Gonzalez v. New Britain

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CRISTINA GONZALEZ v. CITY OF

NEW BRITAIN ET AL.

(AC 44749)

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Moll, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant city of New

Britain and its animal control officer, D, for injuries she allegedly sus-

tained as a result of the defendants’ negligence. D had responded to

reported dog attacks in January and June, 2016, involving two pit bulls

that occurred at certain real property in New Britain. The plaintiff sus-

tained injuries during a 2018 attack by the same pit bulls and, at the

time, was a tenant at the property. The plaintiff alleged that D was

negligent for, inter alia, failing to remove the pit bulls from the property,

and alleged claims for indemnification and statutory negligence against

the city. The plaintiff filed an amended complaint alleging that, based

on the 2016 attacks, D knew or should have known that, as a tenant on

the property, the plaintiff would have been attacked by the pit bulls. The

court granted the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiff’s amended

complaint on the basis of governmental immunity, and the plaintiff

appealed to this court. On appeal, the plaintiff did not dispute that

governmental immunity applied to her claims against the defendants in

light of the discretionary nature of D’s alleged conduct but, instead,

alleged that the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to govern-

mental immunity applied. Held that the trial court correctly concluded

that the plaintiff’s amended complaint was legally insufficient because

she did not plead facts demonstrating that she was an identifiable victim

for purposes of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to

governmental immunity: that complaint did not contain allegations dem-

onstrating that she was legally compelled to be at the property when

the pit bulls attacked her or that her tenancy was required by law,

rather, the only logical reading of the amended complaint was that her

residence at the property was purely voluntary; moreover, the only

identifiable class of foreseeable victims that our case law has recognized

in connection with this exception to governmental immunity has been

that of schoolchildren attending public schools during school hours, the

plaintiff did not fall within that class, and this court declined to recognize

any additional classes of individuals who may be identifiable victims

beyond that demarcated limit.

Argued October 3—officially released November 8, 2022

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, the defen-

dants’ alleged negligence, and for other relief, brought

to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New

Britain, where the plaintiff filed an amended complaint;

thereafter, the court, Wiese, J., granted the defendants’

motion to strike the amended complaint; subsequently,

the court, Wiese, J., granted the defendants’ motion for

judgment and rendered judgment thereon, from which

the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Lucas M. Watson, for the appellant (plaintiff).

John F. Diakun, corporation counsel, for the appel-

lees (defendants).

Opinion

MOLL, J. The plaintiff, Cristina Gonzalez, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor

of the defendants, the city of New Britain (city) and

James Davis, following the granting of the defendants’

motion to strike the plaintiff’s amended complaint on

the basis of governmental immunity. On appeal, the

plaintiff asserts that the court incorrectly concluded

that her amended complaint was legally insufficient

because she did not plead facts demonstrating that she

was an identifiable victim for purposes of the identifi-

able person-imminent harm exception to governmental

immunity. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the

judgment of the trial court.

The following facts, as alleged in the plaintiff’s

amended complaint, and procedural history are rele-

vant to our resolution of this appeal. On or before Janu-

ary 9, 2016, Davis was employed by the city as an animal

control officer. Davis’ responsibilities ‘‘included, but

[were] not limited to, identifying dangerous dogs in the

city . . . and removing them and/or quarantining them

. . . .’’ Between January 9, 2016, and March 17, 2018,

Davis responded to three separate reported dog attacks

by two pit bulls that had occurred at 167 Oak Street in

New Britain (property). On January 9, 2016, the pit bulls

attacked a Chihuahua on the property. In response to

the January 9, 2016 incident, Davis ordered the pit bulls’

owner, who was the landlord of the property, to quaran-

tine the pit bulls on the property for fourteen days. On

June 21, 2016, the pit bulls attacked a tenant on the

property, which resulted in the transport of the tenant

to a hospital with severe bodily injuries. During his

investigation of the June 21, 2016 incident, Davis

learned that, on several prior occasions, the pit bulls

had chased the tenant and the tenant’s friends on the

property. Following the June 21, 2016 incident, the pit

bulls’ owners1 informed Davis that they intended to

euthanize one of the pit bulls because of its ‘‘aggressive

temperament . . . .’’ On March 17, 2018, the pit bulls

attacked the plaintiff on the property, where she lived as

a tenant. The plaintiff sustained severe and permanent

injuries as a result of the March 17, 2018 incident.2

On March 16, 2020, the plaintiff commenced the pres-

ent action against the defendants. The plaintiff’s original

complaint set forth three counts. Count one alleged a

common-law negligence claim against Davis. Count two

alleged a claim for indemnification against the city pur-

suant to General Statutes § 7-465. Count three alleged

a statutory negligence claim against the city pursuant

to General Statutes § 52-557n. The crux of the plaintiff’s

claims was that Davis ‘‘knew or should have known of

the dangerous propensity of the pit bulls . . . and [he

should have] removed them from the [property] after

the second dog attack, [which occurred on June 21,

2016].’’ On May 1, 2020, the defendants filed a motion

to strike the original complaint in its entirety on the

basis of governmental immunity. On October 13, 2020,

the trial court, Wiese, J., over the plaintiff’s objection,

granted the motion to strike the original complaint,

concluding that (1) the parties did not dispute that

governmental immunity applied to the plaintiff’s claims,

and (2) the plaintiff failed to allege facts satisfying the

identifiable person element of the identifiable person-

imminent harm exception to governmental immunity,

such that the exception was inapplicable.

On November 16, 2020, the plaintiff requested permis-

sion to file an amended complaint, which the court

granted, over the defendants’ objection, on December

7, 2020. The plaintiff’s amended three count complaint

substantively tracked her original complaint, except

that she added an allegation that, ‘‘[b]ased on the previ-

ous attacks that occurred on January 9, 2016 and June

21, 2016 . . . Davis knew or should have known that,

as a tenant on the [property], the plaintiff would have

been attacked by the pit bulls . . . .’’

On January 6, 2021, the defendants filed a motion to

strike the plaintiff’s amended complaint in toto on the

basis of governmental immunity. First, the defendants

asserted that the plaintiff failed to allege that Davis had

violated a duty, arising from a statute, an ordinance, a

rule, or a procedure, requiring him to seize the pit bulls

following the June 21, 2016 incident. Even if Davis had

such a duty, the defendants posited, that duty was dis-

cretionary in nature and, therefore, subject to govern-

mental immunity. Second, the defendants contended

that none of the three recognized exceptions to govern-

mental immunity was implicated under the facts

pleaded by the plaintiff. With respect to the identifiable

person-imminent harm exception, the defendants

claimed that the plaintiff failed to plead facts qualifying

her as an identifiable person because she did not allege

that she was legally compelled to be on the property

at the time of the March 17, 2018 incident.

On February 22, 2021, the plaintiff filed an objection

to the defendants’ motion to strike her amended com-

plaint. The plaintiff conceded that governmental immu-

nity applied to her claims against the defendants, but

she argued that she had pleaded facts establishing that

she was an identifiable victim for purposes of the identi-

fiable person-imminent harm exception to governmen-

tal immunity. The plaintiff contended that Davis ‘‘could

have foreseen imminent injury’’ to her, as anyone who

came onto the property and who did not own, care for,

or have a relationship with the pit bulls was ‘‘highly

likely’’ to be attacked by them. The plaintiff further

argued that, as a tenant of the property, she was legally

compelled to be on the property at the time of the

March 17, 2018 incident. On February 24, 2021, the

defendants filed a reply brief, inter alia, iterating that

the plaintiff was not legally compelled to be on the

property at the time of the March 17, 2018 incident

and, therefore, the identifiable person-imminent harm

exception did not apply.

On April 9, 2021, following a hearing, the court issued

a memorandum of decision granting the defendants’

motion to strike the plaintiff’s amended complaint. Cit-

ing Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1, 243 A.3d 1064 (2020),

and Kusy v. Norwich, 192 Conn. App. 171, 217 A.3d 31,

cert. denied, 333 Conn. 931, 218 A.3d 71 (2019), the

court stated that, to determine whether the plaintiff had

pleaded facts satisfying the identifiable victim element

of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to

governmental immunity, it had to consider whether the

plaintiff was legally compelled to be present on the

property when the pit bulls attacked her.3 The court

determined that the plaintiff was not legally compelled

to be on the property, notwithstanding her status as a

tenant of the property. Accordingly, the court con-

cluded that the plaintiff had failed to allege facts demon-

strating the applicability of the identifiable person-

imminent harm exception and, therefore, her amended

complaint was legally insufficient. Thereafter, pursuant

to Practice Book § 10-44, the defendants filed a motion

for judgment on the stricken amended complaint, which

the court granted on May 10, 2021. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the plaintiff does not dispute that the

claims in her amended complaint directed to the defen-

dants were subject to governmental immunity in light

of the discretionary nature of Davis’ alleged conduct.4

See General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) (B).5 The plaintiff

maintains, however, that the court incorrectly con-

cluded that her amended complaint was legally insuffi-

cient on the basis that she failed to plead facts satisfying

the identifiable victim element of the identifiable per-

son-imminent harm exception to governmental immu-

nity. The plaintiff argues that, contrary to the court’s

determination, she was legally compelled to be on the

property at the time of the March 17, 2018 incident

because she was a tenant of the property. We disagree.

We begin by setting forth the following standard of

review and legal principles governing our review of the

plaintiff’s claim. ‘‘Because a motion to strike challenges

the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently,

requires no factual findings by the trial court, our review

of the court’s ruling on the [defendants’ motion] is ple-

nary. . . . We take the facts to be those alleged in the

complaint that has been stricken and we construe the

complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining

its legal sufficiency. . . . Thus, [i]f facts provable in

the complaint would support a cause of action, the

motion to strike must be denied. . . . Moreover, we

note that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation]

need not be expressly alleged. . . . It is fundamental

that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint chal-

lenged by a [defendant’s] motion to strike, all well-

pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from

the allegations are taken as admitted. . . . Indeed,

pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically,

rather than narrowly and technically.’’ (Internal quota-

tion marks omitted.) Wine v. Mulligan, 213 Conn. App.

298, 302–303, 277 A.3d 912 (2022).

The plaintiff’s claim implicates the identifiable per-

son-imminent harm exception to governmental immu-

nity, which is one of three recognized exceptions to

that doctrine.6 Borelli v. Renaldi, supra, 336 Conn. 28.

‘‘Our Supreme Court has recognized an exception to

discretionary act immunity that allows for liability when

the circumstances make it apparent to the public officer

that his or her failure to act would be likely to subject

an identifiable person to imminent harm . . . . This

identifiable person-imminent harm exception has three

requirements: (1) an imminent harm; (2) an identifiable

victim; and (3) a public official to whom it is apparent

that his or her conduct is likely to subject that victim

to that harm. . . . All three must be proven in order

for the exception to apply. . . . [Our Supreme Court

has] stated previously that this exception to the general

rule of governmental immunity for employees engaged

in discretionary activities has received very limited rec-

ognition in this state. . . . The exception is applicable

only in the clearest of cases. . . .

‘‘An allegedly identifiable person must be identifiable

as a potential victim of a specific imminent harm. . . .

Although the identifiable person contemplated by the

exception need not be a specific individual, the plaintiff

must fall within a narrowly defined identified [class] of

foreseeable victims. . . . [T]he question of whether a

particular plaintiff comes within a cognizable class of

foreseeable victims for purposes of this exception to

qualified immunity is ultimately a question of policy for

the courts, in that it is in effect a question of duty. . . .

This involves a mixture of policy considerations and

evolving expectations of a maturing society . . . .

[T]his exception applies not only to identifiable individ-

uals but also to narrowly defined identified classes of

foreseeable victims. . . . Our [Supreme Court’s] deci-

sions underscore, however, that whether the plaintiff

was compelled to be at the location where the injury

occurred remains a paramount consideration in

determining whether the plaintiff was an identifiable

person or member of a foreseeable class of victims.

. . .

‘‘Our courts have construed the compulsion to be

somewhere requirement narrowly. . . . [T]his court

[has previously] concluded that a plaintiff did not satisfy

the requirement because [t]he plaintiff [did] not [cite]

any statute, regulation or municipal ordinance that com-

pelled her to drive her car on the stretch of [the] [s]treet

where [an] accident occurred . . . [and] [did] not

[show] that her decision to take [the] particular route

was anything but a voluntary decision that was made

as a matter of convenience. [See DeConti v. McGlone,

88 Conn. App. 270, 275, 869 A.2d 271, cert. denied, 273

Conn. 940, 875 A.2d 42 (2005).] . . . [O]ur Supreme

Court [has] determined that a person is not an identifi-

able victim if he is not legally required to be somewhere

and could have assigned someone else to go to the

location to complete the task in his place. . . . In

Grady [v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324, 355–56, 984 A.2d 684

(2009)], the municipality did not provide refuse pickup

service, and residents could either obtain a transfer

station permit and discard their own refuse, or hire

private trash haulers to come to their home. . . .

Because the plaintiff . . . had the option of hiring an

independent contractor to dispose of his refuse, the

court did not classify him as an identifiable victim for

injuries he sustained when he slipped on an ice patch

at the transfer station.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quo-

tation marks omitted.) Buehler v. Newtown, 206 Conn.

App. 472, 482–84, 262 A.3d 170 (2021); see Borelli v.

Renaldi, supra, 336 Conn. 29 (no legal compulsion for

decedent to be passenger in motor vehicle); Buehler v.

Newtown, supra, 487 (no legal compulsion for plaintiff

to officiate volleyball match at school); Kusy v. Nor-

wich, supra, 192 Conn. App. 185 (no legal compulsion

for plaintiff to be at school when carrying out contrac-

tual duty to deliver milk); see also St. Pierre v.

Plainfield, 326 Conn. 420, 424, 438, 165 A.3d 148 (2017)

(plaintiff ‘‘was in no way compelled to attend’’ aqua

therapy sessions at municipal pool).

‘‘Our Supreme Court has noted that [t]he only identifi-

able class of foreseeable victims that [the court has]

recognized . . . is that of schoolchildren attending

public schools during school hours . . . . Students

attending public school during school hours are

afforded this special designation as identifiable victims

because they were intended to be the beneficiaries of

particular duties of care imposed by law on school

officials; they [are] legally required to attend school

rather than being there voluntarily; their parents [are]

thus statutorily required to relinquish their custody to

those officials during those hours; and, as a matter of

policy, they traditionally require special consideration

in the face of dangerous conditions. . . . Accordingly,

this court has consistently held that students who are

injured outside of school hours do not fall within the

class of identifiable victims under the identifiable vic-

tim-imminent harm exception.’’ (Citations omitted;

footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Buehler v. Newtown, supra, 206 Conn. App. 484–85.

Applying the aforementioned binding legal principles,

we conclude that the plaintiff did not plead facts in

her amended complaint demonstrating that she was an

identifiable victim or a member of an identifiable class

of foreseeable victims for purposes of the identifiable

person-imminent harm exception to governmental

immunity.7 The plaintiff’s amended complaint did not

contain allegations demonstrating that she was legally

compelled to be at the property when the pit bulls

attacked her. The plaintiff did not allege that her ten-

ancy was required by law; indeed, the only logical read-

ing of the amended complaint is that the plaintiff’s resi-

dence at the property as a tenant was purely voluntary.

In addition, the only identifiable class of foreseeable

victims that our case law has recognized in connection

with this exception is that of schoolchildren attending

public schools during school hours. See id. The plaintiff

does not fall within that class, and we decline to recog-

nize any additional classes of individuals who may be

identifiable victims beyond that demarcated limit. See

Kusy v. Norwich, supra, 192 Conn. App. 187 (declining

‘‘to extend the classes of individuals who may be identi-

fiable victims beyond the narrow confines of children

who are statutorily compelled to be on school grounds

during regular school hours’’). For these reasons, we

conclude that the court did not commit error in striking

the plaintiff’s amended complaint as legally insuffi-

cient.8

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1

The plaintiff’s amended complaint refers to a single owner of the pit

bulls when discussing the incident of January 9, 2016, as well as the subse-

quent incident of March 17, 2018, and to multiple owners of the pit bulls

vis-à-vis the June 21, 2016 incident.

2

The plaintiff’s amended complaint is silent as to whether Davis took any

actions in response to the incidents of June 21, 2016, and March 17, 2018.

3

The court did not expressly address whether the plaintiff’s claims in her

amended complaint were subject to governmental immunity. In granting

the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiff’s amended complaint, however,

the court indicated that it was incorporating by reference its October 13,

2020 decision granting the defendants’ motion to strike the plaintiff’s original

complaint. In its October 13, 2020 decision, the court stated that the plaintiff

had conceded that governmental immunity applied to her claims. Moreover,

the record reflects that the parties did not dispute that the plaintiff’s claims

were subject to governmental immunity.

4

In her amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, as an animal control

officer employed by the city, Davis’ responsibilities ‘‘included, but [were]

not limited to, identifying dangerous dogs in the city . . . and removing

them and/or quarantining them,’’ and that, following the June 21, 2016 inci-

dent, Davis should have removed the pit bulls from the property. The parties

do not address in their respective appellate briefs whether the plaintiff

sufficiently alleged that Davis owed her a duty of care vis-à-vis the pit bulls.

For purposes of our analysis, we assume that the plaintiff adequately alleged

that a duty of care existed.

5

General Statutes § 52-557n (a) (2) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Except as

otherwise provided by law, a political subdivision of the state shall not be

liable for damages to person or property caused by . . . (B) negligent acts

or omissions which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an

official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law.’’

‘‘[Section] 52-557n abandons the common-law principle of municipal sov-

ereign immunity and establishes the circumstances in which a municipality

may be liable for damages. . . . One such circumstance is a negligent act

or omission of a municipal officer acting within the scope of his or her

employment or official duties. . . . [Section] 52-557n (a) (2) (B), however,

explicitly shields a municipality from liability for damages to person or

property caused by the negligent acts or omissions [that] require the exercise

of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly

or impliedly granted by law. . . . Accordingly, a municipality is entitled to

immunity for discretionary acts performed by municipal officers or employ-

‘‘Municipal officials are immunized from liability for negligence arising

out of their discretionary acts in part because of the danger that a more

expansive exposure to liability would cramp the exercise of official discre-

tion beyond the limits desirable in our society. . . . Discretionary act immu-

nity reflects a value judgment that—despite injury to a member of the

public—the broader interest in having government officers and employees

free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions, unham-

pered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits, outweighs the

benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) Buehler v. Newtown, 206 Conn. App.

472, 481–82, 262 A.3d 170 (2021).

6

‘‘The other two exceptions are: where a statute specifically provides for

a cause of action against a municipality or municipal official for failure to

enforce certain laws; and . . . where the alleged acts involve malice, wan-

tonness or intent to injure, rather than negligence.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Borelli v. Renaldi, supra, 336 Conn. 28 n.14. Only the identifiable

person-imminent harm exception is germane to this appeal.

7

As this court noted in a recent decision, ‘‘[a]t least three members of

our Supreme Court recently have observed that the court’s application of

the identifiable person-imminent harm exception, particularly with respect

to the identifiable person prong of the exception, may be doctrinally flawed,

unduly restrictive, and/or ripe for revisiting in an appropriate future case.

See Borelli v. Renaldi, supra, 336 Conn. 34, 59–60 n.20 (Robinson, C. J.,

concurring); id., 67 (D’Auria, J., concurring); id., 67–113, 146–54 (Ecker, J.,

dissenting). Nevertheless, this court is required to follow binding Supreme

Court precedent unless and until our Supreme Court sees fit to alter it.’’

Buehler v. Newtown, supra, 206 Conn. App. 488 n.14.

8

As an alternative ground for affirmance, the defendants argue that the

plaintiff failed to allege that she was subject to imminent harm for purposes

of the identifiable person-imminent harm exception to governmental immu-

nity. It is not necessary for us to address this issue in light of our conclusion

that the plaintiff failed to plead facts satisfying the identifiable victim element

of the exception. See Kusy v. Norwich, supra, 192 Conn. App. 187 n.9

(declining to address whether plaintiff was subject to imminent harm after

concluding that plaintiff was not identifiable victim, as ‘‘[a]ll three [elements]

must be proven in order for the exception to apply’’ (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Nevertheless, we note that, following the June 21, 2016

incident, there were no reported dog attacks by the pit bulls on the property

until nearly two years later, on March 17, 2018, when the pit bulls allegedly

attacked the plaintiff. Thus, the facts pleaded by the plaintiff did not establish

that there was a sufficiently high probability that she would be harmed by

the two pit bulls on the property. See Williams v. Housing Authority, 159

Conn. App. 679, 705–706, 124 A.3d 537 (2015) (setting forth four part test

to satisfy imminent harm element of identifiable person-imminent harm

exception, including that (1) ‘‘the likelihood of the harm must be sufficient

to place upon the municipal defendant a clear and unequivocal duty . . .

to alleviate the dangerous condition’’ and (2) ‘‘the probability that harm will

occur must be so high as to require the defendant to act immediately to

prevent the harm’’ (citation omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted)), aff’d, 327 Conn. 338, 174 A.3d 137 (2017).