Opinion

State v. Curry

  • 406 S.C. 364
  • 752 S.E.2d 263
  • 2013 S.C. LEXIS 320
  • 2013 WL 6252436
Court
Supreme Court of South Carolina
Filed
Dec 4, 2013
Status
Published
Author
Pleicones
On the bench
Beatty, Hearn, Kittredge, Pleicones, Toal
Cited by
66 cases
Authority
More cited than 7.9%

finding that because the witnesses' testimonies varied substantially, the defendant's "claim of self- defense present[ed] a quintessential jury question, which, most assuredly, is not a situation warranting immunity from prosecution"

How later courts described this case

  • finding that because the witnesses' testimonies varied substantially, the defendant's "claim of self- defense present[ed] a quintessential jury question, which, most assuredly, is not a situation warranting immunity from prosecution"
  • holding for a defendant to be justified in using deadly force under the Act, "a valid case of self-defense must exist, and the trial court must necessarily consider the elements of self-defense in determining a defendant's entitlement to the Act's immunity[,] . . . includ[ing] all elements of self-defense, save the duty to retreat"
  • finding the defendant's "claim of self-defense present[ed] a quintessential jury question, which, most assuredly, [was] not a situation warranting immunity from prosecution" when the defendant was in a prior altercation with the victim and later retrieved a gun and shot the victim
  • finding the accused's "claim of self-defense present[ed] a quintessential jury question, which, most assuredly, [was] not a situation warranting immunity from prosecution" when the defendant was in a prior altercation with the victim and later retrieved a gun and shot the victim

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice PLEICONES.

I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree with the majority that the Protection of Persons and Property Act (Act) creates a statutory immunity but leaves intact the common law defenses of habitation, of others, and of self-defense. While a criminal defendant is entitled to have the issue of statutory immunity decided prior to trial by a judge, once the case goes to trial a defendant’s right to a jury charge on these defenses is determined under common law principles. I therefore agree that appellant was not entitled to a jury charge on the presumption created by S.C.Code Ann. § 16-11-440(C) (Supp.2012). However, since that charge was given, and since it was hopelessly confusing when viewed in light of the charge on common law self-defense, and since the trial judge, acting without benefit of our decision in State v. Duncan, 392 S.C. 404 , 709 S.E.2d 662 (2011), denied appellant’s immunity request under an incorrect standard, 6 I would reverse his convictions and remand for a new trial.

. The trial judge held that appellant was not entitled to immunity using the directed verdict standard of "any evidence” to deny the request rather than asking whether appellant had proven immunity by a preponderance of the evidence.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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