stating that suppression of evidence found in an illegal search is not required where the State establishes that the evidence “ultimately or inevitably” would have been discovered by lawful means, but precluding the argument that law enforcement could have conducted a constitutional seizure or search but failed to do so (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that suppression of evidence found in an illegal search is not required where the State establishes that the evidence “ultimately or inevitably” would have been discovered by lawful means, but precluding the argument that law enforcement could have conducted a constitutional seizure or search but failed to do so (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
- stating that “[t]he question whether a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact,” and that “the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard controls [an appellate court’s] review of a district court’s finding of voluntary consent.” (quotation omitted)
- explaining that “Diede’s nervousness in response to questioning by multiple police officers after her passenger had been arrested and her denial that she had seen Hanson toss something into the truck were not enough to establish reasonable suspicion that she possessed a controlled substance”
- explaining that reasonable suspicion must be “based on specific, articulable facts” that allow the officer “to articulate at the omnibus hearing that he or she had a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the seized person of criminal activity”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GILDEA, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Dietzen.