Rhonda Boyette v. Marcus Adams

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10288

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

RHONDA BOYETTE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

MARCUS ADAMS,

Defendant-Appellee.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 5:19-cv-01802-LCB

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 22-10288

Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Rhonda Boyette appeals the district court’s partial grant of

summary judgment in favor of Detective Marcus Adams and its de-

cision to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law

claims. With respect to her claims of illegal seizure and malicious

prosecution brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court

determined that Detective Adams was entitled to qualified immun-

ity. Because we agree that Detective Adams was entitled to quali-

fied immunity and that the district court acted within its discretion

in declining to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction, we affirm. 1

I

Ms. Boyette was married to James Monte Long, Sr. from

2011 to 2014. Together they had a son, J.L., who was born in 2011.

In 2014, Shortly after the couple divorced in 2014, Mr. Long filed a

report of child abuse with the City of Madison Police Department

(“MPD”) after finding J.L. with bruising on his face and right but-

tock. Mr. Long submitted with the report pictures of J.L.’s bruises

and a text message from Ms. Boyette admitting that she had caused

1 Although Ms. Boyette labeled her second claim as a false arrest, it properly

was, and was treated by the district court as, a claim for malicious prosecution

because the relevant arrest was effectuated pursuant to a warrant. See Wil-

liams v. Aguirre, 965 F.3d 1147, 1158 (11th Cir. 2020). Ms. Boyette’s argu-

ments on appeal acquiesce to this characterization.

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22-10288 Opinion of the Court 3

the injury. The pictures depicted bruising on J.L.’s face and a large

red imprint of a hand on his buttock.

On June 18, 2016, Mr. Long filed another report with the

MPD concerning a bruise on J.L.’s leg that J.L. claimed was from

his mother. He again included pictures. The MPD closed a subse-

quent investigation due to lack of supporting evidence.

In February of 2018, the MPD received a report from the

principal of J.L.’s school that J.L. had arrived at school with a note

addressed to his counselor. According to the note, Mr. Long made

J.L. take off his clothes and took pictures. Detective Adams began

investigating the potential production of child pornography.

Detective Adams went to Mr. Long’s residence to ask about

the pictures. According to Detective Adams, the two had been ac-

quainted but he did not recognize Mr. Long’s name from the report

or initially realize who Mr. Long was upon seeing him in person.

Mr. Long explained to Detective Adams that he took the pictures

to document J.L.’s injuries, as he believed that J.L. was “getting the

hell beat out of him” by Ms. Boyette. The pictures depicted a large

bruise on J.L.’s right buttock and an adjacent large, discolored

bruise on his upper right leg.

In continuing that investigation, Detective Adams shifted to

focusing on potential child abuse and arranged a forensic interview

for J.L. at the National Children’s Advocacy Center (“NCAC”).

During that interview, J.L. was largely unresponsive but admitted

that his mother spanked him, including on his buttocks and back

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4 Opinion of the Court 22-10288

with a belt but did not use the belt “anymore.” The MPD closed

the case. 2

A related medical examination concluded that the marks on

J.L.’s skin were normal childhood injuries. It also found no signs

of acute or chronic injury.

In November of 2018, J.L.’s godmother and court-appointed

observer, Rebecca Goodsell, contacted Detective Adams about

concerns of Ms. Boyette abusing J.L. Ms. Goodsell apparently was

Mr. Long’s girlfriend, but the timeline and nature of their relation-

ship is unclear from the record. Detective Adams denied any

knowledge of that relationship at the time of the investigation.

Ms. Goodsell emailed to Detective Adams pictures of J.L.’s

bruising and a recorded conversation between her and J.L. about

the bruising. In that conversation, J.L. repeatedly stated that he did

not know where or how he got the bruises on his back. Eventually,

however, he did state that several weeks prior his mother had

spanked him with a wooden paddle. He claimed that his mother

switched to a wooden paddle “because [she believed] the belt [had

not] been working.”

Detective Adams advised Ms. Goodsell to file a police report

and she did so several days later, including images of J.L.’s bruising

2 According to Detective Adams, the conclusions of that report of “un-

founded” and “no crime committed” referred to the initial child pornography

case and not the case of physical abuse.

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22-10288 Opinion of the Court 5

from the most recent incidents. The set of pictures depicted a pair

of faded bruises on J.L.’s lower back, and another on his left hip and

upper left buttock.

In early December of 2018, Mr. Long emailed Detective Ad-

ams photographs of J.L. he had taken several days before. The pic-

tures depicted large, discolored bruises on J.L.’s back, and smaller

bruises on his lower back, right buttocks, and several on his right

hip. Ms. Boyette admitted that, approximately one week earlier,

she had given J.L. three “licks” with the paddle.

Detective Adams initiated another investigation and con-

tacted the Alabama Department of Human Resources (“DHR”).

Detective Adams also set up another forensic interview with the

NCAC, this time with December Guzzo, who was familiar with

and previously had interviewed J.L. on two occasions. In prepara-

tion, she reviewed all of J.L.’s prior interviews, discussed them with

previous examiners, and reviewed the photographs of his injuries.

During the interview with Ms. Guzzo, J.L. stated that his

mother had spanked him a single time with the paddle for not get-

ting dressed, which “hurt a lot.” That occasion did not leave a

bruise, but a week prior he had three bruises on his “bottom” from

another paddling when his mother hit him three times. J.L. also

appeared to point at his lower back and buttocks when indicating

where his mother paddled him. There were “a lot of other times”

that a spanking left him with “red” and “blue” bruises from either

a belt or the paddle. His mother was the only person who paddled

him. The spankings made him “not happy,” and he wanted them

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6 Opinion of the Court 22-10288

to stop. He was able to see the bruises on his backside in pictures

his father showed him. During the interview, J.L. drew a picture

of the paddle unprompted. Detective Adams observed the inter-

view from a live video feed in another room.

Based on the interview, Ms. Guzzo opined that J.L. finally

was of an age where he could provide reliable and consistent infor-

mation, as he narrated freely in his own words when prompted

with open-ended questions and provided specific sensory details

about his experiences. Ms. Guzzo believed that, because J.L. was a

focused and willing cooperator in the interview and appeared to be

drawing information from his own experiences, there was no indi-

cation of bias or “coaching” in his statements. She further noted

that he did not provide leading answers, such as by saying “my dad

or mom told me to say,” or provide a one-sided recitation of the

facts. Finally, she opined that, in her experience, the nature of J.L.’s

bruising and the emotional impact of the punishment exceeded the

acceptable range of corporal punishment and, thus, was abuse.

The day after J.L.’s forensic interview with Ms. Guzzo, Ms.

Boyette and her husband, Haden Boyette, visited the MPD with

J.L. Detective Adams told them that there was an open case con-

cerning J.L. and scheduled to speak with Ms. Boyette at a later date.

Mr. Boyette claimed that Mr. Long had “put up” J.L. to say that he

was being sexually abused by Mr. Boyette, but Detective Adams

explained that he was not a suspect and that the case did not in-

volve any allegations of sexual abuse. Meanwhile, Mr. Long filed

another report of abuse to J.L.

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22-10288 Opinion of the Court 7

Several days later, Ms. Boyette arrived for her scheduled in-

terview with Detective Adams and signed a Miranda waiver form.

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). She assumed she was

there because J.L. “told [her] his dad told him to say stuff and called

him Judas.” Detective Adams showed her the pictures of J.L.’s

bruises, of which she claimed to not know the origin but admitted

to paddling J.L. on multiple occasions. She said that she did not

know how J.L. incurred his injuries but did not blame anyone else.

Ultimately, Detective Adams informed Ms. Boyette that she

was under arrest for child abuse based on the cases dating back to

2014 and J.L.’s recent statements in the interview with Ms. Guzzo.

Specifically, Detective Adams arrested Ms. Boyette on suspicion of

violating Ala. Stat. § 26-15-3, which provides that “[a] responsible

person . . . who shall torture, willfully abuse, cruelly beat, or oth-

erwise willfully maltreat any child under the age of 18 years shall,

on conviction be guilty of a Class C felony.”

Upon being placed in handcuffs, Ms. Boyette attempted to

hand Detective Adams several papers, which he believed to be re-

lated to her divorce with Mr. Long. Ms. Boyette replied: “No, it’s

about his daughter talking about what he did to her.” Detective

Adams declined to review the papers as they did not concern J.L.

After arresting Ms. Boyette, Detective Adams returned to

the MPD lobby to inform Mr. Boyette of his wife’s charges. Mr.

Boyette avers that he asked Detective Adams to speak to J.L.,

which Detective Adams declined to do, allegedly stating that he did

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8 Opinion of the Court 22-10288

not care what J.L. had to say at that point and that he had heard

everything he needed to hear from J.L.

Eventually, the charges against Ms. Boyette were dismissed

for improper venue. Detective Adams presented his case files and

notes to a magistrate in the appropriate venue and applied for a

warrant for Ms. Boyette’s arrest. The magistrate typed the com-

plaints for child abuse, which Detective Adams signed, found prob-

able cause for the charges, and issued a warrant for Ms. Boyette’s

arrest.

In Detective Adams’ experience, magistrates in the area con-

sider repetitive bruising caused in the name of corporal punish-

ment to be excessive, thus giving rise to probable cause for child

abuse. Detective Adams also believed that he had probable cause

to arrest Ms. Boyette on the lesser offense of third-degree assault.

Detective Adams was not involved in the independent investiga-

tion by the DHR, which later found that Ms. Boyette had not

abused J.L. According to Detective Adams, the DHR determines

only whether to pursue remedial action for abuse, which does not

impact his decision to seek a warrant.

Soon thereafter, Ms. Boyette voluntarily surrendered to law

enforcement and bonded out of jail that same day. The charges

brought against her were dismissed the next month. The county

judge determined that J.L. had been directed by Mr. Long to make

false allegations against Ms. Boyette and found Mr. Long in con-

tempt of court, sentencing him to 120 days in jail.

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22-10288 Opinion of the Court 9

Ms. Boyette then filed this § 1983 action, raising five claims

against Detective Adams. For her illegal seizure and malicious

prosecution claims, she asserted that Detective Adams lacked prob-

able cause to arrest her. She also raised three related state-law

claims.

II

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judg-

ment, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-mov-

ing party. See Terrell v. Smith, 668 F.3d 1244, 1249-50 (11th Cir.

2012). See also Fuqua v. Turner, 996 F.3d 1140, 1149 (11th Cir.

2021) (stating that all “reasonable” inferences must be resolved in

favor of the non-moving party). Summary judgment is appropriate

when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and [] the

moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quotation omitted). See

also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the

outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty

Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The mere fact that the record

contains some scintilla of evidence to support the non-movant’s

position is not dispositive; “a ‘genuine’ dispute requires that the ev-

idence is such that a reasonable jury could find for the non-mo-

vant.” Hammett v. Paulding Cnty., 875 F.3d 1036, 1049 (11th Cir.

2017).

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10 Opinion of the Court 22-10288

III

To proceed with her constitutional claims under § 1983, Ms.

Boyette must overcome Detective Adams’ defense of qualified im-

munity. Qualified immunity shields government officials acting

within their discretionary authority from civil damages liability un-

less the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was

clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct. See Ash-

croft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). “In this [C]ircuit, the law

can be ‘clearly established’ for qualified immunity purposes only by

decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit Court of Ap-

peals, or the highest court of the state where the case arose.”

Jacoby v. Baldwin Cnty., 835 F.3d 1338, 1344 (11th Cir. 2016).

A

Detective Adams was entitled to qualified immunity on Ms.

Boyette’s illegal seizure claim. As explained below, he had at least

arguable probable cause to arrest her.

“Probable cause to arrest exists when law enforcement offi-

cials have facts and circumstances within their knowledge suffi-

cient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed

or was committing a crime.” United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d

999, 1002 (11th Cir. 1992). “This standard is met when the facts and

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she

has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent

person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the suspect

has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.”

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22-10288 Opinion of the Court 11

Rankin v. Evans, 133 F.3d 1425, 1435 (11th Cir. 1998) (internal quo-

tation marks omitted) (quoting Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155,

158 (11th Cir. 1995)). To that end, probable cause requires more

than mere suspicion but does not require convincing proof or the

level of proof necessary to support a conviction. See id. (citations

omitted). See also Gates v. Khokhar, 884 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir.

2018) (“innocent behavior frequently will provide the basis for a

showing of probable cause”) (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,

243 n.13 (1983)).

Even if probable cause does not exist, “arguable probable

cause” still entitles an arresting officer to qualified immunity. See

Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002). Arguable prob-

able cause exists “where reasonable officers in the same circum-

stances and possessing the same knowledge as the [arresting of-

ficer] could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest.” Id.

(citation omitted). Arguable probable cause employs a standard of

objective reasonableness, such that it may be present “regardless of

the officer’s underlying intent or motivation.” Id. Here, the undis-

puted facts could have led a reasonable officer to believe that Ms.

Boyette violated Alabama law.

Detective Adams was aware about Ms. Boyette’s potential

abuse of J.L. in 2014, when he was a mere two years old. In a text

message, she admitted to causing him injuries at that time. On four

more occasions over the next four years, Mr. Long or Ms. Goodsell

filed reports alleging abuse of J.L. by Ms. Boyette, with each report

accompanied by photographic evidence. Those photographs

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12 Opinion of the Court 22-10288

depicted bruising of varying degrees on J.L.’s backside—the back

of his legs, lower back, hips, and buttocks. Ms. Boyette admitted

to paddling J.L., including during a timeframe consistent with the

last set of photographs submitted by Mr. Long.

Detective Adams also witnessed J.L. freely narrate his his-

tory of punishment, including being hit on his backside with a belt

and paddle, and the pain and negative feelings he endured. J.L.

stated that his mother was the only person who paddled him, and

voluntarily drew a picture of the paddle. Ms. Guzzo, a child foren-

sic interview specialist, believed that J.L. was sincere and that his

answers were free of evidence of bias or coaching. And when De-

tective Adams interrogated Ms. Boyette, she did not direct the

blame for J.L.’s injuries to any other person.

Ms. Boyette does not dispute these facts. Instead, she posits

that a reasonable jury could find that Detective Adams was biased

in favor of Mr. Long because they were acquaintances from 30

years prior. Ms. Boyette’s theory has a shaky foundation. The bias,

she claims, is evinced by Detective Adams ignoring evidence of

coaching, such as in the recorded conversation between Ms. Good-

sell and J.L. That recording, however, shows a concerned adult

attempting to draw out an answer from a reticent child. Despite

her repeated questioning, at no time did Ms. Goodsell lead or sug-

gest an answer to J.L.

With respect to the forensic interview between Ms. Guzzo

and J.L., Ms. Boyette asks that we infer coaching even though a

specialist who was intimately familiar with J.L. found none. She

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22-10288 Opinion of the Court 13

then turns to Detective Adams’ failure to investigate her husband’s

allegations of coaching. But Detective Adams had no bona fide

concern with coaching at that time given Ms. Guzzo’s assessment,

so it was not surprising that the first mention of sexual abuse alle-

gations at the culmination of his investigation did not send him

running to question J.L. Furthermore, it was within the purview

of the NCAC to interview J.L., and such an interview had happened

not one day prior.

Only reasonable inferences must be resolved in Ms. Boy-

ette’s favor. Ms. Boyette’s line of logic of is simply too attenuated

to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Fuqua, 996 F.3d at

1149; Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195. Detective Adams’ investigation may

not have been perfect, but the law does not demand perfection.3

In sum, Detective Adams correctly determined that he had

probable cause to arrest Ms. Boyette based on years of repeated

punishment of a child with a belt and paddle that purportedly left

visible bruising, and which was supported by photographic evi-

dence and testimony. At a minimum, a reasonable officer in his

position could have believed that Ms. Boyette had committed a vi-

olation of Ala. Stat. § 26-15-3 by willfully abusing or cruelly beating

3 Ms. Boyette places great weight on our decision in Kingsland v. City of Mi-

ami, 382 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by

Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715 (2019). That decision is unpersuasive absent

reasonable evidence of explicit bias. See Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1229-31.

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14 Opinion of the Court 22-10288

J.L., and therefore had arguable probable cause. See Lee, 284 F.3d

at 1195; Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1435. 4

Ms. Boyette’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. For

starters, there is no dispute that “reasonable and appropriate” cor-

poral punishment generally is permissible under Alabama Law.

See Ala. Stat. § 13A-3-24(1); Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298. But this case

was not about the legality of each isolated instance of punishment

imposed upon J.L., but rather, Detective Adams’ investigation of

what appeared to be a pattern of violence (and resulting injuries)

over many years amounting to abuse or assault. Even if Detective

Adams was mistaken on the merits, the evidence required to sup-

port a finding of probable cause need not reach the level of proof

necessary to support a conviction. See Rankin, 133 F.3d at 1435.

See also Gates, 884 F.3d at 1298 (“The rationale behind qualified

immunity is that an officer who acts reasonably should not be held

personally liable merely because it appears, in hindsight, that he

might have made a mistake.”). Nor does the eventual dismissal of

4 Detective Adams also reasonably believed that he had probable cause to ar-

rest Ms. Boyette on the lesser offense of third-degree assault on a child. See

Ala. Stat. § 13A-6-22. See also Bombailey v. State, 580 So. 2d 41, 43 (Ala. Crim.

App. 1990) (affirming conviction for third-degree assault of a child for single

incident of beating, including with a belt, that left bruising). If Detective Ad-

ams had probable cause or arguable probable cause to arrest for any offense,

qualified immunity applied. See Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240,

1258 (11th Cir. 2010).

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22-10288 Opinion of the Court 15

Ms. Boyette’s charges affect the validity of her arrest. See Marx v.

Gumbinner, 905 F.2d 1503, 1507 (11th Cir. 1990).

Ultimately, Ms. Boyette’s attempts to create a genuine issue

of material fact as to whether Detective Adams was entitled to

qualified immunity for her illegal seizure claim fall short. Detective

Adams was acting within his discretionary authority, and he was

entitled to qualified immunity from Ms. Boyette’s illegal seizure

claim because he had probable cause, or at least arguable probable

cause, for the arrest.

B

Detective Adams also was entitled to qualified immunity on

Ms. Boyette’s malicious prosecution claim, as there was no genuine

issue of material fact as to whether he reasonably believed that he

had probable cause to arrest her. To establish a § 1983 malicious

prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) the elements of the

common law tort of malicious prosecution; and (2) a violation of

her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable sei-

zures. See Thompson v. Clark, 142 S. Ct. 1332, 1337-38 (2022);

Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003). Under Alabama

law, the elements for the common-law tort of malicious prosecu-

tion are (1) a judicial proceeding instituted or continued by the pre-

sent defendant, (2) with malice and without probable cause,

(3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s favor, and (4) caused

damage to the plaintiff accused. See Grider, 618 F.3d at 1256 (citing

Wood, 323 F.3d at 882).

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16 Opinion of the Court 22-10288

As to the second prong, “it is well established that an arrest

without probable cause is an unreasonable seizure that violates the

Fourth Amendment.” Id. (citations omitted). As such, the exist-

ence of probable cause defeats a § 1983 malicious prosecution

claim. See id. See also Washington v. Howard, 25 F.4th 891, 904

(11th Cir. 2022) (“If an officer fully and honestly places evidence

before the magistrate, reasonably believing that there is probable

cause, those ‘procedural steps . . . shield against a Fourth Amend-

ment claim.’”) (citing Hupp v. Cook, 931 F.3d 307, 324 (4th Cir.

2019)).

Ms. Boyette argues that Detective Adams was not entitled

to qualified immunity on her malicious prosecution claim because

he lacked probable cause for the same reasons discussed above.

Once again, she cannot show that Detective Adams lacked proba-

ble cause or arguable probable cause, or that in the context of this

claim, that he unreasonably believed that he had probable cause

when securing the warrant. See id.

Although Ms. Boyette does not change the tenor of her ar-

gument, several facts that were less relevant above merit mention-

ing here given the timing of her second arrest (which took place

several months after her initial warrantless arrest). Such facts in-

clude the papers that Ms. Boyette handed to Detective Adams after

she was initially placed under arrest, the allegations by Mr. Boyette

against Mr. Long from that same day, and the Boyettes’ request

that Detective Adams speak with J.L. again. Ms. Boyette argues

that had Detective Adams further investigated that evidence, he

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22-10288 Opinion of the Court 17

may have determined that Mr. Long coached J.L. and that may

have created an issue of fact as to whether there was actual proba-

ble cause to support the second arrest. But see Lowe v. Aldridge,

958 F.2d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir. 1992) (conflicting evidence did not

negate probative value of incriminating evidence used to procure

warrant in child abuse case, such that no genuine issue of material

fact existed as to objective reasonableness of defendants’ actions,

warranting summary judgment on remand).

Detective Adams declined to review that evidence and his

decision was objectively reasonable at the time. And he only

needed to reasonably believe that he had probable cause in secur-

ing the warrant from the magistrate judge. The papers did not re-

late to J.L., and J.L.’s case did not concern allegations of sexual

abuse. The very day before, Detective Adams sat and watched Ms.

Guzzo interview J.L., who affirmed that his mother had paddled

him on multiple occasions and otherwise physically punished him

for years. Ms. Guzzo, a specialist in interviewing child abuse vic-

tims and who was familiar with J.L., believed that J.L. was sincere.

Given this context and his awareness of the complaints of

alleged abuse to J.L. since his infancy, Detective Adams could have

reasonably believed, in presenting his case files and notes to the

magistrate, that he had probable cause to arrest Ms. Boyette on

charges of child abuse. See Washington, 25 F.4th at 904. Because

Ms. Boyette does not argue that Detective Adams made a material

omission or excluded exculpatory evidence, and does not argue

that the warrant was facially invalid, the magistrate’s subsequent

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18 Opinion of the Court 22-10288

determination of probable cause shields Detective Adams from lia-

bility. See id. Consequently, the district court did not err in grant-

ing summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on Ms.

Boyette’s malicious prosecution claim.

IV

The district court had original jurisdiction over Ms. Boy-

ette’s constitutional claims under § 1983 pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1331. There is no dispute that her constitutional claims arose out

of a common nucleus of operative fact as the state law claims,

namely, Detective Adams’ investigation of J.L.’s injuries. The dis-

trict court therefore had the authority and discretion to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. See Parker v.

Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 468 F.3d 733, 742-43 (11th Cir. 2006).

Such discretion may arise under four circumstances, but

only one is relevant here, that is, whether “the district court has

dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. at

743. To that end, because the district court properly granted sum-

mary judgment on the constitutional claims, it acted within its dis-

cretion when it subsequently declined to exercise supplemental ju-

risdiction over state law claims that no longer had a federal anchor.

See Baggett v. First Nat’l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342,

1352-53 (11th Cir. 1999).

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22-10288 Opinion of the Court 19

V

We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment

on the federal claims. We also affirm the district court’s decision

to not exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

AFFIRMED.