stating that with respect to wrongly-admitted evidence impacting a witness's credibility, the Court should consider "the importance of the witness's testimony to the prosecution's case, whether the witness's testimony was cumulative, whether other evidence corroborates or contradicts the witness's testimony, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the State's case"
How later courts described this case
- stating that with respect to wrongly-admitted evidence impacting a witness's credibility, the Court should consider "the importance of the witness's testimony to the prosecution's case, whether the witness's testimony was cumulative, whether other evidence corroborates or contradicts the witness's testimony, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the State's case"
- holding that when performing the Colf balancing test, the trial court should "articulat[e] for the record the specific facts and circumstances supporting its decision . . . .[,]" and "must state not only whether the probative value of the prior conviction substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect, but also why"
- finding the impeachment value of manslaughter offenses did not weigh in favor of admissibility because "manslaughter offenses, while crimes of violence, are not crimes of dishonesty or untruthfulness that directly impact the witness's veracity"
- finding the circuit court's ruling permitting admission of a defense witness's prior conviction was the law of the case when the defendant did not challenge the use of the conviction to impeach the witness's testimony
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice PLEICONES,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s decision to allow Bush, petitioner’s only witness, to be impeached by two remote manslaughter convictions. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that this improper impeachment was harmless error.
The test for determining whether an error involving a witness’s credibility 9 is harmless is derived from Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). See State v. Holmes, 320 S.C. 259 , 464 S.E.2d 334 (1995); State v. Gadsden, 314 S.C. 229 , 442 S.E.2d 594 (1994). The first inquiry is into the importance of the witness’s testimony to the proponent’s case, then whether the witness’s testimony was cumulative and whether other evidence contradicts or corroborates this witness’s testimony, and finally we look to the strength of the State’s case. Here, the case was largely a credibility contest between petitioner and the victim, a classic “he said, she said” contest without any physical evidence. Bush was the only other person present at the time of the alleged incident, and his testimony was critical to petitioner’s defense. While I agree that under some circumstances an error in permitting a witness to be impeached by prior convictions can be deemed harmless in light of another unobjected-to impeachment, I do not find those circumstances present here. Compare e.g. State v. McFarlane, 279 S.C. 327 , 306 S.E.2d 611 (1983)(in lewd act prosecution, defendant’s *32 erroneous impeachment with manslaughter harmless in light of proper impeachment with second degree rape conviction).
In my opinion, the erroneous impeachment of Bush by the two manslaughter convictions cannot be deemed harmless because he was also impeached by a weapons offense. State v. Holmes, supra. I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for a new trial.
HEARN, J., concurs.
. The issue is whether the court improperly permitted Bush’s credibility to be impeached by his prior conviction under Rule 609, SCRE, yet the majority at times treats the question as one of character impeachment. See Rule 608, SCRE. I do not agree that Rule 608 is relevant to our analysis or decision here.