Heinrich C. Schweizer

United States Tax Court

T.C. Memo. 2022-102

HEINRICH C. SCHWEIZER,

Petitioner

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,

Respondent

—————

Docket No. 3679-18. Filed October 6, 2022.

—————

Peter J. Tomao and Lawrence J. Scherer, for petitioner.

Rachel L. Schiffman, Jane J. Kim, Thomas A. Deamus, Brian J.

Bilheimer, and Mimi M. Wong, for respondent.

MEMORANDUM FINDINGS OF FACT AND OPINION

LAUBER, Judge: This case concerns petitioner’s entitlement to

a charitable contribution deduction for a gift of art. By Order served

June 15, 2021, we granted in part respondent’s Motion for Partial Sum-

mary Judgment, holding that petitioner had failed to satisfy the sub-

stantiation requirements of section 170(f)(11) and the regulations prom-

ulgated thereunder for claiming this deduction. 1 In April 2022 we held

a trial to decide the sole remaining issue: whether petitioner’s failure to

meet these requirements was “due to reasonable cause and not to willful

neglect.” See § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II). We hold that petitioner did not have

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Internal Reve-

nue Code, Title 26 U.S.C. (Code), in effect at all relevant times, all regulation refer-

ences are to the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all

relevant times, and all Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Pro-

cedure.

Served 10/06/22

2

[*2] reasonable cause for his failures, and we thus sustain disallowance

of the charitable contribution deduction.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts including exhibits

that is incorporated by this reference. Petitioner resided in New York

when he timely petitioned this Court.

A. Petitioner’s Career

Petitioner has a long, varied, and distinguished career as an Af-

rican art dealer and collector. He was born in Munich, Germany, to par-

ents who were both artists. He began collecting African art at a young

age, beginning with less expensive objects but progressively setting his

sights higher.

Petitioner received most of his education in Germany. He was

awarded a law degree by a prestigious German university and passed a

five-day state law exam (equivalent to a bar exam in the United States).

He then embarked on an internship in New York City with Sotheby’s,

one of the world’s leading brokers of decorative and fine art. When this

internship ended, he returned to Germany for graduate studies in law,

spending five years working towards a Ph.D. Those studies were cur-

tailed in 2006 when Sotheby’s invited him to apply for a vacancy in its

African art department. Petitioner accepted that offer, left his Ph.D.

program before finishing his dissertation, and moved to New York to

work full time in the African art field.

Petitioner served as the Director of African and Oceanic Art at

Sotheby’s from 2006–2015. He was successful in this position; during

his tenure, the value of Sotheby’s annual auctions of African art rose

from $2 million to $55 million. One aspect of his job was to evaluate

African art held by customers and potential customers. In discharging

that responsibility he regularly gave customers estimates of the price at

which their art might sell at auction. He also worked directly with So-

theby’s appraisal department, assisting its professionals in providing

customers with formal appraisals concerning the fair market value

(FMV) of artwork.

Petitioner filed his first U.S. income tax return in 2007. On the

recommendation of a colleague at Sotheby’s he hired Wasserman & Wise

(Wasserman firm) to prepare his returns. He dealt primarily with Larry

Wasserman, who signed the returns as the preparer. But Alan Kassel,

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[*3] an enrolled agent in the firm, did most of the actual return prepa-

ration for petitioner.

B. Petitioner’s Donations of Art

Shortly after assuming his position at Sotheby’s, petitioner began

donating works of African art to various museums. He claimed charita-

ble contribution deductions for these gifts, all of which were reported on

returns prepared by the Wasserman firm. These gifts included a work

valued at $60,000 in 2007, a work valued at $100,000 in 2009, and a

work valued at $5,000 in 2010.

In 2011, the tax year at issue, petitioner decided to make a sub-

stantial contribution to the Minneapolis Institute of Art (MIA) to honor

a colleague who was in poor health. The work he selected for donation

was a Dogon sculpture that he had acquired in Paris, allegedly for

$100,000, in 2003. (The Dogon people are indigenous to the central plat-

eau region of Mali, in West Africa.)

On December 6, 2011, petitioner donated the Dogon sculpture to

the MIA. He anticipated claiming a charitable contribution deduction

for this gift, and he received from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) an

automatic six-month extension of time, to October 15, 2012, to file his

2011 return. See § 6081(a). On June 7, 2012, he secured Mr. Kassel’s

assistance in requesting a Statement of Value (SOV) from the IRS with

respect to the Dogon sculpture. A taxpayer may request an SOV from

the IRS Art Appraisal Services (AAS) unit before filing the return on

which a gift of art is to be reported, hoping to receive assurance that the

IRS will accept the value as claimed. See I.R.S. Publication 561, Deter-

mining the Value of Donated Property 4 (Jan. 2022).

Mr. Kassel transmitted the SOV package to the AAS unit. This

package included a one-and-a-half page “appraisal” of the Dogon sculp-

ture by Michael Oliver, a New York dealer in African art, who valued

the work at $600,000. Mr. Oliver, who testified at trial, was not a certi-

fied appraiser in 2011 or at any time thereafter. He acknowledged that

this was the only FMV appraisal that he had ever done.

Mr. Kassel also included in the SOV package a substantially com-

plete Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions, reporting a

$600,000 value for the sculpture. This document included Mr. Oliver’s

signature and the signature of an MIA officer attesting to receipt of the

gift. Petitioner secured these signatures from Mr. Oliver and from the

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[*4] MIA officer. At no time did Mr. Kassel have any contact with Mr.

Oliver or with anyone at the MIA.

C. Petitioner’s 2011 Tax Return

Petitioner did not receive a response from the AAS unit before his

2011 return became due. The Wasserman firm accordingly prepared,

and petitioner filed on October 9, 2012, a return claiming a $600,000

deduction for his gift of the Dogon sculpture. Because that amount ex-

ceeded the maximum allowable as a deduction for 2011, see

§ 170(d)(1)(A), he claimed a $406,395 deduction for that year and carried

the balance forward.

Petitioner included with his return a partially completed Form

8283. When a taxpayer donates property (other than publicly traded

securities) valued in excess of $5,000, Form 8283 instructs the taxpayer

to include the following information on section B of the form: (1) a de-

scription of the donated property, (2) a brief summary of its physical

condition, (3) the appraised FMV of the property, (4) the date the prop-

erty was acquired by the donor, (5) the manner of acquisition, and (6) the

donor’s “cost or adjusted basis.” The instructions to Form 8283 state

that, “[i]f you have reasonable cause for not providing the information

. . . , attach an explanation so your deduction will not automatically be

disallowed.” Instructions for Form 8283, at 5 (Dec. 2006). Form 8283

advises the taxpayer that “[a]n appraisal is generally required for prop-

erty listed in Section B (see instructions)” and that “[i]n certain cases,

you must attach a qualified appraisal of the property. See instructions.”

The Form 8283 appended to petitioner’s 2011 return was missing

most of this information. The Dogon sculpture, for which a $600,000

value was claimed, was listed on section A of the form, where taxpayers

are instructed to report “Donated Property of $5,000 or Less and Certain

Publicly Traded Securities.” On the line calling for a “[d]escription of

donated property,” the words “SEE ATTACHED” appeared. But no such

attachment was included in the return. Section B of the form was left

entirely blank; petitioner thus supplied no information as to the acqui-

sition date or manner of acquisition, and he failed to supply a summary

of the sculpture’s physical condition. The signature lines, where the ap-

praiser and an MIA officer were supposed to affix their signatures, were

left blank. And petitioner did not attach to his return an appraisal of

the artwork as required by section 170(f)(11)(D) for gifts valued in excess

of $500,000.

5

[*5] There was conflicting testimony at trial about whether the Was-

serman firm sent the 2011 return to petitioner for execution and filing

or whether he visited the firm to sign it there. Petitioner testified that

he visited the firm and reviewed the return with Mr. Kassel. During

that review he allegedly noted, and questioned Mr. Kassel about, the

incomplete Form 8283 and the absence of an appraisal. According to

petitioner, Mr. Kassel advised that there was no need to include a com-

plete Form 8283 or appraisal with the return because “the IRS already

had it—or has it,” referring to the documents included with the June

2012 submission to the AAS unit. Mr. Kassel, who testified at trial, did

not corroborate petitioner’s testimony.

The IRS selected petitioner’s 2011 return for examination. Dur-

ing the examination an IRS staff appraiser determined that the FMV of

the Dogon sculpture was $250,000. The IRS issued petitioner a timely

notice of deficiency, asserting as its primary position that no deduction

was allowable because petitioner failed to satisfy the statutory and reg-

ulatory substantiation requirements for this gift. The notice asserted as

its secondary position that the allowable charitable contribution deduc-

tion should be reduced to $250,000. Calculating the tax on the basis of

this secondary position, the notice determined a deficiency of $95,081

and an accuracy-related penalty of $19,016. (The notice did not deter-

mine a deficiency or penalty on the basis of the IRS’s primary position.)

Respondent has conceded the accuracy-related penalty for inability to

show timely supervisory approval. See § 6751(b)(1).

D. Tax Court Proceedings

Petitioner timely petitioned this Court. On January 17, 2020, re-

spondent filed, and on February 11, 2020, we granted, a Motion for

Leave to File First Amendment to Answer. In his amended Answer re-

spondent asserts an increased deficiency, contending that the charitable

contribution deduction should be denied in its entirety because peti-

tioner failed to satisfy the substantiation requirements of section

170(f)(11) and Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13.

On January 21, 2020, respondent filed a Motion for Partial Sum-

mary Judgment seeking a ruling that petitioner failed to satisfy these

substantiation requirements. By Order served June 15, 2021, we

granted that Motion in part, finding that petitioner: (1) failed to obtain

a timely “qualified appraisal” of the Dogon sculpture, as required by

Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c)(3), (2) failed to attach to his 2011

return an appraisal of any kind, as required by section 170(f)(11)(D) for

6

[*6] gifts valued in excess of $500,000, and (3) failed to attach to his

return a fully completed Form 8283, as required by section 170(f)(11)(C)

and Treasury Regulation § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i)(B). Each of these failures

is independently sufficient to warrant disallowance of the deduction.

See § 170(f)(11)(A)(i). But we noted that petitioner might be allowed a

deduction despite these shortcomings if his failure to meet the substan-

tiation requirements was due to “reasonable cause and not to willful ne-

glect.” See § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II). We denied summary judgment on this

latter question and reserved it for trial, which we held on April 12, 2022.

OPINION

The IRS’s determinations in a notice of deficiency are generally

presumed correct. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). The

taxpayer bears the burden of proving entitlement to any deductions

claimed and of substantiating their amounts. Rule 142(a); Hradesky v.

Commissioner, 65 T.C. 87, 90 (1975), aff’d per curiam, 540 F.2d 821 (5th

Cir. 1976). However, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner

with respect to any “new matter” or “increase[] in deficiency.” Rule

142(a); see Turner v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 48, 50 (1977). Respondent

thus bears the burden of proof to the extent he seeks an increased defi-

ciency as asserted in his amended answer.

A. Underlying Principles

Section 170(a)(1) allows as a deduction any charitable contribu-

tion made within the taxable year. If the taxpayer donates property

other than money, the amount of the contribution is generally equal to

the FMV of the property at the time of the gift. See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-

1(c)(1). Where a contribution of property (other than publicly traded

securities) is valued in excess of $5,000, the taxpayer must “obtain[] a

qualified appraisal of such property.” § 170(f)(11)(C). A qualified ap-

praisal must be secured no later than the due date of the return, includ-

ing extensions. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A), (iv)(B).

A taxpayer claiming a noncash contribution valued in excess of

$5,000 must “attach[] to the return . . . such information regarding such

property and such appraisal as the Secretary may require.”

§ 170(f)(11)(C). The required information includes an appraisal sum-

mary (i.e., Form 8283) that must be included with “the return on which

such deduction is first claimed for such contribution.” Deficit Reduction

Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 155(a)(1)(B), 98 Stat. 494, 691; see

Costello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-87, 109 T.C.M. (CCH) 1441,

7

[*7] 1445; Jorgenson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-38, 79 T.C.M.

(CCH) 1444, 1450 (noting that the IRS has prescribed Form 8283 to be

used as the “appraisal summary”); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(2). Where

a contribution of property is valued in excess of $500,000, the taxpayer

must both obtain and attach to his return “a qualified appraisal of such

property.” § 170(f)(11)(D). Failure to comply with these requirements

generally precludes a deduction. See § 170(a)(1) (“A charitable contribu-

tion shall be allowable as a deduction only if verified under regulations

prescribed by the Secretary.”), § 170(f)(11)(A)(i) (providing that “no de-

duction shall be allowed” unless specified substantiation requirements

are met).

B. “Reasonable Cause” Exception

We ruled on summary judgment that petitioner had failed to sat-

isfy these substantiation requirements because he did not attach to his

2011 return either a fully completed Form 8283 or an appraisal of any

kind. Petitioner seeks to avoid disallowance of his deduction by relying

on section 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II), which provides that a deduction may be

allowed despite such a failure “if it is shown that the failure . . . is due

to reasonable cause and not to willful neglect.” See Oakhill Woods, LLC

v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2020-24, 119 T.C.M. (CCH) 1144, 1150–

51. We have construed section 170(f)(11)(A)(ii)(II) similarly to other

Code sections that provide for “reasonable cause” defenses. See ibid.;

Presley v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2018-171, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) 387,

402, aff’d, 790 F. App’x 914 (10th Cir. 2019); Crimi v. Commissioner,

T.C. Memo. 2013-51, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) 1330, 1353.

“Reasonable cause” requires a taxpayer to exercise ordinary busi-

ness care and prudence. See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241,

246 (1985); Presley, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) at 402. Whether a taxpayer had

reasonable cause is a fact-intensive inquiry that requires examination

of all the facts and circumstances. Presley, 116 T.C.M. (CCH) at 402;

Crimi, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1353. If a taxpayer alleges reliance on the

advice of an accountant, return preparer, or other tax professional, the

taxpayer must show that he “actually relied in good faith on the profes-

sional’s advice.” Crimi, 105 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1353; see Neonatology As-

socs., P.A. v. Commissioner, 115 T.C. 43, 98–99 (2000), aff’d, 299 F.3d

221 (3d Cir. 2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1) (requiring that the tax-

payer must have “reasonably relied in good faith on [the] advice”).

Petitioner contends that he received, and reasonably relied upon,

advice from Mr. Kassel that it was unnecessary to include either a

8

[*8] qualified appraisal or a fully completed Form 8283 with his 2011

return. We find no factual support for that contention. There is no cred-

ible evidence that Mr. Kassel gave petitioner any such advice. And if

Mr. Kassel did offer such advice, petitioner could not have reasonably

relied in good faith upon it. 2

1. Professional Advice

In determining whether petitioner relied in good faith on profes-

sional advice, we must first determine whether he actually received such

advice. See Neonatology, 115 T.C. at 99. We have defined advice as “any

communication, including the opinion of a professional tax adviser, set-

ting forth [an] analysis or conclusion . . . provided to (or for the benefit

of) the taxpayer.” Pankratz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-26, 121

T.C.M. (CCH) 1178, 1185 (quoting Treasury Regulation § 1.6664-

4(c)(2)). We look to see whether the taxpayer relied on the adviser’s

judgment. See Woodsum v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 585, 593 (2011). A

professional who simply prepares a return by inputting data without

exercising judgment is not considered to render “advice” that justifies

reasonable reliance. See Parker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-357,

104 T.C.M. (CCH) 823, 828.

We first must determine whether Mr. Kassel provided advice to

petitioner. Petitioner testified that he went to Mr. Kassel’s office, 3 re-

viewed the return before signing it, and questioned Mr. Kassel about the

absence of an appraisal and of a properly completed Form 8283. Accord-

ing to petitioner, Mr. Kassel advised him that these deficiencies were

immaterial “because the IRS already had” these items, referring to the

documents included in the June 2012 submission to the AAS unit.

Apart from petitioner’s testimony, the record contains no evidence

that he received professional advice directed to the statutory and the

regulatory reporting requirements. He supplied no evidence of any writ-

ten advice from Mr. Kassel or the Wasserman firm. Our resolution of

2 Although Mr. Wasserman signed the 2011 return as the “preparer,” he did

not testify at trial. Petitioner does not contend, and the record contains no evidence,

that Mr. Wasserman provided petitioner any affirmative advice regarding the matters

at issue here.

3 There was conflicting testimony about whether the Wasserman firm sent the

2011 return to petitioner for execution and filing or whether petitioner went to the

firm’s office. Petitioner testified that he did the latter, and we will assume arguendo

that he did.

9

[*9] this first question thus depends on the credibility of petitioner’s tes-

timony.

As the trier of fact, we observe a witness’s candor, sincerity, and

demeanor in order to evaluate the testimony and assign it appropriate

weight in determining disputed facts. Neonatology, 115 T.C. at 84. We

are not bound to accept a taxpayer’s self-serving and unverified asser-

tions. See Tokarski v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74, 77 (1986); Hradesky,

65 T.C. at 90. We find that petitioner’s testimony was unverified, self-

serving, and unreliable.

In this case Mr. Kassel was available to testify, and did testify, at

trial. But he did not corroborate, in any respect, petitioner’s testimony

about the alleged advice. And petitioner’s counsel asked no questions of

Mr. Kassel squarely directed to this point. The fact that petitioner did

not seek corroborative testimony from the person who might have sup-

plied it weighs against him. See Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436,

440–41 (1972); see also Verra v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1972-199, 31

T.C.M. (CCH) 996, 998–99, aff’d without published opinion, 474 F.2d

1336 (2d Cir. 1973).

Mr. Kassel could not recall the exact circumstances surrounding

preparation of petitioner’s 2011 return—not surprisingly, since those

events occurred 11 years previously. But Mr. Kassel did testify that he

would not have filed a tax return if he saw that it contained an incom-

plete Form 8283. On the basis of that testimony, we find it implausible

that Mr. Kassel would have advised petitioner to do the opposite. We

find it equally implausible that Mr. Kassel, having written “SEE

ATTACHMENT” on a tax return, would have advised petitioner that it

was appropriate to file a return lacking an attachment. And if petitioner

had (as he testified) brought the defective Form 8283 to Mr. Kassel’s

attention, we find it implausible that Mr. Kassel, an experienced return

preparer, would not have retrieved from his files the substantially com-

plete Form 8283 that he had previously submitted to the AAS unit.

Under these circumstances, we are not required to accept peti-

tioner’s self-serving testimony. See Tokarski, 87 T.C. at 77. There is no

credible evidence that Mr. Kassel affirmatively advised petitioner to file

a tax return that was defective on its face. The premise for petitioner’s

reliance-on-professional-advice defense—that he received advice justify-

ing reliance—thus collapses.

10

[*10] 2. Actual Reliance in Good Faith

Assuming arguendo that Mr. Kassel told petitioner that he need

not include either a fully completed Form 8283 or a qualified appraisal

with his 2011 return, we find no credible evidence that petitioner actu-

ally relied on such advice in good faith. A taxpayer who advances a re-

liance-on-professional-advice defense must establish that his “reliance

was reasonable.” See Atkinson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2015-236,

110 T.C.M. (CCH) 550, 563 (quoting Freytag v. Commissioner, 89 T.C.

849, 888 (1987), aff’d on another issue, 904 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1990),

aff’d, 501 U.S. 868 (1991)); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b)(1).

“Circumstances that may indicate reasonable cause and good

faith include an honest misunderstanding of fact or law that is reasona-

ble in light of all of the facts and circumstances, including the experi-

ence, knowledge, and education of the taxpayer.” Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-

4(b)(1). Petitioner is a highly educated and sophisticated individual,

with a law degree and five years of doctoral study. Beginning in 2007,

his position at Sotheby’s enabled him to gain considerable experience in

matters involving art appraisal at the highest levels. He may lack for-

mal training in U.S. tax law, but we find that he possesses a sharp and

sophisticated mind for business and dealings in fine art.

Of particular relevance to this case, petitioner was clearly famil-

iar with Form 8283 and the section 170(f)(11) reporting requirements.

He had made at least three prior tax-deductible contributions of African

art, including a work valued at $60,000 in 2007, a work valued at

$100,000 in 2009, and a work valued at $5,000 in 2010. He was required

to secure qualified appraisals for these donations, and he was required

to include (and presumably did include) a fully completed Form 8283

with each return. This was not ancient history but immediately pre-

ceded his 2011 gift.

Petitioner testified that he himself secured the signatures of Mr.

Oliver and the MIA officer on the Form 8283 for the Dogon sculpture

that was submitted to the AAS unit in June 2012. Mr. Kassel had no

contact with either of these parties. This further establishes that peti-

tioner was personally familiar with Form 8283 and its requirements.

We have consistently held that blind reliance on a return pre-

parer is not a defense. Rather, the taxpayer must personally review the

return and satisfy himself that it is accurate before signing and filing it.

See, e.g., Metra Chem Corp. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 654 (1987);

11

[*11] Bronson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-260, 84 T.C.M. (CCH)

447; Osborne v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2002-11, 83 T.C.M. (CCH)

1083; Bilzerian v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-187, 82 T.C.M.

(CCH) 295.

Petitioner knew that his 2011 return had to include a properly

completed Form 8283, duly signed by the appraiser and an MIA officer,

and that a qualified appraisal needed to be attached to the return.

Armed with this knowledge, petitioner could not have reasonably relied

on contrary advice from Mr. Kassel. Such reliance would exemplify

“willful blindness.” Cf. Jarnagin v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 368, 378

(2017) (rejecting taxpayers’ reasonable cause defense because failing to

read or pay attention to certain lines on their tax returns “constitute[d]

willful blindness to the . . . requirement[s]” (quoting United States v.

Williams, 489 F. App’x 655, 659 (4th Cir. 2012))).

Even if petitioner had not already been familiar with Form 8283

and its requirements, the defects were there in plain view. The Dogon

sculpture was listed (incongruously) in section A of the form, where tax-

payers are instructed to report donated property worth less than $5,000

and “certain publicly traded securities.” On the line calling for a

“[d]escription of donated property,” the words “SEE ATTACHED” ap-

peared, but there was no attachment. Section B of the form, where the

gift should have been reported, was left blank, including two gaping

blanks for signatures. Form 8283 explicitly says that “[a]n appraisal is

generally required for property listed in Section B,” but there was no

appraisal.

One does not need to be a tax expert to open his eyes and read

plain English. If petitioner had reviewed the Form 8283 as he testified,

it would have been obvious to him that it was defective in many respects.

We find it wholly implausible that a taxpayer as educated as petitioner,

having devoted almost a decade to the study of law, would have acqui-

esced in the notion that he could properly file a tax return obviously

lacking these required elements.

Taxpayers have a duty to review their returns before signing and

filing them, and the duty of filing accurate returns cannot be avoided by

placing responsibility on a tax return preparer. Metra Chem, 88 T.C.

at 662; Magill v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 465, 479–80 (1978), aff’d, 651

F.2d 1233 (6th Cir. 1981). We find it most likely that petitioner did not

review his 2011 return with any care at all. And if he did review it, he

could not have reasonably relied on advice from Mr. Kassel that the

12

[*12] return’s blatant errors and omissions were immaterial. See Chi-

arelli v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2021-27, 121 T.C.M. (CCH) 1188,

1193 (citing Metra Chem, 88 T.C. at 662).

To reflect the foregoing,

Decision will be entered under Rule 155.