stating that the test refusal statute “incorporates the requirement from section 169A.51 that an officer may request that a person submit to a chemical test when the officer ‘has probable cause to believe the person 8 was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle’ while impaired” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b) (2012))
How later courts described this case
- stating that the test refusal statute “incorporates the requirement from section 169A.51 that an officer may request that a person submit to a chemical test when the officer ‘has probable cause to believe the person 8 was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle’ while impaired” (quoting Minn. Stat. § 169A.51, subd. 1(b) (2012))
- concluding that an erroneous jury instruction was not harmless when the instruction deviated “so substantially” from the applicable law defining an element of the offense that it was “difficult to determine the impact of the erroneous instruction”
- stating that “probable cause incorporates the ... intuitions of the officer” because “an officer’s training and experience is the lens through which the fact-finder must evaluate the reasonableness of an officer’s determination of probable cause”
- stating that the reasonableness of an officer’s actions in a probable-cause analysis is “an objective inquiry” and the “actual, subjective beliefs of the officer are not the focus in evaluating reasonableness” (quotation omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GILDEA, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Dietzen.