United States v. Seefried

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

HUNTER SEEFRIED, Case No. 21-cr-287 (TNM)

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Did the electoral certification on January 6, 2021 involve the “administration of justice”?

The answer determines whether significant sentencing enhancements may apply to convictions

under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) for obstruction of an official proceeding. In the Court’s view, the

answer is no. Text, context, and precedent show that the “administration of justice” most

naturally refers to a judicial or related proceeding that determines rights or obligations. The

electoral certification was not such a proceeding.

I.

This Court found Hunter Seefried guilty of obstructing an official proceeding—the

electoral certification—under § 1512(c), along with four other counts. See Presentence

Investigation Report (PSR) ¶ 9; see also Tr. of Bench Trial Verdict, ECF No. 109. Hunter

Seefried was a 22-year-old forklift technician when he came to Washington on January 6. See

PSR ¶ 76; see also Def.’s Mem. in Aid of Sentencing at 15, ECF No. 114. He watched as other

protestors used a police riot shield and a wooden beam to shatter the Capitol’s large windows.

See PSR ¶ 19. He then cleared glass from a window and clambered through it, followed by other

protestors. See id. ¶¶ 19–20. Once inside the Capitol building, Seefried joined other protestors

in confronting U.S. Capitol police and even chasing an officer through the Senate corridors. See

1

id. ¶ 21. Seefried’s fellow rioters searched for Members of Congress and the location of the

certification proceeding. See id. ¶ 22.

II.

Section 1512(c)(2) provides that “whoever corruptly . . . obstructs, influences, or impedes

any official proceeding, or attempts to do so” faces a fine or up to 20 years imprisonment. 18

U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2). The Government has charged many defendants in the January 6 cases with

violating this statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, No. 21-cr-37, Superseding

Indictment, ECF No. 59; United States v. Reffitt, No. 21-cr-32, Second Superseding Indictment,

ECF No. 34; United States v. Rubenacker, No. 21-cr-193, Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 33.

The “official proceeding” at issue in these cases is the certification of electoral votes.

During this proceeding, the “certificates and papers purporting to be certificates of the electoral

votes . . . [are] opened, presented, and acted upon in the alphabetical order of the States.” 3

U.S.C. § 15. Then, tellers “make a list of the votes as they [] appear” and “the result . . . [is]

delivered to the President of the Senate,” who announces the outcome of the election. Id.

Finally, a list of the votes is entered in the House and Senate journals. See id. This Court has

held—along with most other judges in this district—that the certification qualifies as an “official

proceeding” under § 1512(c). See, e.g., United States v. Hale-Cusanelli, 2022 WL 4300000, at

*1 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2022).

But does the electoral certification also involve the “administration of justice”? That is a

thornier question. For defendants convicted under § 1512(c), the Government has argued that

sentencing enhancements for obstructing or interfering with “the administration of justice”

should apply. U.S.S.G. §§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B), (b)(2). One provision triggers an eight-level

enhancement “[i]f the offense involved causing or threatening to cause physical injury to a

2

person, or property damage, in order to obstruct the administration of justice.” Id.

§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B). And another prompts a three-level enhancement “[i]f the offense resulted in

substantial interference with the administration of justice.” Id. § 2J1.2(b)(2).

For Seefried, this is not an academic question. If these enhancements apply, his

sentencing guideline level is 25, with a recommended sentence of 57–71 months; if they do not,

his level is 14, with a recommended sentence of 15–21 months. The Court finds that the

enhancements in §§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) do not apply because the electoral certification

does not involve the “administration of justice.”

III.

In interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines, the Court applies the ordinary tools of statutory

interpretation and looks to the plain meaning of its terms. Many circuits agree. See, e.g., United

States v. Savin, 349 F.3d 27, 35–36 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Peterson, 629 F.3d 432, 434

(4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bustillos-Pena, 612 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 2010); United States

v. Bahhur, 200 F.3d 917, 927 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir.

2021); United States v. Collins, 754 F.3d 626, 630 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Kirilyuk, 29

F.4th 1128, 1137 (9th Cir. 2022).

To discern the text’s plain meaning, courts look to dictionary definitions and analyze the

word or phrase in context. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Nielsen, 896 F.3d 475, 485–87 (D.C. Cir.

2018). The relevant context for a sentencing guideline may include the commentary. See, e.g.,

Kirilyuk, 29 F.4th at 1137–39. Finally, the Court looks to precedent to analyze how other courts

have interpreted this phrase or similar phrases.

A.

First, text. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the phrase “administration of justice” as

3

“[t]he maintenance of right within a political community by means of the physical force of the

state” and “the state’s application of the sanction of force to the rule of right.” Administration of

Justice, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Similarly, “due administration of justice” is

defined as “[t]he proper functioning and integrity of a court or other tribunal and the proceedings

before it in accordance with the rights guaranteed to the parties.” Id. Although the Guideline

only contains the phrase “administration of justice,” not “due administration of justice,” the

Government has given the Court no reason to believe these are not closely associated phrases.

These definitions suggest that the “administration of justice” involves a judicial or quasi-judicial

tribunal that applies the force of the state to determine legal rights.

The certification does not share the characteristics of these definitions. The best evidence

for what actually occurs during the certification is the statute proscribing its procedures. See 3

U.S.C. § 15. During the proceeding, “certificates and papers purporting to be certificates of the

electoral votes . . . [are] opened, presented, and acted upon in the alphabetical order of the

States.” Id. Then, tellers “make a list of the votes as they . . . appear” and deliver the result to

the President of the Senate after Members resolve any objections. Id. Finally, the votes are

entered in the House and Senate journals. See id.

The certification is thus largely a ceremonial proceeding where Members and staff open,

read, list, and announce the electoral votes. See id. It takes place within the deliberative branch

of government—Congress—not the branches that typically exercise judgment (the judiciary), or

force (the executive). See generally The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). Congress

applies no “physical force” or “sanction of force” during the certification. And the proceeding

involves no possibility of punishment by the state, as a judicial, investigatory, or enforcement

proceeding might to “maint[ain] [] right within a political community.” Nor does the

4

certification involve the “proper functioning and integrity of a court or other tribunal . . . in

accordance with the rights guaranteed to the parties.” These definitions evoke traditional judicial

or quasi-judicial bodies that decide or maintain the legal rights of the parties before them. In

contrast, the certification confirms, announces, and officially records whom the people have

chosen to be President and Vice President. See 3 U.S.C. § 15. In other words, it commemorates

and completes the peaceful transfer of executive authority.

Consider another relevant definition. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “obstructing the

administration of justice” and “interfering with the administration of justice” as “[t]he skewing

of the disposition of legal proceedings, as by fabricating or destroying evidence, witness-

tampering, or threatening or intimidating a judge.” Perverting the Course of Justice, Black’s

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (cross-referencing these phrases). This definition is probative

because § 2J1.2 uses the terms “obstruct” and “interference” when discussing what a defendant

might impermissibly do to the “administration of justice.”

This definition further corroborates that the “administration of justice” involves

something like a legal proceeding, such as a trial or grand jury hearing. Obstruction or

interference with such a proceeding occurs through action that could “skew . . . the disposition.”

The definition suggests that possible actions include falsifying or destroying evidence, tampering

with witnesses, or threatening a judge. The certification does not resemble a trial or similar

judicial proceeding where evidence could be falsified or destroyed, witnesses could be tampered

with, or a judge could be intimidated so as to interfere with the disposition of parties’ legal

rights.

Indeed, the Government could have charged Seefried with violating § 1503, a different

provision in the same statute that defines “obstruction of justice” as an act that “corruptly or by

5

threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes,

or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 1503 (emphasis added). But to the Court’s knowledge, none of the January 6 defendants have

been charged under § 1503. Though the Court hesitates to derive meaning from exercises of

prosecutorial discretion, the existence of similar language elsewhere with a clear relationship to

the enhancements in § 2J1.2 is curious. The official proceeding statute under which this Court

convicted Seefried contains no such language. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512.

To be sure, some courts have recently interpreted the “administration of justice” in

§ 2J1.2 more broadly. In United States v. Miller, another judge in this district defined the

individual words in the phrase by looking to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. See

21-cr-75, Tr. at 16 (May 23, 2022), ECF No. 73. The court explained that “administration in this

sense means to mete out, and justice means fair treatment.” Id. The court reasoned that these

definitions are broad enough to encompass the certification because Congress was “adjudicating

in some . . . limited sense, subject to very substantial constraints, the results of the election.” Id.

But this Court hesitates to slice and dice a term of art. “Adhering to the fair meaning of

the text (the textualist’s touchstone) does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of each word

in the text . . . . The full body of a text contains implications that can alter the literal meaning of

individual words.” Antonin Scalia & Brian A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal

Texts 356 (2012) (Scalia & Garner); see also Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1825

(2020) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts must adhere to the ordinary meaning of phrases,

not just the meaning of the words in a phrase.”); William Eskridge, Interpreting Law 62 (2016)

(noting that judges should follow ordinary meaning “when two words combine to produce a

meaning that is not the mechanical composition of the two words separately”).

6

And even if segmenting the terms of the phrase were appropriate, another legal dictionary

supports this Court’s reading. Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines “administration” as the

“execution of a law by putting it in effect, applying it to the affairs of men.” Administration,

Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969). And it defines “justice” as “[t]hat end which ought

to be reached in a case by the regular administration of the principles of law involved as applied

to the facts.” Justice, Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d ed. 1969). Even separating the words

supports the reading that the “administration of justice,” as a legal term of art, refers to state

action vis-à-vis legal rights.

In United States v. Rubenacker, another judge in this district interpreted the

administration of justice broadly to apply § 2J1.2’s enhancements to a January 6 defendant

convicted under § 1512(c). See United States v. Rubenacker, 21-cr-193, Tr. at 71–72 (May 26,

2022), ECF No. 70. In Rubenacker, the court reasoned that the Black’s Law Dictionary

definition of “administration of justice” suggests “that the state would use mechanisms, such as

the police or prosecutors, to force compliance with or maintain a right; that is not necessarily tied

to a court or a particular tribunal.” Id. at 72. The court explained that “the physical force of the

state” was present during the certification “in the form of law enforcement officers located in and

around the Capitol to secure the proceedings.” Id. at 75. And it suggested that legislators’

statutory right to object during the certification “can be analogized to evidentiary objections.”

Id. at 66.

This Court is unconvinced. The fact that law enforcement is present at an official

proceeding—which will often be the case—surely cannot mean that the administration of justice

is occurring. Consider a presidential inauguration. Police and Secret Service are present at this

official proceeding to protect the incoming President and other distinguished attendees. But no

7

one would say that the inauguration involves the “administration of justice”; it is a ceremonial

proceeding that formally installs the Nation’s new leader.

The definitions of the “administration of justice” discussed above suggest that a judicial

or quasi-judicial body must itself be applying the force of the state to decide legal rights, not that

force need merely be present. The Rubenacker court’s other argument—that legislators have the

right to object to the certification—also does not mean that the certification involves the

administration of justice. Simply because Members may debate whether a certified vote is

proper, and rules exist for resolving objections, does not mean they are administering justice.

Indeed, if this were the case, it is hard to imagine a congressional proceeding that would not

qualify, given that the legislative process often involves these same characteristics.

Admittedly, the dictionary definitions here are a bit unwieldy. Dictionary definitions are

valuable because they are evidence of how ordinary speakers of language understand words and

how legal interpreters understand terms of art. But dictionaries do not end the inquiry. This is so

because not all “meanings appropriate to particular contexts are to be found in the dictionary.”

Scalia & Garner at 70.

A reader therefore must look to context to determine “which of several possible senses a

word or phrase bears.” Id.; accord Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“If

the usual evidence indicates that a statutory phrase bears an ordinary meaning different from the

literal strung-together definitions of the individual words in the phrase, we may not ignore or

gloss over that discrepancy. Legislation cannot sensibly be interpreted by stringing together

dictionary synonyms of each word.” (cleaned up)); see also id. at 1766 (Alito, J., dissenting)

(“[T]he meaning of language depends on the way a linguistic community uses words and phrases

in context.”). So the Court looks to both the context in which the “administration of justice”

8

most often appears and the immediate context found in the commentary to § 2J1.2.

B.

The Court undertakes two analyses to understand how the “administration of justice” is

properly understood in context. The first uses a methodology called “corpus linguistics” to

assess the customary usage of the phrase at the time the Sentencing Commission crafted the

Guidelines. The second looks to § 2J1.2’s commentary, which the Court finds helpful but not

dispositive.

1.

Although dictionaries provide a useful starting point, “[b]ecause common words typically

have more than one meaning, you must use the context in which a given word appears to

determine its aptest, most likely sense.” Scalia & Garner at 418; see generally Stephen C.

Mouritsen, The Dictionary is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies and a Corpus-Based

Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1915 (2010) (describing the shortcomings of

collecting dictionary definitions and advocating for a broader, corpus-based approach to

linguistic meaning). To understand what meaning the Guideline most naturally evokes, the

Court also looks to customary usage at the time.

Courts may assess the customary usage of a phrase by searching relevant databases of

naturally occurring language. This method is known as corpus linguistics. “Corpus linguistics is

an empirical approach to the study of language that uses large, electronic databases” of language

gathered from sources. Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning,

127 Yale L. J. 788, 828 (2018); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning:

Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1621,

1643–49 (2017) (explaining why the method helps clarify linguistic meaning).

9

Other courts have deployed corpus-based approaches to textual meaning. For example,

Justice Breyer, writing for the Court, adopted a corpus-based approach to illuminate the meaning

of the phrase “carries a firearm.” See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 128–31 (1998)

(recounting the phrase in context from dictionaries, literature, and newspaper articles found in

computerized databases). Other courts have also conducted corpus-based analyses using

publicly available databases. See, e.g., Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc., 930 F.3d 429, 439 (6th Cir.

2019) (Thapar, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); United States v. Rice, 36

F.4th 578, 583 n.6 (4th Cir. 2022); Health Freedom Def. Fund, Inc. v. Biden, No. 8:21-cv-1693,

--- F. Supp. 3d ---, 2022 WL 1134138, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2022).

Because various publicly-available databases of language exist, see, e.g.,

https://www.english-corpora.org/; lncl8.lawcorpus.byu.edu, courts must choose a corpus

carefully. The database searched should include texts from the relevant linguistic community

that would read and understand the text at issue. Cf. Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the

Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 536 (1947) (explaining that texts “addressed to

specialists, [] must be read by judges with the minds of the specialists”); James A. Heilpern,

Dialects of Art: A Corpus-Based Approach to Technical Terms, 58 Jurimetrics J. 377, 389–97

(2018) (explaining the promise of a corpus-based approach for terms of art).

The primary linguistic community using and understanding the Sentencing Guidelines is

an informed legal audience—most notably, lawyers and judges. Unlike most statutes, which are

at least theoretically intended to be read and understood by citizens, the Guidelines are a

practitioner’s guide to federal sentencing. The Court therefore focused on the Corpus of

10

Caselaw Access Project (COCAP), which compiles the text of federal and state court decisions.

See https://lncl8.lawcorpus.byu.edu/. 1

But just in case one thinks the Guidelines should be read like criminal statutes—directed

to the general public—the Court also searched the Corpus of Historical American English

(COHA), which collects sources across genres, including fiction, magazines, newspapers, and

academic articles. Cf. Rice, 36 F.4th at 583 n.6 (looking to a database collecting “documents an

ordinary speaker of English would interact with regularly” when interpreting a criminal statute).

At the very least, it would be notable if these corpora produced wildly different results. As it

turns out, they did not.

The Court queried the COCAP for the years 1977–1987. This period represents the

decade before and including the year in which the Commission promulgated § 2J1.2. See

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 (effective Nov. 1, 1987). Cf. Safelite, 930 F.3d at 444 (Thapar, J., concurring in

part and concurring in the judgment) (looking to a ten-year period to generate a sample of written

text around the time Congress first passed the relevant language). This search returned 14,118

hits, or “concordance lines.” Given such a large universe, the Court reviewed a random sample

of 375 concordance lines containing the phrase “administration of justice” to see what sorts of

official proceedings were discussed. This sample size produces a 95% confidence interval. A

random sample can be generated through the database itself by filtering for a specific number of

results.

The most frequent usage of the “administration of justice”—about 65% of the total hits—

corresponds with the sense described above: a judicial proceeding deciding legal rights. The

1

The Court has collected and coded the hits from the databases it queried into a spreadsheet

appended as Attachment A.

11

phrase appeared in conjunction with witness tampering, contempt of court, various evidentiary

privileges, the effect of jury instructions on court proceedings, and the conduct of juries. The

phrase also accompanies issues of judicial management, including delays in court proceedings,

repeat litigants, and even courtroom dress code. Other hits dealt with media access to judicial

proceedings. Finally, some hits reflected more general concerns about retroactivity and the

“fair,” “proper,” “effective,” or “thorough” administration of justice by courts.

The next most common context in which the “administration of justice” appeared—

around 25% of hits—involved disciplining judges or lawyers for conduct that interfered with

judicial proceedings. Some hits referenced violations of various ethical rules, contempt of court,

recusal, disqualification of counsel, and perjury when a lawyer testified before a grand jury.

Again, the customary usage of the phrase was closely linked with judicial proceedings, or an

actor who is intimately involved with the judicial process.

Another category of note—about 4% of hits—involved law enforcement activities. Some

hits referenced conduct such as resisting arrest. Others discussed the need for anonymous

informants to promote cooperation with law enforcement, the rationale for the exclusionary rule,

and prosecutorial discretion. One discussed setting standards for roadside intoxication tests.

These hits differed from those described above in that they did not always involve a formal

proceeding or a judicial body. But they all contemplate the state’s application of force or the

government’s role in investigating and prosecuting crimes. 2

2

The Court identified a few other categories, all of which had only a few hits. These referred to

grand juries, bar associations, and two committees (one Congressional and the other Presidential)

that have the phrase “administration of justice” in their title. The Court also coded a few entries

as “unclear” if the context in the concordance line did not provide enough information to

categorize the entry.

12

In contrast, the least common usage of “administration of justice” was as a broad term

referring to government function generally. The Court identified three such entries out of the

375 it coded. One dealt with a public utility commission that discussed the administration of

justice in broad terms. Another noted that local commissioners’ power to issue licenses involves

the administration of justice. And another suggested that Texas counties are involved in the

administration of justice. No entries discussed a Congressional proceeding.

This is not to say that because the administration of justice most often appeared in the

context of a judicial proceeding means that it takes on that meaning in all contexts. And of

course, the certification of electoral votes could involve the administration of justice, despite not

appearing in this sample. But the vast majority of examples in the sample shared certain

hallmarks such as action disruptive of, or prejudicial to, a court proceeding; discipline of judges

and lawyers; and conduct that would disrupt or aid law enforcement investigations. The

certification does not share these characteristics.

Even if the proper linguistic community is not lawyers and judges, a review of a broader

set of sources does nothing to undermine the Court’s findings. Querying COHA for the same

time period returned 12 results for “administration of justice.” Though the Court hesitates to

draw conclusions from such a small sample size—four of which are from the same book—these

results largely support the Court’s prior interpretation. The phrase most often appeared in the

context of judicial decision-making, courts generally, bar associations, or law enforcement. Two

concordance lines could be interpreted as referring to government generally, and two were

unclear. These limited exceptions seem to be outliers.

In short, there is essentially no evidence that either judges, lawyers, or speakers more

generally used the term “administration of justice” to refer to legislative proceedings like the

13

certification of the electoral count. Instead, both professional and lay speakers overwhelmingly

used this term to reference judicial proceedings or activities closely related to them. To be sure,

corpus linguistics is but one tool in the interpretative toolbox. But “[i]ts foremost value may

come in those difficult cases where . . . dictionaries diverge. In those cases, corpus linguistics

can serve as a cross-check on established methods of interpretation (and vice versa).” Wilson,

930 F.3d at 440 (Thapar, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Even though

dictionaries do not necessarily diverge here, corpus linguistics provide further evidence that the

Government is stretching the Guideline beyond its natural meaning.

2.

The Government offers a different bit of context. It argues that the commentary to

§ 2J1.2 defines the administration of justice broadly enough to encompass the certification. See

Gov’t Mem. in Aid of Sentencing (Gov’t Mem.) at 29.

To begin, query whether the commentary to a sentencing guideline is authoritative. See,

e.g., United States v. Winstead, 890 F.3d 1082, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (noting disagreement over

this issue). The Supreme Court held in Stinson v. United States that the commentary should “be

treated as an agency’s interpretation of its own legislative rule.” 508 U.S. 36, 44–45 (1993)

(citing Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). The Court explained

that commentary which “interprets or explains a guideline is authoritative unless it violates the

Constitution or a federal statute, or is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of, that

guideline.” Id. at 38.

Yet other circuits have explained that Stinson should be applied with care. This is so

because it rests on Seminole Rock (later called Auer) deference, which the Supreme Court

recently clarified. See generally Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019). When Stinson was

14

decided, courts were far more willing to defer to agency interpretations of text. After Kisor, they

must be more careful to reduce ambiguity using the standard tools of statutory interpretation

before deferring. See 139 S. Ct. at 2414. “Congress has delegated substantial responsibility to

the Sentencing Commission, but, as the Supreme Court emphasized in Kisor, the interpretation

of [the Guidelines] ultimately ‘remains in the hands of the courts.’” United States v. Nasir, 17

F.4th 459, 472 (3d Cir. 2021) (en banc) (quoting Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2420); see also United

States v. Riccardi, 989 F.3d 476, 485 (6th Cir. 2021) (“Kisor must awake us from our slumber of

reflexive deference to the commentary” (cleaned up)).

And the D.C. Circuit has suggested that courts should eschew deference to the

Commission where the commentary expands the meaning of the text of the Guidelines

themselves. See Winstead, 890 F.3d at 1092 (“[S]urely Seminole Rock deference does not extend

so far as to allow [the Commission] to invoke its general interpretive authority via commentary

. . . to impose such a massive impact on a defendant with no grounding in the guidelines

themselves.”).

But the Court need not wade into that debate. Even if § 2J1.2’s commentary bound the

Court, it supports a narrower interpretation of the “administration of justice” than the

Government offers. The commentary to § 2J1.2 provides:

“Substantial interference with the administration of justice” includes a premature

or improper termination of a felony investigation; an indictment, verdict, or any

judicial determination based upon perjury, false testimony, or other false evidence;

or the unnecessary expenditure of substantial Governmental or court resources.

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1. The modifying phrase “substantial interference” appears only in the

three-level enhancement. Compare § 2J1.2(b)(2), with id. (b)(1)(B) (eight-level enhancement

referencing only the “administration of justice”).

As it has in prior cases, the Government relies on the last portion of the definition, “the

15

unnecessary expenditure of substantial Governmental or court resources,” to argue that the

enhancement applies. See Gov’t Mem. at 29. According to the Government, this part of the

definition means that the “administration of justice” encompasses more than judicial

proceedings. See id. Because the rioters’ disruption of the electoral certification caused

“unnecessary expenditure of substantial Governmental . . . resources,” the argument goes, they

substantially interfered with the administration of justice. Id. While the events of January 6

caused the Government to commit significant resources—evidenced in part by the number of

cases charged in this district—this argument proves too much. If courts may enhance an

obstruction-related sentence by eleven levels any time the Government can show that the offense

caused unnecessary expenditure of its resources, “substantial interference with the administration

of justice” could encompass just about anything. Indeed, the Government could theoretically

trigger the enhancements at will.

The Government’s reliance on the “unnecessary expenditure” clause also obscures the

rest of the definition. In short, it fails to read that phrase in context. Substantial interference

with the administration of justice also “includes a premature or improper termination of a felony

investigation; an indictment, verdict, or any judicial determination based upon perjury, false

testimony, or other false evidence[.]” U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1. This portion of the definition

fits the Court’s textual interpretation of the “administration of justice” in Part III.A. The list

refers to investigations, verdicts, and judicial determinations—all of which involve the coercive

force of the state and the actual or potential determination of legal rights in judicial or

enforcement proceedings.

Isolating the “unnecessary expenditure of substantial Governmental . . . resources” clause

also cuts out the “or court” part of the phrase. That “Governmental” appears next to “court” in a

16

phrase about “resources” suggests that the term really refers to prosecutorial resources rather

than the expenditure of resources by any public agency. See Scalia & Garner at 195–98

(explaining that words “associated in a context suggesting that [they] have something in common

. . . should be given related meanings” under the canon noscitur a sociis). After all, a broad

definition of “Governmental” would include court resources, rendering the phrase “or court”

superfluous. See id. at 176–79 (explaining that under the surplusage canon, “courts must . . .

lean in favor of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which

may make some idle and nugatory” (citation omitted)). That the other portions of the definition

also refer to judicial-like proceedings bolsters this conclusion.

More, the Government ignores another section of the commentary that lists exemplar

offenses to which this Guideline applies. See U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt., Background. These

offenses fit with the Court’s definition of “administration of justice” in Part III.A. For example:

“using threats or force to intimidate or influence a juror or federal officer; obstructing a civil or

administrative proceeding; stealing or altering court records; unlawfully intercepting grand jury

deliberations . . . [and] using intimidation or force to influence testimony [or] alter evidence[.]”

Id. All the examples that the Commission provides evoke traditional notions of judicial or

enforcement proceedings and are consistent with the Court’s corpus linguistics analysis. None of

them relate to a legislative proceeding.

True, the commentary cross-references § 1512, along with a slew of other statutes. See

U.S.S.G. § 2J1.2 cmt, Statutory Provisions. But that does not mean that the three- and eight-

point enhancements apply to every situation in which the Government charges § 1512(c)—only

that they could apply at times. Indeed, the mine run of § 1512(c) cases may well qualify for the

§ 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) enhancements. For there are many “official proceedings” that

17

involve the official application of force to decide legal rights, like a trial. But the key here is that

the electoral certification is not one such proceeding. It does not qualify for these enhancements

because it involves no judicial or quasi-judicial application of force to decide or maintain legal

rights.

C.

Finally, precedent. Seefried cites decisions that he claims limit the “administration of

justice” to “judicial or grand jury proceedings.” Def.’s Mem. at 4. The Government counters

that other courts have applied the enhancement to proceedings that would not fit Seefried’s

“narrow definition.” Gov’t Mem. at 30.

Seefried cites United States v. Aguilar, in which the Supreme Court construed the phrase

“due administration of justice” in another section of the same statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1503. See 515

U.S. 593, 598–99 (1995). Section 1503 makes it a crime to “corruptly . . . influence[], obstruct[],

or impede[], or endeavor[] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice[.]”

18 U.S.C. § 1503. This particular clause in the statute follows other prohibited conduct, most of

which pertain to judicial proceedings. See id. (forbidding the influencing, intimidating, or

impeding any juror or officer who may be “serving at any examination or other proceeding

before any United States magistrate judge or other committing magistrate,” or injuring any such

officer).

In Aguilar, the Court held that a man who made false statements to FBI agents—a

potential grand jury witness—did not violate § 1503. See Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599. The Court

reasoned that the FBI agents were not an “arm of the grand jury” and that grand jury had not

“even summoned them to testify.” Id. at 600. Because the defendant did not know that his false

statements were likely to affect the grand jury proceeding, the Court explained that he could not

18

be found guilty for “imped[ing] the due administration of justice.” Id. at 599–601. Ultimately,

Aguilar’s reasoning suggests that the “administration of justice” in § 1503 is analogous to a

“judicial or grand jury proceeding.” Id. at 599.

Seefried also cites various appellate decisions that follow Aguilar to interpret the “due

administration of justice” in § 1503 to mean “interfering with the procedure of a judicial hearing

or trial.” United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 502–03 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United

States v. Brenson, 104 F.3d 1267, 1280 (11th Cir. 1997) (“Section 1503 employs the term ‘due

administration of justice’ to provide a protective cloak over all judicial proceedings.”); cf. United

States v. Warlick, 742 F.2d 113, 115–16 (4th Cir. 1984) (“[O]bstruction of the administration of

justice requires . . . some act that will . . . thwart the judicial process.”).

Admittedly, terms may carry different meanings in a statute versus a guideline. See, e.g.,

DePierre v. United States, 564 U.S. 70, 88 (2011). But Aguilar’s reasoning, and that of the

circuit courts following it, is still a building block in the wall of evidence supporting the reading

that the “administration of justice” involves a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding applying the

force of the state to decide legal rights.

The cases the Government cites do not cast doubt on this Court’s interpretation of the

“administration of justice.” See Gov’t Mem. at 30. Indeed, many of its authorities involve

judicial or investigative proceedings from which punishment could follow. See, e.g., United

States v. Pegg, 812 F. App’x 851, 860 (11th Cir. 2020) (defendant’s action “prevented the

government from prosecuting” another investigative target); United States v. Atl. States Cast Iron

Pipe Co., 627 F. Supp. 2d 180, 200–04 (D.N.J. 2009) (defendants’ actions obstructed agency’s

efforts to investigate a deadly accident); United States v. Weissman, 22 F. Supp. 2d 187, 194–98

(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (defendant withheld subpoenaed documents from an investigative congressional

19

committee and lied at his deposition). And even the case it cites that is furthest from a judicial

proceeding still involved a law enforcement investigation. See United States v. Ali, 864 F.3d

573, 574 (7th Cir. 2017) (affirming application of the three-level administration of justice

enhancement where man absconded abroad with children and several federal agencies and agents

worked for days to complete his seizure). This Court’s interpretation fits comfortably alongside

these holdings.

Finally, though it is historical rather than legal precedent, recall that the phrase

“administration of justice” appears in one of our seminal founding documents: the Declaration of

Independence. And it does so in the context of judicial proceedings. In castigating King George

III, Thomas Jefferson wrote: “He has obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his

Assent to law for establishing Judiciary powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will

alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.” The

Declaration of Independence para. 8 (U.S. 1776). In short, text, context, and precedent suggest

that the Government reads the “administration of justice” too broadly.

* * *

An inconsistency in the Government’s litigating position also bears noting. January 6

defendants have argued in motions to dismiss their indictments that they have not violated §

1512(c) because the statutory phrase “official proceeding” only references proceedings that

involve the administration of justice, and the electoral certification does not. See, e.g., United

States v. Sandlin, 575 F. Supp. 3d 16, 23–24 (D.D.C. 2021). Seefried made the same argument

here. See Mot. to Dismiss at 2, ECF No. 36.

The Government has argued in opposition that § 1512(c) “operates as a catch-all to cover

otherwise obstructive behavior that might not constitute a more specific” obstruction offense—

20

such as obstruction of the administration of justice. See Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss at 7–8, ECF

No. 44. Most judges in this district have agreed. See, e.g., United States v. Montgomery, 578 F.

Supp. 3d 54, 61–65 (D.D.C. 2021) (explaining that Congress does not engage in the

administration of justice). The Government cannot have its cake and eat it too. It would be

incongruous for this Court to say pre-trial that the “official proceeding” of the electoral

certification is more expansive than proceedings only involving the administration of justice, but

then turn around at sentencing to say the opposite.

It is the Government’s burden to prove that a sentencing enhancement applies. See

United States v. Bapack, 129 F.3d 1320, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1997). It has not done so here.

IV.

The Court acknowledges that this is a close interpretative call. If the Sentencing

Commission had foreseen the Capitol breach, it may well have included “official proceeding” in

the text of § 2J1.2. But the Commission did not. Given that courts should interpret the

Guidelines using traditional tools of statutory interpretation, this Court declines to rewrite

§ 2J1.2 to say what it does not. If the Commission wishes to expand the text of the Guideline to

include official proceedings such as the electoral certification, “it may seek to amend the

language of the guidelines by submitting the change for congressional review.” Winstead, 890

F.3d at 1092.

In the meantime, this Court may still consider the concerns underlying the Government’s

requests for these enhancements under the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing. But for all of these

reasons, the Court finds that Seefried did not obstruct, impede, or interfere with the

“administration of justice” and that the enhancements in § 2J1.2(b)(1)(B) and (b)(2) are

inapplicable.

21

SO ORDERED.

2022.10.31

08:40:40 -04'00'

Dated: October 31, 2022 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

TREVOR N. McFADDEN, U.S.D.J.

22

Attachment A

Classification/Desc

Year Corpus Source or Source Type Excerpt of Concordance Line Contextual summary

ription

As we said in both Benoit and Ross , in determin

Maine, In the Matter of ing appropriate disciplinary sanctions , we must Considering appropriate sanctions for

Ronald L. KELLAM, be careful to assure the orderly administration of a judge whose discourtesy to parties Judicial discipline,

1986 COCAP 503 A.2d 1308 justice in the public interest . rose to violation of the Judicial Code. judicial proceeding

We agree with the finding of the hearing board th

at the respondent ’s conduct violated C.R.C.P. 24

1.6 and the following disciplinary rules in the Co

de of Professional Responsibility : DR 1 -

102 ( A ) ( 1 ) ( a lawyer shall not violate a disci

plinary rule ) ; DR 6 -

101 ( A ) ( 2 ) ( a lawyer shall not handle a legal

matter without preparation adequate in the circu

mstances ) ; DR 6 -

101 ( A ) ( 3 ) ( a lawyer shall not neglect a legal

matter entrusted to him ) ; DR 7 -

101 ( A ) ( l ) ( a lawyer shall not intentionally fa

il to seek the lawful objectives of his client ) ; D

R7-

Colorado, The PEOPLE 101 ( A ) ( 3 ) ( a lawyer shall not prejudice or d

of the State of Colorado, amage his client during the course of the professi

Complainant, v. Thomas onal rela tionship ) ; and DR 1 -

H. MAY, Attorney- 102 ( A ) ( 5 ) ( a lawyer shall not engage in con Finding lawyer's failure to apprise

Respondent, 745 P.2d duct that is prejudicial to the administration of ju client of case status violated state Discipline of lawyer,

1987 COCAP 218 stice ) . professional conduct rules. judicial proceeding

Texas, Phil P. O’NEAL,

Appellant, v. The Nevertheless , there comes a time when the order

COUNTY OF SAN ly administration of justice requires that the appe Discussing failure of court reporter

SABA, Appellee, 577 llate process be not delayed further by the absenc timely to prepare statement of facts Judicial proceeding,

1979 COCAP S.W.2d 795 e of the statement of facts . needed for appeal. not delaying

Michigan, PEOPLE v.

KAMIN; PEOPLE v. In Rich , this Court refused retroactive applicatio

AUSTIN; PEOPLE v. n of a jury instruction on the defense of intoxicati

CARGILL; PEOPLE v. on and specific intent because of the marked effe

HARRISON, 405 Mich. ct on the administration of justice in view of the Discussing reasons for a new rule's Judicial proceeding,

1979 COCAP 482 profound reliance on the old rule . exclusively prospective application jury instruction

Illinois,

INTERNATIONAL Although summary judgment is an important tool

SOCIETY FOR in the administration of justice and its use encou

KRISHNA raged in proper cases ( Fooden v. Board of Gover

CONSCIOUSNESS, nors ( 1971 ) , 48 Ill. 2d 580 , 586 , 272 N.E. 2d

INC., Plaintiff- 497 ; Allen v. Meyer ( 1958 ) , 14 Ill. 2d 284 , 29

Appellant, v. THE 2 , 152 N.E. 2d 576 ) , courts must remain cautio

CITY OF EVANSTON us not to preempt the right to trial by jury where

et al., Defendants- a material dispute may exist ( Anderson v. Doric

Appellees, 53 Ill. App. k ( 3rd Dist . 1975 ) , 28 Ill . App . 3d 225 , 227 , Discussing impropriety of grant of

1977 COCAP 3d 443 327 N.E. 2d 541 ) . summary judgment below. Judicial proceeding

Because the issue has potentially far -

D. Mass., UNITED reaching ramifications with respect to the orderl Asserting the ability of the court to

STATES of America v. y and effective administration of justice in the di defer ruling on an evidentiary motion Judicial proceeding,

John R. BARLETTA, strict court , it is appropriate that this court detail against Government's contrary judicial power &

1980 COCAP 500 F. Supp. 739 the basis for its determination . argument. prerogative

The imposition of the ethical obligation of honest

y upon lawyers under DR 1 -

Kansas, State of Kansas, 102 ( A ) ( 4 ) and subsequent discipline for viol

Petitioner, v. J. R. ation of the rule is permissible and may be neces Discussing tenstion between ethical

Russell, Respondent, sary in the interests of the administration of justi rules and lawyer's First Amendment

1980 COCAP 227 Kan. 897 ce . rights. Discipline of lawyer

A literal interpretation of Article I , § 22 of the C

onstitution of North Dakota would wreak havoc

with established judicial practices in that it would

N. Dakota, KFGO allow public access to all phases of the administr

RADIO, INC. and ation of justice , including chambers ’ conference

WDAY, Inc., Plaintiffs s , plea bargaining and settlement conferences , a

and Appellees, v. doption proceedings , those juvenile proceedings Discussing ramifications of state Judicial proceeding,

Cynthia ROTHE, 298 presently closed , grand jury proceedings , and ap constitutional provision concerning judicial power &

1980 COCAP N.W.2d 505 pellate court conferences . public's access to proceedings. prerogative

“ In a proceeding in which the Commission finds

that : ( 1 ) the subject matter is generally known

to the public ; ( 2 ) there is broad public interest ;

( 3 ) confidence in the administration of justice i

s threatened due to lack of public information co

ncerning the status and conduct of the proceedin

g ; and ( 4 ) the public interest in maintaining co

nfidence in the judicial office and the integrity of

the administration of justice requires that some o

r all aspects of such proceeding should be publicl

y conducted or otherwise reported or disclosed to

the public , the requirement of confidentiality m

ay , to the extent determined by the Commission

, be modified with respect to said proceeding ; an

Cal., Mosk v. Superior d , after completion of the investigation , a public Discussing when the Commission on

Ct. of Los Angeles hearing shall be held and shall be publicly condu Judicial Performance may allow Judicial proceeding,

1979 COCAP Cnty, 25 Cal. 3d 474 cted . disciplinary hearings to be public. discipline, judge

( 3 ) The misbehavior of any person in the presen

Pa., Smith v. Mason, ce of the court , thereby obstructing the administr Discussing when a person may be Judicial proceeding,

1984 COCAP 328 Pa. Super. 314 ation of justice . found in criminal contempt of court. contempt

After reviewing the record , we conclude that cau

se for discipline has been established and a publi

c censure is the appropriate discipline . In the for

mal complaint you were charged with violating R

ule 241 ( B ) , C.R. C.P. , and the Code of Profes

sional Responsibility , DR 1 -

102 ( A ) ( 5 ) , DR 6 -

101 ( A ) ( 3 ) , and DR 7 -

101 ( A ) ( 2 ) and ( 3 ) , by reason of the followi

ng acts : ( 1 ) neglecting a legal matter entrusted t

o you ; ( 2 ) failing to carry out a contract of emp

loyment entered into with a client for professiona

l services ; ( 3 ) causing damage or prejudice to a

client during the course of your professional rela Concluding public censure was the

Colo., People v. tionship ; and ( 4 ) engaging in conduct that was appropriate discipline for a dilatory Judicial proceeding,

1981 COCAP Gottsegen, 623 P.2d 878 prejudicial to the administration of justice . and otherwise negligent attorney. discipline, lawyer

It was for this reason that a separate standard for

misbehavior , " conduct prejudicial to the admini

stration of justice by bringing the judicial office i

nto disrepute , ” was deleted by the Senate Judici

DDC, Hastings v. ary Committee for fear that such a general disrep Limiting a statute controlling

Judicial Conf. of the ute standard directly embodied in the statute coul censurable judicial behavior to that

United States, 593 F. d be used to intrude into a judge ’s personal life which would interfere with judge's Judicial proceeding,

1984 COCAP Supp. 1371 unrelated to his or her judicial conduct . duties or taint public's perception. discipline, judges

The proper administration of justice necessitates

Ind., In re Colestock, the maintenance of independent professional jud Finding that a lawyer violated rules of Judicial proceeding,

1984 COCAP 461 N.E.2d 137 gment by a lawyer on behalf of his client . professional responsibility. discipline, lawyer

Wash., In re Further , the holding of a private hearing would h

Disciplinary Proceeding ave damaged the public 's confidence in the admi

against Mark S. Demig, nistration of justice and led to suspicions as to th Finding appropriate the procedure of a

1987 COCAP 108 Wash. 2d 82 e objectiveness of the hearing . judicial conduct proceeding below. Judicial proceeding

The Independent Counsel relies on a single quota

tion plucked from Blackmer v. United States , 28

4 U.S. 421 , 438 , 52 S.Ct . 252 , 255 , 76 L.Ed .

375 ( 1932 ) : " one of the duties which the citize

n owes to his government is to support the admin

istration of justice by attending its courts and givi Rejecting government's request to

DDC, In re Sealed Case, ng his testimony whenever he is properly summo subpoena potentially self- Judicial proceeding,

1987 COCAP 832 F.2d 1268 ned . " incriminating documents. court procedure

In order to promote the expeditious administratio

N.C., LEA COMPANY n of justice , we elect to exercise the rarely used

v. NORTH CAROLINA general supervisory powers given this Court in ar

BOARD OF ticle IV , section 12 ( 1 ) of the Constitution of N Judicial proceeding,

TRANSPORTATION, orth Carolina and choose to address two collatera powers &

1986 COCAP 317 N.C. 254 l issues not raised by the parties . Guiding determination of damages. prerogatives

On the other hand , there are other dining occasio

ns that support activities germane to the State Ba

r ’s performance of its duties in the improvement

Mich., Falk v. State Bar of the administration of justice and the advance Assessing propriety of judges at Bar association

1981 COCAP of Mich., 411 Mich. 63 ment of jurisprudence . various social functions. regulating judges

The concluding clause of the statute penalizes an

yone who “ corruptly ... endeavors to influence , Outlining provisions of s. 1503 against

E.D. Va., U.S. v. Caron, obstruct , or impede , the due administration of j improper influence of witness, juror, Judicial proceeding,

1982 COCAP 551 F. Supp. 662 ustice . ” or court official. perjury

The administration of justice would be greatly bu

rdened if required to accommodate separate trials

in all cases where multiple parties have participa

ted in a criminal offense and where one or more

have confessed to its commission . " State v. Fer

guson , 3 Wn . App . 898 , 906 , 479 P. 2d 114 (

Wash., State v. Samsel, 1970 ) , review denied , 78 Wn .2 d 996 ( 1971 ) Finding no error in refusal to grant Judicial proceeding,

1985 COCAP 39 Wash. App. 564 . motion to sever. court procedure

The committee found that respondent had violate Finding violation of professional rules

Pa., In Re Anonymous d D.R. 1 - requiring lawful behavior where

No. 60 D.B. 83, 33 Pa. 102 ( A ) ( 5 ) in that his conduct was prejudicia lawyer consumed drugs and consorted Judicial proceeding,

1984 COCAP D. & C.3d 187 l to the administration of justice . with drug dealers. discipline, lawyer

The Commission , based upon its findings of con

duct prejudicial to the administration of justice w

hich brings the judicial office into disrepute , as

Miss., In re Inquiry opposed to willful misconduct in office , has dete

Concerning County rmined that a public reprimand is an appropriate

Court Judge Kelly sanction finding that this case is somewhat simila Describing appropriate sanctions for

COLLINS, 524 So. 2d r to the trilogy of check collecting cases filed by t personal use of labor of county Judicial proceeding,

1987 COCAP 553 he Commission . prisoners. discipline, judge

In a mandamus action in which petitioner seeks t

o have discovery orders involving a claim of priv

ilege reviewed , we have held that review is appr

opriate when : “ ‘ ( 1 ) disclosure of the allegedly

privileged or confidential information renders i

mpossible any meaningful appellate review of th

e claim of privilege or confidentiality ; and ( 2 ) t

he disclosure involves questions of substantial im

portance to the administration of justice . ’ ” Unit

ed States v. West , 672 F. 2d 796 , 798 -

99 ( 10th Cir .1982 ) ( quoting United States v.

Winner , 641 F. 2d 825 , 830 ( 10th Cir .1981 ) (

quoting Iowa Beef Processors , Inc. v. Bagley , 6

C.A. 10, 01 F. 2d 949 ( 8th Cir .1979 ) ) , cert . denied , 4

Barclaysamerican Corp. 57 U.S. 1133 , 102 S.Ct . 2959 , 73 L.Ed .2 d 13 Judicial proceeding,

1984 COCAP v. Kane, 746 F.2d 653 50 ( 1982 ) . Refusing to breach judicial privilege. discipline, judge

It is very obvious that the public policy which re

nders the protection of witnesses necessary for th

e administration of justice must as a necessary co

nsequence involve that which is a step towards a Upholding absolute privilege for

nd is part of the administration of justice — nam defamatory statements in documents

Md., Adams v. Peck, ely , the preliminary examination of witnesses to prepared for use inlitigation but not Judical proceeding,

1980 COCAP 288 Md. 1 fínd out what they can prove . filed. procedure

In our judgment the court ’s order requiring appe

llant to wear a tie in court was a simple requirem

Ak., Friedman v. ent bearing a reasonable relationship to the prope Judicial proceeding,

District Court, 611 P.2d r administration of justice in that court . ” Id . at Upholding court's requirements of powers &

1980 COCAP 77 23 . minimum standards of dress. prerogatives

“ This was in disobedience to a lawful order , or

a command , if you want to call it that , of the co Reviewing proceedings below to find

Ga., Dowdy v. Palmour, urt , which tended to obstruct the administration in contempt attornets who did not Judicial proceeding,

1982 COCAP 164 Ga. App. 804 of justice . stand to reply to the court. discipline, lawyer

Finally , the Magistrate concluded that no conditi

on or combination of conditions would assure the

D. P.R., U.S. v. safety of the Government ’s witnesses and the c Judicial proceeding,

Acevedo-Ramos, 600 F. ommunity or insure the proper administration of Reviewing magistrate judge's pretrial powers &

1984 COCAP Supp. 501 justice in defendant ’s case . detention of witness. prerogatives

CITY CONSUMER

SERVICES, INC.,

Plaintiff, v. David G. Judicial proceeding,

HORNE, et al., Disqualification will not hinder the efficient adm Consdering motion to disqualify powers &

1983 COCAP Defendants inistration of justice counsel. prerogatives

The term " serious crime " shall include any felo

ny and any lesser crime a necessary element of w

hich , as determined by the statutory or common

law definition of such crime , involves improper

conduct as an attorney , interference with the ad

ministration of justice , false swearing , misrepre

sentation , fraud , willful failure to file income ta

x returns , deceit , bribery , extortion , misapprop

D.C., In re James D. riation , theft , or an attempt or a conspiracy or so Considering whether conduct of

Hutchinson, 518 A.2d licitation of another to commit a " serious crime . attorney was "serious crime" requiring Judicial proceeding,

1986 COCAP 995 ” disbarment. discipline, lawyer

Fla., Petition of

SUPREME COURT

SPECIAL

COMMITTEE FOR

LAWYER

DISCIPLINARY

PROCEDURES TO

AMEND Describing goals of program providing

INTEGRATION RULE, for deposition of clients' common trust

ARTICLE II AND The goals of the Court ’s program are to improve funds in savings accounts, interest

ARTICLE XI, 373 So. the administration of justice in this state and to e payable to programs designed to Judicial proceeding,

1979 COCAP 2d 1 xpand the delivery of legal services to the poor . benefit the public. policy

Although the court concluded that “ there was an

ample independent source of identification ” , it a

dded that it was so tainted by duress and imprope

D.C., U.S. v. Walton, r suggestiveness “ that it would . be an aberration Describing reasoning to forbid in- Judical proceeding,

1979 COCAP 411 A.2d 333 in the administration of justice ” to permit it . court identification. procedure

Courts exist for the administration of justice , an

d in the conduct of trials in general much must ,

of necessity , and in the very nature of things , be

left to the discretion of the court charged with th

e duty of administering justice , and having the i

Ala., Hall v. State, 377 nherent power to regulate such matters in the tria Explaining finding of no abuse of Judical proceeding,

1979 COCAP So. 2d 1123 l forum . discretion below. procedure

Therefore , we sustain charge II , but only insofa

r as it charges respondent with engaging in " con

duct that is prejudicial to the administration of ju

stice ” ( DR 1 -

102 [ A ] [ 5 ] ) and " [ c ] onceal [ ing ] or kno

wingly fail [ ing ] to disclose that which he is req Upholding sanction for failure to

N.Y., In re Devine, 128 uired by law to reveal ” ( DR 7 - comply with subpoena of documents Judicial proceeding,

1987 COCAP A.D.2d 1024 102 [ A ] [ 3 ] ) . as predicate to censure. discipline, lawyer

The hearing committee found that while respond

ent had not violated Disciplinary Rule 1 -

102 ( A ) ( 3 ) , which provides for illegal condu

ct involving moral turpitude , it did find that resp

ondent violated Rules of Professional Responsibi

lity D.R. 1 -

102 ( A ) ( 4 ) , in that he had engaged in conduc

t amounting to a form of misrepresentation , D.R

.1-

102 ( A ) ( 5 ) , in that he had engaged in conduc

t that is prejudicial to the administration of justic

e , and D.R. 1 -

102 ( A ) ( 6 ) , in that he had engaged in conduc Characterizing behavior of lawyer

Pa., In re Anonymous t that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice l who misrepresented facts in Judicial proceeding,

1978 COCAP No. 25 D.B. 77 aw : transaction. discipline, lawyer

" This is a serious crime because the true admini

C.A. 2, U.S. v. Assi, stration of justice is the cornerstone of all our lib

1984 COCAP 748 F.2d 62 erties . Judge providing jury instructions Judicial proceeding

N.Y., People v. Discussing incentives back of

Grissom, 128 Misc. 2d Requiring the party who wants the minutes to ord production requirements as between Judicial proceeding,

1985 COCAP 246 er them promotes the administration of justice . parties. procedure

Bredemann v. Bredemann , 253 Minn. 21 , 24 -

5 , 91 N.W. 2d 84 , 87 ( 1958 ) stated the rule th

at dissolution judgments may be set aside “ unde

r such circumstances as amount to a fraud on the

court and the administration of justice . * * * To

Minn., In re Marriage of be fraud on the court and the administration of ju

Adams, 393 N.W.2d stice , there must be found to be fraud on [ the wi Judicial proceeding,

1986 COCAP 508 fe ] . " Explaining controlling precedent. procedure

We are also conscious of undue delays in the ad

ministration of justice produced by unnecessary t

rials , and also of the crushing financial burdens Judicial proceeding,

C.A. 3, U.S. v. placed on the taxpayers who ultimately pay the e Rejecting judicial economy arguments powers &

1978 COCAP Moskow, 588 F.2d 882 xpenses of federal criminal litigation . against allowing conditional pleas. prerogatives

The obstruction of justice predicate contained in

paragraph 5 provides : It was part of the pattern o

f racketeering activity that in or about September

, 1981 , in the Eastern District of New York and

elsewhere , that the defendants , Joseph Massino

, a / k / a “ Joseph Messina , ” a / k / a “ Joseph

Massina , ” a / k / a “ Joey , ” and Salvatore Vital

e , a / k / a “ Sally , ” unlawfully , wilfully and kn

owingly would and did corruptly endeavor to infl

uence , obstruct and impede the due administrati

on of justice in that the defendants would and did

corruptly endeavor to counsel another person to

avoid service of a grand jury subpoena , in violati

S.D.N.Y., U.S. v. on of Title 18 , United States Code , Section 150 Judicial proceeding,

1986 COCAP Vitale, 635 F. Supp. 194 3 . Recalling the indictment. procedure

The defendant argued that he could not be guilty Rejecting argument that grand jury

E.D. Pa., U.S. v. of the offense because there was no judicial proc must have heard testimony or decided

Simmons, 444 F. Supp. eeding pending which could be equated to an “ a to issue subpoean before it could be

1978 COCAP 500 dministration of justice . ” "obstructed." Grand Jury

The complaint alleged that his described conduct

violated DR 6 -

101 ( A ) ( l ) and ( 3 ) , which provide that a la

wyer shall not handle a legal matter when he kno

ws , or should know , that he is not competent to

do so , and that he shall not neglect a legal matter

Ore., In re Complaint as entrusted to him . Violation of DR 1 -

to the Conduct of 102 ( A ) ( 5 ) was also charged . That rule forbi Assessing discipline of lawyer whose

RICHARD F. CRIST, ds a lawyer to engage in conduct that is prejudici inexperience made him incompetent

1984 COCAP Accused, 683 P.2d 85 al to the administration of justice . to handle a probate. Discipline, Lawyer

As the Supreme Court noted in Northern Pipelin

e Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. , s

upra , 458 U.S. 50 at 64 , n. 15 , 102 S.Ct . 2858

Bankr. N.D. Ga., In re at 2867 , n. 15 , 73 L.Ed .2 d 598 at 610 , n. 15 :

Seven Springs “ The Framers chose to leave to Congress the pre Explaining why courts cannot arrogate Judicial proceeding,

Apartments, Phase II, cise role to be played by the lower federal courts powers not given to them by powers &

1983 COCAP 33 B.R. 458 in the administration of justice . ” Congress. prerogatives

The accused ’s conduct with respect to his intera

Ore., In re: Complaint ction with Calvin and with Wade was boorish in

as to the Conduct of the extreme , but the issue is whether that conduc

WILLIAM C. t was “ prejudicial to the administration of justice Finding that badgering of clerks was

ROCHAT, Accused, ” or “ adversely reflects on his fitness to practice prejudicial to the administration of

1983 COCAP 295 Or. 533 law ” or both . justice. Discipline, Lawyer

Certainly this court recognizes the importance of

the orderly and efficient administration of justice

but acknowledges the court ’s primary responsib

ility of assuring individuals their rights to a prope

E.D. Va., U.S. v. Allen, rly selected jury , based upon the Batson standar Qualifiying criticisms of imprecion of Judicial proceeding,

1987 COCAP 666 F. Supp. 847 ds . guidance to lower courts. procedure

Mass., Michael J. Foley Although the single justice was not in error , it is

vs. Lowell Division of appropriate that we consider the matter under our

the District Court broader inherent common law and constitutional

Department, 398 Mass. powers to supervise the administration of justice Taking cognizance of a justice's

1986 COCAP 800 . conduct. Discipline, judge

But , while the mediation of courts is based upon

the principle of judicial impartiality , disintereste

dness , and fairness pervading the whole system

of judicature , so that courts may as near as possi

ble be above suspicion , there is , on the other sid

e , an important issue at stake : that is , that cause

s may not be unfairly prejudiced , unduly delayed

, or discontent created through unfounded charg

es of prejudice or unfairness made against the ju

Pa., Commonwealth v. dge in the trial of a cause . It is of great importan

Cherpes, 360 Pa. Super. ce to the administration of justice that such shoul Outlining the duties and discretion of

1987 COCAP 246 d not occur . a judge to vet his own imparitality. Discipline, judge

None of these cases contains any reasoned analys

is explaining why the “ administration of justice

” language should include bar proceedings . Upo

n reflection , however , we conclude that it does .

Ore., In re Complaint as Bar disciplinary proceedings , although sui gene Asserting that bar proceedings are

to the Conduct of ris in nature , strongly resemble judicial proceedi "adminsitration of justice" for

FERRIS F. BOOTHE, ngs in that they primarily involve factual adjudic purposes of rules of professional

1987 COCAP Accused, 740 P.2d 785 ations . conduct. Discipline, lawyer

C.A. 6, DETROIT

POLICE OFFICERS’

ASSOCIATION et al.,

Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. see also President ’s Commission on Law Enforc Referencing

Coleman A. YOUNG, ement and the Administration of Justice , Task F President's

Mayor of the City of orce Report : The Police 169 , 174 ( 1967 ) ( citi Commission on Law

Detroit, et al., ng sur veys which found racially exclusionary hir Adducing evidence and citations that Enforcement and the

Defendants-Appellants, ing practices and racially discriminatory job assig hiring program did not violate Title Administration of

1979 COCAP 608 F.2d 671 nments in Detroit Police Department ) . VII. Justice

Not only did Respondent engage in conduct preju

dicial to the administration of justice in ignoring

the various inquiries sent to him by Bar Counsel

in the Jones Conservatorship case , but he made

D.C., In re Melvin J. arguments and gave testimony at the hearing in t

WASHINGTON, 489 his case that the Hearing Committee charitably c Characterizing conduct that resulted in

1985 COCAP A.2d 452 haracterized as “ frivolous . ” three months' suspension. Discipline, Lawyer

This is a distinction well recognized in Common

wealth v. Shawell , supra. , wherein the Supreme

Court said : “ The nature and character [ of the d

uty ] and the practice under the common law and

related statutes must control the interpretation of

the term ‘ court . ’ Is the duty of such nature as t

o require joint consideration by all the members

of the court ? . .

. The appointment and removal of public official

s..

.has far reaching consequences and should be ex

ercised by all the available judges of the tribunal

assembled . .

. ( but ) there are many things in connection with

Pa., Hamill Estate, 3 Pa. the general administration of justice ( that may b Judicial powers &

***1977 COCAP D. & C.3d 100 e done by fewer members ) . ” Elaborating on the court's functions. prerogatives

As pointed out in United States v. Tateo , supra ,

377 U.S. at 466 , the rule of United States v. Ball

is also grounded upon fairness in the administrat

Md., Sweetwine v. ion of justice , considering the interests of the pu Discussing the appropriate scope of Judicial proceeding,

1980 COCAP State, 288 Md. 199 blic as well as those of the defendant . grant of retrial. procedure

Asserting liability under disciplinary

Ore., In Re: Complaint rule for causing secreatary (also a

as to the conduct of Smith , by persuading his secretary to make a fal notary) to make a false

HECTOR E. SMITH, se acknowledgement , engaged in conduct that pr acknowledgement on a power of a

1981 COCAP Accused, 292 Or. 84 ejudicial to the administration of justice . attorney. Discipline, Lawyer

In re Murphy states that opinion work product “ c

an be discovered only in very rare and extraordin

ary circumstances . where weighty consideration

D. Minn., U.S. v. s of public policy and a proper administration of

Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. justice would militate against the nondiscovery o Discussing appropriate bounds of Judicial proceeding,

1979 COCAP 1070 f an attorney ’s mental impressions . ” privilege. procedure

As discussed in Section I.A , supra , by developi

ng a complete and searching record , the trial cou

C.A. 9, U.S. v. Kamer, rt can , and should , ensure the thor ough and eff Grounding the insufficieny of trial Judicial proceeding,

1986 COCAP 781 F.2d 1380 ective administration of justice . judge's process. procedure

Respondent is further charged with violating Dis

ciplinary Rules 1 -

102 ( A ) ( 1 ) , ( 4 ) , ( 5 ) and ( 6 ) , by engagin

g in conduct involy -

ing dishonesty , fraud , deceit or misrepresentati

on and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the ad Describing basis of liability for

Ind., In re McDaniel, ministration of justice which adversely reflects o knowingly false testimony to grand Perjury, Discipline,

1984 COCAP 470 N.E.2d 1327 n his fitness to practice law . jury. Lawyer

Section 53a -

147 , a part of our penal code , covers the crime

of bribery in broad terms and is not limited to the

Conn., State v. Carr, jr., administration of justice and attempts to influen Describing basis of liability for

1977 COCAP 172 Conn. 458 ce legislation . bribing a police officer. Law enforcement

The administration of justice under our adversary

system largely depends upon the public ’s ability

Md., Atty Gen'l of Md. to rely on the honesty of attorneys who are place

v. Waldron, 289 Md. d in a position of being called upon to conduct th Asserting and explaining judicial

1981 COCAP 683 e affairs of others both in and out of court . oversight of the bar. discipline, judges

The court notes that to try both of these charges s

eparately is not in the best administration of justi

ce , for among other reasons — a ) the cost and ti

me of two trials , and b ) inconvenience to witnes

Fla., State v. Patrus, 46 ses returning for a second trial , and c ) delay in u Finding trial court exceeded discretion Judicial proceeding,

1977 COCAP Fla. Supp. 19 ltimate resolve of the accusations . in requiring separate trials. procedure

We recognize that the fair and orderly administra

tion of justice requires that trial judges must have

reasonable discretion in dealing with errant juror

s who demonstrate their unwillingness to abide b

Miss., Jones v. State, y the instructions of the court , or other unanticip Defending discretion of judges to Judicial proceeding,

1981 COCAP 398 So. 2d 1312 ated occurrences which transpire during trials . discontinue trials. procedure

Finally , we do not believe that retroactive applic

ation of Brown will " ' cast substantial doubt upo

n the validity of numerous prior judgments , and

would impose a great burden on the administrati

Wash., In the Matter of on of justice by allowing many cases to be relitig

the Marriage of Joyce E. ated . .

Hilt, Respondent, and . " ' Milbradt , 103 Wn .2 d at 342 , quoting Ann

Daniel M. Hilt, ot. , Comment Note — Prospective or Retroactiv

Appellant, 41 Wash. e Operation of Overruling Decision , 10 A.L.R. 3 Deciding to allow retroactive

1985 COCAP App. 434 d 1371 , 1391 ( 1966 ) . application of new rule. Judicial proceedings

The general subject is , therefore , one in which t

he public [ has ] an interest , with regard to whic

h legislative action , in the interest of the public i

s absolutely necessary . . .

. [ The use of stenographers to report judicial pro

ceedings ] expedites judi cial procedure , econom

izes the time of public tribunals , and so promote

s the prompt administration of justice and reduce

Pa., Jones v. Montefiore s the amount of public moneys in that behalf exp Requiring county to pay costs of Judicial proceeding,

1980 COCAP Hosp., 418 A.2d 1361 ended stenography. procedure

Because the court could not sanction the method

by which the jury panel was formed , it reversed

the judgment below " in the exercise of our powe Quoting precedent in discussion of

Colo., Fields v. People, r of supervision over the administration of justice review of lower court's practices for Judicial proceeding,

1987 COCAP 732 P.2d 1145 in the federal courts . " calling potential jurors. procedure

The Bar states that acceptance of this petition wil

l not adversely affect the public interest , underm

Fla., Fla. Bar v. ine the purity of the courts , or hinder the admini Granting peition for leave to resign

Hawkins, 467 So. 2d stration of justice or the confidence of the public where attorney repeatedly failed in his

***1985 COCAP 998 in the legal profession . duties. Discipline, Lawyer

Md., ATTORNEY

GRIEVANCE

COMMISSION OF

MARYLAND v.

WILLIAM H. Quoting disciplinary rule as basis for

PATTISON, JR., 292 Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the admi liability of attorney who converted

1982 COCAP Md. 599 nistration of justice . client funds to his own use. Discipline, Lawyer

An attorney may also be disciplined for conduct

Kan., State v. Russell, which interferes with the processes of the admini Quoting bases of liabilty for attorney's

1980 COCAP 227 Kan. 897 stration of justice statements. Discipline, Lawyer

Rule 60 ( b ) , however , does not subsume or abr

D.C., Synanon ogate the court ’s “ inherent power to dismiss an

Foundation, Inc. v. action when a party has willfully deceived the co

Bernstein, 503 A.2d urt and engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent w Assessing remedial options against

1986 COCAP 1254 ith the orderly administration of justice . ” attorney's fraud on the court. Discipline, Lawyer

He voiced concern that the holding of the majorit

y invites state and federal authorities to undermin

e the historic independence of the press by attem

pting to annex the journalistic profession as an in

vestigative arm of government which will in the l Discussing Supreme Court opinions

Oh., In re McAuley, 63 ong run harm rather than help the administration on the limited reporter's privilege from

1979 COCAP Ohio App. 2d 5 of justice . testifying before grand juries. Grand Jury

In determining the retroactivity of constitutional r

ules in criminal cases , the Supreme Court has co

nsidered three criteria : “ ‘ ( a ) the purpose to be

served by the new standards , ( b ) the extent of t

he reliance by law enforcement authorities on the

old standards , and ( c ) the effect on the admini

stration of justice of a retroactive application of t Reciting doctrinal basis for Judicial proceeding,

1985 COCAP C.A. 7, 757 F.2d 811 he new standards . ’ retroactivity determination. procedure

Neither good -

faith reliance by state or federal authorities on pr

ior constitutional law or accepted practice , nor s

evere impact on the administration of justice has

sufficed to require prospective application in thes

e circumstances . ” ( Williams v United States , 4 Reciting doctrinal basis for giving

N.Y., People v. Molina, 01 US 646 , 653 ; United States v Johnson , 457 retroactive effect to motion to Judicial proceeding,

1983 COCAP 121 Misc. 2d 483 US 537 . ) suppress evidence. evidence

The speedy and efficient administration of justic

E.D. Ark., Curl v. Gen. e requires , however , that ‘ [ m ] eritless claims .

Tele. Co. of the .. be disposed of at the first appropriate opportuni

Southwest, 669 F. Supp. ty . ’ Hungate v. United States , 626 F. 2d 60 , 62 Discussing the dismissal of a Judicial proceeding,

1987 COCAP 930 ( 8th Cir .1980 ) . complaint. procedure

He noted , for example , that “ although the rule i

s thought to deter unlawful police activity in part

through the nurturing of respect for Fourth Amen

dment values , if applied indiscriminately it may

C.A. 3, Morrison v. well have the opposite effect of generating disres

Kimmelman, 752 F.2d pect for the law and administration of justice . ” I Discussing Powell, J. on the

1985 COCAP 918 d . 428 U.S. at 491 , 96 S.Ct . at 3051 . exclusionary rule. Law enforcement

The majority would do well to bear in mind the c

omment of Judge Markell for this Court in the ca

se of In re Meyerson , 190 Md. 671 , 678 , 59 A.

2d 489 ( 1948 ) , quoted many times since then ,

to the effect that “ due regard for the administrati

Md., In re Application on of justice does not permit disbarment and rein

of Howard C., 286 Md. statement to be made mere adjuncts to reform sc Discussing timing of admission to the

1979 COCAP 244 hools and the parole system . ” bar aafter criminal acts. Discipline, Lawyer

The following acts or omissions by an attorney , i

ndividually or in concert with another person , ar

e misconduct and grounds for discipline , whethe

r or not occurring in the course of an attorney - Citing grounds of liability for attorney

Mich., In re Grimes, client relationship : " ( 1 ) conduct prejudicial to who backdated and persuaded client to

1982 COCAP 414 Mich. 483 the proper administration of justice ; " backdated a loan agreement. Discipline, Lawyer

Steinle mistakenly believes that his duty to his cli

ent extends even to commencing a frivolous and

meritless action intended to harass appellees and

to impede and obstruct the due administration of

justice by intentionally forcing a United States Di

C.A. 7, Steinle v. strict Judge to recuse himself from a pending cri

1985 COCAP Warren, 765 F.2d 95 minal case on the eve of trial . Characterizing attorney's conduct. Discipline, Lawyer

Characterizing attorney's repeated

Ind., In re Friedland, There are limits which have been drawn to guara violations of rules of professional

1981 COCAP 416 N.E.2d 433 ntee the effective administration of justice . conduct. Discipline, Lawyer

Although a defendant ’s right to counsel must be

respected , this right can not be manipulated in s

uch a manner as to impede the efficient administ

ration of justice . People v. Lucero , Colo. , 615

P. 2d 660 ( 1980 ) ; United States ex rel . Basker Discussing rejection of defendant's

ville v. Deegan , 428 F. 2d 714 ( 2d Cir . 1970 ) , request to discharge counsel and

Colo., People v. Barnes, cert . denied , 400 U.S. 928 , 91 S.Ct . 193 , 27 represent himself after jury was Judicial proceeding,

1981 COCAP 636 P.2d 1323 L.Ed .2 d 188 . empanneled. procedure

However , because of the strong constitutional i

mplications of the attorney -

client privilege , “ it would serve the orderly ad

ministration of justice and further insure the defe

ndant a fair trial if the admissibility of the [ attor

ney -

client communications ] could be determined in Explaining use of motion to suppress

La., State v. Taylor, 502 a pretrial proceeding . ” State v. Tanner , supra , to test admissibility of attorney-client Judicial proceeding,

1987 COCAP So. 2d 537 at 1174 . communications before trial. procedure

U.S. Claims, White The interests embodied in rules dealing with pret

Mountain Apache Tribe rial disclosure are significant and are an essential Judicial proceeding,

1984 COCAP v. U.S., 4 Cl. Ct. 575 part of the administration of justice . Discussing sanctions. procedure

Complaint Concerning

The Honorable Robert

Crane WINTON, Jr., Standard of Conduct The Code of Judicial Condu

Judge of District Court, ct focuses on conduct prejudicial to the administr

Hennepin County, State ation of justice , which includes but is not limited Explaining significance of canons

***1984 COCAP of Minnesota to criminal conduct . within Code of Judicial Conduct. Discipline, judge

Factors to be taken into account in determining w

hether a decision is to be applied prospectively or

retroactively are : ( 1 ) the purpose of the new ru

le , ( 2 ) the general reliance on the old rule , and

Mich., Hardigree v. ( 3 ) the affect on the administration of justice . P Reciting factors for determining

Green, 97 Mich. App. eople v Hampton , 384 Mich 669 , 673 - retroactive or prospective application Judicial proceeding,

1980 COCAP 62 674 ; 187 NW2d 404 ( 1971 ) . of a decision. precedent

Our inspection of the District ’s Plan persuades u

s that , though it burdens the Court , counsel and

others involved in the administration of justice , i

t does not , as a corollary , reward defendants wit

C.A. 5, U.S. v. Bullock, h automatic dismissals in all cases of underachie Assessing a District Court's plan for Judicial proceeding,

1977 COCAP 551 F.2d 1377 vement . case management. procedure

N.J., Greenberg v. The recusal of all judges so affected could impos Rejecting mandatory recusal of judges

Kimmelman, 99 N.J. e a substantial burden on the administration of ju whose spouses work in the kind of

1985 COCAP 552 stice , particularly in Atlantic County . business at bar. Discipline, judge

The Illinois Supreme Court “ has frequently held

that differences in the size of the municipalities

may raise special or unique problems in connecti

Ill., Rincon v. License on with many activities which justify classificatio

Appeal Comm'n of the n including * * * [ the ] administration of justice Allowing different review procedures Local

City of Chicago, 62 Ill. , [ citations ] • • Du Bois v. Gibbons ( 1954 ) , 2 for license depending on the size of commissioners

1978 COCAP App. 3d 600 Ill. 2d 392 , 402 , 118 N.E. 2d 295 , 301 . the municipality. issuing licenses

The only authority cited by the Willough -

bys to support their argument for the requiremen

t of a specific intent is a definition of contempt in

an Illinois case , picked up and quoted by this co

urt in In re Holbrook , 133 Me . 276 , 280 , 177

A. 418 , 420 ( 1935 ) , along with an assortment

of other definitions from other jurisdictions : any

act which is calculated to embarrass , hinder or o

bstruct the court in the administration of justice ..

.. ( Emphasis added ) We reject the Willough -

bys ’ suggestions that “ is calculated ” as there u

Me., State v. sed means “ is specifically intended ” ; we read “

Willoughby, 532 A.2d is calculated ” as meaning nothing more than “ h

1987 COCAP 1020 as a natural tendency . ” Upholding contempt conviction. Judicial proceeding

This contempt power may not be taken away or a Judicial proceeding,

Ala., Hall v. Hall, 485 bridged , as it is essential to the due administratio powers &

1986 COCAP So. 2d 747 n of justice . Describing a court's inherent power. prerogatives

The trial judge ’s knowledge of the condition of

his docket , considered against the need for an or

derly and prompt administration of justice , place

d him in a unique position to determine whether t Allowing dismissal with prejudice

La., Thomas v. State, he dismissal should be with or without prejudice considering previous continuances and Judicial proceeding,

1980 COCAP 383 So. 2d 108 . judge's docket. procedure

Here , sufficient evidence was presented from w

hich the trial court could conclude that the respon

dents knew that the preliminarily qualified jurors

were precluded from talking to anyone , includin

g members of the media , about the case ; that th

e respondents ’ conduct in contacting the jurors d

espite this knowledge was “ volitional and comm

itted when they knew their conduct was wrongful

” ; and that the respondents ’ conduct was ' cont

emptuous because they “ knowingly interfered wi

th the lawful Order of the court and that misbeha

vior was of such a character as to obstruct the ad Judicial proceeding,

Colo., In re Stone, 703 ministration of justice ” and offend the dignity of Upholding contempt finding for powers &

1985 COCAP P.2d 1319 the court . improper contact with jurors. prerogatives

His actions undertaken with such knowledge wo

uld demonstrate a fundamental lack of honesty a

nd truthfulness , a deep want of trustworthiness a

nd fidelity to those with whom he has entered a b

usiness relationship , and a chronic contempt for

N.J., In re Application the administration of justice and the laws that go Characterizing lawyer's engagement in

1983 COCAP of Matthews, 94 N.J. 59 vern the affairs of individuals . criminal activity. Discipline, Lawyer

The policy underlying the statute of limitations is

primarily for the protection of the defendant , an

d the courts , from litigation of stale claims wher

e plaintiffs have slept on their rights and evidenc

e may have been lost or witnesses ’ memories fa

ded . This policy is sound and necessary for the o

Az., Dicenso v. Bryant rderly administration of justice . ” Brooks v. Sout

Air Conditioning Corp., hern Pacific Co. , 105 Ariz. 442 , 444 , 466 P. 2d Judicial proceeding,

1982 COCAP 131 Ariz. 605 736 , 738 ( 1970 ) . Discussing doctrine. procedure

. If the single justice concludes that the administr

ation of justice would not be facilitated by reporti

Mass., Commonwealth ng the appeal to the full bench , the Commonwea Judicial proceeding,

v. Dunigan et al., 384 lth can not proceed as if no determination had be Affirming judicial prerogatives under powers &

1981 COCAP Mass. 1 en made . state law. prerogatives

To the extent such a charge is valid at common la

w , it is constitutionally impermissible as it disco

urages defendants from exercising their rights to Considering whether a perjury

C.A. 4, U.S. v. Endo, testify , without substantially benefiting the admi information is constitutionally Judicial proceeding,

1980 COCAP 635 F.2d 321 nistration of justice . permissible. procedure

The Court noted that , according to her allegation

s , plaintiff was discharged in retaliation for her r

efusal to commit a criminal act and that to permit

N.C., Hogan et al. v, her discharge , without legal recourse , upon suc Assessing the bounds of at-will

Forsyth Country Club h grounds would be offensive to the compelling p employment; plaintiff getting her day

1986 COCAP Co., 79 N.C. App. 483 ublic interest in the administration of justice . in court Judicial proceeding

In so holding , we are aware of the consideration

s regarding possible prior good -

faith reliance on RAJI 4.01 and the administratio Judicial proceeding,

Az., State v. Garcia, 152 n of justice as the result of vacating prior convicti Discussing retroactive application of a powers &

1986 COCAP Ariz. 245 ons in cases where that instruction was given . new rule. prerogatives

We are further satisfied that Judge Blair did not e

rr in concluding , based on his factual findings , t

hat Santamour ’s conduct did not “ [ fall ] below

an acceptable standard for fair and honorable ad

Ala., Blakesley v. State, ministration of justice . ” Bruce v. State , 612 P.

1986 COCAP 715 P.2d 269 2d 1012 ( Alaska 1980 ) . Rejecting defense of entrapment. Law enforcement

Va., Stockton v. The orderly administration of justice requires tha

Commonwealth, 227 t tactical matters , such as continuances , be left Finding meritless dispute with court- Judicial proceeding,

1984 COCAP Va. 124 with counsel . appointed counsel. procedure

Respondents assert that these requirements facilit

ate the efficient administration of justice , becaus

e nonresident attorneys allegedly are less compet

Sup. Ct., Frazier v. ent and less available to the court than resident at Finding discriminatory bar admission Bar association rules

1987 COCAP Heebe, 96 L. Ed. 2d 557 torneys . rules not backed by evidence. regulating lawyers

Cal., Wenger v. Prejudicial conduct must be “ conduct prejudicial

Comm'n on Judicial to the administration of justice that brings the ju

Performance, 29 Cal. 3d dicial office into disrepute . ” ( Const. , art . VI , Assessing bases for disqualification of

1981 COCAP 615 § 18 , subd . ( c ) ; italics added . ) a judge. Discipline, judge

W.D. Mo., Williams v. The preservation of public trust both in the scrup Explaining motivations for requiring

Trans World Airlines, ulous administration of justice and in the integrit disqualification of attorney likely to

1984 COCAP Inc., 588 F. Supp. 1037 y of the bar is paramount . reveal confidential information. Discipline, Lawyer

The trial court ’s inherent power to protect the so

und administration of justice has provided the ba Judicial proceeding,

C.A. 9, Wheeler v. U.S., sis for orders issued to protect jurors after the tria Discussing a post-trial protective powers &

1981 COCAP 640 F.2d 1116 l has ended . order. prerogatives

If the Government suffered any prejudice , the sp

ecifics of which are still unknown to me , it was

E.D. Pa., U.S. v. plainly self -

Consolidated Foods inflicted . Delay in the administration of justice Chiding the government's lack of Judicial proceeding,

1978 COCAP Corp., 455 F. Supp. 142 has been the subject of much criticism . preparation. procedure

“ Administration of justice ” has been described t

husly : “ The administration of justice consists in

the trial of cases in the court , and their judicial

determination and disposition by orderly procedu

re , under rules of law , and putting of the judgm

ent into effect . ” Massey v. City of Macon , 97

Ga.App . 790 , 794 , 104 S.E. 2d 518 , 521 -

522 ( 1958 ) . We do not believe that the langua

ge “ a lawyer shall not : . . engage in conduct that

is prejudicial to the administration of justice ” is

so vague and indefinite that it violates the due pr Discussing state bar rules and refusing

Tex., Howell v. State, ocess and equal protection clauses of the Constit vagueness challenge in disciplinary

1977 COCAP 559 S.W.2d 432 ution of Texas . case. Discipline, Lawyer

In contrast to the problems of choice of forum , c

hoice of law and conflicting rules of navigation f

oreseen in those cases , we see no similar burden

C.A. 1, Austin v. s on the administration of justice or on the flow o

Unarco Indus., Inc., 705 f maritime commerce that will result from a deni Discussing concerns in the definition Judicial proceeding,

1983 COCAP F.2d 1 al of admiralty jurisdiction in this case . of the reach of admiralty jurisdiction. procedure

“ By withholding the identity of the informer , th

e government profits in that the continued value

of informants placed in strategic positions is prot

ected , and other persons are encouraged to coop

erate in the administration of justice . ” United St Discussing the necessity of anonymity

C.A. 2, In re U.S., 565 ates v. Tucker , 380 F. 2d 206 , 213 ( 2d Cir . 19 of informants to promote cooperation

1977 COCAP F.2d 19 67 ) . with law enforcement. Law enforcement

Particularly in an era of excessively crowded low

er court dockets , it is in the interest of the fair an Quoting Supreme Court's

C.A. 9, Vauman v. U.S. d prompt administration of justice to discourage reaffirmation of review of final rather Judicial proceeding,

1977 COCAP Dist. Ct., 557 F.2d 650 piecemeal litigation . than "piecemeal" judgments. procedure

See § 3162 ( a ) ( 2 ) ( “ the court shall consider ,

among others , each of the following factors : th

e seriousness of the offense ; the facts and circu

mstances of the case which led to the dismissal ;

and the impact of a reprosecution on the administ Discussing dismiassal under the

C.A. 8, U.S. v. Ray, 768 ration of this chapter and on the administration o Speedy Trial Act for delay between Judicial proceeding,

1985 COCAP F.2d 991 f justice . ” ) . filing of, and hearing on, motions. procedure

The Court reflected upon the extraordinary natur

e of the state ’s interest in Dostert v. Neely , supr

a : “ In declining to enjoin the imposition of the d

isciplinary suspension against the plaintiff , the c

ourt wishes to emphasize the extraordinary state i

nterest in disciplinary proceedings which affect s

tate judges . Disciplinary proceedings exist to vin

dicate the most fundamental of state interests , th

S.D. W. Va., Dostert v. e need for a fair and impartial administration of j

1982 COCAP Neely, 537 F. Supp. 912 ustice for the benefit of all the state ’s citizens . Discussing sanctions against judges. Discipline, judge

( 5 ) Respondent ’s conduct aforesaid constitute

d misconduct in office , in that said conduct was

clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice

within the provisions of article 6 , § 30 of the Mi

Mich., In re Hotchkiss, chigan Constitution of 1963 , as amended , and Adopting a statement of reprimand

1982 COCAP 415 Mich. 1101 GCR 1963 , 932.4 , as amended . against a judge. Discipline, judge

In Stovall v. Denno , 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct . 19

67 , 18 L.Ed .2 d 1199 ( 1967 ) , a majority of th

e United States Supreme Court agreed on the fact

ors which should inform a decision regarding retr

oactivity : “ The criteria guiding resolution of the

question implicate ( a ) the purpose to be served

by the new standards , ( b ) the extent of the relia

nce by law enforcement authorities on the old sta

ndards , and ( c ) the effect on the administration Judicial proceeding,

Pa., Commonwealth v. of justice . ” ( Footnote omitted . ) Id. , at 297 , 8 Reciting standards for retroactive powers &

1980 COCAP Miller, 417 A.2d 128 7 S.Ct . at 1970 . application. prerogatives

Wash., In re

Disciplinary Proceeding The Commission has held that Judge Staples ' act

Against Fred R. Staples, ions nevertheless do not fit within the " administr Allowing a judge to engage in limited

1986 COCAP 105 Wash. 2d 905 ation of justice " exclusion . We disagree . law reform efforts. Judicial conduct

Factors to be considered in determining whether

transfer is appropriate typically include whether t

he statute of limitations has oth erwise run , the c

onvenience of the parties and witnesses , and the

effect on the efficient and expeditious administra

tion of justice . E. g. , Sherar v. Harless , supra , Judicial proceeding,

S.D.N.Y., Wingate v. 561 F. 2d at 794 ; Eccles v. United States , 396 F powers &

1980 COCAP Harris, 501 F. Supp. 58 .Supp . 792 , 796 ( D.N.D. 1975 ) . Considering transfer. prerogatives

United States ex rel . Brown v. Fogel , 395 F. 2d

291 , 293 ( 4th Cir . 1968 ) ( for breach of condit

ion other than nonappearance , court may do all t Judicial proceeding,

C.A. 5, U.S. v. hat is appropriate to orderly progress of trial and Collecting citations supporting history powers &

1979 COCAP Williams, 594 F.2d 86 fair administration of justice ) . of criminalization of bail-jumping. prerogatives

The court may order a prepleading mental health

and physical examination of a defendant and a pr

epleading investigation by the Department of Pro

bation to provide material that would reasonably

aid in the administration of justice by facilitating

the plea bargaining process . ( People v Crosby ,

N.Y., People v. Scala, 87 Misc 2d 1079 , 1080 [ Sup Ct , Bronx County Judicial proceeding,

1985 COCAP 128 Misc. 2d 831 1976 ] . ) Discussing pretrial abilities of court. procedure

The doctrine of equitable estoppel is premised up

on principles of fair dealing and is designed to ai

d the law in the administration of justice where ,

without its aid , injustice might result . City & C

ounty of Denver v. Stackhouse , 135 Colo. 289 ,

Colo., Fanning v. 310 P. 2d 296 ( 1957 ) ; Corporation of Presiding Discussing doctrine estopping plaintiff

Denver Urban Renewal Bishop v. Board of County Commissioners , 689 from raising issue in separate action Judicial proceeding,

1985 COCAP Auth., 709 P.2d 22 P. 2d 738 ( Colo.App .1984 ) . that could have been raised in first. procedure

In scrupulously guarding this fundamental right ,

our Supreme Court has noted that : [ a ] jury is a

n integral part of the court for the administration

of justice and on elementary principles its verdict

must be obedient to the court ’s charge , based s

olely on legal evidence produced before it and en Judicial proceeding,

N.J., Battista v. Olson, tirely free from the taint of extraneous considerat powers &

1986 COCAP 213 N.J. Super. 137 ions and influences . Discussing juries. prerogatives

Therefore , Appellee asserts that the court can im

pose a default judgment by analogy to the interro

gatory statute , or in the alternative it is within th

e inherent power of the court “ to do all things th

at are necessary for the administration of justice

Okla., Amoco within the scope of its - Judicial proceeding,

Production Co. v. jurisdiction . ” Layman v. State , 355 P. 2d 444 ( Assessing whether default judgment powers &

1980 COCAP Lindley, 609 P.2d 733 Okl.Cr.App .1960 ) would be appropriate. prerogatives

The interest of the public in the fair and proper a

dministration of justice includes concerns that tri

als be conducted in an evenhanded manner ; that

the participants in the adversary process , includi

ng witnesses , be protected from unfair tactics ; a

nd that the courts maintain the integrity of the ju

Colo., Rodriguez v. dicial system and the highest ethical standards of

District Court, 719 P.2d the legal profession . James , 708 F. 2d 40 ; Garc Protecting privilege of communication

1986 COCAP 699 ia , 517 F. 2d 272 ; G. Lowenthal , supra , at 61 . of sitnesses with counsel. Procedure; policy

The hearing board concluded that the respondent

’s submission of false documents to the grievanc

e committee violated C.R.C.P. 241.6 ( 7 ) and D

R1-

102 ( A ) ( 1 ) ( violation of a disciplinary rule )

, DR 1 -

102 ( A ) ( 4 ) ( conduct involving dishonesty , f

raud , deceit or misrepresentation ) , and DR 1 -

Colo., People v. Yost, 102 ( A ) ( 5 ) ( conduct that is prejudicial to the

1986 COCAP 729 P.2d 348 administration of justice ) . Recalling findings below. Discipline, Lawyer

Alternatively , the bar asserts that it adopted the

Rules under its authority to make regulations to a

id in the administration of justice ( Bus . & Prof.

Code , § 6031 ) and to ensure that persons admitt Recalling State Bar's justifications for

Cal., People v. Perez, 24 ed to the bar have received proper training ( see allowing supervised law students to Bar association

1979 COCAP Cal. 3d 133 Bus . & Prof. Code , § 6047 ) . participate in criminal matters. adopting rules

defendants EDWARD G. PARTIN , JACK P. F.

GREMILLION , JR. , HAROLD SYKES , BEN

TRANTHAM and CROCKETT CARLTON , u

nlawfully , willfully and knowingly did combine ,

conspire , confederate and agree together and wi

th each other and with their co-

conspirators , Claude W. Roberson , Mitchell Hu

sser and other unknown parties , to commit an of

fense against the United States , to -

wit , Title 18 , United States Code , Section 150

3 , that is to corruptly endeavor to influ ence , ob

struct and impede the due administration of justi

ce in the United States District Court for the Sout

hern District of Texas in that knowing that one C

laude W. Roberson was a material Government Judicial proceeding,

C.A. 5, U.S. v. Partin, witness at the trial of the criminal case , then pen powers &

1977 COCAP 552 F.2d 621 ding Restating the indictment. prerogatives

defendants EDWARD G. PARTIN , JACK P. F.

GREMILLION , JR. , HAROLD SYKES , BEN

TRANTHAM and CROCKETT CARLTON , u

nlawfully , willfully and knowingly did combine ,

conspire , confederate and agree together and wi

th each other and with their co-

conspirators , Claude W. Roberson , Mitchell Hu

sser and other unknown parties , to commit an of

fense against the United States , to -

wit , Title 18 , United States Code , Section 150

3 , that is to corruptly endeavor to influ ence , ob

struct and impede the due administration of justi

ce in the United States District Court for the Sout

hern District of Texas in that knowing that one C

laude W. Roberson was a material Government Judicial proceeding,

Mich., Falk v. State Bar witness at the trial of the criminal case , then pen powers &

1981 COCAP of Mich., 411 Mich. 63 ding Influencing witness prerogatives

Public confidence in the fairness of the criminal j

ustice system and community participation in the

administration of justice are also critical by -

Mass., Commonwalth v. products of juries composed of a representative

Brown, 11 Mass. App. cross section of the community . People v. Wheel Discussing the proportionality Judicial proceeding,

1981 COCAP Ct. 288 er , 22 Cal . 3d 258 , 270 - 272 ( 1978 ) . requirements for juries. procedure

This is so because the mayor had the power to is

sue a warrant for the arrest of defendant to comp

el his appearance at a stated time by reason of th

e mayor ’s statutory powers enumerated in R. C.

1905.20 , relating to criminal matters which , int

er alia , provides : “ * * * The mayor shall award

Oh., Vill. Of Oakwood and issue all writs and process that are necessary

v. Wuliger, 69 Ohio St. to enforce the administration of justice througho Law enforcement;

1982 COCAP 2d 453 ut the municipal corporation . * * * ” Citing ordinance. Mayoral powers

Woven throughout our disciplinary cases involvi

ng attorneys is the thought that they occupy a spe

cial position because they are actively involved in

W. Va., Re: Bonn administering the legal system whose ultimate g

1980 COCAP Brown, 166 W. Va. 226 oal is the evenhanded administration of justice . Discussing the disciplinary system. Discipline, Lawyer

The fact that she chose instead to make her dema

nds in the midst of an already unstable , difficult

, and conceivably dangerous setting gives rise to

a reasonable inference that her conduct was calcu

Ill., People v. Siegel, 94 lated to embarrass , hinder or obstruct the court i Evaluating conduct of disruptive Judiical proceeding;

1983 COCAP Ill. 2d 167 n its administration of justice . individual disruptive incident

When a defendant , for one reason or another , re

fuses the assistance of counsel , trial courts are fa

ced with a difficult question : should the Court re

quire “ standby ” counsel , even against the wish

es of the defendant , in order to protect the defen

dant ’s basic rights ? There is no right to standby

counsel . Nevertheless , the appointment of stand

by counsel may benefit not only the defendant bu Judicial proceeding,

Del., Hicks v. State, 434 t also the Court , by insuring an orderly and fair a procedure, fairness

1981 COCAP A.2d 377 dministration of justice . Assessing doctrine. to defendant

The following assertion of Judge Will is not true

and to that extent creates an appearance of despe

ration in attempting to establish a point : “ ‘ The

Judicial Council ’s order was undeniably “ neces

sary . ... for the effective and expeditious adminis

tration of justice . ’ The chaos and hardship to liti

gants that would have ensued at the expiration of

the Marathon stay , had there been no uniform p

Bankr. N.D. Ill., In re rocedure for carrying forward the business of fed Judicial proceeding,

Wildman, et al., 30 B.R. eral bankruptcy jurisdiction , are universally ackn Judge's assessment of delegations to powers &

1983 COCAP 133 owledged . ” bankruptcy judges. prerogatives

( 2 ) On motion of the state , the court or a party ,

the court may continue the case when required i

n the administration of justice and the defendant

Wash., State c. Kelly, will not be substantially prejudiced in the present Ordering conditions for grants of Judicial proceeding;

1982 COCAP 32 Wash. App. 112 ation of his or her defense . continuances. procedure

C.A. 10, Plastic Considering that this case is on appeal from an or

Container Corp. v. der granting summary judgment , the court has , i

Continental Plastics of n furtherance of the proper administration of just

Oklahoma, 607 F.2d ice , decided the issue of collateral estoppel on th Judicial proceeding;

1979 COCAP 885 e merits of the case . Discussing procedure in patent cases. procedure

In Ex Parte Reynolds , supra , the progenitor of t

his line of cases , the court interpreted Robinson

as diminishing the importance of the “ reliance ”

prong of the tripartite test of Stovall and Desist , Judicial proceeding,

N.D. Tex., Bullard v. and virtually eliminating the third branch of the t powers &

1980 COCAP Estelle est ( effect on administration of justice ) . Discussing retroactivity. prerogatives

For these reasons , this Court feels that unless rel

iance upon the old rule is so great that the accom

panying difficulties in the retroactive administrati Judicial proceeding,

E.D. Ill, Persico v. U.S. on of justice forbid ; it is important that some ave powers &

1977 COCAP DoJ, 426 F. Supp. 1013 nue of relief be made open to the petitioner . Discussing retroactivity. prerogatives

There would also seem to be little impact on - Judicial proceeding,

C.A. 1, Fernandez v. the administration of justice whether or not Rick powers &

1982 COCAP Chardon, 681 F.2d 42 s is applied retroactively . Discussing retroactivity. prerogatives

D. Mass., Lombard v.

Eunice Kennedy This is not a case , therefore , in which the unspe

Schriver Ctr. for Mental cified duration of M.G.L. c. 260 , § 7 ’s tolling p Assessing the effects of mental Judicial proceeding,

Retardation, Inc., 556 F. eriod would have pernicious consequences for th incompetence on state tolling powers &

1985 COCAP Supp. 677 e administration of justice . provision. prerogatives

Pa., In re Anonymous

No. 65 D.B. 75, 7 Pa.

D. & C.3d 519 . . . Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the admi Citing basis of liability for not

1977 COCAP BOARD nistration of justice . informing client and not filing action. Discipline, Lawyer

This court also has said that a minimal showing o

n the part of defendant serves the administration

of justice because it is much easier for defendant

than plaintiff to determine , for example , the abs

U.S. Claims, Park v. ence of defendant ’s witnesses and loss of defend Discussing showings for prejudicial Judicial proceeding;

1986 COCAP U.S., 10 Cl. Ct. 790 ant ’s documents . delay. procedure

By statute , the Supreme Court has " power and c

ontrol over attorneys and counsellors - at -

law and all persons practicing or assuming to pr

actice law ” in this State , and the Appellate Divi

sion is specifically " authorized to censure , susp

end from practice or remove from office any atto

rney and counsellor -

atlaw admitted to practice who is guilty of profe

ssional misconduct , malpractice , fraud , deceit ,

crime or misdemeanor , or any conduct prejudici

N.Y., In re Padilla, 67 al to the administration of justice ” ( Judiciary La Reiterating court's control of conduct

1986 COCAP N.Y.2d 440 w § 90 [ 2 ] ) . of lawyers. Discipline, Lawyer

As was said by this court in Southern Pacific Tra

Tex., State v. Rotello, nsportation Go . v. Stoot , 530 S.W. 2d at 931 : Affirming dismissal for prejudicial Judicial proceeding;

1984 COCAP 671 S.W.2d 507 Delay haunts the administration of justice . delay. procedure

M.D. Fla., U.S. v. The court found that the district court ’s conclusi Judicial proceeding;

Lehder-Rivas, 667 F. on that publicity posed a serious and imminent th Discussing restraining order on powers &

1987 COCAP Supp. 827 reat to the administration of justice was correct . attorneys regarding media contacts. prerogatives

C.A. 9, U.S. v. Tertou, Judicial proceeding;

1984 COCAP 742 F.2d 538 (footnote citing the Speedy Trial Act) procedure

Accordingly , and in furtherance of the

administration of justice , we conclude that a trial

Ct. Customs & Patent de novo is indicated in this case so that the

Appeals, ASG Indus. et merits of the issue of the amount of the net Considering impacts of recent Judicial proceeding;

1979 COCAP al. v. U.S., 610 F.2d 770 bounty herein involved can be fully developed . statutory amendments on procedure. procedure

We are entirely convinced that the ex parte dispo

sition of a criminal case out of court , or the disp

osition of any case for reasons other than an hone

N.C., In re Inquiry st appraisal of the facts and law as disclosed by t

Concerning Judge W. he evidence and the advocacy of both parties , wi Finding a violation of ethical rules in

Milton Nowell, 293 ll amount to conduct prejudicial to the administra judge's dispositoin of a case outside of Discipline, judicial;

1977 COCAP N.C. 235 tion of justice . normal procedures. procedure

Black ’s Law Dictionary , Rev. 4th Ed. , informs

us that such a body is ( p. 425 ) — “ A tribunal o

fficially assembled under authority of law at the a Public utility commission querying

Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, ppropriate , time and place , for the administratio attributes of a body that can

Petition of Myers, 46 n of justice . In re Carter ’s Estate , 254 Pa. 518 , constitutionally exercise judicial

1977 COCAP Fla. Supp. 74 99 A. 58 . ” functions Broad description

On this occasion , however , Zywicki informed t

he police officer that a decision of the District of

Columbia Superior Court had narrowed the appli

cation of 40 U.S.C. § 13k to prohibit only conduc

t engaged in “ with the intent to disrupt or interfe

C.A.D.C., Grace v. re with or impede the administration of justice or

Burger, 214 U.S. App. with the intent of influencing the administration Recounting conduct of officers at Judicial proceeding;

1981 COCAP D.C. 375 of justice . ” Supreme Court. procedure

The trial court also found , pursuant to § 220. -

15 , that appellee had the capacity to understand

the proceedings against him ; his plea was knowi

C.A. 2, Lockett v. ngly and voluntarily made ; and acceptance of th

Montemago, 784 F.2d e plea was required in the interest of the public in Assessing court's finding that pleas Judicial proceeding;

1986 COCAP 78 the effective administration of justice . was voluntary. procedure

The findings in 9 ( b ) and ( e ) , which we have

N.C., In re Inquiry adopted , constitute conduct prejudicial to the ad

Concernign a Judge, ministration of justice that brings the judicial offi Assessing judge's involvement with

1983 COCAP 309 N.C. 635 ce into disrepute . female probation officer. Discipline, judge

The raising of revenue and the allocation of finan

cial resources among all government entities is in

itially and primarily the responsibility of the legis

lative branch of government , and sound public p

olicy considerations demand that when the judici

ary seeks to use its inherent power to overcome t

his peculiar prerogative of the Legislature , it be

held to a high standard and assume the burden of

showing that the funds sought to be compelled a

Tex., District Judges v. re essential for the holding of court , the efficient

County Judge, 657 administration of justice , or the performance of Reciting standard for judicial, as Judicial proceeding;

1983 COCAP S.W.2d 908 its constitutional and statutory duties . opposed to legislative, exactions. financing

" conduct that is prejudicial to the administration

N.Y., In re Newman, 64 of justice ” ( Code of Professional Responsibility Basis of liability for a lawyer's

19781 COCAP A.D.2d 145 , DR 1 - 102 , subd [ A ] , par [ 5 ] ) ; repeated violations of ethical rules. Discipline, lawyer

To permit the losing party in an ongoing depende

ncy custody dispute , as in the case before us , to

file a later adoption proceeding before a different

Arizona juvenile judge while the dependency pr

oceedings are being processed by another Arizon

Az., In re Appeal, 680 a juvenile judge would cause havoc to the orderly Discussing prudential concerns of lack Judicial proceeding;

1983 COCAP P.2d 163 administration of justice . of jurisdictional limits. procedure

Applying this interpretation of the 1831 Act to th

e facts in Nye , the Supreme Court noted that the

allegedly obstructive acts occurred more than on

e hundred miles from the court in which the unde

rlying action was pending , and concluded that su

ch actions were not “ so near thereto as to obstru Judicial proceeding;

S.D.N.Y., U.S. v. Reed, ct the administration of justice , ” and therefore c powers &

1985 COCAP 601 F. Supp. 685 ould not be punished by the offended court . Recalling criteria for "obstruction." prerogatives

C.A. 11, U.S. v.

1986 COCAP Petzold, 788 F.2d 1478 (footnote citing s. 1503) Obstruction statute Unclear

Fla., State v. Patrus, 46 This discretion should be exercised in fairness to Announcing bounds for courts' Judicial proceeding;

1977 COCAP Fla. Supp. 19 all parties and the administration of justice . exercises of discretion. procedure

” Rather we think the language of these cases am

ply indicates that the purpose of the requirements

was to insure that dishonest , unscrupulous or co

rrupt individuals would not use their knowledge

W. Va., Puchinsky v. of the law to perpetrate fraud upon the unsuspect Citing, and then distinguishing, the

W. Va. Bd. of Law ing and unknowledgeable public or to obstruct th motivationd of bar rules from a

Examiners, 164 W. Va. e proper administration of justice for their own o lawyer's holding some or other

1980 COCAP 736 r their clients ’ benefit . political philosophy. Discipline, Lawyer

A court retains inherent power to grant relief to a

party who has been denied an opportunity to def

end in a divorce action under such circumstances

Minn., In re Marriage of as amount to a fraud on the court and the admini Judicial proceeding;

Nordmark, 388 N.W.2d stration of justice . Bredemann v. Bredemann , 2 powers &

1986 COCAP 436 53 Minn. 21 , 24 , 91 N.W. 2d 84 , 87 ( 1958 ) . Describing powers of the court. prerogatives

Typical of the reasoning of these courts is E. W.

Scripps Co. v. Fulton , supra , where the public i

nterest was stated as follows : “ It can never be cl

W. Va., State ex rel. aimed that in a democratic society the public has Judicial

The Herald Mail Co., no interest in or does not have the right to observ Discussing access of journalists to proceedings; access

1980 COCAP 165 W. Va. 103 e the administration of justice . judicial proceedings. to

In considering the serious request which was not

made lightly , we are guided by the rationale of

our Superior Court in Crawford ’s Estate , 307 P

a. 102 , 108 ( 1931 ) , wherein the court stated : “

Pa., Kaplan v. Due consideration should be given by him [ judg

Alleghany Co. Comm'rs, e ] to the fact that the administration of justice sh Assessing whether any county judge Judicial proceeding;

1986 COCAP 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 396 ould be beyond the appearance of unfairness . would be able to hear the instant case. procedure

Assessing denial of continuance when

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.