The opinion
Case: 22-30298 Document: 00516540249 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/09/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 22-30298 November 9, 2022
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Hannah Davis, also known as Hannah Callaway,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Jayson Richardson, individually ; in his official
capacity; Chris Thomas, individually ; in his official
capacity; Jeffery Henderson, individually ; in his
official capacity,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
USDC No. 5:19-CV-1330
Before Davis, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-Appellant, Hannah Davis, appeals the district court’s
summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellants, the sheriff and deputy
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
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No. 22-30298
sheriffs of the DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s Department, who have been sued in
their individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the
reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Deputies Christopher Thomas and Jeffery Henderson of the DeSoto
Parish Sheriff’s Department responded to a complaint of a parked car in the
middle of a bridge on a public highway. The deputies found Plaintiff-
Appellant, Hannah Davis, in the passenger seat of the vehicle with its motor
running. Davis was asleep and naked from the waist down. Davis contends
that the deputies’ conduct after their arrival on the scene violated her
constitutional rights. She sued the deputies, along with the DeSoto Parish
Sheriff, Jayson Richardson, in their individual and official capacities, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The summary judgment evidence established that the officers shook
Davis to try to get her to identify herself. When this was unsuccessful, they
did a sternum rub in the center of Davis’s chest. After a second sternum rub,
Davis finally responded to the officers and was able to communicate with
slurred speech. The officers located Davis’s pants and urged her to put them
on. When she did not do so, they assisted her by lifting her up by her arms
and pulling the pants over her legs.
When Davis refused to identify herself, the deputies asked her for
permission to search her vehicle. Davis consented, and her consent was
noted in a recording. A state trooper was called to conduct a field sobriety
test. Davis was unable to complete the test, and she was placed under arrest
and transported to the DeSoto Parish Jail.
The district court, in a thorough opinion, parsed through all of Davis’s
claims and granted summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiff’s action. We
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agree with the district court’s analysis of the summary judgment evidence
and its reasons for dismissing Plaintiff’s claims which we summarize below.
II. DISCUSSION
Davis asserts that deputies, acting under the color of state law,
violated her constitutional rights when they discriminated against her,
searched her car without a warrant, used the sternum rub while she was
unresponsive, touched her nude body without consent, and conspired to
deprive her of equal protection under the law.
“We review a summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standards as the district court.” Wilson v. City of Bastrop, 26 F.4th 709, 712
(5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). Summary judgment shall be granted “if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a). “An assertion of qualified immunity alters the usual summary
judgment burden of proof, shifting it to the plaintiff to show that the defense
is not available, though [w]e still draw all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Wilson, 26 F.4th at 712 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
A. Violation of Equal Protection
We agree with the district court that Davis fails to allege or provide
evidence that she was intentionally discriminated against or that similarly
situated individuals were treated differently. The failure to present
competent summary judgment evidence on these claims led the district court
to correctly conclude that this cause of action was meritless.
B. Excessive Force
Davis next contends that the deputies used excessive force and
violated her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The district court
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correctly analyzed Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth Amendment because
the claim that excessive force was used in the course of an arrest should
properly be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness”
standard.
Davis cites two specific instances where she asserts the deputies used
excessive force: (1) when Deputy Thomas employed a sternum rub on her
chest, as she laid unresponsive, and (2) when both deputies assisted Davis in
dressing herself and simultaneously touched her exposed body. Davis does
not allege any unwanted touching occurred outside the context of the
sternum rub or the momentary action by the deputies in pulling up her pants.
The Defendants assert, and we agree, that the sternum rub was an
appropriate action under the circumstances which they were trained to use
in their basic training. Camera footage showed the deputies asking Davis
multiple questions and attempting to provoke a response, but Davis remained
unresponsive. Deputy Thomas explained in deposition that a sternum rub
was a maneuver that he learned to awake an unresponsive individual.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the district court
that the degree of force Deputy Thomas used in this situation was neither
clearly excessive nor unreasonable.
As for the unwanted touching, the video footage shows the deputies’
attempting to find Davis’s clothes, and then helping Davis cover her exposed
body. They lifted Davis by her arms and pulled Davis’s pants over her legs,
and this was done after repeated attempts to have Davis pull the pants up
herself.
We agree with the district court that the deputies’ actions were
neither excessive nor objectively unreasonable. Consequently, we agree with
the district court that the deputies are entitled to qualified immunity, and
summary judgment was properly granted on this claim.
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C. Illegal Search - Fourth Amendment
Davis contends that the warrantless search of her vehicle violated the
Fourth Amendment. The automobile exception allows law enforcement
officers to search a vehicle without a warrant when they have probable cause
to do so – that is when they believe the vehicle contains contraband or
evidence of a crime. Having seen a substantial quantity of alcohol in the
vehicle, the officers clearly had probable cause to believe that Davis had
committed the crime of driving while under the influence of alcohol. In
addition, Davis consented to the search.
D. Monell Liability
Davis also sued the DeSoto Parish Sheriff’s Department and the
Sheriff, Jayson Richardson, asserting Monell 1 liability because they
maintained the policies that allegedly allowed the deputies to violate her
constitutional rights. As with Davis’s other §1983 claims, she is unable to
establish Monell liability because, among other reasons, she has not provided
any evidence that the deputies violated her constitutional rights. “[A]
municipality cannot be liable ‘[i]f a person suffered no constitutional injury
at the hands of the individual police officer.’” Bustos v. Martini Club, Inc.,
599 F.3d 458, 467 (5th Cir. 2010) (second alteration in original) (citation
omitted).
As to Davis’s claims against Richardson individually, Davis makes no
specific allegations against Sheriff Richardson giving rise to a constitutional
violation, so this claim was correctly dismissed.
1
Monell v. Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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E. State Law Claims
The district court also dismissed a number of state law claims alleging
state law violations. These included a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”) against the deputies and a claim against Sheriff
Richardson as vicariously responsible for the acts of the deputies. As to the
IIED claim, the court found no evidence of outrageous conduct by the
deputies required to establish this claim. As to the claim against the sheriff
predicated on his vicarious liability, we agree with the district court that
Davis produced no summary judgment evidence demonstrating conduct by
the deputies that would subject them to liability; consequently, there can be
no vicarious liability imposed on the sheriff.
For these reasons and those outlined in the detailed, careful opinion
of the district court, the judgment is AFFIRMED.
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