and stability, despite parent’s substantial

compliance with permanency plan); In re A.P., 728 A.2d 375,

379 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal denied, 560 Pa. 693, 743 A.2d

912 (1999) (holding where, despite willingness, parent cannot

meet “irreducible minimum parental responsibilities, the needs of

the child must prevail over the rights of the parent”). Thus,

even where the parent makes earnest efforts, the “court cannot

and will not subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for

permanence and stability to a parent’s claims of progress and

hope for the future.” In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,

513 (Pa. Super. 2006).

In re R.M.G., 997 A.2d at 347.

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Here, Father claims that the trial court erred in determining that a goal

change to adoption is in the Children’s best interest. Father’s Brief at 27.

He specifically disputes that reasonable efforts were made by DHS to finalize

his permanency plan, asserting that the “CUA made no outreach to [him],

did not send him updated single case plans[,] or arrange any physical,

virtual[,] or telephone visits from August 2021 to the time of the hearing[.]”

Id. at 28. Father further argues that he was willing to take parenting and

other programs offered by the CUA, that he had housing and was to be

released within four days of the hearing, and that he is willing to take the

steps to remedy the condition that brought the [Children] into care once he

is released from prison. Id.

Unfortunately, the trial court’s pronouncement of its decision to

change the permanency goals from reunification to adoption is devoid of any

reference to the section 6351(f) and (f.1) factors, which the court is required

to consider prior to making such determinations. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f)

(listing the factors that a court shall determine at a permanency hearing);

42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(f.1) (providing additional determinations that the court is

required to make “based upon the determinations made under subsection (f)

and all relevant evidence presented at the hearing”). In its notice of

compliance with Rule 1925(a), the trial court directs us to the notes of

testimony from the March 11, 2022 hearing for its statement of reasons for

terminating Father’s parental rights and changing the Children’s permanency

goals to adoption. See Notice of Compliance, 5/12/22, at 2 (citing N.T.

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Hearing at 95-99). Our review of the transcript, however, reveals only the

trial court’s analysis under section 2511(a) and (b) pertaining to the

termination of Father’s parental rights, followed by a single statement that

“it’s in the best interest of these [C]hildren to have this goal changed to

adoption.” N.T. Hearing at 95-97. No explanation for the goal change has

been provided. “Questions regarding the propriety of an order granting or

denying a goal change petition are … discrete inquiries requiring an analysis

of interests exquisitely separable from those interests reviewed in questions

relating to the involuntary termination of parental rights.” In re R.I.S., 36

A.3d 567, 575 (Pa. 2011). Without a proper analysis of the relevant section

6351(f) and (f.1) factors in support of the trial court’s decision to change the

permanency goals to adoption, our ability to perform appellate review is

impeded. Thus, we are constrained to vacate the April 11 and 12, 2022

orders granting the goal changes, and we remand for an examination of the

merits of the goal change petitions under the appropriate statutory

provisions.

Accordingly, we affirm the March 11, 2022 decrees involuntarily

terminating Father’s parental rights to Children, we vacate the April 11 and

12, 2022 orders changing the permanency goals to adoption, and we

remand with instructions consistent with this memorandum.

Decrees affirmed. Orders vacated. Case remanded. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/16/2022

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