holding that § 1396a(a)(3) of the Medicaid Act — which requires a state to “grant[ ] an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under *950 the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness” — is privately enforceable because it “creates an obligation on the part of the State and is phrased in terms of benefitting Medicaid recipients”
How later courts described this case
- holding that § 1396a(a)(3) of the Medicaid Act — which requires a state to “grant[ ] an opportunity for a fair hearing before the State agency to any individual whose claim for medical assistance under *950 the plan is denied or is not acted upon with reasonable promptness” — is privately enforceable because it “creates an obligation on the part of the State and is phrased in terms of benefitting Medicaid recipients”
- holding that plaintiffs failed to show a violation of clearly established law where their medical care services were not diminished even though the state failed to provide adequate notice that it was using plaintiffs’ Medicare benefits to offset their prison medical expenses
- holding that section 1396a(a)(3), which states that “[a] State plan for medical assistance must provide for granting an opportunity for a fair hearing ... to any individual whose; claim ... is denied ...,” benefits individuals so as to create a personal right
- finding where a complaint is “based entirely upon past acts and not continuing conduct that, if stopped, would provide a remedy to them . . . it therefore does not come under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young . . .”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLAY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the outcome reached by the majority opinion, but write separately to emphasize that my concurrence is compelled by the Supreme Court’s holding in Washington State Dep’t of Social & Health Services v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371 , 123 S.Ct. 1017 , 154 L.Ed.2d 972 (2003), as to Plaintiffs’ claims brought under the Social Security Act.
I also write separately to emphasize that while I agree with the majority opinion’s outcome as to Plaintiffs’ claims brought under the Equal Protection Clause, I disagree with the majority’s language and discussion related to this claim. Specifically, I do not concur in the majority opinion’s discussion of the Supreme Court’s statement in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 , 119 S.Ct. 1518 , 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999), as to whether “the State’s legitimate interest in saving money provides no justification for its decision to discriminate among equally eligible citizens.” That is, I do not join the majority opinion’s language and related discussion to the effect that “[t]hough a state cannot discriminate against a potential welfare recipient based upon how long that individual has been in the state, it can — and does — discriminate against that individual based upon his ability to provide for himself without state assistance.” I decline to join that portion of the majority opinion’s language because I believe it to be at variance with the import and holding of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 , 119 S.Ct. 1518 , 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999), and a plethora of Supreme Court pronouncements in the area of equal protection.