Sheila A. Knepfle v. J & P Cycles, LLC

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[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-11996

____________________

SHEILA KNEPFLE,

Plaintiff-Appellant-

Cross Appellee,

versus

J-TECH CORPORATION,

a foreign corporation,

Defendant,

J & P CYCLES, LLC,

a foreign corporation,

LEMANS CORPORATION,

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-11996

a foreign corporation,

Defendants-Appellees,

HJC CORP.,

Defendant-Appellee-

Cross Appellant.

____________________

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

D.C. Docket No. 8:18-cv-00543-KKM-CPT

____________________

Before WILSON, BRANCH, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.

BRANCH, Circuit Judge:

Sheila Knepfle, a Florida citizen and resident, appeals from

the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a mixed

group of domestic and foreign corporations, (collectively, “the

defendants”), in a product liability action stemming from a

motorcycle accident and allegedly defective helmet. Knepfle

contends that the district court erroneously excluded the testimony

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21-11996 Opinion of the Court 3

of her expert witness, Dr. John D. Lloyd, after finding his testimony

based on novel and untested theories unreliable.

In the district court proceedings, defendant HJC

Corporation (“HJC”), a foreign corporation organized under the

laws of, and principally operating within, South Korea, moved

separately for summary judgment based on a lack of personal

jurisdiction. The district court denied this motion as moot, after

granting summary judgment to all the defendants on the merits.

HJC cross-appeals from the denial of its motion and maintains that

the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. According to

HJC, the district court erroneously conflated HJC with its domestic

subsidiary, HJC America, Inc. (“HJCA”), without conducting any

veil-piercing analysis or alter-ego analysis. Consequently, the

district court attributed HJCA’s marketing efforts to HJC and found

that the parent company had sufficient contacts with Florida to

allow Knepfle to hale it into federal court from across the world.

After careful review, and with the benefit of oral argument,

we conclude that the district court erred by failing to conduct a veil-

piercing or alter-ego analysis with respect to HJC and HJCA for

personal jurisdiction purposes. We agree with HJC that the district

court erred by failing to address HJC’s jurisdictional motion before

reaching the merits of the defendants’ summary judgment motion.

Accordingly, we REVERSE the district court’s denial of HJC’s

motion for summary judgment.

Moving to the merits, the district court properly excluded

Knepfle’s expert’s testimony pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence

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4 Opinion of the Court 21-11996

702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Co., 509 U.S.

579 (1993). To present his products liability theory, Dr. Lloyd

needed to demonstrate that he employed a reliable methodology

in determining that Knepfle was not wearing her helmet during her

secondary impact with the pavement, and, additionally, that the

straps holding the helmet in place could loosen during normal

usage. Not only did Lloyd fail to follow what he conceded were

generally accepted practices in his field—taking measurements that

would confirm or disprove his theory that Knepfle’s helmet flew

off during her accident—he also failed to conduct a single study of

the helmet’s double-D ring fastening system under real-world

conditions.

Because the district court properly excluded Lloyd’s

testimony, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the defendants.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 16, 2014, Knepfle, riding her Harley-Davidson

motorcycle, approached an intersection in Spring Hill, Florida. As

she pulled up, the driver of an oncoming Mazda turned left, and

Knepfle hit the vehicle’s side, vaulting her forward off of her bike.

The Z1R Nomad Sinister half-shell helmet she was wearing

protected her head as it impacted the Mazda’s front passenger side.

But according to Knepfle, before landing on the pavement, her

helmet came off, and her unprotected skull hit the pavement,

causing permanent injuries.

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Knepfle filed a products-liability action in Florida state court

alleging strict liability, negligence, and negligent performance

against LeMans Corporation (“LeMans”), a Wisconsin corporation

with its principal place of business in Wisconsin; J-Tech

Corporation (“J-Tech”), a Korean corporation with its principal

place of business in Korea; and J&P Cycles, LLC (“J&P”), a limited

liability company whose sole member, Motorsport Aftermarket

Group, Inc., is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of

business in California. LeMans timely removed the case to federal

court. In November 2018, Knepfle moved to file an amended

complaint, explaining that she did not know whether J-Tech or a

separate Korean corporation, HJC, manufactured her helmet, and

the district court granted her motion. Soon after, Knepfle filed her

First Amended Complaint in the United States District Court for

the Middle District of Florida, adding HJC as a defendant to the

lawsuit. According to Knepfle, the Z1R Nomad helmet “contained

a manufacturing or design defect wherein the helmet would not

stay securely on [her] head and would suddenly, and without

warning, fly off of her head during ordinary and foreseeable

use . . . .” Consequently, she maintained that her helmet flew off

in the time between her first and second impacts.

In May 2019, HJC moved to dismiss Knepfle’s suit against it

for lack of personal jurisdiction, explaining that, contrary to

Knepfle’s claims, HJC only conducted business overseas. The

district court denied the motion as well as HJC’s motion for

reconsideration of that order. It found that Knepfle pled facts

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-11996

sufficient to track the language of Florida’s long arm statute, and—

without distinguishing between HJC and its domestic subsidiary,

HJC America, Inc. (“HJCA”)—that personal jurisdiction over HJC

comported with due process because, through HJCA’s website,

HJC “purposefully availed itself of Florida[’s]” market.

Soon after, the defendants filed answers to Knepfle’s

complaint asserting multiple affirmative defenses, including a lack

of personal jurisdiction over HJC. At that point, Knepfle

voluntarily dismissed J-Tech, leaving HJC; J&P; Motorsport

Aftermarket Group, Inc.; and LeMans as defendants, and

proceeded to discovery.

Discovery revealed that Knepfle purchased the Z1R Nomad

helmet from a J&P store in Ormond Beach, Florida, in October

2009. J&P, an Iowa corporation with a principal place of business

in Texas, purchased the helmet from LeMans, a Wisconsin

company that, in relevant part, sells Z1R Nomad brand motorcycle

helmets as its private label brand. Although LeMans formulated

and owns the Z1R Nomad model name, HJC served as LeMans’s

designer and manufacturer for the helmet.

HJC is a South Korean corporation that primarily does

business in South Korea. It does not conduct business in Florida

and produced documentation and affidavits asserting that it does

not advertise its helmets in Florida or to Florida residents, much

less market the Z1R brand. Rather, pursuant to its business

practices, HJC sells all its helmets, whether private-label or HJC-

branded, to wholesale distributors, none of which are in Florida.

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HJC designed the Z1R Nomad helmet at issue in South Korea and

manufactured it at a plant in Beijing, China. However, a foreign

subsidiary of LeMans purchased and took possession of the helmet

overseas.

Notably, though, HJC’s domestic subsidiary, HJCA—

principally located in La Habra, California—operates a website

providing marketing and warranty information for HJC-branded

helmets but not for those manufactured under private labels.

Though HJCA does not sell HJC-branded helmets through its

website, it provides information about where to purchase them,

including at retailers in Florida. Nevertheless, HJCA has never

advertised the private label Z1R Nomad helmet on its website.

After discovery, Knepfle and the defendants each sought to

introduce expert testimony, and to exclude the testimony of the

other’s expert, respectively. Knepfle’s expert, Dr. John D. Lloyd,

sought to present his novel theory that the Z1R Nomad helmet’s

double D-ring fasteners—which rest on the side of the wearer’s

chin, rather than beneath it—make the helmet more prone to

losing tension than other types of helmet fasteners.

Commensurately, Lloyd planned to testify that he believed that the

D-rings on Knepfle’s Z1R Nomad helmet lost tension after her

initial impact with the Mazda, allowing the helmet to fly off before

she hit her head on the ground. In support, Lloyd intended to point

to his visual inspection of the accident, during which he saw no

visible damage to the rear of Knepfle’s helmet, which, in his view,

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indicated that it had not endured a secondary impact with the

pavement.

To confirm that suspicion, Lloyd inspected Knepfle’s Z1R

Nomad helmet and attended the defendants’ expert’s inspection of

it, too. Lloyd observed superficial impact marks on the rear of the

helmet, but, without providing any scientific basis, opined that

“[h]ad the helmet been on [Knepfle’s] head at the time of impact

the gouge marks [on the rear of the helmet] would have been more

substantial.” During the defendants’ expert’s inspection, Lloyd also

noticed visible compression of the helmet’s compression liner in

the upper front right quadrant without a corresponding fracture of

the helmet’s outer shell—which Lloyd attributed to the initial

impact with the Mazda—but did not see any visible compression

in the rear EPS liner.

Lloyd performed slightly more work on his design defect

theory. After measuring Knepfle’s head to confirm that the Z1R

Nomad helmet was the correct size, he asked her to put on the

helmet without adjusting the retainer strap. After Knepfle

complied, Lloyd noticed that the double D-rings rested against the

left side of her chin “in a near vertical orientation,” an observation

he subsequently confirmed on a dummy head. In his view, this

created a risk of loosening not present in a helmet that allows for

fastening under the chin. Based on data from a U.S. Army 1988

anthropometric survey, Lloyd determined that the Z1R Nomad

helmet’s left strap was too short: the Army data suggested a

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required length of between 132 and 138 millimeters, while the Z1R

Nomad helmet’s left strap measured only 102 millimeters.

Over a Zoom call with Knepfle’s counsel, Lloyd

demonstrated how the incorrect orientation of the retainer straps

could cause the helmet to fly off. Holding a demonstration helmet

upside down with the left side of the helmet on the opposite side

of the D-rings and pulling the retention strap lightly, Lloyd showed

how his theory could work. Next, following published testing

methods, Lloyd used a pendulum apparatus to determine the effect

of an impact at speeds from 13 to 35 mph on a dummy head

wearing a Department of Transportation-certified helmet as well

as one not wearing a helmet. Comparing the data, Lloyd came to

the unremarkable conclusion that a high-speed collision would

cause more damage to an unhelmeted head than a helmeted one.

He did not look into whether other accidents have occurred

because of double-D locking mechanisms or if other motorcycle

helmets have similar designs to the Z1R Nomad helmet.

In their motion to exclude Lloyd’s testimony, the defendants

argued that his proffered testimony fell short of Daubert and Rule

702 because he failed to perform any acceptable testing to

determine whether Knepfle’s Z1R Nomad helmet was in place

when she hit the ground. They further contended that Lloyd failed

to identify a single generally accepted test, peer-reviewed article,

or independent study that supported his opinion on the design

defect or his theory of events. The defendants also alleged that

Lloyd’s opinion rested on flawed and unreliable methodology.

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Specifically, they highlighted that, although Lloyd took

measurements of Knepfle’s Z1R Nomad helmet’s front protective

foam liner, he did not conduct any measurements on the rear liner,

and instead merely “eyeballed it.” Furthermore, the defendants

noted that Lloyd failed to look into whether other similar accidents

occurred with other types of D-ring fasteners. Finally, they

castigated Lloyd’s failure to test his design defect theory beyond a

simple “demonstration,” explaining that:

For his demonstration, [Lloyd] suspended a helmet

upside down (holding it by the retention straps) and

manipulated the straps and D-rings to create an angle

between the long and short straps. As the angle

neared or reached perpendicular, the tension on the

D-rings relaxed and allowed them to separate. Once

separated, the webbing of the long strap could pull

through the double D-rings.

According to the defendants, Lloyd’s demonstration bore little

relevance to Knepfle’s claims because it is impossible for the straps

of a tightened retention system to become perpendicular while the

helmet is fastened on a rider’s head. And, as a result, Lloyd’s

testimony would be little more than unreliable ipse dixit.

In response, Knepfle argued that Lloyd’s testimony satisfied

Daubert. First, she noted his qualifications: Lloyd served as a

senior researcher in biomechanics at the Department of Veterans

Affairs and as a director of the biomechanics laboratory and

traumatic brain injury research laboratory. Moreover, she

emphasized that Lloyd has presented on the biomechanics of head

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and brain injuries at scientific conferences, his work has appeared

in peer-reviewed journals, he regularly testifies on helmet design

defects in products-liability cases, and he was a co-investigator on

a National Institute of Health grant to develop a medical helmet

designed to mitigate the risk of head and brain injuries.

As for Lloyd’s methodology, Knepfle argued that Lloyd’s

testimony about the length of the Z1R Nomad helmet’s left side

strap was “based on the science of anthropometry, the science of

measurements[,] and proportions of the human body.” And,

because the greater the angle between the straps and the rings, the

greater the likelihood of the double D-rings loosening, Lloyd

planned to testify that an under-chin strap system would allow the

rings to remain parallel to the straps at all times and prevent the

incorrect orientation that ostensibly caused Knepfle’s Z1R Nomad

helmet to fly off.

During the Daubert hearing, Lloyd performed his Z1R

Nomad helmet demonstration for the district court. Again flipping

the helmet upside down and demonstrating how the straps would

feed when pulled in particular positions, Lloyd testified that the

Z1R Nomad helmet strap is too short, constituting a design defect

which, in turn, caused Knepfle’s injuries. He also showed the court

a video he had created to demonstrate the effects on a dummy

head. However, the video featured a dummy wearing a

motorcycle helmet with a retention system fastened underneath

the chin. The district court subsequently asked him whether he

performed the same test on a dummy with a fastening system like

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the Z1R Nomad helmet’s. He admitted that he had not. The

district court also asked him whether he had performed tests to

confirm his hypothesis about vertical straps, and Lloyd admitted

that he had not.

The district court granted the defendants’ motion to exclude

Lloyd’s testimony. At the outset, the district court recognized that

“[a]lthough Lloyd likely possesses the requisite qualifications to

testify,” it found his methodologies “unreliable,” noting that his

novel theory had never been independently tested or subjected to

peer review and that Lloyd failed to identify an error rate for the

methodology or to establish any general scientific acceptance of the

method. Rather, the district court noted that

no one has ever conducted a study of [Lloyd’s]

hypothesized design defect with the double D-rings

clasping mechanism—including Lloyd. He simply

theorizes that it is feasible that the rings would permit

the straps to loosen when perpendicular to the straps.

Yet, he offers no evidence (including physics

calculations) for support.

In addition to their motions in limine, the defendants also

filed a joint motion for summary judgment on the merits, pointing

out that Knepfle’s case could not survive without Dr. Lloyd’s

testimony to establish a genuine dispute of material fact on the

existence of a defect or causation. HJC also filed a separate motion

for summary judgment for want of personal jurisdiction, arguing

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that it undisputedly did not manufacture, sell, or otherwise direct

the product to Florida.

In a short, one-page response, Knepfle asserted, without

reasoning or citation, that:

1. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment is

wholly without merit.

2. There is no basis to strike Dr. Lloyd’s opinions

under Daubert.

3. Plaintiff filed a brief in opposition to Defendants’

Motion to Exclude Testimony and Opinions of

Dr. Lloyd on March 2, 2021. Plaintiff adopts and

incorporates that brief in opposition here, as the

arguments are basically the same.

4. Because there is no basis to strike Dr. Lloyd’s

opinions, Defendant’s [sic] Motion for Summary

Judgment must be denied.

The district court noted that, by failing to present any

argument as to why it should not grant summary judgment if it

excluded Dr. Lloyd’s testimony, Knepfle had waived any

opposition to the motion for summary judgment. It also

highlighted Knepfle’s counsel’s concession during the Daubert

hearing that Knepfle’s case turned entirely on Dr. Lloyd’s

testimony about the D-ring system. And, because the district court

had excluded Lloyd’s testimony as unreliable, the district court

granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the

merits.

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Having already granted the defendants’ joint motion for

summary judgment on the merits, the district court denied HJC’s

motion for summary judgment based on a lack of personal

jurisdiction as moot. Knepfle timely appealed, and HJC cross-

appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

Cognizant of our Article III responsibility to assure ourselves

of our jurisdiction before reaching the merits of a case, we start

with HJC’s personal jurisdiction claim. See Frank v. Gaos, --- U.S.

----, 139 S. Ct. 1041, 1046 (2019). We then address Knepfle’s

arguments concerning the exclusion of Dr. Lloyd’s testimony.

A. Personal Jurisdiction

In its cross-appeal, HJC argues that the district court erred

by denying its motion for summary judgment based on a lack of

personal jurisdiction because it conflated HJC, the foreign

manufacturer that exclusively conducts business overseas, with

HJCA, a domestic subsidiary tasked with marketing HJC portfolio

products, but not those manufactured under other firms’ private

labels, including the Z1R Nomad. Rather, according to HJC,

because it did not purposely avail itself of the Florida market,

neither Florida’s long-arm statute nor the Due Process Clause

permitted the district court to exercise personal jurisdiction over

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it. 1 HJC is correct and the district court committed jurisdictional

error.

We review de novo whether a district court properly

exercised personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.

Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1350 (11th

Cir. 2013).

“Federal courts ordinarily follow state law in determining

the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v.

Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A)).

To that end, we turn to Florida’s long-arm jurisdictional statute,

Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a), to determine whether the district court

properly exercised jurisdiction over HJC. We conclude that it did

not.

Pursuant to Florida’s long-arm statute, a nonresident

defendant submits to personal jurisdiction in Florida by:

[c]ausing injury to persons or property within

[Florida] arising out of an act or omission by the

defendant outside [Florida], if, at or about the time of

the injury . . . (b) [p]roducts, materials, or things

processed, serviced, or manufactured by the

defendant anywhere were used or consumed within

[Florida] in the ordinary course of commerce, trade,

or use.

1

Knepfle failed to file a brief in reply.

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Fla. Stat. § 48.193(1)(a)(6)(b). And, to determine whether personal

jurisdiction exists under § 48.193(1), Florida courts must conduct a

two-part inquiry, first asking whether the factual allegations bring

the plaintiff’s action within the ambit of the long-arm statute and,

second, if the facts implicate § 48.193(1), whether those facts

demonstrate sufficient “minimum contacts” to satisfy due process

requirements. See, e.g., Wendt v. Horowitz, 822 So. 2d 1252, 1257

(Fla. 2002). Simultaneously, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due

Process Clause limits a state’s power to exercise control over a

nonresident defendant. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283 (2014).

HJC maintains that the district court erred by concluding

that Florida’s long arm jurisdictional statute authorized it to hale

the Korean corporation into court based on HJCA’s marketing.

Further, it emphasizes that its interest in the Z1R Nomad helmet

ended over 7,500 miles away from Florida, when it sold the product

to a distributor in southeast Asia. Indeed, nothing in the record

establishes that HJC played any role, or took any interest, in the

fate of the helmet after HJC sold it. Despite recognizing this fact,

the district court exercised jurisdiction after noting that HJC knows

that retailers sell its helmets in 167 different retail locations in

Florida, and that HJC actively sought the benefit of the Florida

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market. 2 Simply put, the district court attributed HJCA’s

marketing efforts to its foreign parent, HJC.3

Florida provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction

over a nonresident parent corporation based on the actions or

omissions of its subsidiary entities as follows:

plaintiff may establish personal jurisdiction of [an]

upstream, nonresident parent in three ways. First,

the plaintiff may show that the non-Florida parent

company independently satisfies the test for

jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statutes.

Second, the plaintiff may establish facts that justify

piercing the corporate veil. Third, the plaintiff may

show that the parent exercises sufficient control over

the subsidiary to render the subsidiary an agent or

alter ego of the parent, thus establishing jurisdiction.

2

According to the district court, “HJC itself publishes a list of 167 retail

locations where its products can be purchased throughout Florida. Not only

does HJC specifically know its helmets will end up in Florida, but it actively

seeks the benefit of the Florida market.”

3

We note that Knepfle purchased the Z1R Nomad helmet from LeMans,

which sells the Z1R helmets as its private label brand. HJC manufactures both

private-label helmet brands for other companies, as well as its own HJC-

branded helmets, which are then sold to wholesale distributors. The

distinction between the Z1R-branded helmets, or other private label brands,

and the HJC-branded helmets does not affect our analysis because none of the

distributors with whom HJC conducts business are in Florida. The fact

remains that the district court improperly attributed, without addressing the

applicable standard under Florida law espoused in Schwartzberg, the actions

of HJCA to its nonresident parent corporation, HJC.

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However, [t]he amount of control exercised by the

parent must be high and very significant.

Schwartzberg v. Knobloch, 98 So. 3d 173, 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012)

(alteration in original) (internal citations, quotations, and footnote

omitted).

In its due process analysis, the district court, citing

exclusively to other district courts, explicitly attributed HJCA’s

domestic efforts to market HJC-branded helmets to HJC in order

to find that Knepfle properly pled sufficient facts to establish HJC’s

knowledge that the Z1R Nomad helmet would be directed to

Florida, a jurisdictional prerequisite under Florida’s long-arm

statute. See Aegis Def. Servs., LLC v. Gilbert, 222 So. 3d 656, 661

(Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (citing Schwartzberg, 98 So. 3d at 177). This

attribution was, according to Florida’s own interpretation of its

law, erroneous because Knepfle failed to make the requisite

showing to justify piercing the corporate veil or to demonstrate

that HJCA was an alter ego of HJC.

Specific jurisdiction under § 48.193(1) “requires a

connection or ‘connexity’ between the enumerated activity in

Florida and the cause of action.” Gilbert, 222 So. 3d at 661. In this

case, the district court found “connexity” between the sale of the

Z1R Nomad helmet and HJCA’s efforts to cultivate the Florida

market by publishing a list of retailers at which consumers could

purchase HJC-branded helmets. But, in Florida, when a plaintiff

seeks to assert specific personal jurisdiction against an out-of-state

parent corporation using its subsidiary’s efforts, she must either

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“establish facts that justify piercing the corporate veil” or “show

that the parent exercises sufficient control over the subsidiary to

render the subsidiary an agent or alter ego of the parent, thus

establishing jurisdiction.” 4 Schwartzberg, 98 So.3d at 182.

Knepfle, in her response to HJC’s motion to dismiss below,

emphasized the number of retailers in Florida selling HJC’s

products. Citing to HJCA’s website, she conflated HJCA with its

nonresident parent company and did not attempt to explain why

HJCA’s marketing efforts in Florida were sufficient to render it an

alter ego of HJC. Knepfle even acknowledged that HJCA

“promotes” HJC’s products in Florida but contended without

elaboration that “[i]t would be completely outrageous for HJC to

assert that it had no knowledge that its goods would be sold in

Florida[.]”5 However, without more, Knepfle has not

demonstrated that HJCA’s actions can be attributed to HJC for the

4

A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on general

or specific personal jurisdiction. General personal jurisdiction applies to a

corporation like HJC “when the corporation’s affiliations with the State in

which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive as to render [it] essentially

at home in the forum State.” Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 122 (quoting Goodyear

Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)). Because

Knepfle does not claim that HJC submits to general personal jurisdiction in

Florida, we concern ourselves only with the district court’s specific personal

jurisdiction over it.

5

Knepfle seemed to shy away from acknowledging the separateness of HJC’s

and HJCA’s corporate structures, referring to HJCA as HJC’s “North American

branch,” rather than as a subsidiary.

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purpose of exercising personal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-

arm statute. She failed to establish facts that justify piercing the

corporate veil or to show that HJC exercises sufficient control to

render HJCA its alter ego. Accordingly, under Florida law, HJCA’s

actions cannot establish the contacts necessary to hale HJC into

court under Florida’s long-arm statute. We therefore conclude

that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over HJC

and erred in denying HJC’s motion for summary judgment.

B. Evidentiary Challenges

Turning to the merits on appeal, Knepfle contends that the

district court abused its discretion by granting the defendants’ joint

motion to exclude Dr. Lloyd’s testimony, and, subsequently, erred

by granting their motion for summary judgment on her products-

liability claims. 6 While the district court, after a two-day Daubert

hearing, concluded that Dr. Lloyd qualified as an expert and that

his testimony could help the jury resolve complex scientific issues,

it also found Dr. Lloyd’s testimony inadmissible because it relied

on unreliable methodology. After examining the record, we find

that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr.

Lloyd’s testimony as unreliable.

6

Knepfle’s argument is best characterized by her counsel’s statement at oral

argument: “Dr. Lloyd used a whole lot of science,” which the district court

ignored during its Rule 702 analysis. In reality, however, the district court

listened to, and properly rejected, Dr. Lloyd’s “science.”

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We review a district court’s exclusion of expert testimony for

abuse of discretion. Seamon v. Remington Arms Co., LLC, 813

F.3d 983, 987 (11th Cir. 2016). “The considerable leeway accorded

to a district judge requires us to defer to the judge’s decision on

expert testimony, unless it is manifestly erroneous.” Chapman v.

Proctor & Gamble Distrib., LLC, 766 F.3d 1296, 1305 (11th Cir.

2014) (internal citations and quotation omitted).

In federal trials, district courts must act as “gatekeep[ers]” to

“ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted

is not only relevant, but reliable.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 & n.7.

Rule 702, which governs the admission of expert testimony,

permits a district court to admit expert opinion testimony if:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge,

skill, experience, training, or education may testify in

the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s

scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence

or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is

based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is

the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and

methods to the facts of the case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. Hence, pursuant to Rule 702, a district court

should determine the admissibility of expert testimony by

considering these three factors:

(1) the expert is qualified to testify competently

regarding the matters he intends to address; (2) the

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22 Opinion of the Court 21-11996

methodology by which the expert reaches his

conclusions is sufficiently reliable as determined by

the sort of inquiry mandated in Daubert; and (3) the

testimony assists the trier of fact, through the

application of scientific, technical, or specialized

expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine

a fact in issue.

City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th

Cir. 1998) (footnote omitted).

With respect to the first factor, an expert’s scientific training,

education, or field experience may qualify him to testify on certain

matters. See United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260–61 (11th

Cir. 2004).

However, reliability, the second factor, requires a more

thorough inquiry. To assess the reliability of an expert’s testimony,

courts consider: “(1) whether the expert’s theory can be and has

been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer

review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of

the particular scientific technique; and (4) whether the technique is

generally accepted in the scientific community.” Id. at 1262

(quotation omitted); see also Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526

U.S. 137, 150 (1999) (explaining that reliability requires a case-

specific inquiry). Although we commit decisions regarding an

expert’s reliability to the district court’s sound discretion, it may

not “make ultimate conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the

proffered evidence.” Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d

1190, 1193 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted).

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21-11996 Opinion of the Court 23

Finally, turning to the third factor, helpfulness, expert

testimony generally helps the trier of fact when the testimony

“concerns matters that are beyond the understanding of the

average lay person.” Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1262. “But nothing in

either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district

court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data

only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522

U.S. 136, 146 (1997). Rather, a “court may conclude that there is

simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion

proffered.” Id.; see also McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1299

(11th Cir. 2004) (“Under Daubert, scientific testimony does not

assist the trier of fact unless the testimony has a justified scientific

relationship to the pertinent facts.”).

Nevertheless, even the admission of expert testimony that

satisfies Daubert lies at the sound discretion of the district court.

Hughes v. Kia Motors Corp., 766 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2014).

Finally, the party seeking to introduce the expert at trial bears the

burden of establishing his qualifications, reliability, and

helpfulness. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260.

Knepfle predicated her products liability claim—and,

accordingly, her appeal—on two distinct but coterminous theories.

First, she argued that she had her helmet on for the first impact—

when the front of her head hit the car—but not the subsequent

one—when the back of her head collided with the pavement.

Second, Knepfle claimed that a design defect, the Z1R Nomad’s

double-D fastening system, allowed the helmet to come loose

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24 Opinion of the Court 21-11996

while she was mid-air—which would not occur if the helmet

fastened underneath the wearer’s chin. Because the district court

excluded Dr. Lloyd’s testimony with respect to both theories, and

Knepfle appeals the exclusion of both parts of his testimony, we

address each in turn.

i. Reliability of an “eyeballing” inspection for helmet liner

compression

Starting with Dr. Lloyd’s testimony about helmet liner

compression, or lack thereof, the district court found Dr. Lloyd’s

methodology unreliable. Contrary to Knepfle’s assertion that

visual inspections are generally acceptable means of testing liner

compression, the district court pointed to Lloyd’s own testimony

that the industry standard requires practitioners to use calipers or

3D scanning technology, and that a compression to the liner could

exist that cannot be seen by the naked eye. On appeal, Knepfle

contends that the district court misinterpreted Lloyd’s testimony:

rather than saying that his colleagues would find mere visual

inspections unscientific, she maintains that Lloyd said that experts

in the field reserve measurement for compression visible to the

naked eye. And, in Knepfle’s view, Lloyd’s methodology was

reliable because it focused on “relevant compression (i.e., clearly

visible compression).” 7 We disagree.

7

Knepfle does not offer any explanation as to why only visible compression

would be relevant. She merely states that the district court glossed over the

“vital” distinction in Lloyd’s methodology between visible compression and

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21-11996 Opinion of the Court 25

We start by dispensing with Knepfle’s claim that the district

court misconstrued Dr. Lloyd’s testimony about the general

acceptance of his “eyeballing” method. Despite her contentions on

appeal, our review of the record confirms the district court’s

interpretation. During the Daubert hearing, the district court

asked Lloyd how “other scientists or experts” measure liner

compression, and whether “they do a visual inspection alone, [or if

it is] standard practice to measure.” Lloyd responded that other

experts use “[c]alipers typically. [And that] [m]ore recently, the

[3D] scanning has come into play.”

However, despite Lloyd’s acknowledgment that experts in

the field “typically” use calipers and, sometimes, 3D scanning to

measure liner compression (rather than visual inspection alone),

Knepfle asks the fact-finder to take Lloyd at his word that

“eyeballing” the rear compression liner is a generally accepted

method of determining force of impact without additional

measuring. Knepfle argues that the district court’s “failure to

recognize” the thrust of Lloyd’s testimony—that he did not need

to proceed past a visual inspection—amounts to abuse of

discretion. However, Knepfle has put forth no evidence that visual

inspection alone is a generally accepted methodology. The district

compression “not visible to the naked eye.” Rather, Knepfle quotes Lloyd’s

hearing testimony in which he claimed that there was “no evidence of impact

to the rear” of the helmet, pointing only to eyewitness testimony, rather than

any sort of inspection, measurement, or evaluation of the helmet he

conducted.

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26 Opinion of the Court 21-11996

court did not abuse its discretion in declining to take Lloyd at his

word.

Not only do Daubert and its progeny not require the district

court to admit expert opinions based on the ipse dixit of the expert,

Lloyd applied his methodology inconsistently. Lloyd followed the

generally accepted methodology to assess the size of the liner

compression in the front portion of Knepfle’s helmet but chose not

to follow the same methodology for the rear of Knepfle’s helmet.

Thus, on one hand, Lloyd implicitly conceded needing to collect

measurements to verify that the only conspicuous liner

compression in the front came from a high-force impact but not to

determine whether there was any non-conspicuous compression

stemming from relatively weaker, but still significant, secondary

impacts. 8 Indeed, rather than taking measurements to exclude

alternative theories, Lloyd’s methodology seems to focus only on

obtaining evidence that confirms a predetermined theory.

Instead of providing any evidence that other experts accept

visual inspections or showing that her second impact would

necessarily result in visible liner compression, Knepfle’s entire

claim distills to the contentions that Lloyd is an expert, he looked

at the available evidence, and deduced what happened. Quite

simply, Knepfle relies on Lloyd’s unreliable ipse dixit. But “nothing

in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a

8

Importantly, Lloyd testified that it would be possible for compression of the

liner not to be visible to the naked eye.

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21-11996 Opinion of the Court 27

district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to

existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.” Joiner, 552 U.S.

at 146.

Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion

by finding that Dr. Lloyd’s methodology concerning the helmet

liner compression was unreliable.

ii. Design Defect Theories

With respect to the district court’s exclusion of Lloyd’s design

defect testimony, we disagree with Knepfle that the district court

abused its discretion. As with Lloyd’s “eyeballing” test for liner

compression, the district court found that Knepfle failed to provide

any evidence that his methodology concerning helmet strap

failure—which involved flipping an empty helmet upside down

and manipulating the straps—is generally accepted, let alone

reliable. Yet on appeal Knepfle contends that the district court

erred in its application of Daubert because defendants’ expert could

not point to any peer-reviewed studies that disprove Lloyd’s theory

about helmet straps.

Knepfle misunderstands her burden of proof under Daubert.

She bears the burden of proving that Lloyd’s opinions are reliable,

and the district court properly identified this burden. See Frazier,

387 F.3d at 1260. It is not the job of defendants’ expert, or of the

district court for that matter, to prove her expert wrong.

Accordingly, on abuse of discretion review of Daubert rulings, we

must “defer to the judge’s decision on expert testimony, unless it is

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28 Opinion of the Court 21-11996

manifestly erroneous.” Chapman, 776 F.3d at 1305 (quotation

omitted). We focus our inquiry not on whether Lloyd’s theories

were correct, but only on whether the district court properly

evaluated Lloyd’s testimony for reliability under the Federal Rules

of Evidence and Daubert. We conclude that it did.

Again, Lloyd presented no evidence establishing the general

acceptance of flipping an empty helmet upside down and manually

manipulating the straps to establish the performance of that helmet

under real-world conditions. The district court properly concluded

that Lloyd needed to show that his methodology could stand on its

own, and Knepfle fails to show that the district court’s decision was

manifestly erroneous. Granted, Lloyd reliably demonstrated that

helmet straps, free of any friction or resistance that a person’s head

would normally provide, may reach certain angles that render the

Z1R Nomad’s double D-ring system deficient. But he failed to

show that the conditions necessary for the locking mechanism to

fail can occur in real-world situations, saying nothing of Knepfle’s

specific case.

Because Knepfle could not show that the district court’s

decision was manifestly erroneous, we hold that it did not abuse its

discretion in excluding Dr. Lloyd’s testimony.

C. Summary Judgment

Finally, we briefly address Knepfle’s claim that the district

court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the

remaining defendants. After excluding Dr. Lloyd’s testimony, the

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21-11996 Opinion of the Court 29

district court determined that Knepfle failed to identify any

material disputes of fact regarding the existence of a design defect

in the Z1R Nomad helmet or the defendants’ role in causing her

injuries under her strict liability, negligence, and negligent failure

to warn claims. 9 As a result, it granted the defendants’ motion for

summary judgment. We affirm.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary

judgment. Amy v. Carnival Corp., 961 F.3d 1303, 1308 (11th Cir.

2020). A district court should grant summary judgment when the

movant “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Hughes, 766 F.3d at 1331. The party seeking

summary judgment may accomplish this by establishing “that

there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s

case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).

To assert a claim under Florida law for a product defect,

“whether the claim is for negligence or strict liability, a plaintiff

must show ‘(1) that a defect was present in the product; (2) that it

caused the injuries complained of; and (3) that it existed at the time

the retailer or supplier parted possession with the product.’”

Lesnik v. Duval Ford, LLC, 185 So. 3d 577, 581 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)

9

We need not address Knepfle’s general negligence claims against the

remaining defendants because they all rely on, and fail for the lack of, the

existence of a design defect.

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30 Opinion of the Court 21-11996

(quoting Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA

1981)).

Without Dr. Lloyd’s testimony, nothing in the record

supports Knepfle’s claim that the Z1R Nomad helmet was

defectively designed or manufactured. Knepfle also set forth no

argument below as to why the district court should not grant

defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Accordingly, the

district court properly granted the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment on Knepfle’s strict liability and negligence

claims. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.

III. CONCLUSION

Because the district court improperly exercised personal

jurisdiction over HJC, we reverse its denial of HJC’s motion for

summary judgment.

We affirm the district court’s grant of the defendants’

motion to exclude Knepfle’s expert’s testimony because she fails to

demonstrate that the district court’s decision was manifestly

erroneous. Because the district court properly excluded Knepfle’s

expert’s testimony, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary

judgment in favor of the defendants.

REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.