Opinion

Vandermost v. Bowen

  • 53 Cal. 4th 421
  • 137 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1
  • 269 P.3d 446
  • 2012 Cal. LEXIS 572
Court
California Supreme Court
Filed
Jan 27, 2012
Status
Published
On the bench
Cantil-Sakauye, Liu
Cited by
34 cases
Authority
More cited than 44.3%

relying on Supreme Court precedent to discuss Sections 2 and 5 in relation to state provision requiring compliance with the VRA

How later courts described this case

  • relying on Supreme Court precedent to discuss Sections 2 and 5 in relation to state provision requiring compliance with the VRA

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Filed 1/27/12

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

JULIE VANDERMOST, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. )

)

DEBRA BOWEN, )

as Secretary of State, etc., ) S198387

)

Respondent; )

)

CITIZENS REDISTRICTING )

COMMISSION, )

)

Intervener. )

___________________________________ )

On December 9, 2011, we issued an order to show cause in this matter to consider

an election-related question that must be addressed expeditiously to avoid potential

disruption of the statewide primary and general elections to be held in June and

November 2012. A proposed referendum (designated No. 1499), for which petition

signatures have been gathered and submitted to election officials, would require the

electorate to decide, at the November 2012 general election, whether to accept or reject

the California state Senate district map that has been certified by the Citizens

Redistricting Commission (Commission).1 The Commission, a new constitutional entity

1 Under the California Constitution, the referendum power refers to the authority of

the people to require that a statute that has been adopted by the Legislature, or a

redistricting map that has been certified by the Citizens Redistricting Commission, be

(Footnote continued on following page)

1

recently established by the voters to draw voting district boundaries (instead of the

Legislature)2 in light of population changes identified in the national census undertaken

at the beginning of each decade, completed its eight-month-long task in August 2011 and

certified new voting district maps for not only the state Senate, but also for the state

Assembly, the United States Congress, and the State Board of Equalization. The

Secretary of State and county election officials have been using these four Commission-

certified maps since mid-August 2011 in preparation for the upcoming June and

November 2012 elections.

County election officials and the Secretary of State currently also are in the

process of verifying the petitions submitted to determine whether there are sufficient

valid signatures to qualify the proposed referendum for placement on the November 2012

general election ballot. If the referendum qualifies, the state Senate map certified by the

Commission will automatically be stayed, presenting the question of what Senate districts

should be used for the 2012 primary and general elections of the state Senate. In view of

the numerous interconnected election-related events that must occur soon after the end of

January 2012 in order to avoid disrupting the 2012 primary and general elections,3 this

(Footnote continued from previous page)

submitted to a vote of the electorate, and be approved by the electorate before such

measure becomes effective. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9; id., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (i).) The

initiative power, by contrast, refers to the authority of the people to propose statutes and

constitutional amendments to be submitted to a vote of the electorate, and the authority of

the electorate to adopt or reject the proposed measure. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8.)

2 See California Constitution, article XXI, sections 1 to 3.

3 The calendar of steps in preparation for the June 5, 2012, Primary Election is

available on the Secretary of State’s Web site, <http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/2012-

elections/calendar/pdfs/section-6-primary-election.pdf> (as of Jan. 27, 2012). Among the

events particularly relevant to the present case are the following: From December 30,

2011, to February 23, 2012, state Senate candidates may obtain, in lieu of paying filing

fees, the requisite number of signatures of registered voters who are eligible to vote for

(Footnote continued on following page)

2

action has been filed requesting this court to decide at this juncture which state Senate

district map should be utilized if the proposed referendum qualifies and triggers a stay of

the Commission’s certified Senate district map.

Petitioner, Julie Vandermost, emphasizes the interest of referendum proponents

and petition signers in insisting on an “up or down” referendum vote by the statewide

electorate before the voting districts that are the subject of the proposed referendum are

utilized as the basis for electing any state senators. Accordingly, she asserts, if the

Commission’s state Senate map is stayed by the qualification of the referendum for the

November 2012 ballot, we should not order the use of the Commission’s state Senate

district map as an interim remedy governing the 2012 primary and general elections.

Indeed, petitioner argues, we should issue an “alternative [or] peremptory writ of

mandate commanding Respondent Debra Bowen, in her capacity as Secretary of State of

the State of California, to . . . refrain from taking any action . . . implementing the

Citizens Redistricting Commission’s certified Senate map.” Moreover, petitioner urges,

we should establish new interim state Senate boundaries by either (1) using the state

(Footnote continued from previous page)

that candidate — in other words, those who are registered in the district in which the

candidate will run (Elec. Code, § 8106); and between February 13, 2012, and March 9,

2012, candidates must file a “Declaration of Candidacy” and nomination papers (id.,

§§ 8020, 8040, 8041) for the district in which he or she will run.

The Secretary of State has submitted a declaration by Jana M. Lean, Chief of the

Elections Division, describing procedures used to implement the new district lines.

According to the declaration, a system known as CalVoter II (CVII) “is used to set up an

election. Throughout the election cycle, which begins more than five months before the

election is held, CVII is used to certify statewide candidates [and] prepare the certified

list of candidates.” The declaration describes the various steps that must be taken to

program CVII, and asserts — apparently assuming those same internal timelines, and no

effort to further expedite them — that “approximately six weeks would be required to

implement any changes to the Senate maps.”

3

Senate district map that the Legislature created in 2001 based on the 2000 census and that

has been used for the last decade; (2) using a map creating new Senate districts by using

the state Assembly districts recently certified by the Commission and combining two

adjacent Assembly districts to form each new Senate district (the “nesting” proposal); or

(3) establishing alternate, court-drawn boundaries as described in a new so-called

“model” map based on a proposal submitted by petitioner’s redistricting consultant.

Finally, petitioner prays for an order directing the Secretary of State to implement

whatever new interim district boundaries we select for the June 5, 2012, Primary Election

and the November 6, 2012, General Election.4

The Secretary of State and the Commission both urge us to hold that even if the

Commission’s certified state Senate district map eventually is stayed by the qualification

of the proposed referendum, the Commission’s map nevertheless should be employed for

the 2012 elections. The Secretary of State stresses the need to avoid disruption of the

election planning process; both the Secretary and the Commission contest the legality of

petitioner’s alternative maps; and the Commission emphasizes that the state Senate

redistricting map it has certified is the product of an open, deliberate, and nonpartisan

process that a majority of California voters created through the exercise of the

constitutional initiative power in 2008 and 2010.

As past decisions establish, if a referendum that is directed at a newly adopted

redistricting map qualifies for the ballot, triggering a stay of the new redistricting map

pending the electorate’s vote on the referendum, this court has the responsibility of

determining which voting district map should be used for the upcoming interim electoral

cycle. (See, e.g., Assembly v. Deukmejian (1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 657-658; accord,

4 All parties agree that any interim state Senate district map that we decide should

be used for the June 2012 primary election must also be used for the November 2012

general election.

4

Legislature v. Reinecke (1972) 6 Cal.3d 595, 601.) In determining which map should be

used for the interim elections, this court must consider (1) what maps are reasonably and

practically available, and (2) the pros and cons of each potentially viable map in light of

the constitutional scheme and criteria set out in recently amended article XXI of the

California Constitution. If, after so analyzing each of the potential maps, the court

concludes that a map other than the one currently being implemented by election officials

should be used for the upcoming 2012 elections in the event the proposed referendum

qualifies for the ballot, this court would direct election officials to employ a “dual track”

planning process during the remainder of the signature verification process. Officials

would thus be able to proceed with the current district maps if the referendum does not

qualify for the ballot, but would be ready to use the alternative voting districts should the

proposed referendum qualify for the ballot.

As we explain, in the present case four alternative maps have been proposed for

use in the 2012 elections in the event the referendum qualifies for the ballot: the three

maps proposed by petitioner and the Commission’s certified state Senate district map.

After reviewing the pros and cons of each of these proposed alternatives in light of the

constitutional scheme and criteria, we conclude, for the reasons discussed below, that the

Commission’s certified map is clearly the most appropriate map to be used in the 2012

state Senate elections even if the proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot.

Accordingly, after first confirming that we properly may exercise jurisdiction in

this matter and that the petition presents issues sufficiently ripe for review, we conclude

that if the proposed referendum qualifies for the November 2012 general election ballot

and stays the Commission’s certified state Senate map, the Commission’s state Senate

map should be used on an interim basis for the June and November 2012 elections,

pending the outcome of the referendum. If the proposed referendum does not qualify for

the ballot, the Commission’s state Senate map will continue to be used for the 2012

election and future elections until replaced pursuant to article XXI of the state

5

Constitution by new maps drawn by a future newly constituted Commission following

the 2020 census.

I. Background, procedure,

and summary of conclusions

Article XXI of the California Constitution, as amended by ballot measures

approved by the electorate in November 2008 (Prop. 11, the Voters First Act) and

November 2010 (Prop. 20), removes the task of redistricting from the Legislature and

gives it to the newly created Citizens Redistricting Commission. (Cal. Const., art. XXI,

§§ 1 & 2.) The Commission is required to adjust the boundary lines of California’s state

Senate, state Assembly, congressional, and State Board of Equalization voting districts

“[i]n the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction

of Congress at the beginning of each decade . . . .” (Id., art. XXI, § 1.)

The membership of the Commission selected to create new districts in light of the

2010 census was finalized in late 2010, and in the first eight months of 2011 the

Commission held more than 70 business meetings and 34 public hearings in 32 cities

throughout the state. The Commission produced draft statewide maps on which it sought

and responded to public comment, and finally, in mid-August 2011, it approved and

certified all four required maps. (We describe the Commission’s structure and process

and the requirements of article XXI in greater detail post, part II.) Two challenges to the

Commission’s certifications were initiated shortly thereafter.

First, and roughly contemporaneously with certification by the Commission, an

organization designated Fairness and Accountability in Redistricting (FAIR), a

Republican-funded entity,5 was established. Under FAIR’s sponsorship, Julie

5 See <http://www.fairdistricts2012.com> (as of Jan. 27, 2012). FAIR is not

mentioned in the petition itself, but the petition states: “Republicans have sponsored and

funded the referendum against the Commission’s Senate plan.”

6

Vandermost, a registered California voter and the petitioner in this proceeding, initiated

the process of attempting to qualify a referendum measure, challenging the state Senate

map, for placement on the November 2012 general election ballot.6 After the Attorney

General prepared a title and summary of the proposed referendum for inclusion on the

referendum petitions, FAIR commenced soliciting referendum petition signatures, which

were due for submission by November 13, 2011. (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (i).)

Second, in September 2011, while the proposed referendum petition was

circulating for signatures, two petitions for writ of mandate were filed in this court

challenging the Commission’s state Senate and congressional district maps on numerous

constitutional and statutory grounds, and seeking to bar the Secretary of State from

implementing either map. (See Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 3, subd. (b)(2) (hereafter article

XXI, § 3(b)(2)) [authorizing such suits].) The petition in Vandermost v. Bowen

(Sept. 16, 2011, S196493), challenged the Commission’s certified state Senate map; the

petition in Radanovich et al. v. Bowen (Sept. 29, 2011, S196852), challenged the

Commission’s certified congressional map. After preliminary briefing (see Cal. Rules of

Court, rule 8.487) and thorough consideration of all the issues raised by petitioners, we

determined that the petitions lacked merit and denied the requested writs on October 26,

2011.7

6 The constitutional provision permits earlier ballot submission of a referendum to

the voters if a special election is called by the Governor. (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2,

subd. (i), referring to art. II, § 9, subd. (c); see also Elec. Code, § 9016, as amended by

Stats. 2011, ch. 558, § 1, approved by the Gov. on Oct. 7, 2011 [providing that all

initiatives and referendum measures that are certified for the ballot on or after July 1,

2011, will be placed on the ballot only at a Nov. statewide general election or at a

statewide special election].)

7 The 126-page petition in Vandermost v. Bowen (Sept. 16, 2011, S196493) sought

issuance of a writ directed to the Secretary of State, as the chief elections officer,

commanding her to refrain from implementing the Commission’s certified maps for the

Senate districts, and to refrain from taking any other action to hold, or to order county

(Footnote continued on following page)

7

Thereafter FAIR completed the signature-gathering process and timely submitted

referendum petition signatures to county election officials immediately prior to the

November 13, 2011 filing deadline. On November 23, 2011, the Secretary of State

confirmed that at least 504,760 “raw” (unverified) referendum petition signatures had

been submitted by FAIR, and ordered county election officials to determine, by random

sampling, the number of qualified signers and to certify that result to the Secretary.8

On December 2, 2011, Vandermost filed the present petition,9 asserting that

approximately 710,000 referendum signatures have been collected, and that in view of

(Footnote continued from previous page)

officials to hold, any election using the Commission’s certified Senate maps. Petitioner

asserted that the maps violate state constitutional criteria for voting districts, set out in

article XXI, section 2, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution, concerning

contiguity, geographic integrity, and compactness, and that they failed to afford

Latino/Hispanic voters an opportunity to elect candidates of choice under sections 2

and 5 of the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.). Petitioner also

requested the immediate appointment of special masters to “advise the Court on the

instant petition,” and if the court found the Senate maps to be unconstitutional, she

requested that this court direct the special masters to draw new district boundaries for the

Senate. Although the cover page of the petition requested an emergency stay, the petition

did not set forth a separate plea for emergency relief. In acting on the petition, we

assumed that petitioner sought to stay any action on the part of the Secretary of State to

implement the Commission’s certified state Senate map. Our order denying the petition

read: “The requests of petitioner and real party in interest for judicial notice are granted.

[¶] The motion of real party in interest to strike the declarations of Dr. T. Anthony Quinn

is denied. [¶] The petition for a writ of mandate is denied. [¶] The request for an

emergency stay is denied.”

8 Statutory schedules concerning the timing for such events, and related statutory

procedures, are described post, part III.

9 Petitioner is represented in this matter, as she was in the petition filed in this court

in September, by Charles H. Bell, Jr., of the Sacramento law firm Bell, McAndrews &

Hiltachk, LLP. The firm’s Web site identifies Mr. Bell as general counsel to the

California Republican Party. (See <http://www.bmhlaw.com/index.htm> [as of Jan. 27,

2012].)

8

the circumstance that 504,760 valid signatures are required to qualify the proposed

referendum for the November 2012 ballot,10 the referendum is “likely to qualify and stay

timely implementation of the [state Senate] map” and hence she is entitled to seek

“relief” under article XXI, section 3(b)(2).11

The petition seeks immediate relief,12 as well as future contingent relief that would

be triggered in the event the proposed referendum actually qualifies for placement on the

ballot. The contingent relief sought by the petition would take effect only after county

10 See California Constitution, article II, section 9, subdivision (b) (requiring a

petition “certified to have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent of the

votes for all candidates for Governor at the last gubernatorial election”).

11 Article XXI, section 3(b)(2) reads in relevant part: “Any registered voter in this

state may . . . file a petition for a writ of mandate or writ of prohibition to seek relief

where a certified final map is subject to a referendum measure that is likely to qualify and

stay the timely implementation of the map.”

12 With respect to immediate relief, the petition seeks an order granting

(1) suspension of statutory filing fees (Elec. Code, §§ 8103-8105) and related “in lieu-

filing-fee petition” procedures for candidates who wish to submit signatures in lieu of

paying filing fees (Elec. Code, § 8106, subd. (a)(7)), which procedures would otherwise

have commenced on December 30, 2011; and (2) appointing an expert or special master

or masters to serve in effect in a “standby/advisory” role by advising the court on “the

process of determining interim Senate Districts for 2012.”

The petition also seeks a third form of immediate relief, amounting to a request for

an immediate preliminary stay of the Commission’s Senate map. The petition asserts that

“[t]he [submitted referendum] petitions contain sufficient ‘raw’ signatures to suspend

temporarily the implementation of” the Commission’s state Senate map and it seeks as

immediate relief an order “prohibiting the Secretary of State and county election officials

acting at her direction from implementing” that map “for the June 5, 2012 primary

election, until [a] new interim Senate map [has] been implemented by this Court.”

Elsewhere the petition asserts that the Secretary of State’s November 23, 2011, order

finding an adequate number of raw signatures and directing county election officials to

commence random sampling “immediately suspends the operation of the Commission-

certified Senate maps until such time as the signature verification process is complete.”

Such a preliminary stay of the Commission’s certified state Senate map would force

county election officials to immediately halt preelection planning that they have

undertaken and continue to undertake in preparation for the June 2012 primary election.

9

election officials and the Secretary of State finish the time-consuming, statutorily

governed process needed to determine whether the proposed referendum actually is

supported by the requisite number of valid signatures and hence qualifies for the ballot —

a process that may take approximately nine to 17 weeks following submission of petition

signatures.13 If the referendum qualifies, the Commission’s certified Senate map would

automatically be stayed by operation of law.14 Petitioner asks that, in the event the

proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot, this court should establish new interim state

Senate district maps for the June and November 2012 state Senate elections by either

(1) using the old state Senate map created by the Legislature in 2001; or (2) creating a

new state Senate map by “nesting” two adjacent Commission-certified Assembly districts

within one Senate district; or (3) establishing a different new state Senate map based on a

proposal by petitioner’s redistricting consultant, addressing alleged “deficiencies . . . in

the Commission’s Senate map.”

On December 9, 2011, we denied the request for all immediate relief pending this

court’s eventual decision in this matter, issued an order to show cause concerning the

prayer for future contingent relief, and granted a motion by the Commission to intervene.

We established an extremely expedited briefing schedule, designed to permit this court to

conduct oral argument by early January 2012, and file an opinion by the end of that

month. We also specified additional issues for briefing, expressly reserving resolution of

the threshold question of jurisdiction for our eventual written decision.15

13 Statutory schedules concerning the timing for such events, and related statutory

procedures, are described post, part III.

14 See post, part III.

15 Our December 9, 2011, order stated:

(Footnote continued on following page)

10

(Footnote continued from previous page)

“In light of the short time frame imposed by the impending 2012 electoral cycle,

and the need to clarify the districts that are to be used in conducting the primary and

general elections for the California Senate in 2012 should the referendum petitions that

have been filed with the Secretary of State prove sufficient to qualify the referendum for

placement on the November 2012 ballot and to stay the Senate redistricting map drawn

and certified by the Citizens Redistricting Commission, the court has determined that it is

appropriate to issue an order to show cause in this matter at this juncture, while reserving

the question of this court’s jurisdiction for resolution in our eventual decision in this

proceeding.

“In addition to addressing issues relating to what relief, if any, this court should

order in the event the referendum regarding the Senate redistricting map qualifies for the

November 2012 ballot, the parties are directed to address the following jurisdictional

issues: (1) What standard or test should this court apply in determining whether a

referendum is ‘likely to qualify’ within the meaning of article XXI, section 3,

subdivision (b)(2) of the California Constitution, for purposes of deciding when a petition

for writ of mandate may be filed in this court under that constitutional provision? (2) Is

this court’s authority to entertain a petition for writ of mandate prior to the formal

qualification of a referendum petition limited to the circumstances set forth in article

XXI, section 3, subdivision (b)(2), or does this court have other authority (including

inherent authority) to entertain such a petition even if it cannot yet be determined whether

such a referendum is ‘likely to qualify’ for placement on the ballot?

“The motion of the Citizens Redistricting Commission to intervene in this

proceeding and for leave to file preliminary opposition is granted.

“To the extent the petition filed in this matter seeks any interim relief pending this

court’s eventual decision in this matter, the request for any such interim relief is denied.

“Petitioner’s request for judicial notice filed on December 2, 2011, is granted.

“To facilitate this court’s conducting of oral argument in this matter as early as the

first two weeks in January 2012, and the filing of an opinion in this matter as early as the

end of January 2012, the court orders an extremely expedited briefing schedule, as

follows:

“Respondent and intervener Citizens Redistricting Commission are each directed

to serve and file a return or opposition to the order to show cause on or before

Wednesday, December 14, 2011.

“Petitioner may serve and file a reply to the return or opposition on or before

Monday, December 19, 2011.

“Any application to file an amicus curiae brief and any amicus curiae brief may be

served and filed on or before Wednesday, December 21, 2011.

(Footnote continued on following page)

11

Having considered the subsequent briefing and oral argument, we conclude as

follows: (1) This court has jurisdiction to entertain this writ proceeding and it is

sufficiently ripe for our review. (2) In the event the referendum eventually qualifies for

presentation to the voters on the November 2012 ballot, triggering a stay of the

Commission’s certified state Senate map by operation of law, election officials are

nonetheless directed to use the boundaries set out in the Commission-certified state

Senate map on an interim basis for the June 2012 primary election and November 2012

general election, pending a vote by the people on the proposed referendum at the

November 2012 election.

II. California Constitution, amended article XXI

and the Citizens Redistricting Commission

We first briefly describe the structure and workings of the Citizens Redistricting

Commission.

Prior to 2008, redistricting in California was performed by the Legislature subject

to the veto power of the Governor — or by the courts, when the Legislature and

Governor could not agree. (See, e.g., Legislature v. Reinecke (1973) 10 Cal.3d 396;

Wilson v. Eu (1992) 1 Cal.4th 707.) The electorate, however, dramatically changed the

process by ballot measures in 2008 and 2010. Those measures amended California

Constitution, article XXI, transferring the redistricting task to a newly created Citizens

Redistricting Commission. (Prop. 11, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 5, 2008)

(Footnote continued from previous page)

“Any reply or consolidated reply to any amicus curiae brief or briefs may be

served and filed on or before Thursday, December 22, 2011.

“All service and filings may be made by facsimile with the original and hard

copies to follow by mail. The court’s fax number is (415) 865-7183.

“No extension of time will be granted.”

12

(Proposition 11); Prop. 20, as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 2, 2010) (Proposition

20).)

A. Charge and selection of the Commission

California Constitution, article XXI, section 2 establishes the Commission and

defines how it is to be constituted. The constitutional provision creates a body that

excludes career politicians, reflects citizen participation at every level, and is expected to

rise above partisanship. Accordingly, subdivision (b) of section 2 charges the

Commission with “conduct[ing] an open and transparent process enabling full public

consideration of and comment on the drawing of district lines; . . . draw[ing] district lines

according to the redistricting criteria specified in this article; and . . . conduct[ing]

themselves with integrity and fairness.” Section 2, subdivision (c)(1) of article XXI

further provides that “[t]he selection process is designed to produce a commission that is

independent from legislative influence and reasonably representative of this State’s

diversity.”

The Commission has 14 members. Five must be registered with the largest

political party in California (based on voter registration), five must be registered with the

second largest political party in California, and four must be individuals who are not

registered with either of the two largest political parties. (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2,

subd. (c)(2).) Commission members are ineligible to hold elective public office at the

federal, state, county or city level for a period of 10 years, beginning from the date of

their appointment to the Commission (id., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (c)(6)), and, for a five-year

period beginning from their appointment, are ineligible to hold appointive federal, state,

or local public office, or to serve as paid staff for, or as a paid consultant to, the State

Board of Equalization, Congress, the Legislature, or any individual legislator, or to

register as a federal, state or local lobbyist in California. (Ibid.)

Government Code section 8250 et seq., enacted by the voters in 2008 as part of

Proposition 11, governs the process for selecting commissioners. Government Code

13

section 825216 sets forth how the commissioners are to be selected. The State Auditor,

an office that is independent of the legislative and executive branches (§ 8546), initiates

an application process, open to all registered voters, that is designed to “promote[] a

diverse and qualified applicant pool.” (§ 8252, subd. (a)(1).) According to the

Commission’s Final Report on Redistricting, August 15, 2011 (Final Report), the State

Auditor “undertook a significant outreach process throughout the state utilizing a wide

variety of communications media, including mainstream and ethnic media, social media,

a website, and staff assigned to respond to all telephone calls and e-mails.” (Final Rep.,

at p. 2, available on the Commission’s Web site, <http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov> [as of

Jan. 27, 2012].) Section 8252, subdivision (a)(2) authorizes the State Auditor to remove

from the pool those applicants with a conflict of interest. Subdivisions (a)(2)(A) and

(a)(2) (B) of section 8252 identify the relationships that can create a conflict of interest.

Section 8252 also authorizes the State Auditor to establish an “Applicant Review

Panel” to screen the applicants. (§ 8252, subd. (b).) The panel consists of three

independent auditors randomly drawn from a pool comprised of “all auditors employed

by the state and licensed by the California Board of Accountancy at the time of the

drawing” (ibid.); one of the three must be registered with the largest political party in

California, one must be registered with the second largest political party in California,

and the third must not be not registered with either of those two parties. (Ibid.)

Prospective panel members are to be screened for conflicts of interest under the same set

of standards that are applied to applicants. (§ 8252, subd. (a)(2).) Once the panel is

constituted, the State Auditor provides it with the applications of prospective commission

members. (§ 8252, subd. (c).)

16 Subsequent unlabeled statutory references in this part (pt. II) and in part III are to

the Government Code.

14

The panel then selects “60 of the most qualified applicants,” 20 of whom must be

registered with the largest political party; 20 must be registered with the second largest

political party; and the final 20 must not be registered with either of those two parties.

(§ 8252, subd. (d).) Selection is to be made on the basis of “relevant analytical skills,

ability to be impartial, and appreciation for California’s diverse demographics and

geography.” (Ibid.) The panel presents its pool of recommended applicants to the

Secretary of the Senate and to the Chief Clerk of the Assembly, and those officers, in

turn, permit the President pro Tempore of the Senate, the Minority Floor Leader of the

Senate, the Speaker of the Assembly, and the Minority Floor Leader of the Assembly

each to strike up to two applicants from each subpool of 20, for a total of eight strikes per

subpool. (§ 8252, subd. (e).) The State Auditor then randomly draws eight names from

the remaining pool of applicants: three from the subpool of applicants registered with the

largest political party, three from the subpool registered with the second largest political

party, and two from the remaining subpool. These eight individuals serve on the

Commission. (§ 8252, subd. (f).) They, in turn, review the remaining pool of applicants

and appoint a final six to complete the Commission: two are to be drawn from the

subpool of those registered with the largest political party, two are to be drawn from the

subpool of those registered with the second largest political party, and two are to be

drawn from the remaining subpool. The six appointees must be approved by at least five

affirmative votes of the original eight commissioners; those five votes must include the

votes of two Commissioners registered with the largest political party, two

Commissioners registered with the second largest political party, and one from a

Commissioner not registered with either party. (§ 8252, subd. (g).) The six appointees

are to be “chosen to ensure the commission reflects this state’s diversity, including, but

not limited to, racial, ethnic, geographic, and gender diversity.” (Ibid.) The Commission,

however, need not comply with any specific ratio or formula. (Ibid.)

15

B. The redistricting process

California Constitution, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (b) and related statutes

establish a public redistricting process. The constitutional provision requires the

Commission to “conduct an open and transparent process enabling full public

consideration of and comment on the drawing of district lines.” Section 8253 implements

that charge, and requires the Commission to “establish and implement an open hearing

process for public input and deliberation that shall be subject to public notice and

promoted through a thorough outreach program to solicit broad public participation in the

redistricting public review process. The hearing process shall include hearings to receive

public input before the commission draws any maps, and hearings following the drawing

and display of any commission maps. In addition, hearings shall be supplemented with

other activities as appropriate to further increase opportunities for the public to observe

and participate in the review process. The commission shall display the maps for public

comment in a manner designed to achieve the widest public access reasonably possible.

Public comment shall be taken for at least 14 days from the date of public display of any

map.” (§ 8253, subd. (a)(7).)

The Commission was sworn in during the month of January 2011, and conducted

an open bidding process to hire independent counsel and experts to advise it on matters

related to the federal Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.) (Voting Rights

Act) and technical issues. It thereafter held more than 70 business meetings and 34 public

hearings in 32 cities throughout the state. (Final Rep., at p. 4.) Generally, the

Commission’s hearings were scheduled in the early evening hours at school or

government locations in the center of a community, making it convenient for “average

citizens” to participate. (Ibid.) It regularly allowed public input and comment at its

business meetings as well. (Ibid.) Its educational materials were broadly distributed in

English and six other languages (Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Tagalog, and

Vietnamese), and it ultimately received, in addition to oral testimony, more than 2,000

16

written submissions, including maps reflecting statewide, regional, or other districts.

(Ibid.; see also Final Rep., at pp. 3-5 [listing representative groups providing submissions

and other testimony].) The Commission’s staff received “written comments, input and

suggestions from more than 20,000 individuals and groups.” (Id., at p. 5.) The

Commission held 23 public input hearings before issuing a set of its draft maps in June of

2011. After a five-day public review period, it held 11 more public input hearings around

the state to collect reactions to and comments concerning those draft maps. (Ibid.) It held

22 business meetings in Sacramento to discuss the draft maps, at which more than 276

people appeared and commented. All of the Commission’s public meetings were “live-

streamed,” captured on video, and placed on the Commission’s Web site for public

viewing. All of the Commission’s completed documents, and those of its staff, were

posted on the Commission’s Web site for public viewing as well. (Ibid.) All such

materials remain archived on the Commission’s Web site, <http://wedrawthelines.ca.gov>

(as of Jan. 27, 2012).

Pursuant to California Constitution, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (c)(5), the

structure of the Commission’s vote on each map mirrored the balanced process described

above, under which the Commission’s members were selected. An affirmative vote on

each map was required to be supported by a supermajority of at least nine Commission

members, including three from each subpool of members: those registered with the

largest political party in California (that is, three Democrats), those registered with the

second largest political party (that is, three Republicans), and three who are not registered

with either major party. With regard to the state Senate map — the subject of the

proposed referendum — the Commission’s vote was 13 to 1 in favor.

C. Redistricting criteria

California Constitution, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (d) requires the

Commission to “establish single-member districts for the Senate, Assembly, Congress,

and State Board of Equalization pursuant to a mapping process” that complies with

17

criteria expressly set forth in article XXI itself. It is of considerable consequence to our

analysis that the constitutional provision ranks the applicable criteria by order of priority.

First, “[d]istricts shall comply with the United States Constitution. Congressional

districts shall achieve population equality as nearly as is practicable, and Senatorial,

Assembly, and State Board of Equalization districts shall have reasonably equal

population with other districts for the same office, except where deviation is required to

comply with the federal Voting Rights Act or allowable by law.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI,

§ 2, subd. (d)(1).)

Second, “[d]istricts shall comply with the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C.

Sec. 1971 and following).” (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2, subd. (d)(2).)

Third, “[d]istricts shall be geographically contiguous.” (Cal. Const., art XXI, § 2,

subd. (d)(3).)

Fourth, the Commission’s maps must respect “[t]he geographic integrity of any

city, county, city and county, local neighborhood, or local community of interest . . . in a

manner that minimizes their division to the extent possible without violating the

requirements of any of the preceding subdivisions.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § 2,

subd. (d)(4).) The Constitution defines a “community of interest” as “a contiguous

population which shares common social and economic interests that should be included

within a single district for purposes of its effective and fair representation.” (Ibid.)

“Examples of such shared interests are those common to an urban area, a rural area, an

industrial area, or an agricultural area, and those common to areas in which the people

share similar living standards, use the same transportation facilities, have similar work

opportunities, or have access to the same media of communication relevant to the election

process.” (Ibid.) The term “communities of interest” expressly excludes “relationships

with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.” (Ibid.)

Fifth, “[t]o the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria

above, districts shall be drawn to encourage geographical compactness such that nearby

18

areas of population are not bypassed for more distant population.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI,

§ 2, subd. (d)(5).)

Sixth, and finally, “[t]o the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict

with the criteria above, each Senate district shall be comprised of two whole, complete,

and adjacent Assembly districts, and each Board of Equalization district shall be

comprised of 10 whole, complete, and adjacent Senate districts.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI,

§ 2, subd. (d)(6) [commonly referred to as the “nesting” goal].)

Subdivision (e) of article XXI, section 2, provides that “[t]he place of residence of

any incumbent or political candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map.

Districts shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an

incumbent, political candidate, or political party.”

Subdivision (f) of article XXI, section 2, provides that “[d]istricts for the

Congress, Senate, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization shall be numbered

consecutively commencing at the northern boundary of the State and ending at the

southern boundary.”

These criteria are derived, for the most part, from the standards developed by the

special masters appointed by this court in 1973 after the Legislature failed to pass

legislative and congressional redistricting bills that were acceptable to the Governor.

(Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pp. 400-402.) This court approved the use

of these criteria in Legislature v. Reinecke, and they subsequently were added to the

Constitution as article XXI when the voters approved Proposition 6 in 1980. The current

version of article XXI, as amended by the voters in 2008 (Prop. 11) and again in 2010

(Prop. 20), expands upon the original criteria articulated by the special masters in 1973,

based, in large part, on decisions of this court applying the criteria developed by the

special masters. (See, e.g., Wilson v. Eu, supra, 1 Cal.4th 707.) Unlike former article

XXI, section 2, or the judicial decisions on which that provision was based, however, the

current version of article XXI, in section 2, subdivision (d), expressly ranks the criteria in

19

order of priority, stating explicitly that a lower-ranked criterion is to be followed only

when doing so does not conflict with a higher-ranked criterion or criteria.

III. Did this court have authority to issue an order to show cause

in this original writ proceeding in the absence of a showing

that the proposed referendum was “likely to qualify” for the ballot?

And does this court at this juncture have authority to determine which

state Senate district map should be used in the event the referendum

qualifies for the ballot and stays the operative effect of

the Commission-certified state Senate map?

In considering petitioner’s request for relief, we must first address the threshold

question whether this court had authority to issue an order to show cause in this original

writ proceeding in the absence of a showing by petitioner that the proposed referendum

was “likely to qualify” for the ballot. In her preliminary opposition to the petition, filed

prior to this court’s consideration of the petition, the Secretary of State maintained that

the petition in this proceeding was not properly filed and should be summarily denied

because petitioner had not demonstrated that the underlying proposed referendum was

“likely to qualify” for the ballot within the meaning of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) of the

California Constitution. We will analyze this threshold question in light of the

circumstances that were before this court on December 9, 2011, when we issued the order

to show cause, both to explain why this court’s December 9 action was authorized and

appropriate, and, as importantly, to provide guidance on this procedural point for the

future in the event similar circumstances arise in the course of subsequent redistricting

efforts.

As we will explain, we conclude the petition’s allegations adequately invoked our

traditional extraordinary writ authority under article VI, section 10 of the state

Constitution over a question that was, and is, ripe for our decision. For this reason, it is

not necessary for this court to apply the language in article XXI, section (3)(b)(2)

20

providing that a “registered voter . . . may file . . . a petition for a writ of mandate . . . to

seek relief where a certified final map is subject to a referendum measure that is likely to

qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map.” (Cal. Const., art. XXI,

§ 3(b)(2).)

As noted above, the petition filed in this case on December 2, 2011, stated that the

proponents of the referendum had submitted a total of approximately 710,000 raw

(unverified) signatures in support of the referendum to local election officials throughout

the state. The petition asserted that because only approximately 504,000 valid signatures

were required to qualify the referendum for the ballot, the number of signatures that had

been submitted established that the proposed referendum was “likely to qualify” for

placement on the November 2012 ballot and thus that the petition was properly filed

under the provisions of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) of the California Constitution and

should be entertained and acted on by this court. Article XXI, section 3(b)(2) provides in

this regard that “[a]ny registered voter . . . may file . . . a petition for a writ of mandate

. . . to seek relief where a certified final map is subject to a referendum measure that is

likely to qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map.” (Italics added.)

As also noted above, the preliminary opposition filed by the Secretary of State

took issue with the petition’s contention that the number of raw signatures that had been

submitted to election officials established that the proposed referendum was likely to

qualify for the ballot. The preliminary opposition pointed out that in the prior separate

mandate proceeding filed in this court (see ante, fn. 7 and related text), petitioner had

asserted that she anticipated obtaining more than 780,000 raw signatures on the

referendum petition but that petitioner instead submitted only approximately 710,000 raw

signatures. The preliminary opposition, noting that a 2008 study of initiative petitions

reported that initiative proponents “lose up to 40 [percent] of gross signatures in the

verification check” (citing Center for Governmental Studies, Democracy by Initiative:

Shaping California’s Fourth Branch of Government (2d ed. 2008) p. 149), asserted that

21

given the relatively low number of raw signatures that had been submitted, it was too

soon to tell whether the proposed referendum was likely to qualify for placement on the

November 2012 ballot. For this reason, the Secretary of State took the position that the

petition was not properly filed and should be summarily denied.

As we have pointed out (ante, at p. 10), our order to show cause in this matter

specifically reserved resolution of this threshold issue for our eventual opinion and

directed the parties to brief two questions related to this issue, regarding (1) the test or

standard this court should apply in determining whether a proposed referendum is “likely

to qualify” within the meaning of article XXI, section 3(b)(2), and (2) whether this

court’s authority to entertain a petition for a writ of mandate prior to the formal

qualification of a referendum petition is limited to the circumstances set forth in article

XXI, section 3.17

The briefs responding to the order to show cause filed by the Secretary of State

and the Commission argued that in order to comply with the “likely to qualify” provision

of article XXI, section 3(b)(2), a petitioner must demonstrate by “a preponderance of the

evidence” that it is “more probable than not” that the referendum petition will qualify for

placement on the ballot. Both briefs further contended that because the relatively low

number of raw signatures submitted in support of the proposed referendum left it unclear

whether there was a sufficient number of valid signatures to qualify the referendum for

the ballot, petitioner failed to meet the “likely to qualify” standard. In addition, both

asserted that if the petition failed to satisfy the “likely to qualify” standard set forth in

article XXI, section 3(b)(2), this court lacked authority to entertain the mandate

proceeding. Accordingly, both maintained that the petition should be dismissed on this

basis.

17 The two questions are reproduced in full ante, footnote 15.

22

In her reply, petitioner disagreed with the proposed interpretation of the “likely to

qualify” language, arguing that in light of the provision’s purpose, the phrase “likely to

qualify” should not be interpreted to mean that a petition for writ of mandate may be filed

only when it can be shown that it is “more probable than not” that a proposed referendum

will qualify for placement on the ballot, but instead that such a petition may be filed on a

lesser showing. (The reply did not specify or quantify the lesser showing that petitioner

believes is contemplated by the “likely to qualify” language.) In addition, the reply

maintained that, in any event, the number of raw signatures that had been submitted in

support of the proposed referendum was sufficient to establish that it was more probable

than not that the referendum would qualify. Finally, the reply asserted that, apart from

article XXI, section 3(b)(2), this court possesses authority under article VI, section 10 of

the Constitution — establishing this court’s original jurisdiction “in proceedings for

extraordinary relief” — to entertain the petition for a writ of mandate in this case because

the petition presented a matter of great public importance that had to be resolved

promptly in light of the impending 2012 electoral cycle.

For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that there is no need for this court to

decide the meaning of the term “likely to qualify” as used in article XXI, section 3(b)(2)

or to determine whether the “likely to qualify” standard of section 3(b)(2) was satisfied at

the time the petition in this case was filed or is satisfied at the present time. As we

explain, in light of the statewide importance of the issue presented by the petition and the

need for an expeditious judicial resolution of this matter, this court had authority, under

article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution, to issue an order to show cause in

this original writ proceeding at the time the petition was filed and also possesses the

authority at the present time to determine, through the exercise of its original writ

jurisdiction, what state Senate district map should be used as an interim measure if the

23

proposed referendum qualifies.18 The sentence of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) in

question — containing the “likely to qualify” language — was not intended, and cannot

reasonably be interpreted, to limit or restrict this court’s authority under article VI,

section 10 to determine that such an original writ proceeding is appropriately ripe for

adjudication and resolution at an earlier point in time. As the facts of this case illustrate,

in light of the great public interest and exigencies of the electoral process, this court may

need to assume jurisdiction and act expeditiously when such a petition is filed if the court

is to retain the ability to render a meaningful decision that can be realistically

implemented. This is so even under circumstances in which it cannot reasonably be

predicted whether the proposed referendum is likely to qualify for the ballot. Nothing in

the background or purpose of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) suggests that the provision was

intended to deprive this court of its fundamental and long-standing constitutional

authority to accept such a filing and to act in such a setting when the court determines

that it is appropriate and prudent to do so.

In analyzing this issue, it is important to recognize at the outset that it is firmly

established that this court possesses “jurisdiction,” in the fundamental sense, to entertain

a petition for an original writ of mandate that is directed to the Secretary of State and

concerns her official duties related to the electoral process, and to grant appropriate relief

in such a proceeding. Article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution explicitly

provides in this regard that this court possesses “original jurisdiction in proceedings for

18 Although the petition in this case asserted that it was filed under the authority

granted by article XXI, section 3(b)(2), the representations disclosed by the petition

demonstrated that petitioner, as a registered voter and the official proponent of the

proposed referendum in question, unquestionably had standing to file a petition for an

original writ of mandate seeking the relief in question under the so-called “public-interest

exception” applicable to mandate proceedings. (See, e.g., Hollman v. Warren (1948) 32

Cal.2d 351, 356-357; see generally 8 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Extraordinary

Writs, § 84, pp. 970-973, and cases cited.)

24

extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition,” and this court

has long exercised such original extraordinary writ jurisdiction with respect to public

officials’ exercise of their official conduct. (See, e.g., Hollman v. Warren, supra, 32

Cal.2d at pp. 354-357; see generally People ex rel. S.F. Bay etc. Com. v. Town of

Emeryville (1968) 69 Cal.2d 533, 537-538 [discussing 1966 state constitutional

amendment that “deliberately broadened the constitutional language relating to

jurisdiction in extraordinary writ proceedings”].) In past cases, this court has repeatedly

exercised authority to entertain and decide petitions for original writs of mandate related

to the referendum, initiative, and redistricting process in circumstances in which an

expeditious ruling was necessary to the orderly functioning of the electoral system. (See,

e.g., Senate v. Jones (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1142; Wilson v. Eu (1991) 54 Cal.3d 546; Wilson

v. Eu, supra, 1 Cal.4th 707; Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638; Legislature

v. Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d 396; Silver v. Brown (1965) 63 Cal.2d 270.)

Accordingly, we disagree with the Secretary of State’s and the Commission’s

argument and analysis regarding this court’s alleged lack of authority to issue an order to

show cause in this writ proceeding in light of the petition’s asserted failure to establish

that the proposed referendum was likely to qualify for the ballot. Properly analyzed, the

issue does not implicate this court’s fundamental jurisdiction over petitioner’s mandate

action. Rather, the issue presents a question of the “justiciability” of petitioner’s claim,

and, more specifically, whether the action is “ripe” for adjudication under the “ripeness”

doctrine that constitutes one aspect of justiciability. As this court explained in Pacific

Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170: “The ripeness

requirement, a branch of the doctrine of justiciability, prevents courts from issuing purely

advisory opinions. [Citation.] It is rooted in the fundamental concept that the proper role

of the judiciary does not extend to the resolution of abstract differences of legal opinion.

It is in part designed to regulate the workload of courts by preventing judicial

consideration of lawsuits that seek only to obtain general guidance, rather than to resolve

25

specific legal disputes. However, the ripeness doctrine is primarily bottomed on the

recognition that judicial decisionmaking is best conducted in the context of an actual set

of facts so that the issues will be framed with sufficient definiteness to enable the court to

make a decree finally disposing of the controversy. On the other hand, the requirement

should not prevent courts from resolving concrete disputes if the consequence of a

deferred decision will be lingering uncertainty in the law, especially when there is

widespread public interest in the answer to a particular legal question. [Citations.]”

(Italics added.) As the Court of Appeal observed in California Water & Tel. Co. v. Los

Angeles (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 22, “[a] controversy is ‘ripe’ when it has reached . . .

the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful

decision to be made.”

In past cases this court has repeatedly held that this court may appropriately

exercise its jurisdiction over a petition for an original writ of mandate when “the issues

presented are of great public importance and must be resolved promptly.” (County of

Sacramento v. Hickman (1967) 66 Cal.2d 841, 845; see, e.g., Clean Air Constituency v.

California State Air Resources Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 801, 808; see generally 8 Witkin,

Cal. Procedure, supra, Extraordinary Writs, § 146, pp. 1043-1046.) We have frequently

found challenges ripe for the invocation and exercise of our original writ jurisdiction

under this standard in cases involving significant legal issues affecting the electoral

process, when a speedy resolution of the underlying controversy is necessary to avoid a

disruption of an upcoming election. (See, e.g., Wilson v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 472-

473; Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 646; Thompson v. Mellon (1973) 9

Cal.3d 96, 98; Legislature v. Reinecke (1972) 6 Cal.3d 595, 598; Jolicoeur v. Mihaly

(1971) 5 Cal.3d 565, 570, fn. 1; Silver v. Brown, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 277-278; Perry

v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, 90-91.)

In this case, the legal issue posed by the petition plainly presented a question of

significant statewide public importance. The petition noted that a referendum petition,

26

challenging the state Senate redistricting map that had been certified by the Commission

and that was currently being implemented by election officials throughout the state, had

been circulated for signatures and had been timely filed with election officials with a

number of raw signatures that was greater than the number of verified signatures required

for qualification. The petition also pointed out that if the proposed referendum proves to

have a sufficient number of verified signatures to qualify for placement on the November

2012 ballot, the existing Commission-certified state Senate map would, as a matter of

law, automatically be stayed pending the electorate’s November 2012 vote on the

referendum measure. (See Cal. Const., art. II, § 10, subd. (a); Assembly v. Deukmejian,

supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 654-657, and cases cited [construing the cited constitutional

provision to mean that a “duly qualified referendum” stays implementation of the

challenged electoral maps].) And the petition further explained that if the existing state

Senate map is stayed by qualification of the proposed referendum, this court would bear

the direct responsibility of deciding which state Senate districts are to be used by election

officials for the interim June 2012 primary election and November 2012 general election.

(Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 657-658.) Thus, there is no question

that the legal issue presented by the petition — what state Senate districts should be used

for those elections in the event the proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot — is

clearly an issue of sufficient statewide public importance to warrant this court’s exercise

of its original writ jurisdiction.

At the time the petition was filed, however, the proposed referendum had not yet

qualified for the ballot (indeed, at the time of filing this opinion, it still has not qualified),

and the question raised by the informal opposition to the petition was whether the matter

was sufficiently ripe to render it appropriate for this court to issue an order to show cause,

establish a briefing schedule, and proceed to adjudicate the matter, or whether the petition

was premature.

27

As we will explain (see, post, at pp. 29-32), both on December 2, 2011 (when the

petition for writ of mandate was filed in this court), and on December 9, 2011 (when this

court considered whether to issue an order of show cause), it was apparent (1) that it was

a close question whether a sufficient number of valid signatures had been filed to qualify

the proposed referendum for placement on the November 2012 ballot, and (2) that the

ultimate resolution of that question might not be determined until early March 2012. As

we also will explain, however, under the circumstances shown by the petition, our timely

intervention was critical because of practical impediments faced by election officials

preparing for the 2012 election cycle.

Under the applicable California statutes (Elec. Code, § 9030 et seq.), when, as in

this case, the proponents of a referendum filed with election officials petitions containing

a number of raw signatures greater than the number of valid signatures required for

qualification, local election officials were required to conduct a random sampling of the

raw signatures to make an initial determination of the percentage of raw signatures that

would be found to be valid signatures.19 Here, the last day for counties to complete

random sampling was January 10, 2012. (Elec. Code, § 9030, subds. (d), (e).)

Thereafter, based on the county certificates, the Secretary of State was required to

determine the statewide result of the random sampling by January 18, 2012. Under the

governing statutory provisions, if the random sampling projected a number of total valid

signatures that was less than 95 percent of the required number of valid signatures, the

petition would fail without any further count. If the projection of valid signatures was

110 percent or more of the required number, the petition would qualify without any

19 Random sampling is conducted in each county with regard to 3 percent of the

signatures presented, or 500 signatures, whichever number is greater. If fewer than 500

signatures are submitted in a county, the county election officials must check each

signature. (Elec. Code, § 9030, subd. (d).)

28

further count. If the projection of valid signatures was between 95 and 110 percent, the

Secretary of State would notify counties that a full count of all submitted signatures

would be required to verify the number of valid signatures that had been submitted.

(Elec. Code, §§ 9030, subds. (f) & (g), 9031, subd. (a).) If a full count was required, the

last day for counties to determine the number of qualified signatures would be March 6,

2012. (Id., § 9031, subds. (b) & (c).) Thereafter, by March 12, 2012, the Secretary of

State would determine whether the referendum petition qualifies for placement on the

November 2012 ballot. (Id., §§ 9031, subd. (d), 9033.)

At the time the petition in the present case was filed, all parties in this proceeding

agreed that the available data indicated that the random sampling of the petition

signatures was very likely to result in a projection falling between 95 and 110 percent of

the required number of valid signatures. Thus, although the parties disagreed whether the

available data demonstrated that it was more probable than not that the proposed

referendum would qualify, the parties agreed that the data established that there was at

least a substantial possibility that the referendum would ultimately qualify for the ballot.

And because the parties also agreed that it was quite likely that the final result of the

random sampling process would mean that the verification process would have to go to a

full count of all signatures, at that time it appeared very probable that it would not be

definitively known whether the proposed referendum qualified for the ballot until early

March 2012. However, the Secretary of State informed the court that a number of actions

for the 2012 electoral cycle were required to begin well before that date.

Thus, at the time the petition was filed and this court had to decide whether to

issue an order to show cause, we faced a serious problem of timing and coordination. As

noted in Wilson v. Eu, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 548, “preparing for elections is a complex

and ‘sequential’ process, requiring various tasks be performed before others may begin,

including identifying the various district boundaries, developing county election

precincts, assigning such districts to all registered voters, designing ballot styles, printing

29

ballots, providing polling places, and training precinct workers. Early delays in one

function can impact all other functions. As the Secretary [of State] points out, the need to

know precise district boundaries ‘is at the front end of the process.’ ” According to the

Secretary of State here, “[t]hese words are particularly applicable to the 2012 election

cycle, where elections officials will implement not only new redistricting plans, but also

the new ‘top two’ or ‘voter-nominated’ election scheme adopted by Proposition 14 (June

2010).”

At the time the petition was filed, all four maps certified in mid-August by the

Commission — including the state Senate map — were then the legally applicable maps,

and county election officials and the Secretary of State and others were using and relying

upon them for purposes of state election planning and “preclearance” under section 5 of

the federal Voting Rights Act,20 and would continue to do so unless and until the state

Senate map is automatically stayed by qualification of the proposed referendum or this

court orders otherwise. The Secretary of State, citing a declaration by the chief of the

elections division, explained that up to six weeks would be required “for state and local

elections officials to implement [any] changes [that might be ordered] to the new maps.”

This court was also informed that the Secretary of State and county election officials

needed to know by the end of January 2012 whether they would be required to implement

any changes in the state Senate districts in the event the proposed referendum qualifies

and automatically stays the Commission-certified state Senate redistricting map.

As the circumstances of the present case demonstrate, even when the available

data may be insufficient to show just how likely or probable it is that a proposed

referendum will qualify for placement on the ballot, detrimental consequences to the

orderly process of an election may result if the court fails to exercise jurisdiction

20 See post, footnote 44.

30

expeditiously and the referendum does ultimately qualify for the ballot. The potential

detrimental consequences resulting from this court’s deferring action until later in the

signature verification process may reasonably support a judicial determination that the

proposed mandate action is sufficiently “ripe” to permit this court to exercise jurisdiction

over the mandate action at that earlier juncture.

The combination of the redistricting process embodied in California Constitution,

article XXI and the electoral schedule often leaves very little time between the deadline

for filing referendum petition signatures and the beginning of the numerous tasks that

must be undertaken by candidates and election officials during the upcoming primary and

general election electoral cycle. Thus, it may be necessary for this court to issue an order

to show cause, elicit briefing, and hold oral argument before it can be determined with

any substantial degree of accuracy or confidence how likely or probable it is that the

proposed referendum will qualify for the ballot. Such immediate action by this court may

be essential in order for this court to retain the ability to render a decision (regarding what

districts should be used in the event the referendum qualifies) at a time when the court’s

decision can actually be implemented. If issuance of an order to show cause is deferred

until later in the signature-verification process, then by the time a judicial decision

ultimately is rendered it may, as a practical matter, be impossible for election officials to

use any districts other than the districts that the officials have been utilizing up until the

date on which the Commission-certified maps are stayed by the official qualification of

the proposed referendum. In other words, if this court were to conclude that other

districts should be used in the event the referendum qualifies, it may be too late at that

time to apply the court’s decision to implement those other districts.

Accordingly, we conclude that, in order to preserve this court’s ability to render a

meaningful and realistically enforceable decision regarding which districts should be

used in the event a proposed referendum qualifies, this court properly may determine that

a proposed mandate proceeding is “ripe” for adjudication and may issue an order to show

31

cause in such a proceeding in the absence of a showing that the referendum is “likely to

qualify” for placement on the ballot. Given the realities of the timing of redistricting and

the statutory electoral process, we hold that this court has authority to find that a mandate

action satisfies the ripeness doctrine when we conclude that, in light of the relative

probability that the proposed referendum will qualify for the ballot and the time

limitations and potential detrimental consequences of refusing to consider a mandate

petition at that point in time, it is prudent to issue an order to show cause and decide

which districts should be used in the upcoming elections in the event the proposed

referendum does qualify for placement on the ballot. (Accord, People ex rel. S.F. Bay

etc. Com. v. Town of Emeryville, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 537-539 [an appellate court has

inherent power to order interim relief in aid of its own jurisdiction and to preserve the

effectiveness of its ultimate decision].)

Furthermore, not only may this court issue an order to show cause in the absence

of a showing that the proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot, but this

court’s authority to decide what districts should be used in the event the referendum does

qualify and to grant relief based upon that decision also is not contingent upon a showing

that the proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot. Even when it cannot be

determined from the available data how likely it is that a referendum will qualify for the

ballot — or when there is a substantial possibility that the proposed referendum will

qualify but it is not “more probable than not” that it will qualify — a court may conclude

that it is prudent to determine, at that time, which districts should be used in the event the

referendum does qualify so that election officials are not left without meaningful

guidance if the referendum ultimately qualifies.21 Thus, at the relief stage, just as at the

21 As explained earlier, current California statutes mandate a full count of all

submitted signatures whenever the results of the random sampling process project a

signature validity rate between 95 and 110 percent of the required number of valid

(Footnote continued on following page)

32

order to show cause stage of an original writ proceeding, this court may properly grant

relief before a proposed referendum actually qualifies for the ballot when the court is of

the view that there is a sufficient chance that the proposed referendum will qualify to

make it prudent for the court to advise election officials of the districts that should be

used on an interim basis if the proposed referendum ultimately qualifies for the ballot.

We also emphasize that it is perfectly appropriate for this court, after the issuance

of an order to show cause and while such a proceeding is pending before the court, to

continue to consider all relevant factors that may affect both the need for relief and the

prudence and appropriate timing of affording the relief that the court determines may be

warranted.22

(Footnote continued from previous page)

signatures. (Ante, at pp. 28-29.) This statutory scheme indicates that even when the

random sampling process projects that the number of valid signatures submitted will be

only 95 percent of the required number of valid signatures, the Legislature is of the view

that there is a sufficient chance that a full count of all signatures will show that the

proposed referendum actually has obtained a sufficient number of valid signatures to

qualify for the ballot to require that a time-consuming and expensive full count be

conducted. Accordingly, the suggestion advanced in one of petitioner’s supplemental

briefs — that this court should adopt a rule under which a proposed referendum that

obtains a random sampling rate of less than 100 percent of the required number of valid

signatures should be considered insufficient to permit this court to advise election

officials of the districts that should be used in the event the proposed referendum does

qualify (see post, fn. 22) — would appear to conflict with the underlying premise of the

statutory scheme.

22 In the present case, for example, we asked the parties during the pendency of this

proceeding to file supplemental briefs addressing what significance the signature validity

rate from the completed random sampling process would have with regard to the issue of

whether a proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” under article XXI, section 3(b)(2).

In response, the parties informed the court of the then-current signature validity

rate of the proposed referendum based on the incomplete random sampling process that

had been conducted as of the date the supplemental briefing was filed. Although the

parties reported the same data — obtained from the Secretary of State’s Web site — they

disagreed whether the signature validity rate obtained from the random sampling process

(Footnote continued on following page)

33

Thus, for example, if in this case, after we issued an order to show cause, the

completed random sampling process had projected less than 95 percent of the required

valid signatures, it would have been clear that the proposed referendum had failed to

qualify for the ballot and that there was no longer any need for a decision by this court

because there was no longer any chance that the Commission-certified state Senate map

would be automatically stayed. Under such circumstances, notwithstanding the fact that

this court had properly issued an order to show cause, this court would simply have

dismissed this writ proceeding as moot.

Furthermore, other relevant factors that develop while such an original writ

proceeding is pending in this court also may affect the timing and nature of the relief that

(Footnote continued from previous page)

is a sufficiently reliable indicator concerning whether a referendum is “likely to qualify”

for the ballot.

Petitioner maintained in this regard that “a petition that attains less than a 100

[percent] signature validity rate from the completed random sampling cannot be said to

be ‘likely’ to qualify,” whereas “[a] petition that attains more than 100 [percent] is likely

to qualify.”

The Secretary of State, by contrast, explained that although the random sampling

process is adequate to do what that process is designed to do — namely to determine

“whether the number of valid signatures on petitions is within a broad range, 95 [percent]

to 110 [percent]” — “the sampling technique is not designed to give reliable results at a

greater level of precision.” The Secretary of State advised the court that “to use the

completed sampling process to determine at what point a petition becomes likely to

qualify, or to determine whether a 101 [percent] random sample petition is more likely to

qualify than a 100 [percent] random sample petition, is beyond the capacity of the

process.” (Italics added.) On this point the Commission, in its own supplemental filing

and at oral argument, deferred to and agreed with the Secretary of State.

For the reasons discussed in the text, we conclude that there is no need to

determine whether the current available data establishes that it is likely or more probable

than not that the proposed referendum will qualify. There is a sufficient probability that

the referendum will qualify to make it prudent to decide at this time which districts

should be used in the event the proposed referendum does qualify. (See, post, at p. 42.)

34

this court will provide. For example, as the briefing and oral argument process

progresses, and as this court, through its deliberations, arrives at a consensus concerning

the substantive question of what districts should be used in the event the proposed

referendum qualifies and stays the Commission-certified districts, the court will continue

to assess the relative probability that the referendum will qualify for the ballot and the

prudence of resolving the proceeding prior to the referendum’s actual qualification.

If this court, after deliberation, concludes that even if the proposed referendum

qualifies for the ballot and automatically stays the operative effect of the Commission-

certified map, election officials should be directed to use the Commission-certified map

on an interim basis because the court has concluded that that map best complies with the

constitutionally mandated criteria embodied in the federal and state Constitutions (a

scenario, as we discuss later in this opinion, that reflects this court’s decisionmaking

process in this case), this court could also reasonably conclude that it should issue its

decision as early as possible so as to eliminate the uncertainty that inevitably arises from

the ongoing signature verification process and the pendency of the writ proceeding in this

court. In such a case, when this court has concluded that the Commission-certified map

should be used, so long as there remains a substantial possibility that the referendum will

qualify for the ballot it would not be necessary for the court to decide whether it is more

probable than not that the proposed referendum will qualify. Even if, after the court

issues its opinion, the referendum ultimately does not qualify for the ballot and the

Commission-certified map is not stayed, issuance of the court’s decision — approving

the Commission’s map — could have no adverse effect upon the Commission-certified

map.

By contrast, based on the Commission’s processes and the Secretary of State’s

statutory responsibilities, different considerations may come into play when this court,

after briefing, oral argument, and deliberation, concludes that a map other than the

Commission-certified map should be used in the interim elections in the event the

35

proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot. Because of the possibility that the issuance

of a court decision favoring an alternative map over the Commission-certified map might

— in the event the referendum does not qualify — unnecessarily cast a cloud over the

legitimacy of that Commission-certified map for the ensuing decade, this court may

determine that it is prudent to consider just how likely it is that the proposed referendum

will not qualify for the ballot. In determining whether it is prudent to issue its decision in

advance of the proposed referendum’s qualification notwithstanding this potential

adverse consequence (and if so, how far in advance), this court would undoubtedly take

into account the particular reasons underlying its analysis and determination that an

alternative map is more consistent with the constitutionally based criteria than the

Commission-certified map, and then decide if and when to issue its opinion based in part

on such considerations.

As the foregoing examples illustrate, under this court’s traditional California

Constitution, article VI, section 10 authority over original writ proceedings, this court

properly retains broad discretion to take into account all such considerations as well as

any other relevant factor in deciding what relief is appropriate in such a proceeding and

when it should be ordered. Because of the variety of circumstances that may be

presented in the future, and the impossibility of predicting the nature of the controversies

that may arise in this context, we conclude that it would not be wise or appropriate to

establish a fixed and inflexible rule or standard that would restrict this court’s discretion

to take appropriate action in light of all the circumstances that may be presented in a

particular case. Thus, we reject any suggestion that this court may determine which

districts are to be used for interim elections in the event a proposed referendum ultimately

qualifies for the ballot only if, at the time the court issues its decision, the available data

demonstrates that the referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot.

In their briefs, the Secretary of State and the Commission do not deny that under

the general provisions of article VI, section 10 of the California Constitution regarding

36

original writs of mandate, and the discretion courts may generally exercise under the

ripeness doctrine, this court ordinarily would have authority to issue an order to show

cause in this setting and to provide appropriate relief in light of all of the circumstances

of the case, even if petitioner fails to demonstrate that it is more probable than not that the

proposed referendum measure will qualify for the ballot. The Secretary of State and the

Commission maintain, however, that the specific provision of article XXI, section 3(b)(2)

authorizing “[a]ny registered voter [. . . to] file a petition for a writ of mandate or writ of

prohibition to seek relief where a certified final map is subject to a referendum measure

that is likely to qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map” should be

interpreted to limit this court’s authority to issue an order to show cause and grant relief

in an original writ proceeding in this setting to instances in which a petitioner establishes

that the proposed referendum measure is “likely to qualify” for the ballot. (As discussed

above, both the Secretary of State and the Commission maintain that “likely to qualify,”

as used in article XXI, section 3(b)(2), means “more probable than not.”) In advancing

this argument, the briefs rely upon decisions of this court holding that when constitutional

provisions conflict, “a recent, specific provision is deemed to carve out an exception to

and thereby limit an older, general provision.” (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54

Cal.3d 356, 371; see Greene v. Marin County Flood & Water Conservation Dist. (2010)

49 Cal.4th 277, 290.)

The fundamental flaw in this argument lies in its implicit assumption that the

sentence within article XXI, section 3(b)(2) upon which the briefs rely was intended, and

may reasonably be interpreted, to impose a limitation on the circumstances under which

this court is authorized to issue an order to show cause or to provide relief in this setting.

In our view, it is evident — both from the language of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) itself

and from the judicial background against which the provision was drafted (see Assembly

37

v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638)23 — that this section was intended to expand,

rather than to limit, the ability of referendum sponsors or supporters to institute an

original writ proceeding in this court by explicitly providing that when a proposed

referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot, any registered voter has the right to file

such a petition in this court before the Secretary of State formally certifies that the

referendum has qualified for placement on the ballot. The language of article XXI,

section 3(b)(2) does not purport to limit this court’s jurisdiction or its ability to

determine, at a time prior to when the referendum is “likely to qualify,” that a case falling

within its jurisdiction is ripe for adjudication, and nothing in the ballot pamphlet related

to this initiative measure indicates an intention to limit this court’s broad article VI,

section 10 authority in such a fashion. Indeed, it would clearly defeat, rather than further,

the purpose of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) to interpret the section as limiting this court’s

authority to entertain a writ petition at an earlier time when an earlier commencement of

the action may be necessary, as a practical matter, to enable the court to provide the relief

sought in the petition should such relief be found appropriate. Accordingly, we reject the

argument that article XXI, section 3(b)(2) should be interpreted to limit this court’s

traditional authority under California Constitution, article VI, section 10 in the manner

suggested by the Secretary of State and the Commission.

23 In Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, the referendum proponents

gathered an extraordinary large number of signatures (well over two times the number of

required valid signatures — see id., at p. 682 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.)) in an

exceptionally short period of time (see post, fn. 29), and thus may have been able to

demonstrate even before the petitions were filed with election officials that it was more

probable than not that the referendum would qualify for the ballot. The drafters of the

relevant sentence of article XXI, section 3(b)(2) apparently wanted to make it clear that

in such circumstances any registered voter would have the right to file an action for writ

relief in this court even though the proposed referendum may not yet have formally

qualified for the ballot.

38

Our determination in this regard does not render the pertinent sentence of article

XXI, section 3(b)(2) meaningless or “surplusage.” In the absence of article XXI,

section 3(b)(2), the ripeness of any petition seeking an original writ of mandate that is

filed prior to the qualification of a proposed referendum would be a question for this

court’s discretionary authority over original writs of mandate under article VI, section 10.

Under article XXI, section 3(b)(2), however, when a petitioner is able to show that a

proposed referendum is likely to qualify for placement on the ballot, the petition is, as a

matter of law, sufficiently ripe to permit the petition to be entertained.24 Thus, by virtue

of article XXI, section 3(b)(2), when it is shown that a proposed referendum is likely to

qualify, this court may not properly deny the petition for lack of ripeness. By contrast, a

petition that is filed prior to the time that it can be determined that the proposed

referendum is likely to qualify is unaffected by article XXI, section 3(b)(2) and continues

to be evaluated by this court under all the considerations ordinarily taken into account

under the ripeness doctrine. Accordingly, our conclusion does not render article XXI,

section 3(b)(2) surplusage.25

24 When a petition is properly filed under article XXI, section 3(b)(2), this court is

required to give priority to ruling on the petition. (See art. XXI, § 3(b)(3).) Of course, in

any case in which this court issues an order to show cause in an original writ proceeding

because of the importance of the issue presented and the need for a prompt decision, this

court naturally gives priority to the proceeding in order to provide an expeditious ruling.

The present proceeding is an apt example.

25 Relying upon the “likely to qualify” language in article XXI, section 3(b)(2), the

concurring opinion proposes that the court adopt “as a general rule — indeed a

presumption — that where a petitioner has not shown that a referendum is likely to

qualify, the court should not decide the merits of the mandate petition.” (Conc. opn.,

post, at p. 9.) Because the concurring opinion also concludes that the “likely to qualify”

language is properly interpreted to mean “more likely than not” (conc. opn., post, at

p. 11), under the concurring opinion’s approach this court, as a general rule, would not

decide which map should be used for interim elections if a proposed referendum qualifies

for the ballot unless a petitioner has shown that it is more probable than not that the

proposed referendum will qualify. Thus, in the absence of such a showing, this court

(Footnote continued on following page)

39

(Footnote continued from previous page)

would often be unable to provide timely guidance to election officials, leaving them

without sufficient time to implement this court’s eventual ruling should the referendum

ultimately qualify for the ballot.

For a number of reasons, we believe that the concurring opinion’s approach is

untenable.

First, as we have explained above (ante, pp. 37-39), the “likely to qualify”

language in article XXI, section 3(b)(2) was not intended, and may not reasonably be

interpreted, to limit this court’s authority under article VI, section 10 of the California

Constitution to issue an order to show cause or to decide the merits in an original

mandate proceeding at a point in time earlier than when a referendum is likely to qualify

for the ballot. The concurring opinion fails to identify anything in the language of the

provision or in the ballot materials accompanying the initiative measure that added this

language to the California Constitution indicating that the provision was intended to have

this type of limiting effect on this court’s authority. Under these circumstances, article

XXI, section 3(b)(2) provides no support for the concurring opinion’s conclusion that that

provision’s “likely to qualify” language constitutes the appropriate standard against

which this court’s discretion to grant relief under article VI, section 10 should be

measured or limited.

Second, although the concurring opinion maintains that the “likely to qualify”

standard should be adopted as the general standard for determining when this court will

“decide the merits” in such a mandate proceeding, the “likely to qualify” language of

article XXI, section 3(b)(2), by its terms, is not directed to the time when the court may

or should decide the merits of the mandate petition, but rather to the time when a

registered voter may file such a petition in this court. (“Any registered voter . . . may . . .

file a petition for writ of mandate . . . to seek relief where a certified final map is subject

to a referendum that is likely to qualify and stay the timely implementation of the map.”

(Italics added.)) Although the concurring opinion contests this point, and argues that “the

‘likely to qualify’ language in section 3(b)(2) is better read as specifying when relief is

available and may be granted by this court” (conc. opn., post, at p. 9), in our view a plain

reading of the constitutional language, as well as the purpose of the provision, belie the

concurring opinion’s contrary interpretation.

Third, because the concurring opinion ultimately concludes that “we need not

apply the ‘likely to qualify’ standard in this case because of our ultimate disposition”

(conc. opn., post, at p. 14) — that is, because of the court’s determination that the

Commission-certified state Senate map should be used if the referendum qualifies for the

ballot (see conc. opn., post, p. 3) — the opinion makes clear that its proposed likely-to-

qualify “general rule” is not intended to apply in all cases but only “in circumstances

where [the court] finds or contemplates finding that an alternative to the Commission

(Footnote continued on following page)

40

In sum, for the reasons discussed above, we conclude that, under California

Constitution, article VI, section 10, this court is authorized to issue an order to show

cause and decide which districts should be used in the event a proposed referendum

directed at a Commission-certified redistricting map qualifies for the ballot, even in the

absence of a showing that the proposed referendum is likely to qualify for the ballot.

Finally, applying the general considerations of the ripeness doctrine to the facts of

this case, we conclude that petitioner’s claim was sufficiently ripe to support this court’s

issuance of the order to show cause on December 9, 2011, and that it continues to be

appropriate for this court to determine which state Senate districts should be used in the

interim elections in the event the proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot.

First, as discussed above, at the time the petition was filed on December 2, 2011,

the undisputed facts established that there was a substantial possibility that the proposed

referendum would ultimately qualify for the ballot, but that the determination whether or

(Footnote continued from previous page)

map should be the interim map.” (Conc. opn., post, p. 4.) In advocating the adoption of

a likely-to-qualify rule that applies only in such limited circumstances, the concurring

opinion again departs substantially from the language of article XXI, section 3(b)(2),

which draws no such distinction. The concurrence’s apparent response to this point —

namely, that this court is not granting “relief” when, as in this case, it issues a writ of

mandate directing election officials, in the event the Commission-certified map is stayed

by qualification of the referendum, to use a specified map other than a map sought by

petitioner (see conc. opn., post, at p. 10, fn. 1) — is totally without merit; this court is

clearly granting relief when it directs which map is to be used in the event of a stay,

whether or not the particular outcome ordered by the court is the relief petitioner is

seeking.

In sum, we conclude that article XXI, section 3(b)(2) does not support the

concurring opinion’s approach. For the reasons fully set forth in the text (ante, pp. 23-

39), this court’s authority either to issue an order to show cause or to decide what districts

should be used in the event a proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot is not limited to

circumstances in which the proposed referendum is “likely to qualify” for the ballot.

41

not the referendum would qualify might not be made until early March 2012, when it

would, as a practical matter, be impossible to implement a decision of this court requiring

the use of state Senate district maps other than those certified by the Commission. Under

these circumstances, we conclude that the ripeness doctrine was satisfied and that this

court had authority on December 9, 2011, to issue an order to show cause in this original

writ proceeding.

Second, the relevant factors that have developed while this matter was pending in

this court do not alter our conclusion that it is appropriate to determine in this proceeding

what state Senate districts should be used in the event the proposed referendum qualifies

for the ballot and stays the operative effect of the Commission-certified state Senate map.

During the pendency of this proceeding, the random sampling verification process was

completed, resulting in a determination by the Secretary of State on January 10, 2012,

that the referendum petition had a signature validity rate projecting a total number of

valid signatures between 95 and 110 percent of the required number of valid signatures.

As a consequence, the Secretary of State has directed local election officials to conduct a

full count of all submitted signatures, a process that the Secretary of State indicates will

be completed by those officials no later than February 24, 2012. According to the

Secretary of State’s representations, however, if this court were to wait until it is finally

determined whether the proposed referendum has actually qualified for the ballot, it

would be too late to permit this court’s decision to be implemented if the court were to

determine that a map other than the Commission-certified map should be used for the

June and November 2012 elections. Given these circumstances, we conclude that, even

though the proposed referendum has not yet qualified for the ballot, it is appropriate for

this court to determine at this time which state Senate district map should be used for the

2012 state Senate primary and general elections in the event the referendum does qualify

for the ballot and automatically stays the effect of the districts certified by the

Commission.

42

Accordingly, we now turn to that question.

IV. If the proposed referendum qualifies, triggering a stay

of the Commission’s certified map, under which Senate

district map should the 2012 elections proceed?

A. Relevant case law

Petitioner emphasizes the interest that referendum proponents and petition signers

have in insisting on an “up or down” referendum vote by the statewide electorate before

the subject of that measure becomes effective. She acknowledges that 30 years ago in

Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, this court held, by a four-to-three vote,

that redistricting maps that had been enacted by the Legislature and approved by the

Governor, but stayed by the qualification of a referendum challenging those maps, should

be used as an interim measure pending the electorate’s vote on that referendum.

Petitioner asserts we should not follow that course here, but should instead establish new

interim state Senate district boundaries by either (1) ordering use of the expired state

Senate map that the Legislature created in 2001 based on the 2000 census — a remedy

similar to the one adopted 40 years ago in Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d 595 —

or (2) ordering use of one of two alternative state Senate redistricting maps (other than

the Commission-certified map) that petitioner has proposed. Indeed, petitioner suggests

that the amendments made by Propositions 11 and 20 to article XXI of the California

Constitution “vitiate” the main holding of Assembly v. Deukmejian with respect to the

permissibility of using a stayed map. In order to put petitioner’s argument into context,

we more fully describe the relevant past decisions of this court to which petitioner refers.

In Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d 595, a Republican Governor vetoed

new state Senate, state Assembly, and congressional districts that had been passed by the

Democratic-controlled Legislature after the 1970 census, leaving in place only the old

voting districts that had been based upon the 1960 census. When the petition in Reinecke

was filed, this court did not have sufficient time to appoint special masters and establish

43

court-approved districts for use in the upcoming 1972 elections. Under those

circumstances, this court unanimously concluded that the new Legislature-passed state

Senate and Assembly districts that had been vetoed by the Governor should not be used

on an interim basis for the 1972 elections, and held instead that the old legislative

districts, which had been based on the prior census, should be used for the 1972 elections,

even though, due to population shifts, the old districts did not comply with the “one

person, one vote” principle embodied in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment. (Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, at pp. 601-602.) The court in Reinecke

expressed the view that under the circumstances presented, “it will be far less destructive

of the integrity of the electoral process to allow the existing legislative districts, imperfect

as they may be, to survive for an additional two years than for this court to accept, even

temporarily, plans that are at best truncated products of the legislative process.” (Id., at

p. 602.)26 With respect to congressional districts, however, the court held that the vetoed

map should be used, on an interim basis, in the upcoming elections.27

26 Thereafter, following the failure of the Legislature and Governor to agree on new

district lines in 1973, we appointed three special masters to recommend to the court new

district lines for the succeeding elections in 1974 through 1980, and we eventually

accepted and adopted those recommendations with minor adjustments. (Legislature v.

Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d 396.)

27 The court explained: “There are . . . compelling considerations that impel us to

adopt as a temporary court plan, for the 1972 elections only, the bill passed by the

Legislature to reapportion the congressional districts. (Assembly Bill No. 16, 1971 First

Extraordinary Session.) Unlike the numbers of assemblymen and state senators, which

remain unchanged, the number of representatives in the United States House of

Representatives to which California is entitled increased following the 1970 census from

38 to 43. Accordingly, unless congressional districts are reapportioned, the offices of

five representatives will either have to be left unfilled or filled by statewide elections.

We cannot accept either alternative, for Congress has expressly provided that California

shall elect 43 representatives from 43 single member districts. We need only add that we

fully agree with the congressional mandate. It would be wholly unacceptable to avoid

statewide congressional elections by depriving the state of the representation of five

(Footnote continued on following page)

44

Ten years later, in Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, the three

redistricting statutes at issue in that case (again, covering the state’s Senate, Assembly,

and congressional districts) had been passed by a Democratic-controlled Legislature and

signed by a Democratic Governor in mid-September 1981. A referendum signature drive

by the California Republican Party began the next day, challenging all three maps.

Shortly thereafter, legislators who supported the legislative reapportionment statutes and

who opposed the referendum filed a writ petition in this court, challenging the

Republican-sponsored referendum on various procedural grounds.28

Although petition signatures were gathered and submitted to election officials very

quickly and the Secretary of State was able to determine expeditiously that the

referendum had sufficient valid signatures to qualify for placement on the statewide

ballot,29 in light of the pending writ challenge to the referendum the Secretary of State

(Footnote continued from previous page)

congressmen to which it is entitled, but to conduct statewide elections to fill five

congressional seats in a state of California’s geographical size and large population

would not only tremendously increase the burdens and expenses of effective campaigning

but, by increasing the choices confronting the electorate from the candidates for one to

the candidates for six congressional seats, would seriously impede the casting of

informed ballots.” (Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 602-603, fn. omitted.)

28 Three issues ripe for preelection review were directly presented: (1) Because the

referendum petitions directed signers to use their “address as registered to vote,” rather

than their “residence address,” as required by the then-existing Elections Code, were the

petitions defective? (2) If defective, should the petitions be allowed to qualify for

placement of the referendum before the voters? (3) May the referendum process be used

to challenge reapportionment statutes? (See Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at

p. 643.) A fourth issue subsequently arose after the referendum qualified and

approximately six weeks before the court filed its opinion: In light of the intervening

qualification of the referendum and the consequent automatic stay of the challenged

maps, under what maps should the upcoming election be conducted? (Id., at p. 644.)

29 Within only 60 days — 30 days fewer than the 90 days authorized for signature

gathering — the referendum proponents submitted their completed signature lists to the

(Footnote continued on following page)

45

announced that she had refrained from directing county clerks to place the referendum on

the June primary ballot, pending this court’s resolution of the writ challenge to the

referendum. The Secretary of State also directed that in the interim, county election

officials should proceed on a dual track, preparing to use either the newly adopted maps

or the old maps from 1973 (see ante, fn. 26) for the June 1982 election.

This court in Assembly v. Deukmejian thus faced a timing problem: the June 1982

primary elections were only a few months away, and election officials needed lead time

to prepare ballots. In order to do so, they needed to know the district boundaries. The

prior boundaries had become outdated and unconstitutional — because of population

shifts, they violated “one person, one vote” requirements. The new boundaries, however,

had been stayed by operation of law by the “duly qualified” referendum. (Assembly v.

Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 654-657.)

As already noted, ultimately, in a four-to-three decision, this court decided that the

new boundaries should be used as an interim measure for the June 1982 primary election

and for the subsequent November 1982 general election. The majority concluded that use

(Footnote continued from previous page)

Secretary of State. Approximately 30 days later, after reviewing the signatures, the

Secretary of State announced that the referendum was duly qualified for placement before

the voters on the statewide ballot. (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 645.)

Prior statutes in place at the time of Assembly v. Deukmejian provided shorter time lines

for the required signature verification at each stage of that process. (Compare current

Elec. Code, §§ 9030 & 9031 [allowing county election officials eight business days for

counting of raw signatures, 30 business days for random sampling of 3 percent of raw

signatures, and 30 business days for verifying all signatures by a full count] with former

Elec. Code, §§ 3520 & 3521 (as amended by Stats. 1980, ch. 1287, §§ 11.3 & 11.4,

pp. 4358-4360) [allowing county election officials five business days for raw counting,

15 calendar days for random sampling of 5 percent of raw signatures, and 30 calendar

days for verifying all signatures by a full count].) The longer timing schedules of the

current statutes, combined with the mid-August deadline for certification by the

Commission, exacerbate the time crunch we face now.

46

of the new, albeit challenged maps, which were based on then-current 1980 census data,

“more nearly comports with the requirements of the federal and state equal protection

clauses and is least disruptive of the electoral process” in view of the limited options and

time constraints. (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 665-666.) The court

also reasoned that permitting the voice of 5 percent of the electorate who had signed the

referendum petition “to delay implementation of a constitutionally required

reapportionment plan for two to four years” would “perpetrate a potentially grave

injustice on the majority of the people of this state” (id., at p. 670): “Although the

Constitution of our state grants the power to initiate a referendum to 5 percent of the

voters, it does not require that the effect of that referendum be articulated in a manner

that does such serious injury to conflicting and equally compelling constitutional

mandates.” (Ibid.)

The three dissenting justices in Assembly v. Deukmejian argued that although it

would be proper to apply the new boundaries with respect to congressional elections

(because the number of California seats had increased by two, and there would be no

valid way to elect the new number of congresspersons without using the new boundaries),

the court should abide by its 1972 decision in Legislature v. Reinecke, 6 Cal.3d 595, and

use the decade-old boundaries for state Senate and Assembly elections despite the federal

constitutional flaws concerning those old boundaries. (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra,

30 Cal.3d at pp. 679-694.) Justice Richardson, speaking also for Justices Mosk and

Kaus, argued that the majority’s decision to employ the stayed map “can only be

perceived as an official alignment of the court with one side in a partisan dispute as to

which we should remain scrupulously neutral.” (Id., at p. 680.) Justice Mosk, writing

separately, deplored the majority’s having become “entangled in the ‘political thicket’ by

ignoring their obligation of neutrality on a partisan issue, a neutrality that can be

47

observed only by maintenance of the status quo in legislative districting until the people

speak [on the referendum] at the forthcoming election.” (Id., at p. 693.)30

Quoting from the dissenting opinions in Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d

at pages 679 and 693, petitioner asserts that the court faces now, and should avoid, a

similar “political thicket.” She argues that “the political situation [today] is analogous to

1981. Republicans have sponsored and funded the [proposed] referendum against the

Commission’s Senate map plan.” She alludes to speculation that “the Commission may

have ‘delivered a two thirds majority in the Senate’ to Democrats,” and states that

“Republicans have been dissatisfied with the Commission’s Senate lines for these

reasons.”31 Further, petitioner relies upon the majority opinion’s conclusion in

Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d at page 602, that, on the facts there presented, “it

will be far less destructive of the integrity of the electoral process to allow the existing

legislative districts, imperfect as they may be, to survive for an additional two years than

for this court to accept, even temporarily, plans that are at best truncated products of the

legislative process.” (Italics added.) Petitioner thus argues that the “Commission’s

30 In June 1982, the people, voting by referendum, rejected the Legislature’s

redistricting map. (Legislature v. Deukmejian (1983) 34 Cal.3d 658, 667.) Thereafter,

“Democratic legislators rushed to redraw the lines, passing a compromise plan before

lame duck Democratic Gov. Jerry Brown had left office and his Republican successor

George Deukmejian could be sworn in. The plan was generous enough to Republicans to

garner a two-thirds vote in each house, allowing it to go into effect swiftly and avoid

another referendum [citation]. Those lines stayed in place for the remainder of the

decade.” (Kogan & McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of the Citizens

Commission Final Plans, 4 California Journal of Politics and Policy ___ (forthcoming

Jan. 2012; available via Google Scholar at

<http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/vkogan/research/redistricting.pdf>, p. 4 [as of Jan. 27, 2012].)

31 Petitioner elaborates on these statements in her reply brief. She asserts: “Media

commentators all have noted that the Commission’s maps favored Democrats. Many

signers, alarmed about the state of California’s economy, may have signed to better

prevent the prospect of a safe, two-thirds majority in the State Senate to raise their taxes.”

48

Senate map is now part of a truncated process [in that] a [proposed] referendum has been

filed against it.” She asserts that, in the event the referendum petition eventually is

determined to be supported by an adequate number of verified signatures, we should

order that the June and November 2012 state Senate elections proceed with alternative

interim maps other than the Commission’s certified map that is the subject of the

proposed referendum.

For two reasons, we do not find persuasive petitioner’s claim that the

circumstances in this case are comparable to the circumstances that were presented in

Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d 595, and Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30

Cal.3d 638.

First, the redistricting process here has not been “truncated” as it was by the

Governor’s veto in Legislature v. Reinecke. The constitutionally mandated procedure has

been completed by the Commission’s certification of a Senate map. If the referendum on

that map qualifies for the ballot, the effectiveness of the Commission’s product will be

stayed pending the referendum’s outcome, but qualification itself does not terminate or

reverse the Commission’s redistricting process. As with the stayed product of legislative

redistricting in Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at page 671, the certified

Senate map here has “never been rejected by any government entity” and the redistricting

process thus “has been lengthened but not terminated.”

Second, petitioner overlooks a crucial distinction between the redistricting process

as it existed at the time of those decisions and the redistricting process that is in effect in

California today. At those earlier times, voting districts were created by state legislators

and it was frequently charged that redistricting maps were commonly drawn on a partisan

basis to give maximum political advantage to the political party that enjoyed majority

control of the legislative branch. Given the difference between the origins of the stayed

maps at issue in the former cases and the Commission’s state Senate map, any criticism

49

of Assembly v. Deukmejian, as improperly intruding into the “political thicket” would

simply not apply to the present case.

As we have explained ante, the redistricting process in California has been

completely changed from the earlier process. Under California Constitution, article XXI,

redistricting is now performed by a Citizens Redistricting Commission, whose

membership and procedural requirements are carefully designed to ensure that

redistricting is undertaken on a nonpartisan basis. When a redistricting map adopted by

such a nonpartisan entity is challenged by a proposed referendum measure sponsored by

one political party, we believe it is unrealistic to maintain that a court should be viewed

as improperly intruding into the “political thicket” if it determines, after reviewing the

pros and cons of all viable alternative maps in relation to the constitutional scheme and

criteria, that the map devised by the nonpartisan Commission is the most appropriate one

to be used in an interim election. We also question petitioner’s suggestion that a court

should be viewed as properly avoiding the same political thicket if it were to decide that

the most appropriate map to be used in the interim election is one proposed by the

proponent of a referendum sponsored by one political party. 32

32 In addition, we note a further significant distinction between this case and

Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638. Use of the Commission’s districts for the

2012 elections would not carry with it another problem that was inherent in the situation

this court faced in Assembly v. Deukmejian. The use of the Legislature’s redistricting

maps for the interim elections in that case had the effect of giving an advantage to that

party not only to elect legislators in the interim year elections, but also permitted the

legislators thus elected from those districts to adopt new redistricting maps that would be

needed if the first legislative districts were rejected by the voters in the referendum

election (as ultimately occurred — see ante, fn. 30). Thus, the decision to use the

legislatively devised districts in Assembly v. Deukmejian had a direct effect upon the

districts that were in use in California for the entire decade, and did not affect only the

interim year’s elections.

In the present case, by contrast, if the proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot

and the voters reject the Commission’s districts at the upcoming November 2012

(Footnote continued on following page)

50

Furthermore, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, we do not believe that respect for

the constitutionally based referendum power requires that a court, faced with the question

of which voting district map should be used for an interim election, must exclude from its

consideration a redistricting map that has been stayed by qualification of a referendum.

(See Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 658-660.) A referendum’s

qualification for the ballot is given full respect by recognizing that the qualification stays

the operative effect of the redistricting map that otherwise would lawfully govern the

upcoming election in the absence of the referendum, and requires this court to determine

what districts to use in the interim elections. The stay of the challenged redistricting

map, however, does not necessarily or logically restrict this court’s authority and

responsibility to consider and evaluate on the merits all of the potential redistricting maps

that could be used in the upcoming interim elections to determine which map the court

should direct elections officials to implement for those elections.33

(Footnote continued from previous page)

election, the new districts would not be drawn by legislators elected from the very

districts that the voters have rejected. Rather, pursuant to California Constitution, article

XXI, section 2, subdivision (j), new districts would be established by this court with the

aid of special masters. For this reason, interim use of the Commission’s state Senate map

for the June and November 2012 elections would not produce the same type of long-term

adverse effect that the use of the partisan legislatively drawn districts had in Assembly v.

Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638.

33 As we have seen, even in Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d 595, this court,

while declining to adopt on an interim basis the new state Senate and Assembly districts

that had been passed by the Legislature but vetoed by the Governor, recognized that it

possessed the authority to adopt on an interim basis the new congressional districts that

had been passed by the Legislature, even though the Governor had also vetoed the new

congressional redistricting map. In like manner, the fact that qualification of a

referendum operates to stay the effect of a Commission-certified map does not limit this

court’s authority to consider the merits of that map along with other alternatives in

determining what districts should be utilized at the elections that are to be held before the

referendum is voted upon.

(Footnote continued on following page)

51

In sum, in light of the fundamental change in the redistricting process in

California, we conclude that it would not be appropriate for this court to, in effect, adopt

a presumption against the use of a Commission-certified map as an interim measure in

the event the Commission-certified map is stayed by the qualification of a referendum

petition. Instead, we believe it is most appropriate to fairly evaluate the pros and cons of

all the potential alternative redistricting maps in relation to the constitutional scheme and

criteria in order to determine which should be used in the upcoming elections if the

proposed referendum qualifies for the ballot.

B. Potential interim maps

In so reviewing the pros and cons of each of the redistricting maps that have been

proposed for use on an interim basis in the event the proposed referendum qualifies for

the ballot, we begin with the three alternative maps proposed by petitioner, and then

consider the Commission-certified map.

(Footnote continued from previous page)

Indeed, petitioner’s alternative proposals regarding the relief that she requests this

court provide implicitly acknowledge that the qualification of the proposed referendum

and resultant stay of the Commission-certified state Senate district map would not

deprive this court of the authority to adopt interim state Senate districts that differ from

those embodied in the preexisting 2001 redistricting map. In fact, under one of

petitioner’s proposed alternatives — the “nesting” map described below — this court, in

fashioning Senate districts for use in the interim elections, would utilize without change

the new state Assembly districts that were created and certified by the Commission and

thus adopt a map that includes at least several state Senate districts that precisely mirror

the Senate districts contained in the Commission-certified map.

52

1. Use of the “old map” adopted by the Legislature in 2001 based

on the 2000 census

The first alternative proposed by petitioner is to follow the approach of Legislature

v. Reinecke, supra, 6 Cal.3d 595, and use the outdated state Senate district map that was

formulated by the Legislature in 2001, based on the 2000 census.

The most obvious problem with the 2001 map concerns the principle of “one

person, one vote,” under both the federal equal protection clause (as construed in, e.g.,

Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533) and under California Constitution, article XXI,

section 2, subdivision (d)(1). As noted earlier, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (d)(1)

lists as the first order of priority for redistricting that “[d]istricts shall comply with the

United States Constitution. Congressional districts shall achieve population equality as

nearly as is practicable, and Senatorial, Assembly, and State Board of Equalization

districts shall have reasonably equal population with other districts for the same office,

except where deviation is required to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act or

allowable by law.” (Italics added.)

The United States Supreme Court has explained that with regard to legislatively

enacted reapportionment, “ ‘[m]inor deviations from mathematical equality among state

legislative districts are insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious

discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the

State. Our decisions have established, as a general matter, that an apportionment plan

with a maximum population deviation under 10 [percent] falls within this category of

minor deviations. A plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima

facie case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the State.’ ” (Voinovich v.

Quilter (1993) 507 U.S. 146, 161, quoting Brown v. Thomson (1983) 462 U.S. 835, 842-

843.) Although the high court has not identified an upper limit of deviation that simply

cannot be justified, one of the court’s decisions suggested that the outer limits might be

reached if the deviation exceeded 16.4 percent. (Mahan v. Howell (1973) 410 U.S. 315,

53

329 [stating that a 16.4 percent deviation “may well approach tolerable limits”]; see also

Brown v. Thomson, supra, at pp. 849-850 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.) [noting the Mahan

court’s statement that a 16.4 percent deviation may approach the maximum that is

permissible]; Daly v. Hunt (4th Cir. 1996) 93 F.3d 1212, 1218 [same].)34

Court-ordered reapportionment, contrasted with legislatively enacted

reapportionment, is subject to even stricter standards, and “ ‘must ordinarily achieve the

goal of population equality with little more than de minimis variation.’ ” (Connor v.

Finch (1977) 431 U.S. 407, 417; see also Perry v. Perez (2012) 565 U.S. ___, ___ & fn. 2

[2012 WL 162610, 2012 U.S. Lexis 908] [de minimus standard applies to court-drawn

maps responding to challenged portions of state maps]; Abrams v. Johnson (1997) 521

U.S. 74, 98.) As explained post, the disparities would not be de minimis if we were to

order interim use of the Legislature’s 2001 map.

Petitioner observes that some of the deviations considered by this court in

Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d 638, were higher than the deviations that

would be created now, if this court were to order interim use of the Legislature’s 2001

map that was crafted in light of the 2000 census.35 According to petitioner: “In the case

34 Petitioner, in her reply brief, cites Brown v. Thomson, supra, 462 U.S. 835, as an

example of a case in which the high court accepted a much larger deviation. (See id., at

pp. 839, 846 (lead opn. of Powell, J.) [referring to a 16 percent average deviation and an

89 percent maximum deviation].) In that case, however, the state’s overall redistricting

was not at issue (id. at p. 846); rather, the challenge was limited to a single district that,

because of its status as a county, was accorded a representative despite its small size. The

limited scope of the decision also was recognized by the two concurring justices (id., at

p. 849 (conc. opn. of O’Connor, J.)), and the four dissenting justices agreed that the

court’s holding was “extraordinarily narrow.” (Id., at p. 850 (dis. opn. of Brennan, J.).)

35 For example, in Assembly v. Deukmejian, we observed: “According to figures

supplied by real parties, the current population of the old 76th Assembly District

(530,643) is 236 percent of the population of the old 16th Assembly District (224,488).

The vote of a resident of the former 16th District would, therefore, be worth more than

twice that of a resident of the former 76th District. Compared to the current ideal district

(Footnote continued on following page)

54

of the odd-numbered Senate districts that come up for election in 2012, the percent

deviation from largest to smallest is 38.7 percent; the [most populous] district, Senate

District 37, is over [the ideal population size] by 284,528 people, 30.5 percent, while the

[least populous] district, Senate District 21, is under by 76,335, 8.2 percent.”36 Petitioner

asserts that “[s]eventeen of the odd numbered districts are within 10 percent of the norm,

and eight deviate by less than five percent. Only three deviate by more than 10

percent.”37 Petitioner maintains that “the population deviations are not nearly as great as

they were in [1982] when the Court declined to follow its Reinecke decision.”

(Footnote continued from previous page)

size, the old 76th District is 79.4 percent greater than the ideal, while the old 16th District

is 24.1 percent less than the ideal. The total deviation between the two districts is 103.5

percent.

“Overall, 2 of the old Assembly districts vary by more than 50 percent from the

ideal population size of 295,857; 2 vary by 30 to 50 percent from the ideal size; and 48 of

the 80 districts vary by 10 to 30 percent from the ideal. Only 28 of the districts are within

10 percent of the ideal district size.

“In the Senate, old Senate District 5 now contains 458,587 people, 22.5 percent

less than the ideal number, while old Senate District 38 contains 904,725 people, 52.9

percent more than the ideal. Thus, the vote of a resident of former District 5 would be

worth almost twice that of a resident of former District 38. The total deviation between

the two districts is 75.4 percent. Real parties’ figures show that the population of one old

Senate district is more than 50 percent greater than the ideal; another is 41 percent greater

than the ideal; 19 vary by 10 to 30 percent from the ideal; and 19 are within 10 percent of

the ideal population size.” (Assembly v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 666-667.)

36 In light of our conclusion that this proposed alternative should not be adopted even

under petitioner’s suggested analysis, we need not and do not determine whether it is

appropriate to evaluate population deviations only in the odd-numbered state Senate

districts rather than the deviation in all of the Senate districts.

37 Petitioner concedes that in addition to old Senate District No. 37, which as noted

currently is over the ideal population size by 284,528 people, or 30.5 percent, according

to petitioner, old Senate District No. 17 currently is over the ideal population size by

166,798 people, or 17.9 percent, and old Senate District No. 5, currently is over the ideal

population size by 101,265 people, or 10.9 percent.

55

The Commission asserts that the relevant deviation, as we described it in Assembly

v. Deukmejian, supra, 30 Cal.3d at page 667, is to be measured “between the largest and

smallest districts” — and not from the “ideal” Senate district population.38 The

Commission argues that the calculations of petitioner’s consultant (submitted to us in the

declarations of Dr. T. Anthony Quinn, in support of the petition) improperly “ignore the

relevant population deviation among the 2001 districts from the ‘ideal’ population of a

Senate district,” and that correctly understood, “19 out of 20 of the odd-numbered Senate

districts deviate by more than 16.4 [percent] and are thus patently unconstitutional.”

Moreover, the Commission asserts that “even using [petitioner’s] incorrect frame of

reference (deviation from the ‘ideal,’ rather than comparison to other 2001 districts),

[petitioner] concedes that three districts are unconstitutional.”

In this regard, and as the Commission observed in its preliminary opposition brief

(in which it implicitly accepted for purposes of analysis petitioner’s frame of reference —

deviation from the “ideal,” rather than comparison to other 2001 districts), petitioner’s

own consultant’s summary shows that three 2001 Senate districts, if imposed by this

court, would be constitutionally suspect, as deviating excessively from the ideal. (See

ante, fn. 37.) The Commission asserts in that opposition brief that under petitioner’s own

analysis, Senate Districts Nos. 17 and 37 would be “patently unconstitutional —

deviating by 17.9 [percent] and 30.5 [percent] respectively.” We conclude that such

results would raise serious constitutional questions in light of the court’s obligation, in

adopting an alternative interim map, to avoid any but de minimis deviations. (See

Abrams v. Johnson, supra, 521 U.S. at p. 98.)

Petitioner’s consultant, Dr. T. Anthony Quinn, in a supplemental declaration filed

December 7, 2011, asserts there is a ready fix: “This situation is easily resolved. The

38 Petitioner’s reply brief does not respond to this point.

56

Court could simply order that these three districts be reduced in size so that the districts

electing in 2012 are within the 10 percent deviation range. Petitioner would be very

happy to suggest to the court areas to be removed from the existing districts and the

Secretary of State could instruct the counties to conduct the 2012 election only in the

remaining portions.”

Petitioner’s suggestion that the 2001 lines for three Senate districts could be easily

“revised’ is highly questionable. As the Commission observes, “[f]or example, 2001

Senate district 37 in Riverside County now has a population of 1,215,876. (MacDonald

Decl. Ex. C.) To come within a 10 [percent] deviation of the least populated Senate

district (2001 district number 21), district 37 would need to shed 267,764 people. (Ibid.)

However, the districts immediately to 2001 district 37’s north (2001 districts 18 and 31)

and to its south (2001 district 40) are also overpopulated. (Ibid.) As a result, any ‘re-

drawing’ of 2001 districts would require the Court to reconfigure population clusters in

the greater Los Angeles area, which would be certain to produce population ripple-effects

throughout this densely packed region (if not through the entire state). [Citation to

Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 403.] Moreover, re-drawing Los Angeles-

area districts would affect . . . Latino districts in Los Angeles [under section 2 of the

Voting Rights Act], causing unanticipated effects and likely violating [that act].”39

39 Congress enacted section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to combat minority vote

dilution. Section 2 prohibits the imposition or application of any “voting qualification,”

“prerequisite to voting” or “standard, practice, or procedure,” which results in the “denial

or abridgement of the right of any citizen . . . to vote on account of race or color,” or on

account of minority language status. (42 U.S.C. § 1973(a).) The test for determining

whether an electoral practice results in a denial or abridgment of the right to vote is set

forth in subdivision (b) of section 2 of the act. In order to prevail, a plaintiff must be able

to demonstrate that, “based on the totality of circumstances, . . . the political processes

leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open

to participation by members of a [racial or language minority],” in that members of those

protected classes “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to

(Footnote continued on following page)

57

By comparison, the Commission explained in its Final Report that it “strive[d] for

a total population deviation of zero” and “would allow no more than a 2.0 [percent] total

deviation except where further deviation would be required to comply with the federal

Voting Rights Act or allowable by law.” (Final Rep., at pp. 11-12.)40 The Commission’s

(Footnote continued from previous page)

participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” (42

U.S.C. § 1973(b).) (See generally Wilson v. Eu, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 744-749

[discussing relevant “section 2” and United States Supreme Court authority]; Final Rep.,

at pp. 13-16 [same].)

40 The Commission’s Final Report, at page 10, observed that as originally enacted in

1980, article XXI of the California Constitution “mirrored the special masters’ standard

from the 1970s [see Legislature v. Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d 396, 411, which aimed for

districts within 1 percent of the ideal and in no event deviating more than 2 percent] and

required that ‘the population of all districts of a particular type shall be reasonably

equal.’ (Wilson v. Eu (1992) 1 Cal.4th 707, 753 . . . , italics added.)” The Final Report

continues:

“The Attorney General had interpreted that language ‘as incorporating the more

restrictive population requirements contained in [Reinecke] that the “population of senate

and assembly districts should be within 1 percent of the ideal except in unusual

circumstances, and in no event should a deviation greater than 2 percent be permitted.” ’

(Ibid., quoting Reinecke, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 411.) Accordingly, the special masters in

the 1990s expressly complied with that stricter deviation limit, while acknowledging that

they had selected a maximum deviation that may have been even more stringent than the

California Constitution required. (Wilson, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 753.) The California

Supreme Court approved the masters’ plans without explicitly ruling on the maximum

deviation permitted under the California Constitution. (See id. at p. 719.)

“Proposition 11 and Proposition 20 amended the population-equality language in

California’s Constitution to state that ‘Senatorial, Assembly, and State Board of

Equalization districts shall have reasonably equal population with other districts for the

same office, except where deviation is required to comply with federal Voting Rights Act

or allowable by law.’ (Cal. Const., art. XXI, § (2), subd. (d)(1), amended by initiative,

Gen. Elec. (Nov. [2,] 2010), italics added.)

“No court has interpreted the population-equality language in Propositions 11

or 20. Accordingly, no court has decided whether, or how, the addition of the phrase

‘except where deviation is required to comply with the federal Voting Rights Act or

allowable by law’ to ‘reasonably equal population,’ may alter the total deviation allowed

under the California Constitution.” (Final Rep., at p. 10.)

58

certified Senate map’s maximum total deviation between districts is only 1.98 percent.

(Final Rep., appen. 3, table 1, Senate Districts.)

Petitioner’s proposal to use the Legislature’s outdated 2001 map suffers from

another substantial problem. As noted ante in part II.C., California Constitution,

article XXI, section 2, subdivision (d), as amended in 2008 and 2010, sets out six

prioritized criteria: compliance with (1) the United States Constitution (the equal

protection clause and “one person, one vote” principles) and (2) the federal Voting Rights

Act; (3) geographical contiguity; (4) respect for the “geographic integrity of any city,

county, city and county, local neighborhood, or local community of interest . . . to the

extent possible”; (5) encouraging geographical compactness, to the extent practicable;

and (6) “[t]o the extent practicable, and where this does not conflict with the criteria

above, each Senate district shall be comprised of two whole, complete, and adjacent

Assembly districts . . . .” As observed earlier, some but not all of these six redistricting

criteria currently set out in article XXI, section 2, subdivision (d), also were set out as

relevant standards for the Legislature’s consideration in the prior version of article XXI

that was in effect at the time the Legislature created the 2001 old maps based on the 2000

census. But not all of the criteria set out in the recent amendments to article XXI were

previously articulated, nor were any of the factors previously expressly prioritized; the

Legislature, when crafting the prior maps in 2001, was not required to apply the criteria

pursuant to the rank ordering that controls today.41 Petitioner has made no attempt to

41 Until amended by Proposition 11 in 2008 and Proposition 20 in 2010, California

Constitution, former article XXI, as adopted in 1980, read as follows: “In the year

following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress

at the beginning of each decade, the Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines of the

Senatorial, Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization districts in conformance

with the following standards:

“(a) Each member of the Senate, Assembly, Congress, and the Board of

Equalization shall be elected from a single-member district.

(Footnote continued on following page)

59

address in what ways the Legislature’s old 2001 Senate map based on the 2000 census

comports with these prioritized criteria given population changes during the last decade.

We conclude that, insofar as this alternative map is concerned, petitioner has provided us

with no basis upon which we can conclude that it respects the constitutionally specified

criteria at least as much as any other of the other proposed maps, including the

Commission’s certified state Senate map.

Finally, in an additional significant respect the 2001 Senate district map appears

legally suspect. As discussed ante, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (e) provides that

“[d]istricts shall not be drawn for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an

incumbent, political candidate, or political party.” The Legislature’s 2001 redistricting

map has been widely perceived as specifically designed to protect incumbent legislators

of both major political parties and as serving that purpose well over the decade in which

the redistricting map was in effect. (See, e.g., Center for Governmental Studies,

Redistricting Reform in California: Proposition 11 on the November 2008 California

Ballot (2008) p. 12 [noting that in 2001 the Legislature drew district lines “that favor the

re-election of incumbents from both parties” and that “[a]s a result, only one seat has

changed parties due to competition, and only one incumbent has lost in the 459

legislative and Congressional general election races held this decade” (fn. omitted)];

Block, Partisan Reapportionment (2003) 34 Cal. Journal 21; Plendl, Are the voters dissed

(Footnote continued from previous page)

“(b) The population of all districts of a particular type shall be reasonably equal.

“(c) Every district shall be contiguous.

“(d) Districts of each type shall be numbered consecutively commencing at the

northern boundary of the State and ending at the southern boundary.

“(e) The geographical integrity of any city, county, or city and county, or of any

geographical region shall be respected to the extent possible without violating the

requirements of any other subdivision of this section.”

60

by redistricting? (2002) 33 Cal. Journal 12.)42 By contrast, academic observers have

concluded that the Commission’s maps, including the certified state Senate map,

“represent[] an important improvement on the legislature-led redistricting of 2001. The

new district boundaries kept more communities together and created more compact

districts while at the same time increasing opportunities for minority representation. . . .

[T]hese maps . . . have the potential to modestly increase competition in California

elections and the responsiveness of the legislative branch to changing voter preferences.”

(Kogan & McGhee, Redistricting California: An Evaluation of the Citizens Commission

Final Plans, supra, 4 Cal. Journal of Politics and Policy ___ (forthcoming Jan. 2012;

available via Google Scholar at <http://polisci2.ucsd.edu/vkogan/research/

redistricting.pdf>, pp. 32-33 [as of Jan. 27, 2012].)

It was partly in reaction to the Legislature’s 2001 maps that the Commission was

created and charged with drawing district lines. (See Voter Information Guide, General

Elec. (Nov. 4, 2008) text of Prop. 11, § 2, subd. (b) [noting that “[u]nder current law,

California legislators draw their own political districts” and that, as a result, “99 percent

of incumbent politicians were reelected in the districts they had drawn for themselves in

the recent elections”]; Voter Information Guide, General Elec. (Nov. 2, 2010), Argument

in Favor of Prop. 20 [asserting that “in the last redistricting” politicians paid a consultant

to draw district boundaries “to guarantee their reelection”].) In our view, it would

contravene the intent of the new redistricting regime of article XXI of the California

Constitution if this court were to order the use of old state Senate districts that were

perceived as designed for purposes no longer permissible.

42 See also McGhee, Redistricting and Legislative Partisanship (2008) Public Policy

Institute of California, p. 1; Quinn, CA: The Bipartisan Redistricting: How It Happened

(Oct. 2001) vol. 5, No. 8, Cal-Tax Digest <http://www.caltax.org/member/digest

/oct2001/10.2001.Quinn-BipartisanRedistricting.08.htm> (as of Jan. 27, 2012).

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2. Petitioner’s proposed “nesting” map

Petitioner’s second proposed alternative is to create new state Senate districts by

combining two adjacent state Assembly districts, of which there are 80, into single Senate

districts, of which there are 40. Petitioner refers to this as her “simple nesting plan.”

As noted, California Constitution, article XXI, section 2, subdivision (d) sets forth

six prioritized criteria, the last of which is: “To the extent practicable, and where this

does not conflict with the criteria above, each Senate district shall be comprised of two

whole, complete, and adjacent Assembly districts . . . .” (Italics added.)

Petitioner does not explain how her nesting proposal can be reconciled with article

XXI’s rank ordering of criteria. As the Commission explained in its Final Report,

although it attempted to nest Assembly districts in Senate districts “[t]o the extent

practicable” and when “not in conflict with the other” higher-prioritized criteria, in

practice the Commission, balancing those other criteria, was able to fully achieve the

nesting goal in only three of the 40 Senate districts. (See Final Rep., appen. 5.)43 As the

Commission describes in its brief: In order “to minimize city and county splits (a higher-

order criteria than nesting), the Commission created certain Senate districts from

‘blended’ Assembly districts” so as to “avoid repeating city and county splits that were

unavoidable at the Assembly level.” As the Commission further explains, it “also

blended Assembly districts to respect communities of interest ‘where more than two

Assembly districts had common interests or geographical characteristics that were

common to a single Senate district.’ ” (See Final Rep., at p. 42.)

43 In addition to three districts that achieved 100 percent nesting, three others

achieved nesting of at least 99 percent of the district’s population. The two least-nested

districts achieved that goal with respect to approximately 65 to 66 percent of the district’s

population. (Final Rep., appen. 5.)

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In contrast to the Commission-certified state Senate map, petitioner’s nesting

proposal would require this court to adopt nesting, the lowest valued criterion, as the

controlling criterion, without regard to, and at the expense of, several other higher value

criteria.

First, petitioner’s nesting proposal appears to conflict with criterion (2) of article

XXI, section 2, subdivision (d) — compliance with the federal Voting Rights Act. Under

section 5 of that Act,44 before a state may implement any voting-related change that will

affect a “covered jurisdiction,” the state must seek either judicial or administrative

approval of the change to ensure that it does not have the purpose or effect of denying or

44 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act requires that before certain “covered

jurisdictions” may implement any change in a voting qualification, a prerequisite to

voting, or a standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting (a voting-related

change), the state must seek judicial or administrative approval of the voting-related

change to ensure that it does not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the

right to vote on account of race, color, or language minority. (42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a).)

Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies to only four California counties: Kings,

Merced, Monterey, and Yuba. (Wilson v. Eu, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 746.) Thus, section 5

applies to statewide changes to California’s voting practices and procedures only to the

extent that those changes affect these covered counties. (Lopez v. Monterey County

(1999) 525 U.S. 266, 280-281; see generally Wilson v. Eu, supra, at pp. 745-746; Final

Rep., at pp. 21-23.)

The process of obtaining judicial or administrative approval for a voting-related

change that affects a covered county is called “preclearance.” A state may seek

preclearance either from the Attorney General of the United States (Department of

Justice) or from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, and until a

state obtains preclearance for a voting-related change that affects a covered county, the

voting-related change is unenforceable. (42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a); see, e.g., Perry v. Perez,

supra, 565 U.S. ___ [2012 WL 162610, 2012 U.S. Lexis 908].) Because the

Commission’s four certified maps constitute voting-related changes that will affect the

covered counties, on November 15, 2011, the California Attorney General submitted the

Commission’s maps to the Department of Justice. (The 44-page preclearance

submission, along with all other Commission documentation, is available on the

Commission’s Web site, <http://www.wedrawthelines.ca.gov> [as of Jan. 27, 2012].) On

January 17, 2012, the Department of Justice approved use of the maps.

63

abridging the right to vote on account of race, color, or language minority. (42 U.S.C.

§ 1973c(a).) As observed ante, footnote 44, section 5 of the Voting Rights Act applies to

only four California counties: Kings, Merced, Monterey, and Yuba. A redistricting map

will have the “effect” of “denying or abridging the right to vote” if it “lead[s] to a

retrogression in the position of racial [or language] minorities with respect to their

effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” (Beer v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 130,

141 (Beer); see also Riley v. Kennedy (2008) 553 U.S. 406, 412; Wilson v. Eu, supra,

1 Cal.4th at p. 746.)

“Retrogression, by definition, requires a comparison of a jurisdiction’s new voting

plan with its existing plan. [Citation.] It also necessarily implies that the jurisdiction’s

existing plan is the benchmark against which the ‘effect’ of voting changes is measured.”

(Reno v. Bossier Parish School Bd. (1997) 520 U.S. 471, 478.) Accordingly, newly

drawn districts that improve or maintain the voting rights of minority groups satisfy

section 5. (Beer, supra, 425 U.S. at p. 141; see also City of Lockhart v. United States

(1983) 460 U.S. 125, 134 [finding city’s map was entitled to preclearance because it did

not “increase the degree of discrimination” against the city’s Mexican-American

population]; Wilson v. Eu, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 746.) By contrast, newly drawn (or in

this case proposed alternative) districts that “retrogress” the voting rights of minority

groups would violate section 5.

Petitioner’s consultant, Dr. T. Anthony Quinn, asserts that under petitioner’s

nesting proposal, the sole section 5-covered jurisdiction that would be impacted is

Monterey County, through petitioner’s proposed “nested” Senate Districts Nos. 13

and 15. The Commission asserts that petitioner “fails to address, however, that [these]

proposed Senate districts 13 and 15 fall far below the 2001 benchmark levels and thus

violate Section 5: [Petitioner’s] proposed district 13 [a combination of certified

Assembly Districts Nos. 28 and 29], covering north Monterey County, falls from the

2001 benchmark of 26.22 [percent] Latino Voter Age Population (‘LVAP’) to 17.66

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[percent] LVAP. Similarly, [petitioner’s] proposed Senate district 15 [a combination of

certified Assembly Districts Nos. 27 and 30], reduces the benchmark for South Monterey

from 53.48 [percent] LVAP to 51.31 [percent] LVAP.” The Commission asserts that

“[n]either result is permissible under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.”

In a second way, petitioner’s nesting proposal would appear to exalt nesting over

yet other higher-ranked criteria, set forth in California Constitution, article XXI,

section 2, subdivision (d)(4). That subdivision requires a redistricting map to respect the

“geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local neighborhood, or local

community of interest . . . in a manner that minimizes their division to the extent possible

without violating the requirements of any of the preceding subdivisions.” Petitioner’s

map would result in five more splits of cities and counties compared with the

Commission’s certified map,45 and also would split more “local communities of interest.”

For example, as the Commission observes: Certified “Senate district 1 was created in

part to keep intact the Lake Tahoe basin, in light of overwhelming public support for

keeping that community of interest together. See, e.g., El Dorado County Bd. of

Supervisors Resolution No. 82-2011, submitted [to the Commission] June 28, 2011.)[46]

Ignoring this public input, [petitioner’s] proposed nesting plan splits Lake Tahoe between

her proposed districts 1 and 4.”47

45 As the Commission observes — and petitioner does not contest — the

Commission’s certified Senate map splits “20 cities and 11 counties (excluding zero-

population splits and cities or counties with populations greater than 931,349, the ideal

2010 [S]enate district population), for reasons explained in the Final Report [at p. 42].

[Petitioner’s] nesting map, by contrast, splits 22 cities and 14 counties.”

46 Like all other matters submitted to the Commission, this resolution is posted on

the Commission’s Web site, <http://www.wedrawthelines.ca.gov> (as of Jan. 27, 2012).

47 In another way, petitioner’s nesting proposal, and specifically her proposed state

Senate Districts Nos. 1 and 3, appears to violate article XXI, section 2 of the California

Constitution. As noted earlier, subdivision (f) provides that districts “shall be numbered

(Footnote continued on following page)

65

In addition to subordinating higher-ranked constitutional criteria, the Commission

argues, the nesting proposal also would increase dramatically the number of “deferred”

voters — those voters residing in 2001 districts that who did not vote for a state senator

in 2010 and who thus ideally would be placed in new districts that are scheduled to vote

for a state senator in 2012 but who are instead placed in districts that would not vote for a

state senator until 2014 — and would inevitably “double-defer” some voters.48 The

Commission points out that its own certified maps minimized the number of deferred

voters by employing three numbering alternatives. According to the Commission,

petitioner’s nesting proposal would result in deferrals for at least 4,592,350 voters, an

increase of 15.5 percent over the 3,972,984 voters who will be deferred under the

Commission’s maps.49

The Commission contends that petitioner’s nesting proposal also raises the specter

of “double-deferral” — individual voters who would be deferred in both 2012 and 2014

(Footnote continued from previous page)

consecutively commencing at the northern boundary of the State and ending at the

southern boundary.” Petitioner’s proposed nested state Senate District No. 1 does not

touch the state’s northern boundary, where petitioner would place her proposed nested

state Senate Districts Nos. 2 and 4, and indeed is located south of petitioner’s proposed

nested state Senate District No. 3, as well.

48 The Commission “agrees that some level of voter-deferral is inevitable in any

Senate redistricting plan, as voters move between ‘odd’ and ‘even’ numbered districts.”

Nevertheless, the Commission asserts, the number of deferred voters is an important

consideration when considering alternative interim plans.

49 Based on analysis of the exhibits appended to the declaration of Karin

MacDonald, the Commission asserts that petitioner’s proposed nested Senate Districts

Nos. 33 and 34 “would create more deferrals by their numbering: [The] proposed

[nested] district 34 contains 529,759 residents from a 2001 odd-numbered district and

only 398,611 residents from a 2001 even-numbered district. [The] proposed [nested]

district 33, on the other hand, contains 513,062 residents from a 2011 even-numbered

district and 421,083 residents from a 2001 odd-numbered district.”

66

due to the implementation of another set of maps after the 2012 elections. In this regard,

the Commission explains, “[t]he worse-case scenario is not, as Petitioner casually asserts,

‘having the right to vote in an extra election,’ but rather being denied the right to vote in

both the 2012 and 2014 elections. [Citation.] These ill effects would not occur with the

Commission’s certified Senate districts, yet are virtually guaranteed under [petitioner’s]

nesting proposal.”

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Vandermost v. Bowen · 53 Cal. 4th 421 | Frix